pre-trial suppression hearing in Texas

2024App. 2010) (“We have held that the Rules of Evidence do not apply in a pre-trial suppression hearing.”); Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. Crim.

2016Evid. 104(a) ("the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege” in deciding preliminary questions whether evidence is admissible); Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554 , *732 558 n.3 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) ("we have held that the Rules of Evidence do not apply in a pre-trial suppression hearing”); Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). 9 .

2012Compare Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W.3d 68 , 74–75 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d) (holding right does not apply because it 8 As mentioned above, the trial court precluded appellant from presenting some of the proffered testimony based on the trial court’s mistaken belief the presiding judge had already denied the motion.

2010This was also the holding of the Dallas Court of Appeals in Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd).

2016See id. art. 28.01, § 1(6); see also Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 533 (allowing the trial court to proceed without oral testimony or cross-examination in a pre-trial suppression hearing')) Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (allowing the trial court discretion in determining the merits of a motion to suppress).

2003The State argues that notwithstanding the language of the statute, “a trial court may not dictate how a party discharges its burden at a pre-trial suppression hearing ... so long as the party meets this burden within the format boundaries set out in Art. 28.01 § 1(6).” The State cites two opinions in support of this proposition: Rodriguez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), and Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

2015See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 687 ; Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 577 .4 B.

2014Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2010Ford v. State, 268 S.W.3d 620, 621 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008), overruled on other grounds, 305 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (“The prosecutor obviously understood appellant’s objection because she responded appropriately: Hearsay is admissible in a pretrial suppression hearing; the Confrontation Clause does not apply to a pre-trial suppression hearing.”).

2009NOTES [1] Ford v. State, 268 S.W.3d 620, 625-26 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008). [2] The State's two grounds for review are (1) May a court of appeals decide an issue based on an argument that was not made in the trial court? and (2) May a trial court base its ruling on an unsworn police report offered into evidence at a pre-trial suppression hearing? [3] The prosecutor also stated that she had tried to contact Deputy Halcomb, and she would be "just fine" with having him testify if he arrived in time.

2018See Black v. State, 362 S.W.3d 626 , 635–36 (Tex. Crim.

2018This is because nothing is lost by the trial court’s decision not to hold a hearing on suppression issues since “a trial court may revisit [these issues] at its discretion at any time during the course of a trial.” Black v. State, 362 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex. Crim.

2016See id. art. 28.01, § 1(6); see also Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 533 (allowing the trial court to proceed without oral testimony or cross-examination in a pre-trial suppression hearing')) Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (allowing the trial court discretion in determining the merits of a motion to suppress).

2016See id. art. 28.01, § 1(6); see also Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 533 (allowing the trial court to proceed without oral testimony or cross-examination in a pre-trial suppression hearing')) Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (allowing the trial court discretion in determining the merits of a motion to suppress).

2003The State argues that notwithstanding the language of the statute, "a trial court may not dictate how a party discharges its burden at a pre-trial suppression hearing . . . so long as the party meets this burden within the format boundaries set out in Art. 28.01 § 1(6)." The State cites two opinions in support of this proposition: Rodriguez v. State , 844 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim.

2003The State argues that notwithstanding the language of the statute, “a trial court may not dictate how a party discharges its burden at a pre-trial suppression hearing ... so long as the party meets this burden within the format boundaries set out in Art. 28.01 § 1(6).” The State cites two opinions in support of this proposition: Rodriguez v. State, 844 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), and Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).

2024App. 2002) (“Because suppression hearings involve the determination of preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence . . . the rules of evidence (except privileges) no longer apply to suppression hearings.”); see also Schultz v. State, 457 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“With the exception of rules concerning privileges, the Texas Rules of Evidence do not apply in a suppression hearing.”).

2010See State v. Cullen , 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim.

2010Nevertheless, our disposition would remain the same even if we refused to consider the trial testimony, and we consider the findings of fact and conclusions of law dictated by the trial court at the end of the pre-trial suppression hearing. [2] Officer Schwartzengraber was not a member of the DWI Task Force. [3] Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). [4] In reviewing a motion to suppress, oral findings of fact and conclusions of law may be considered with appropriate deference to the trial court.

2010Nevertheless, our disposition would remain the same even if we refused to consider the trial testimony, and we consider the findings of fact and conclusions of law dictated by the trial court at the end of the pre-trial suppression hearing. [2] Officer Schwartzengraber was not a member of the DWI Task Force. [3] Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). [4] In reviewing a motion to suppress, oral findings of fact and conclusions of law may be considered with appropriate deference to the trial court.

