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17 California opinions name it 3 courts 2011–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc.green2 sentences2022This was the case in Tanguilig, where this court held that a plaintiff who chose to add a co-plaintiff subject to an arbitration agreement could have diligently proceeded to trial of her claims during a 351-day period of claimed impossibility while her co-plaintiff’s claims were sent to arbitration. ( Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 327–329.) As the California Supreme Court explained before Gaines, the section 583.340(c) inquiry “requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable di 2021If in fact the fraud cause of action has been eliminated, the trial court will have no need to reconsider the motion to dismiss on remand. 18 circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves. [Citations.] The critical factor in applying these exceptions to a given factual situation is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her case.’ [Citations.] A plaintiff’s reasonable diligence alone does not preclude involuntary dismissal; it is simply one factor for assessing the existing ex | 5 | 12 |
Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Storesgreen2 sentences2021If in fact the fraud cause of action has been eliminated, the trial court will have no need to reconsider the motion to dismiss on remand. 18 circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves. [Citations.] The critical factor in applying these exceptions to a given factual situation is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting his or her case.’ [Citations.] A plaintiff’s reasonable diligence alone does not preclude involuntary dismissal; it is simply one factor for assessing the existing ex 2020Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.’ (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438 .)” (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 731 .) 7 C. | 5 | 6 |
Hattersley v. American Nucleonics Corp.green2 sentences2018Determining whether the [section 583.340,] subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' ... ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " 'excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the *324 circumstances of the particular case.' " ( Bruns , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 , italics and citations omitted.) " '[S]o long as the c 2018Determining whether the [section 583.340,] subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' ... ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " 'excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the *324 circumstances of the particular case.' " ( Bruns , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 , italics and citations omitted.) " '[S]o long as the c | 4 | 4 |
De Santiago v. D AND G PLUMBING, INC.green2 sentences2018Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' [Citation.] ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " ' excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the circumstances of a particular case.' " ( Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717 , 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 ( Bruns ); see also Howard v. Thrifty Drug & D 2018Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' [Citation.] ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " ' excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the circumstances of a particular case.' " ( Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717 , 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 ( Bruns ); see also Howard v. Thrifty Drug & D | 3 | 3 |
Brunzell Construction Co. v. Wagnergreen2 sentences2021Co. v. Wagner (1970) 2 Cal.3d 545, 554 , fns. omitted; accord, Dowling v. Farmers Ins. 2018The only 13 PAGA claims stayed by Judge Kramer’s order were those of ‘all persons subject to the arbitration agreement’ but not, as I have said, PAGA claims of either Pinela or Tanguilig.”].) Under Bruns, Judge Karnow’s task was to “determine what [was] impossible, impracticable, or futile ‘in light of all the circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves. [Citations.] The critical factor in applying [section 583.340] to a given factual situation is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecu | 2 | 3 |
Sanchez v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2014(See De Santiago v. D and G Plumbing, Inc. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 365, 371 [failure to bring case to trial].) “Where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, we are not authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. [Citation.] 15 Reversible abuse exists only if there is no reasonable basis for the trial court’s action, so that the trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason. [Citations.]” (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271 .) Hills hardly demonstrates such abuse here. 2013Instead, the trial court was to consider whether, in light of all of the circumstances of the case, the 2008 stay rendered it impossible, impracticable, or futile for plaintiff to bring the case to trial within five years. 6 (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 (Sanchez).) The court could reasonably conclude the stay had no such effect. | 1 | 2 |
Sierra-Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011(Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532-1533 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ].) “ ‘[E]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in making the computation.’ [Citation.]” (Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 464, 472 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 50 ].) “Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the cont 2011(Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532-1533 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ].) “ ‘[E]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in making the computation.’ [Citation.]” (Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 464, 472 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 50 ].) “Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the cont | 1 | 1 |
Baccus v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2011(Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532-1533 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ].) “ ‘[E]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in making the computation.’ [Citation.]” (Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 464, 472 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 50 ].) “Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the cont 2011(Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532-1533 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 781 ].) “ ‘[E]very period of time during which the plaintiff does not have it within his power to bring the case to trial is not to be excluded in making the computation.’ [Citation.]” (Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 464, 472 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 50 ].) “Time consumed by the delay caused by ordinary incidents of proceedings, like disposition of demurrer, amendment of pleadings, and the normal time of waiting for a place on the court’s calendar are not within the cont | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chin v. Meier
green
2 sentences2018Determining whether the [section 583.340,] subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' ... ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " 'excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the *324 circumstances of the particular case.' " ( Bruns , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 , italics and citations omitted.) " '[S]o long as the c 2018Determining whether the [section 583.340,] subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' ... ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " 'excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the *324 circumstances of the particular case.' " ( Bruns , supra , 51 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 , italics and citations omitted.) " '[S]o long as the c | 4 | 2016–2018 |
Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.
