pre-trial suppression hearing in Pennsylvania

1986Commonwealth v. Bronaugh, 459 Pa. 634 , 331 A.2d 171 (1975); see Commonwealth v. Ryan, 475 Pa. 559 , 381 A.2d 138 (1977) (appellant contended that the trial testimony of two witnesses should have been suppressed as the fruit of a confession held illegal at a pre-trial suppression hearing, and the court held that the issue was waived because appellant did not object at trial to the admission of the testimony of the witnesses.) Id., 267 Pa.Superior Ct. at 326-27, 406 A.2d at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted).

1986Commonwealth v. Bronaugh, 459 Pa. 634 , 331 A.2d 171 (1975); see Commonwealth v. Ryan, 475 Pa. 559 , 381 A.2d 138 (1977) (appellant contended that the trial testimony of two witnesses should have been suppressed as the fruit of a confession held illegal at a pre-trial suppression hearing, and the court held that the issue was waived because appellant did not object at trial to the admission of the testimony of the witnesses.) Id., 267 Pa.Superior Ct. at 326-27, 406 A.2d at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted).

1986Commonwealth v. Bronaugh, 459 Pa. 634 , 331 A.2d 171 (1975); see Commonwealth v. Ryan, 475 Pa. 559 , 381 A.2d 138 (1977) (appellant contended that the trial testimony of two witnesses should have been suppressed as the fruit of a confession held illegal at a pre-trial suppression hearing, and the court held that the issue was waived because appellant did not object at trial to the admission of the testimony of the witnesses.) Id., 267 Pa.Superior Ct. at 326-27, 406 A.2d at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted).

1979Commonwealth v. Bronaugh, 459 Pa. 634 , 331 A.2d 171 (1975); see Commonwealth v. Ryan, 475 Pa. 559 , 381 A.2d 138 (1977) (appellant contended that the trial testimony of two witnesses should have been suppressed as the fruit of a confession held illegal at a pre-trial suppression hearing, and the court held that the issue was waived because appellant did not object at trial to the admission of the testimony of the witnesses.) IV.

2019Id. at 1087 .

2014See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1084-1085 (Pa. 2013). findings of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an Commonwealth v. Powell, 994 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2010).

1975See also Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358 , 311 A.2d 652 (1973) (dictum that a judge who presides at a pre-trial suppression hearing and hears prejudicial testimony which would be inadmissible at trial should honor a request that, as trial judge, he recuse himself).

1975See also Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358 , 311 A.2d 652 (1973) (dictum that a judge who presides at a pre-trial suppression hearing and hears prejudicial testimony which would be inadmissible at trial should honor a request that, as trial judge, he recuse himself).

2025See Commonwealth’s brief at 65-66 (citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294 (Pa. 2014), for the proposition that “when a PCRA petitioner asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate a pre-trial suppression claim, the burden of proof is on the defendant, not the Commonwealth.”) The Commonwealth notes that the trial judge in this case reviewed extensive evidence and testimony concerning how the lineup was performed, and while it was illegal for lack of counsel, there was nothing to evince that it was otherwise unduly suggestive.

2018Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 62 A.3d 1028, 1031 (Pa.Super. 2013), affirmed, 106 A.3d 695 (Pa. 2014).

2016Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008). -6- J-S74037-16 In his first issue, Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective for advising Appellant not to testify at the pre-trial suppression hearing.

2016Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008). -6- J-S74037-16 In his first issue, Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective for advising Appellant not to testify at the pre-trial suppression hearing.

2016Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008). -6- J-S74037-16 In his first issue, Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective for advising Appellant not to testify at the pre-trial suppression hearing.

2014See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1084-1085 (Pa. 2013). findings of the suppression court, this Court will reverse only if there is an Commonwealth v. Powell, 994 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2010).

1986Commonwealth v. Bronaugh, 459 Pa. 634 , 331 A.2d 171 (1975); see Commonwealth v. Ryan, 475 Pa. 559 , 381 A.2d 138 (1977) (appellant contended that the trial testimony of two witnesses should have been suppressed as the fruit of a confession held illegal at a pre-trial suppression hearing, and the court held that the issue was waived because appellant did not object at trial to the admission of the testimony of the witnesses.) Id., 267 Pa.Superior Ct. at 326-27, 406 A.2d at 1064-65 (footnotes omitted).

1984Compare: Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 238 Pa.Super. 22, 30 , 364 A.2d 702, 706 (1975).

1984Compare: Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 238 Pa.Super. 22, 30 , 364 A.2d 702, 706 (1975).

1982See Commonwealth v. Rice, 271 Pa.Super. 425 , 413 A.2d 739 (1979).

1982See Commonwealth v. Rice, 271 Pa.Super. 425 , 413 A.2d 739 (1979).

1979Appellant contends that the lower court violated her right to confront her accusors by (a) restricting the testimony of defense witnesses concerning the sexual perversions of appellant’s husband and his beating of appellant; (b) restricting cross-examination of appellant’s husband as to these same matters; and (c) his charge to the jury that whatever discord existed between appellant and her husband was largely irrelevant to the issues in this case. a. “[Questions concer[ning the] admission or exclusion of evidence are within the sound discretion of the court and will be reversed on appeal onl

1979Appellant contends that the lower court violated her right to confront her accusors by (a) restricting the testimony of defense witnesses concerning the sexual perversions of appellant’s husband and his beating of appellant; (b) restricting cross-examination of appellant’s husband as to these same matters; and (c) his charge to the jury that whatever discord existed between appellant and her husband was largely irrelevant to the issues in this case. a. “[Questions concer[ning the] admission or exclusion of evidence are within the sound discretion of the court and will be reversed on appeal onl

1979Commonwealth v. Kahley, 467 Pa. 272, 290 , 356 A.2d 745, 754 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044 , 97 S.Ct. 746 , 50 L.Ed.2d 757 . [2] There was a pre-trial suppression hearing in this case that will be discussed in connection with the next assignment of error. [3] The version of the rule governing at the time of the trial in this case was an amendment effective March 18, 1972. [4] Appellant does not argue that there was evidence establishing that the officers' presence in the home was not consensual, but, rather, it is claimed that the Commonwealth did not prove that the admission was consens

1979Commonwealth v. Kahley, 467 Pa. 272, 290 , 356 A.2d 745, 754 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044 , 97 S.Ct. 746 , 50 L.Ed.2d 757 . [2] There was a pre-trial suppression hearing in this case that will be discussed in connection with the next assignment of error. [3] The version of the rule governing at the time of the trial in this case was an amendment effective March 18, 1972. [4] Appellant does not argue that there was evidence establishing that the officers' presence in the home was not consensual, but, rather, it is claimed that the Commonwealth did not prove that the admission was consens