fact-sensitive analysis in New Jersey

2026Super. at 471.] "[A] judicial declaration that a defendant poses a threat to the public health, safety[,] or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis." State v. Cordoma, 372 N.J.

2025Although "a judicial declaration that a defendant poses a threat to the public health, safety or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis," State v. Cordoma, 372 N.J.

2024II. "[A] judicial declaration that a defendant poses a threat to the public health, safety[,] or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis." F.M., 225 N.J. at 505 (quoting State v. Cordoma, 372 N.J.

2024A-4015-21 18 "[A] judicial declaration that a defendant poses a threat to the public health, safety or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis." F.M., 225 N.J. 487 at 505 (quoting Cordoma, 372 N.J.

2021We must affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." [Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] "A judge's sentencing analysis is a fact-sensitive inquiry, which must be based on consideration of all the competent and cred

2021"A judge's sentencing analysis is a fact-sensitive inquiry, which must be based on consideration of all the competent and credible evidence raised by the parties at sentencing." State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 116 (2014).

2026"Probable cause is a well-grounded suspicion that a criminal offense has been or is being committed." State v. Hammer, 346 N.J.

2026"Probable cause is a well-grounded suspicion that a criminal offense has been or is being committed." State v. Hammer, 346 N.J.

2016Because “a judicial declaration that a defendant poses a threat to the public health, safety or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis,” Cordoma, supra, 372 N.J.Super, at 535, 859 A.2d 756 , “an appellate court should accept a trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial credible evidence.” In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-17 , 693 A.2d 92 *506 (1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607 , 560 A.2d 655 (1989)).

2016Because “a judicial declaration that a defendant poses a threat to the public health, safety or welfare involves, by necessity, a fact-sensitive analysis,” Cordoma, supra, 372 N.J.Super, at 535, 859 A.2d 756 , “an appellate court should accept a trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial credible evidence.” In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-17 , 693 A.2d 92 *506 (1997) (citing Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, 115 N.J. 599, 607 , 560 A.2d 655 (1989)).

2019We have repeatedly observed that determinations of admissibility under N.J.R.E. 401 and 403 are "fact-specific evaluation[s] of the evidence in the setting of the individual case." State v. Cole , 229 N.J. 430 , 448-49, 163 A.3d 302 (2017) ; see also State v. Nantambu , 221 N.J. 390 , 395, 113 A.3d 1186 (2015) ("[T]he decision whether to admit a recording into evidence is a highly fact-sensitive analysis ...."); State v. Cotto , 182 N.J. 316 , 333, 865 A.2d 660 (2005) (stating that ruling on admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt "requires a fact-sensitive inquiry").

2019We have repeatedly observed that determinations of admissibility under N.J.R.E. 401 and 403 are "fact-specific evaluation[s] of the evidence in the setting of the individual case." State v. Cole , 229 N.J. 430 , 448-49, 163 A.3d 302 (2017) ; see also State v. Nantambu , 221 N.J. 390 , 395, 113 A.3d 1186 (2015) ("[T]he decision whether to admit a recording into evidence is a highly fact-sensitive analysis ...."); State v. Cotto , 182 N.J. 316 , 333, 865 A.2d 660 (2005) (stating that ruling on admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt "requires a fact-sensitive inquiry").

2026"The defense of unconscionability, specifically, calls for a fact-sensitive analysis in each case, even when a contract of adhesion is involved." Ibid.

2024Id. at 15-16; Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 39 (2006).

2020Whether a nonprofit entity "actually conducts its affairs consistent with its stated purpose often requires a fact-sensitive inquiry." Ibid. (quoting Kuchera v. Jersey Shore Family Health Ctr., 221 N.J. 239, 252 (2015)).

2019"Whether a nonprofit entity, whose certificate of incorporation and by-laws provide that it is organized exclusively for charitable, religious, educational, or hospital purposes, actually conducts its affairs consistent with its stated purpose often requires a fact-sensitive inquiry." Kuchera v. Jersey Shore Family Health Ctr., 221 N.J. 239, 252 (2015).

