fact-sensitive inquiry in Indiana

2018Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002). [12] In order to evaluate Hodge’s claim, it would be necessary to evaluate the evidence adduced at trial to determine if his convictions were so closely related in time, place, and circumstance that they constituted a single episode of criminal conduct.

2018“Whether certain offenses constitute a single episode of criminal conduct is a fact-sensitive inquiry to be determined by the trial court.” Schlichter v. State, 779 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Ind. 2002).

2013Id. (citing State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied).

2010State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

2014Sitts v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2014Sitts v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2019Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. [21] A person commits the offense of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement by fleeing from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, identified himself and ordered the person to stop.

2019Chavez v. State , 988 N.E.2d 1226 , 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

2012“This is not surprising in light of the fact that it is recognized that the determination of whether there are sufficient grounds for piercing the corporate veil ordinarily should not be disposed of by summary judgment, in view of the complex economic questions often involved, especially if fraud is alleged.” Hamilton, 774 N.E.2d at 565 ; see also Ziese, 965 N.E.2d at 719 (“[P]iercing the corporate veil is a fact-sensitive inquiry rendering summary judgment appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances.”).

2012Id. at 570 .

2019Rutledge v. State, 28 N.E.3d 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2016Rutledge v. State, 28 N.E.3d 281, 291 (Ind.Ct.App.2015).

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2004"Whether the officer's suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the cirenmstances." Id.

2026Pugh, 52 N.E.3d at 965.

2026Parker v. State, 196 N.E.3d 244 , 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting State v. Lefevers, 844 N.E.2d 508, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans. denied. [8] Whether an officer’s suspicion was reasonable is a fact-sensitive inquiry that is determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the circumstances.

2026Whether a weapon is “deadly” is a fact-sensitive inquiry in which the factfinder considers the “description of the weapon, the manner of its use, and the circumstances of the case.” Grogg v. State, 156 N.E.3d 744 , 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Geason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)), trans. denied. [25] The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Romero “grabbed [his] gun and . . . put it in [his] waist with [his] holster” before driving to Ibarra’s house.

2025Conduct is within the scope when it is “incidental to authorized conduct or furthers the employer’s business to an appreciable extent.” Id. at 852.

2025But determining the scope of employment is a fact-sensitive analysis with “no precise formula.” Id. at 853.

2020See, e.g., Porter-Starke Servs., 88 N.E.3d at 817-19 (explaining that the holdings in exemption cases involving similar properties differed because of the specific evidentiary presentations and arguments presented, not because of a bright-line test or specific rule).

2019Miller v. Sugden, 849 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see also Meredith v. Meredith, 854 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt 2(c) (“Obviously, a great deal of discretion will have to be used in this determination.”). [13] Ultimately, the determination of how much potential income to attribute to an unemployed or underemployed parent is a fact-sensitive inquiry requiring careful consideration of the evidence in each case.

2019Assessor v. SPD Realty, LLC, 9 N.E.3d 773, 777 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014) (explaining that determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-sensitive inquiry); Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (indicating that each assessment year, and thus each exemption request, stands alone), review denied. 14

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2019Miller v. Sugden, 849 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see also Meredith v. Meredith, 854 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Child Supp. G. 3(A), cmt 2(c) (“Obviously, a great deal of discretion will have to be used in this determination.”). [13] Ultimately, the determination of how much potential income to attribute to an unemployed or underemployed parent is a fact-sensitive inquiry requiring careful consideration of the evidence in each case.

2019See Dunson v. State, 64 N.E.3d 250, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see also Griffith v. State, 788 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ind. 2003). [13] “Whether the officer’s suspicion was reasonable is determined on a case-by-case basis by engaging in a fact-sensitive analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Eichholtz, 752 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (explaining that circumstances should not be considered in isolation from each other and that although each might be susceptible to an innocent explanation, when taken together the circumstances

2019“Reasonable suspicion entails some minimum level of objective justification for making a stop; something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). [14] Here, Officer Parker had reasonable suspicion to detain Overton in the alley, after seeing him walk away from the truck, based on the other information he had learned from dispatch and Officer Hofmeister.

2019Assessor v. SPD Realty, LLC, 9 N.E.3d 773, 777 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2014) (explaining that determining whether an exemption applies is a fact-sensitive inquiry); Fleet Supply, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 747 N.E.2d 645, 650 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2001) (indicating that each assessment year, and thus each exemption request, stands alone), review denied. 14