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35 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Columbus v. Aleshiregreen2 sentences2013Thus, “[t]he defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results, although he may not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels.” State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984); Columbus v. Aleshire, 187 Ohio App.3d 660 , 2010- Ohio-2773, 933 N.E.2d 317, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (“while [supreme court precedent] permits evidentiary objections to the test results challenging issues such as competency, 8 admissibility, relevancy, authenticity, and credibility, it does not 2013Thus, “[t]he defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results, although he may not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels.” State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984); Columbus v. Aleshire, 187 Ohio App.3d 660 , 2010- Ohio-2773, 933 N.E.2d 317, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.) (“while [supreme court precedent] permits evidentiary objections to the test results challenging issues such as competency, 8 admissibility, relevancy, authenticity, and credibility, it does not | 7 | 8 |
City of Columbus v. Daygreen2 sentences2006See, also, Tanner, supra ("[a] defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results, although he may not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels"), and Whitehall v. Weese (Oct. 17, 1995), Franklin App. No. 95APC02-169 ("while a defendant `may not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood-alcohol levels, he may challenge the accuracy of his specific test result.'" Id., quoting Columbus v. Day 2003Thus, a defendant "may challenge the accuracy of his specific test result through the use of expert testimony to show that he could not have produced the test result {¶ 30} claimed by the prosecution under those circumstances." Columbus v. Day (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 173 , 493 N.E.2d 1002 , syllabus. | 4 | 10 |
State v. Tannergreen2 sentences2014Id. at 187, fn. 2. {¶24} Nonetheless, in State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984), we recognized that although an accused may not challenge the general accuracy and scientific reliability of the test procedure selected by ODH, the accused “may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results.” Tanner concerned the constitutionality of a former version of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) that established a per se offense for driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration. 2014Id. at 187, fn. 2. {¶24} Nonetheless, in State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984), we recognized that although an accused may not challenge the general accuracy and scientific reliability of the test procedure selected by ODH, the accused “may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results.” Tanner concerned the constitutionality of a former version of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) that established a per se offense for driving with a prohibited blood-alcohol concentration. | 2 | 25 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2014R. 702 and violates the confrontation and compulsive process clauses of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” [Brief at 8.] The Eleventh District Court of Appeals was recently faced with a similar argument when a defendant argued that Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), required courts to assess the reliability of scientific evidence as a prerequisite to admissibility. 2014R. 702 and violates the confrontation and compulsive process clauses of the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” [Brief at 8.] The Eleventh District Court of Appeals was recently faced with a similar argument when a defendant argued that Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), required courts to assess the reliability of scientific evidence as a prerequisite to admissibility. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. French
green
2 sentences2013Thus, “[t]he defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results, although he may not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels.” State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984); French, 72 Ohio St.3d at 451-452 , 650 N.E.2d 887 . {¶21} In addition to attacks on the specific performance of a particular breath test in an individual defendant’s case, a defendant may also make an attack on the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 based on specific reasons, as opposed 2013Thus, “[t]he defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results, although he may not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels.” State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 6 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984); French, 72 Ohio St.3d at 451-452 , 650 N.E.2d 887 . {¶21} In addition to attacks on the specific performance of a particular breath test in an individual defendant’s case, a defendant may also make an attack on the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 based on specific reasons, as opposed | 7 | 2013–2013 |
City of Columbus v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1990State v. Tanner (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 1 ; Columbus v. Sullivan (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 7 . 1985State v. Tanner (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 1, at 6 ; Columbus v. Sullivan (1982), 4 Ohio App. 3d 7, at 10 ; State v. Grimes (Dec. 30, 1980), Franklin App. No. 80AP-651, unreported, at page 6. | 2 | 1985–1990 |
City of Columbus v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2014The court upheld the statute and explained that it did not impose a *28 conclusive presumption of guilt, because the accused could challenge the accuracy of his test results and “[t]he jury may consider those specific test results, and all other relevant evidence, in ascertaining whether the state has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has violated the statute.” Id. {¶ 25} Similarly, in Columbus v. Taylor, 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 163 , 529 N.E.2d 1382 (1988), we noted that “[i]t is well-established that a defendant may challenge the accuracy of his specific test results.” (Emphasis 2014The court upheld the statute and explained that it did not impose a *28 conclusive presumption of guilt, because the accused could challenge the accuracy of his test results and “[t]he jury may consider those specific test results, and all other relevant evidence, in ascertaining whether the state has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has violated the statute.” Id. {¶ 25} Similarly, in Columbus v. Taylor, 39 Ohio St.3d 162, 163 , 529 N.E.2d 1382 (1988), we noted that “[i]t is well-established that a defendant may challenge the accuracy of his specific test results.” (Emphasis | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Lucarelli
green
1 sentence2014A defendant’s due process rights are further protected because “[a] defendant may also challenge the accuracy of his specific test results at trial and with evidence going to the weight accorded the test results.” Id. {¶ 18} Zanni also contends that “[t]o the extent that Vega is construed to create an irrebuttable presumption of ‘general reliability’, it now usurps the trial court’s function under Ohio Evid. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Vega
green
1 sentence2013The court in Tanner held: “[t]he defendant may still challenge the accuracy of his specific test results, although he may not challenge the general accuracy of the legislatively determined test procedure as a valid scientific means of determining blood alcohol levels.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 6 . {¶25} In the years following Vega, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed its teaching. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Yoder
green
1 sentence2013For example, in 1993, the Supreme Court in Yoder, supra, stated: “The Director of Health, not the court, was delegated the discretionary authority for adoption 7 of breath testing devices and the procedures for their use. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Boyd
green
2 sentences1991This kind of evidence is always relevant and admissible under the holding in State v. Boyd (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 30 , 18 OBR 68, 479 N.E.2d 850 . 1991This kind of evidence is always relevant and admissible under the holding in State v. Boyd (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 30 , 18 OBR 68, 479 N.E.2d 850 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.