limited authority doctrine in Illinois

2020Id. ¶ 15 Shortly thereafter, we reiterated that “the limited-authority doctrine is applicable to private residences.” People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 253 (1993).

2020To support her argument, defendant cites a phrase from People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 254 (1993), wherein our supreme court stated, “the giving of conflicting instructions, one of which is a correct statement of law and the other an incorrect statement of law, is not harmless error.” In Bush, however, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with a non-IPI instruction concerning the limited-authority doctrine that misstated the law.

2020OPINION ¶1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified the following question of law to this court: “Whether, and if so under what circumstances, the limited-authority doctrine[ 1] applies to [Illinois’s] residential 1 The limited authority doctrine provides that the “authority to enter a building for a specific lawful purpose is vitiated when the wrongdoer departs from that purpose and commits a felony or theft.” People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 376 (1993). burglary statute, 720 ILCS 5/19-3.” We answer the certified question in the affirmative, holding that the limi

2020Defendant admitted helping B.B. remove property from the house, once the two woke up in the morning. ¶ 10 The State’s closing argument emphasized the limited authority doctrine outlined in People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374 , 614 N.E.2d 1227 (1993), which provides that defendant had limited authority to be in Suarez’s home but taking property from the house negated that authority.

2020Id. ¶ 15 Shortly thereafter, we reiterated that “the limited-authority doctrine is applicable to private residences.” People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 253 (1993).

2011See People v. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d 422, 487-88 , 186 Ill.Dec. 341 , 616 N.E.2d 294 (1993) (noting that a defendant who intends to commit a crime in the dwelling place of another and is allowed to enter that home enters without authorization, as a defendant's criminal actions vitiate the consent given to the defendant). ¶ 19 Given our resolution of this appeal, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the trial court was correct in finding that the limited-authority doctrine applies to defendants charged with residential burglary by remaining without authority.

2020In Bush, our supreme court described the limited authority doctrine as, “when a defendant comes to a private residence and is invited in by the occupant, the authorization to enter is limited and *** criminal actions exceed this limited authority.” Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 253 ; see also People v. Priest, 297 Ill.

2020App. 3d 797, 805 , 698 N.E.2d 223, 229 (1998) (“The limited authority doctrine provides that when a defendant is invited into a private residence by an occupant, the authorization to enter is limited.”).

2021See People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 199 (2005) (because the legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of previous judicial decisions, a newly enacted statute will generally not be construed to change settled law unless its terms clearly require such a construction).

2019See People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 199 (2005) (because the legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of previous judicial decisions, a newly enacted statute will generally not be construed to change settled law unless its terms clearly require such a construction).

2021When the legislature does not address by way of amendment a judicial construction of a statute by this court, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation (People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶ 27 ), and such a construction becomes as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it (People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 286, 293-94 (2009)). ¶ 33 Finally, we note that defendant makes a broad and vague argument that the legislature did not intend for the limited authority doctrine to apply to an unauthorized-entry burglary involving retail stores following the ena

2019When the legislature does not address by way of amendment a judicial construction of a statute by this court, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation (People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶ 27 ), and such a construction becomes as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it (People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 286, 293-94 (2009)). ¶ 33 Finally, we note that defendant makes a broad and vague argument that the legislature did not intend for the limited authority doctrine to apply to an unauthorized-entry burglary involving retail stores following the ena

2021See Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶ 24 . ¶ 27 Bradford’s refusal to apply the limited authority doctrine to remaining cases also rested on the recognition that one who innocently enters a store and later commits a theft inside necessarily formed the intent to steal while in the store.

2021Id. (citing Marcisz v. Marcisz, 65 Ill. 2d 206, 210 (1976).” Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶ 26 . ¶ 45 We agree with the analyses of Moore and Burlington and reject the rationale of the instant appellate court decision. ¶ 46 CONCLUSION ¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in its analysis of the limited-authority doctrine and in holding as a matter of law that there was not sufficient evidence to support the element of the burglary statute that requires a defendant’s entry to be “without authority.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

2021People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319 (1985). ¶ 35 As noted, the limited authority doctrine underlying defendant’s conviction for burglary was well settled by the time the retail theft statute was enacted, and nothing in the retail theft statute indicates a legislative intent to abrogate the doctrine with respect to burglaries motivated by the desire to shoplift.

2019People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319 (1985). ¶ 35 As noted, the limited authority doctrine underlying defendant’s conviction for burglary was well settled by the time the retail theft statute was enacted, and nothing in the retail theft statute indicates a legislative intent to abrogate the doctrine with respect to burglaries motivated by the desire to shoplift.

2021Id. (citing Marcisz v. Marcisz, 65 Ill. 2d 206, 210 (1976).” Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶ 26 . ¶ 45 We agree with the analyses of Moore and Burlington and reject the rationale of the instant appellate court decision. ¶ 46 CONCLUSION ¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in its analysis of the limited-authority doctrine and in holding as a matter of law that there was not sufficient evidence to support the element of the burglary statute that requires a defendant’s entry to be “without authority.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

2019Id. (citing Marcisz v. Marcisz, 65 Ill. 2d 206, 210 (1976).” Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶ 26 . ¶ 45 We agree with the analyses of Moore and Burlington and reject the rationale of the instant appellate court decision. ¶ 46 CONCLUSION ¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in its analysis of the limited-authority doctrine and in holding as a matter law that there was not sufficient evidence to support the element of the burglary statute that requires a defendant’s entry to be “without authority.” Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

2011See People v. Nash, 173 Ill.2d 423, 432 , 220 Ill.Dec. 154 , 672 N.E.2d 1166 (1996) (court may affirm on any basis the record supports). ¶ 20 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed. ¶ 21 Affirmed.