green
2 sentences2016(Kasel, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 725 .) That principle dictates a fact-sensitive inquiry into the party’s activities relating to the defective product, with due attention to the policies underlying the doctrine of strict liability. 2015(Kasel, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 725 .) That principle dictates a fact-sensitive inquiry into the party’s activities relating to the defective product, with due attention to the policies underlying the doctrine of strict liability. | 3 | 2015–2016 |
Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2018Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' [Citation.] ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " ' excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the circumstances of a particular case.' " ( Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717 , 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 ( Bruns ); see also Howard v. Thrifty Drug & D 2018Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends 'on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.' [Citation.] ' "[I]mpracticability and futility" involve a determination of " ' excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,' " in light of all the circumstances of a particular case.' " ( Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc . (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717 , 730-731, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 ( Bruns ); see also Howard v. Thrifty Drug & D | 2 | 2018–2022 |
Mesler v. Bragg Management Company
green
2 sentences2016(Mesler, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 991 .) And the appellant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a clear abuse of discretion. 2016(Mesler, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 991 .) And the appellant bears the burden of affirmatively establishing a clear abuse of discretion. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Sagi Plumbing v. Chartered Construction Corp.
green
2 sentences2016Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and 10 the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[I]mpracticability and futility” involve a determination of “ ‘excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,’ ” in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.’ ” ( Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, italics omitted.) “ ‘[S]o long as the court may conclude that there was a period of impossibility, impract 2016Determining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and 10 the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[I]mpracticability and futility” involve a determination of “ ‘excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,’ ” in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.’ ” ( Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 730-731, italics omitted.) “ ‘[S]o long as the court may conclude that there was a period of impossibility, impract | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Martinez v. Landry's Rests., Inc.
green
1 sentence2022(See Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 323 .) Gaines applied the diligence requirement in this fashion, considering whether a mediation stay made it impossible or impracticable to bring an action to trial by examining whether 31 the plaintiff was reasonably diligent in seeking to lift the stay and set a trial date before the five-year deadline. ( Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1103–1104.) Likewise, Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pages 324, 327–328 and Martinez v. Landry’s Restaurants, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 783 , 795 considered plaintiffs’ actions only during the period in whic | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc.
green
2 sentences2022This was the case in Tanguilig, where this court held that a plaintiff who chose to add a co-plaintiff subject to an arbitration agreement could have diligently proceeded to trial of her claims during a 351-day period of claimed impossibility while her co-plaintiff’s claims were sent to arbitration. ( Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 327–329.) As the California Supreme Court explained before Gaines, the section 583.340(c) inquiry “requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends ‘on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable di 2022(See Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 323 .) Gaines applied the diligence requirement in this fashion, considering whether a mediation stay made it impossible or impracticable to bring an action to trial by examining whether 31 the plaintiff was reasonably diligent in seeking to lift the stay and set a trial date before the five-year deadline. ( Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 1103–1104.) Likewise, Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pages 324, 327–328 and Martinez v. Landry’s Restaurants, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 783 , 795 considered plaintiffs’ actions only during the period in whic | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Tamburina v. Combined Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2018Co. of America (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 323 , 328, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 175 .) We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's determination not to exclude periods during which plaintiffs contend it was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring the action to trial within the meaning of section 583.340, subdivision (c). ( Gaines , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 1100 & fn. 8, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 137 , 365 P.3d 904 [the abuse of discretion standard "has long been applied in this context"]; Bruns , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 731 , 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 ["[t]he trial court has discretion to det 2018Co. of America (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 323 , 328, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 175 .) We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's determination not to exclude periods during which plaintiffs contend it was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring the action to trial within the meaning of section 583.340, subdivision (c). ( Gaines , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 1100 & fn. 8, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 137 , 365 P.3d 904 [the abuse of discretion standard "has long been applied in this context"]; Bruns , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 731 , 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 248 P.3d 1185 ["[t]he trial court has discretion to det | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Martinez v. Joe's Crab Shack Holdings
green
2 sentences2018Because the period of tolling resulting from the appeal in Joe’s Crab Shack II, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th 362 ended on February 26, 2015, less than six months before July 7, 2015, the trial court ruled pursuant section 583.350 that the Martinez parties had six months from February 26, 2015—that is, until August 26, 2015—to bring the action to trial. 14 particular case.’” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 730-731 (Bruns); see also Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438 .) The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the circumstances justifying ap 2018Because the period of tolling resulting from the appeal in Joe’s Crab Shack II, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th 362 ended on February 26, 2015, less than six months before July 7, 2015, the trial court ruled pursuant section 583.350 that the Martinez parties had six months from February 26, 2015—that is, until August 26, 2015—to bring the action to trial. 14 particular case.’” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 730-731 (Bruns); see also Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438 .) The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the circumstances justifying ap | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood
green
2 sentences2016CEQA review was not intended to be only an afterthought to project approval, but neither was it intended to place unneeded obstacles in the path of project formulation and development.” (Save Tara, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 130-132, 134-137, fns. omitted.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court promoted a fact-sensitive inquiry: “Desirable . . . as a bright-line rule defining when an approval occurs might be, neither of those proposed . . . is consistent with CEQA’s interpretation and policy foundation. 2016Instead, we apply the general principle that before conducting CEQA review, agencies must not ‘take any action’ that significantly furthers a project ‘in a manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily be part of CEQA review of that public project.’ [Citations.] “In applying this principle to conditional development agreements, courts should look not only to the terms of the agreement but to the surrounding circumstances to determine whether, as a practical matter, the agency has committed itself to the project as a whole or to any particular features, so as | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.