2009REASONABLE SUSPICION In his third point of error, Kuhn asserts “the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop [Kuhn’s] vehicle for two weaves onto the shoulder of the roadway.” The State responds, “If 1 … Although we address the merits of Kuhn’s contentions, we do note that Kuhn’s attorney stated the following at the beginning of the hearing on the motion to suppress, “Just for expediency purposes, we’re just contesting the reasonable suspicion to stop.” -2- 04-08-00927-CR weaving were the only factors [sic] considered by the Trooper, Appellant’s contention might have some merit; h

2009The prosecutor noted that "the State does expect Deputy Halcomb to be subpoenaed and would be at trial and will testify to what is in his report," but this hearing was, as the trial judge had stated, simply a hearing "to determine the admissibility of the evidence" that the deputy would testify to at trial. [4] Ford, 268 S.W.3d at 623 . [5] Id. at 625 . [6] Id. [7] Id. at 625-26 . [8] Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim.App.2005). [9] See id. ("Because we have held that preservation of error is a systemic requirement that must be reviewed by the courts of appeals regardless of wheth

2009The prosecutor noted that "the State does expect Deputy Halcomb to be subpoenaed and would be at trial and will testify to what is in his report," but this hearing was, as the trial judge had stated, simply a hearing "to determine the admissibility of the evidence" that the deputy would testify to at trial. [4] Ford, 268 S.W.3d at 623 . [5] Id. at 625 . [6] Id. [7] Id. at 625-26 . [8] Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim.App.2005). [9] See id. ("Because we have held that preservation of error is a systemic requirement that must be reviewed by the courts of appeals regardless of wheth

2009The prosecutor noted that "the State does expect Deputy Halcomb to be subpoenaed and would be at trial and will testify to what is in his report," but this hearing was, as the trial judge had stated, simply a hearing "to determine the admissibility of the evidence" that the deputy would testify to at trial. [4] Ford, 268 S.W.3d at 623 . [5] Id. at 625 . [6] Id. [7] Id. at 625-26 . [8] Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim.App.2005). [9] See id. ("Because we have held that preservation of error is a systemic requirement that must be reviewed by the courts of appeals regardless of wheth

2009The prosecutor noted that "the State does expect Deputy Halcomb to be subpoenaed and would be at trial and will testify to what is in his report," but this hearing was, as the trial judge had stated, simply a hearing "to determine the admissibility of the evidence" that the deputy would testify to at trial. [4] Ford, 268 S.W.3d at 623 . [5] Id. at 625 . [6] Id. [7] Id. at 625-26 . [8] Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim.App.2005). [9] See id. ("Because we have held that preservation of error is a systemic requirement that must be reviewed by the courts of appeals regardless of wheth

2009“When a defendant alleges that the Miranda protections were thwarted, the burden of showing admissibility rests on the prosecution.” Martinez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 615, 623-24 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). 3: At the pre-trial suppression hearing, the State had sought the return of the videotape produced to Appellant’s counsel during discovery.

2009The State responds that Kuhn’s complaints are waived or sufficient proof was offered.1 “[T]he statutes authorizing pre-trial proceedings do not contemplate a ‘mini-trial’ on the sufficiency of the evidence to support an element of [an] offense.” Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. Crim.

2009The prosecutor noted that "the State does expect Deputy Halcomb to be subpoenaed and would be at trial and will testify to what is in his report," but this hearing was, as the trial judge had stated, simply a hearing "to determine the admissibility of the evidence" that the deputy would testify to at trial. [4] Ford, 268 S.W.3d at 623 . [5] Id. at 625 . [6] Id. [7] Id. at 625-26 . [8] Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim.App.2005). [9] See id. ("Because we have held that preservation of error is a systemic requirement that must be reviewed by the courts of appeals regardless of wheth

2000See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). *239 The following evidence was introduced at a pre-trial suppression hearing: Ricky was arrested on August 22, 1998.

1995Miniel v. State , 831 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Tex. Crim.

1993Gentry v. State, 770 S.W.2d 780, 790 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), ce rt. denied, 490 U.S. 1102 , 109 S.Ct. 2458 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1989); Holloway v. State, 751 S.W.2d 866, 869-70 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).