2011See People v. Nash, 173 Ill.2d 423, 432 , 220 Ill.Dec. 154 , 672 N.E.2d 1166 (1996) (court may affirm on any basis the record supports). ¶ 20 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed. ¶ 21 Affirmed.

2010See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 219 (1989) (specific objections waive all grounds not specified).

2010See People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 219 (1989) (specific objections waive all grounds not specified).

2021Although the defendant testified that he had entered the laundromat because his companion wanted to use the telephone, other evidence—including the fact that there was an available telephone outside, that neither defendant nor his companion had laundry, and that they were in possession of keys that opened the laundromat’s vending machine—sufficed to establish that the defendant entered the laundromat with the intent to steal and thus entered “without authority.” Id. ¶ 18 In the case at bar, the appellate court found that the limited authority doctrine set forth in Weaver did not apply because

2021And we remand the cause to that court for it to address the remaining issues that it did not reach, including whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant had the requisite intent to commit a theft upon his entrance to the store. ¶ 48 Appellate court judgment reversed. ¶ 49 Circuit court judgment affirmed. ¶ 50 Cause remanded with directions. - 13 - ¶ 51 JUSTICE THEIS, dissenting: ¶ 52 At issue is whether a person who enters a retail establishment during regular business hours, remains within areas of the store that are open to the public, and shoplifts $77 worth of children

2018Courts should not interpret criminal statutes to provide prosecutors unbridled discretion to arbitrarily charge some shoplifters with Class 2 felony burglary and others with Class A misdemeanor retail theft under similar circumstances; " 'prosecutorial discretion is not a reason for *295 courts to give improbable breadth to criminal statutes.' " Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc. , 566 U.S. 624 , 633, 132 S.Ct. 2034 , 182 L.Ed.2d 955 (2012) (quoting Abuelhawa v. United States , 556 U.S. 816 , 823 n. 3, 129 S.Ct. 2102 , 173 L.Ed.2d 982 (2009) ). ¶ 31 Another reason not to "give improbable breadth"

2018Courts should not interpret criminal statutes to provide prosecutors unbridled discretion to arbitrarily charge some shoplifters with Class 2 felony burglary and others with Class A misdemeanor retail theft under similar circumstances; " 'prosecutorial discretion is not a reason for *295 courts to give improbable breadth to criminal statutes.' " Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc. , 566 U.S. 624 , 633, 132 S.Ct. 2034 , 182 L.Ed.2d 955 (2012) (quoting Abuelhawa v. United States , 556 U.S. 816 , 823 n. 3, 129 S.Ct. 2102 , 173 L.Ed.2d 982 (2009) ). ¶ 31 Another reason not to "give improbable breadth"

2018People v. Bradford, 2014 IL App (4th) 130288, ¶¶ 31, 33-34 .

2018People v. Bradford , 2014 IL App (4th) 130288 , ¶¶ 31, 33-34, 386 Ill.Dec. 834 , 21 N.E.3d 753 .

2024United States v. Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 14 .

2024Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶¶ 17, 22 . ¶ 48 Thus, the guilty findings on counts XII, XIV, and XV cannot stand, as we have already found the evidence was insufficient to prove that Shaffer entered West’s dwelling without authority and reverse Shaffer’s conviction on count XI, into which those counts merged, on that basis.

2020For instance, in People v. Blair, 52 Ill. 2d 371, 374 (1972), we upheld the defendants’ convictions for burglary when they entered a car wash “with admitted intent to commit a theft.” Most recently, in -4- Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 , we reaffirmed the limited authority doctrine’s applicability to retail establishments.

2020For instance, in People v. Blair, 52 Ill. 2d 371, 374 (1972), we upheld the defendants’ convictions for burglary when they entered a car wash “with admitted intent to commit a theft.” Most recently, in -4- Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 , we reaffirmed the limited authority doctrine’s applicability to retail establishments.

2020We observed that, if the “defendant had the intent to commit a theft when he entered the Walmart, then, under Weaver, it must necessarily follow that his entry was ‘without authority’ within the meaning of section 19-1(a) of the burglary statute.” Id. ¶ 19; see also People v. Gharrett, 2016 IL App (4th) 140315, ¶¶ 53-55 (citing Weaver in affirming the defendant’s burglary conviction for entering a private office within a public facility with the intent to commit theft); People ex rel.

2020“We assume not only that the General Assembly acts with full knowledge of previous judicial decisions, but also that its silence on this issue in the face of decisions consistent with those previous decisions indicates its acquiescence to them.” In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶ 25 . ¶ 11 This court first applied the limited authority doctrine to Illinois’s burglary statute in People v. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d 434 (1968).

2020See Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶ 25 .