2018See State v. Fajardo-Santos , 199 N.J. 520 , 531, 533-34, 973 A.2d 933 (2009) (stating that a trial court "engage[s] in a fact-sensitive analysis in setting bail" and noting our Court "us[ed] [an] abuse of discretion standard to review [the] fact-sensitive determination whether to remit forfeited bail" in State v. Ventura , 196 N.J. 203 , 206, 952 A.2d 1049 (2008) ); State v. Korecky , 169 N.J. 364 , 373, 777 A.2d 927 (2001) ("The imposition of a bail condition is a matter of judicial discretion."); State v. Johnson , 61 N.J. 351 , 364, 294 A.2d 245 (1972) (noting that "bail liberty is a matte

2018See State v. Fajardo-Santos , 199 N.J. 520 , 531, 533-34, 973 A.2d 933 (2009) (stating that a trial court "engage[s] in a fact-sensitive analysis in setting bail" and noting our Court "us[ed] [an] abuse of discretion standard to review [the] fact-sensitive determination whether to remit forfeited bail" in State v. Ventura , 196 N.J. 203 , 206, 952 A.2d 1049 (2008) ); State v. Korecky , 169 N.J. 364 , 373, 777 A.2d 927 (2001) ("The imposition of a bail condition is a matter of judicial discretion."); State v. Johnson , 61 N.J. 351 , 364, 294 A.2d 245 (1972) (noting that "bail liberty is a matte

2026The determination of whether a claimant's reasons for leaving a job are "personal or work-related" is "a fact-sensitive analysis." Utley, 194 N.J. at 550 ; see also Haley v. Bd. of Rev., 245 N.J. 511 , 523 (2021).

2021In our analysis, we recognized that notwithstanding N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)’s provision that “lack of transportation” “shall be reviewed as a voluntarily leaving work issue,” resolution of whether Utley left his job for good cause attributab le to work “called for a fact-sensitive analysis.” Id. at 550 .

2020Here, however, we are charged with analyzing the issues under Title Nine, where our primary concern is the "safety of . . . children," and "not the culpability of parental conduct." A.L., 213 N.J. at 18 , and where courts must "engage in a fact-sensitive analysis" based on competent evidence and cannot "fill[] in missing information." See R.W., 438 N.J.

2017Rather than "filling in missing 14 A-0156-15T4 information, an understandable response by judges who regularly witness the evils inflicted on children by their parents' drug use, judges must engage in a fact-sensitive analysis turning on 'particularized evidence.'" Id. at 470 (quoting A.L., supra, 213 N.J. at 28 ).

2025Courts must engage in "a fact-sensitive analysis to ensure that the congruity of facts, and not merely similar legal theories, governs whether an attorney ethically may act adverse to a former client." Ibid. "[T]he analysis 'turn[s] on the identification of any particular confidence[s] having been revealed.'" Dental Health Assocs., 471 N.J.

2025A-2047-22 25 For purposes of deciding motions for recusal under this rule, matters are "substantially related" if: (1) [T]he lawyer for whom disqualification is sought received confidential information from the former client that can be used against that client in the subsequent representation of parties adverse to the former client, or (2) facts relevant to the prior representation are both relevant and material to the subsequent representation. [City of Atlantic City v. Trupos, 201 N.J. 447, 452 (2010).] The Trupos Court adopted this test to "protect[] otherwise privileged communications" be

2018Super. at 17 -18 (quoting Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J.

2017Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543 . "[T]he essential inquiry is whether the child has moved 'beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.'" Filippone, supra, 304 N.J.

2025Whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes "is a fact-sensitive inquiry" and "[t]he critical determinant of custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, A-1624-22 58 and other such factors." Ahmad, 246 N.J. at 611 (quoting State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997)). "[T]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the pa

2025"Whether an individual is 'in custody' for purposes A-1977-23 5 of administering Miranda warnings is a fact sensitive inquiry." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 , 611 (2021) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 266 (2015)).

2024Guided by OPRA’s plain language and our prior case law construing that language, and assuming the truth of the ACLU’s factual allegations in accordance with Rule 4:6-2(e), we consider the ACLU’s argument that CPANJ is a public agency as defined by N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. 3 We conduct a fact- sensitive inquiry, “look[ing] behind the technical form” of the entity at issue “to consider its substantive attributes.” Paff v. State Firemen’s Ass’n, 431 N.J.

2024Finally, the majority correctly notes that in determining whether an entity is a “public agency” under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1’s “broad” definition, we “conduct a fact-sensitive inquiry, ‘look[ing] behind the technical form’ of the entity at issue ‘to consider its substantive attributes.’” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 21) (quoting Paff v. State Firemen’s Ass’n, 431 N.J.

