postconviction evidentiary hearing in Minnesota

2014Id. at 734 ; see also Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn.2002); cf. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 514-15, 520 (Minn.2012) (remanding for a postconviction evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party affidavits stating that an alleged alternative perpetrator had confessed to committing the crime).

2014Id. at 734 ; see also Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. 2002); cf. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 514-15, 520 (Minn. 2012) (remanding for a postconviction evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party affidavits stating that an alleged alternative perpetrator had confessed to committing the crime).

2024In making this decision, “a postconviction court considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “[I]f material facts are in dispute which have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction and which must be resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits, the court must schedule an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

2015“We review the denial of a postconviction evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion,” Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 786 (Minn. 2013), but resolve any doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing in favor of the petitioner, State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Minn. 2013).

2014Id. at 734 ; see also Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn.2002); cf. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 514-15, 520 (Minn.2012) (remanding for a postconviction evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party affidavits stating that an alleged alternative perpetrator had confessed to committing the crime).

2014Id. at 734 ; see also Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. 2002); cf. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 514-15, 520 (Minn. 2012) (remanding for a postconviction evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party affidavits stating that an alleged alternative perpetrator had confessed to committing the crime).

2014Similarly, in Op-sahl v. State, we remanded for an eviden-tiary hearing based, in part, on “affidavits of individuals who claim[ed] to have heard certain state witnesses recant trial testimony.” Opsahl v. State (Opsahl I), 677 N.W.2d 414, 419, 424 (Minn.2004).

2014Similarly, in Opsahl v. State, we remanded for an evidentiary hearing based, in part, on “affidavits of individuals who claim[ed] to have heard certain state witnesses recant trial testimony.” Opsahl v. State (Opsahl I), 677 N.W.2d 414, 419, 424 (Minn. 2004).

2014Id. at 734 ; see also Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn.2002); cf. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 514-15, 520 (Minn.2012) (remanding for a postconviction evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party affidavits stating that an alleged alternative perpetrator had confessed to committing the crime).

2014Id. at 734 ; see also Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 446 (Minn. 2002); cf. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 514-15, 520 (Minn. 2012) (remanding for a postconviction evidentiary hearing based on newly discovered evidence in the form of third-party affidavits stating that an alleged alternative perpetrator had confessed to committing the crime).

2015Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 786 (Minn. 12 2013).

2015“We review the denial of a postconviction evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion,” Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 786 (Minn. 2013), but resolve any doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing in favor of the petitioner, State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 504 (Minn. 2013).

2019But "[a] petitioner's burden of proof for a postconviction evidentiary hearing is lower than his burden for a new trial." Id.

2010Mindful that Ferguson’s “burden of proof for a postconviction evidentiary hearing is lower than his burden for a new trial” and that doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing “should be resolved in favor of granting the hearing,” Wilson, 726 N.W.2d at 107 , we hold that the postconviction court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before it determined whether Ferguson met the first prong of the Larrison test.

2017Although “doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing are resolved in favor of the petitioner,” “a postconviction evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.” Rhodes, 875 N.W.2d at 786 .

2016An appellate court “review[s] a denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as the denial of an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion.” Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016).

2026See State v. Ezeka, 16 N.W.2d at 779–80.

2026See Zornes, 880 N.W.2d at 371 .

2025Moreover, the new evidence that Ezeka presented does not satisfy the fourth element of Rainer or Warren. 11 As to Ezeka’s claim that he had a right to use a postconviction evidentiary hearing as a means of deposing the MDHR and DOJ investigators to determine whether there was information that might cure the acknowledged deficiencies in his equal protection claim, we have previously held that the postconviction remedy provided under Minnesota statutes was “not devised . . . to permit a petitioner to embark upon unlimited and undefined discovery proceedings.” Thompson v. State, 170 N.W.2d 101, 1

2024In making this decision, “a postconviction court considers the facts alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “[I]f material facts are in dispute which have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction and which must be resolved in order to determine the issues raised on the merits, the court must schedule an evidentiary hearing.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 506 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

2023“An alternative approach to appealing directly is for a defendant to seek a postconviction evidentiary hearing and prove at that hearing that even though the record made at the time he entered the guilty plea was adequate, he is still entitled to withdraw his plea because the plea was made involuntarily . . . .” Brown, 449 N.W.2d at 183 ; see also Minn. R.

2023“An alternative approach to appealing directly is for a defendant to seek a postconviction evidentiary hearing and prove at that hearing that even though the record made at the time he entered the guilty plea was adequate, he is still entitled to withdraw his plea because the plea was made involuntarily . . . .” Brown, 449 N.W.2d at 183; see also Minn. R.

2017See State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994) (remanding for a postcon-viction hearing where record was insufficient to determine whether guilty plea was involuntary, requiring plea withdrawal).

2016See State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Minn.2003) (“Due process requires that every defendant be ‘afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (quoting State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.1992))), accord U.S. Const. amend.

2016See State v. Richardson, 670 N.W.2d 267, 277 (Minn.2003) (“Due process requires that every defendant be ‘afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (quoting State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.1992))), accord U.S. Const. amend.

2015State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266 (Minn. 2014).

2015We first consider McKenzie’s contention that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated because the State substantially interfered with his witnesses’ decisions about whether to testify at the postconviction hearing. 2 Although we have considered claims that a government actor interfered with a defense witness before or during a criminal trial, see, kg., State v. Graham, 764 N.W.2d 340, 348-50 (Minn.2009), we have never considered a claim that a government actor interfered with a witness before or during a postconviction evidentiary hearing. 3 *871 In this case, we need not dec

2015The postconviction court denied Wayne’s petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that his claim was time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01 and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).

2015The postconviction court denied Wayne’s petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that his claim was time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 590.01 and procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252 , 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).

2013We have recognized that “any felony conviction is probative of a witness’s credibility,” State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis omitted), and Hooper does not argue that L.J.’s prior convictions were inadmissible at the hearing.

2013Although Larrison has been overruled, see United States v. Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir.2004), Minnesota continues to apply the Larrison test to claims of witness recantation.

2008A petitioner who asserts that he is entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence must show that: (1) the evidence was not known to him or his counsel at the time of trial; (2) the failure to learn of the new evidence was not because of a lack of diligence; (3) “the evidence is material (or as we have sometimes said, is not impeaching, cumulative or doubtful)”; and (4) the evidence will probably produce an acquittal at a retrial or a more favorable result for the [petitioner], Pippitt, 737 N.W.2d at 226 (quoting Race v. State, 417 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn.1987)). *517 The burden of p