fact-sensitive inquiry in Indiana

2018Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002). [12] In order to evaluate Hodge’s claim, it would be necessary to evaluate the evidence adduced at trial to determine if his convictions were so closely related in time, place, and circumstance that they constituted a single episode of criminal conduct.

2018“Whether certain offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct is a fact-sensitive inquiry to be determined by the trial court.” Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002).

2013Id. (citing State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied).

2010State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

2014Sitts v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2014Sitts v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2019Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. [21] A person commits the offense of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by fleeing from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, identified himself and ordered the person to stop.

2019Chavez v. State , 988 N.E.2d 1226 , 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2012“This is not surprising in light of the fact that it is recognized that the determination of whether there are sufficient grounds for piercing the corporate veil ordinarily should not be disposed of by summary judgment, in view of the complex economic questions often involved, especially if fraud is alleged.” Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d at 565 ; see also Ziese, 965 N.E.2d at 719 (“[P]iercing the corporate veil is a fact-sensitive inquiry rendering summary judgment appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances.”).

2012Id. at 570 .

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2004"Whether the officer's suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the cirenmstances." Id.

2019Rutledge v. State, 28 N.E.3d 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2016Rutledge v. State, 28 N.E.3d 281, 291 (Ind.Ct.App.2015).

2026Parker v. State, 196 N.E.3d 244 , 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting State v. Lefevers, 844 N.E.2d 508, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans. denied. [8] Whether an officer’s suspicion was reasonable is a fact-sensitive inquiry that is determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the circumstances.

2019Assessor v. SPD Realty, LLC, 9 N.E.3d 773, 777 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014) (explaining that determining whether an exemption applies is a fact- sensitive inquiry); Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (indicating that each assessment year, and thus each exemption request, stands alone), review denied. 14

2019Assessor v. SPD Realty, LLC, 9 N.E.3d 773, 777 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014) (explaining that determining whether an exemption applies is a fact- sensitive inquiry); Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (indicating that each assessment year, and thus each exemption request, stands alone), review denied. 14

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2019“Reasonable Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2090 | August 13, 2019 Page 6 of 11 suspicion entails some minimum level of objective justification for making a stop; something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). [14] Here, Officer Parker had reasonable suspicion to detain Overton in the alley, after seeing him walk away from the truck, based on the other information he had learned from dispatch and Office

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2017See Estate of Weitzman, 724 N.E.2d at 1124 .

2017Because the determination of whether certain offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct “is a fact-sensitive inquiry,” Slone v. State, 11 N.E.3d 969, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), the State concludes that we cannot say that trial counsel was ineffective where there was a chance that the trial court would accept counsel’s argument.

2016Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind.2015) (citing Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (recognizing “a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson ”)). 10 The continuous crime doctrine requires a fact-sensitive analysis.

2016Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1219 (Ind.2015) (citing Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (recognizing “a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson ”)). 10 The continuous crime doctrine requires a fact-sensitive analysis.