2021We must affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." [Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] "A judge's sentencing analysis is a fact-sensitive inquiry, which must be based on consideration of all the competent and cred

2019We must determine whether: A-2068-16T2 17 (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." [Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Roth, 95 N.J. at 364-65 ).] "A judge's sentencing analysis is a fact-sensitive inquiry, which must be based on consideration of all the competent and credible evidence raised by the

2020Here, however, we are charged with analyzing the issues under Title Nine, where our primary concern is the "safety of . . . children," and "not the culpability of parental conduct." A.L., 213 N.J. at 18 , and where courts must "engage in a fact-sensitive analysis" based on competent evidence and cannot "fill[] in missing information." See R.W., 438 N.J.

2017"Instead of filling in missing 12 A-1084-15T1 information, an understandable response by judges who regularly witness the evils inflicted on children by their parents' drug use, judges must engage in a fact-sensitive analysis turning on 'particularized evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.

2018See State v. Fajardo-Santos , 199 N.J. 520 , 531, 533-34, 973 A.2d 933 (2009) (stating that a trial court "engage[s] in a fact-sensitive analysis in setting bail" and noting our Court "us[ed] [an] abuse of discretion standard to review [the] fact-sensitive determination whether to remit forfeited bail" in State v. Ventura , 196 N.J. 203 , 206, 952 A.2d 1049 (2008) ); State v. Korecky , 169 N.J. 364 , 373, 777 A.2d 927 (2001) ("The imposition of a bail condition is a matter of judicial discretion."); State v. Johnson , 61 N.J. 351 , 364, 294 A.2d 245 (1972) (noting that "bail liberty is a matte

2018See State v. Fajardo-Santos , 199 N.J. 520 , 531, 533-34, 973 A.2d 933 (2009) (stating that a trial court "engage[s] in a fact-sensitive analysis in setting bail" and noting our Court "us[ed] [an] abuse of discretion standard to review [the] fact-sensitive determination whether to remit forfeited bail" in State v. Ventura , 196 N.J. 203 , 206, 952 A.2d 1049 (2008) ); State v. Korecky , 169 N.J. 364 , 373, 777 A.2d 927 (2001) ("The imposition of a bail condition is a matter of judicial discretion."); State v. Johnson , 61 N.J. 351 , 364, 294 A.2d 245 (1972) (noting that "bail liberty is a matte

2021Unlike other jurisdictions, emancipation in New Jersey is a fact sensitive inquiry, Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543 , and concerns whether a child remains financially dependent on a parent or moved beyond their parent's "sphere of influence." Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J.

2018Super. at 17 . 2 "Whether a child is emancipated at age [eighteen], with the correlative termination of the right to parental support," requires a fact-sensitive inquiry, Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543 , to determine if "the child has moved 'beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.'" Dolce, 383 N.J.

2025In light of our general policy against entertaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal, State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459-60 (1992), and our preference for hearing such claims in post-conviction proceedings, ibid., we find it necessary to vacate the order under review and remand this matter to the Law Division to undertake the fact-sensitive analysis required by Barker. [Chen (App. Div. Feb. 1, 2022), slip op. at 3-4.] 1 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972) 2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) A-2168-23 3 Fu

2024In January 2020, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, but remanded to the motion judge to carefully scrutinize the time between defendant's arrest and trial and to undertake the fact-sensitive analysis required under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2025In Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, our Supreme Court stated, [t]he defense of unconscionability, specifically, calls for a fact-sensitive analysis in each case, even when a contract of adhesion is involved. [Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15-16 ].

2025In Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, our Supreme Court stated, [t]he defense of unconscionability, specifically, calls for a fact-sensitive analysis in each case, even when a contract of adhesion is involved. [Muhammad, 189 N.J. at 15-16 ].

2003"Indeed, the very notion of substantial compliance requires a fact-sensitive analysis involving the assessment of all of the idiosyncratic details of a case to determine whether `reasonable effectuation of the statute's purpose' has occurred." Galik, supra, 167 N.J. at 356, 771 A. 2d 1141 (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 236 , 708 A. 2d 401 (1998)).

2003"Indeed, the very notion of substantial compliance requires a fact-sensitive analysis involving the assessment of all of the idiosyncratic details of a case to determine whether `reasonable effectuation of the statute's purpose' has occurred." Galik, supra, 167 N.J. at 356, 771 A. 2d 1141 (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 236 , 708 A. 2d 401 (1998)).