Whatever error in California

1923(Maxon v. Jones, 128 Cal. 77 [ 60 Pac. 516 ]; Estate of Willard, 139 Cal. 501 [64 L.

1923(Maxon v. Jones, 128 Cal. 77 [ 60 Pac. 516 ]; Estate of Willard, 139 Cal. 501 [64 L.

1923(Maxon v. Jones, 128 Cal. 77 [ 60 Pac. 516 ]; Estate of Willard, 139 Cal. 501 [64 L.

1909(McKee v. Hunt, 142 Cal. 526 , [ 77 Pac. 1103 ]; Estate of Scott, 1 Cal. App. 742 , [ 83 Pac. 85 ]; Maxon v. Jones, 128 Cal. 77 , [ 60 Pac. 516 ]; Sterritt v. Barker, 119 Cal. 495 , [ 51 Pac. 695 ]; Briggs v. Breen, 123 Cal. 657 , [ 56 Pac. 633, 886 ]; McKee v. Soher, 138 Cal. 367 , [ 71 Pac. 438, 649 ]; Estate of Willard, 139 Cal. 501 , [ 73 Pac. 240 ].) The rule is thus stated in the marginal note to section 356, Woerner’s American Law of Administration: “Executors and administrators cannot bind the estate by any contract, although assuming to do so, but they are primarily liable to the cred

2025Counsel Was Not Ineffective for Allowing the Questions “The decision whether to object to evidence at trial is a matter of tactics and, because of the deference accorded such decisions on appeal, will seldom establish that counsel was incompetent.” (People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 444 .) Whatever objection defense counsel may have been able to raise to the questions identified, the record suggests a sound tactical reason not to.

2025(People v. Dillard (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 657, 665 , italics added; see also In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352 [“a defendant . . . is entitled to relief based upon a trial court’s misadvisement only if the defendant establishes that he or she was prejudiced by the misadvisement, i.e., that the defendant would not have entered the plea of guilty had the trial court given a proper advisement”]; People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1022-1023 [“ ‘Unlike an uninformed waiver of the specified constitutional rights [i.e., to trial by jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against s

2025In this regard we note the Clancey court expressly declined to “announce a rule that when a trial court offers an indicated sentence, it must advise the defendant of the opportunity to withdraw the plea if the court later decides not to impose the indicated sentence.” (People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 583-584.) The court also noted that section 1018 authorizes a court to permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest “for a good cause shown,”8 but it expressly declined to determine what “standard should govern the withdrawal of a plea after a trial court declines to i

2025(People v. Dillard (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 657, 665 , italics added; see also In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352 [“a defendant . . . is entitled to relief based upon a trial court’s misadvisement only if the defendant establishes that he or she was prejudiced by the misadvisement, i.e., that the defendant would not have entered the plea of guilty had the trial court given a proper advisement”]; People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1022-1023 [“ ‘Unlike an uninformed waiver of the specified constitutional rights [i.e., to trial by jury, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against s

2025In this regard we note the Clancey court expressly declined to “announce a rule that when a trial court offers an indicated sentence, it must advise the defendant of the opportunity to withdraw the plea if the court later decides not to impose the indicated sentence.” (People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 583-584.) The court also noted that section 1018 authorizes a court to permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest “for a good cause shown,”8 but it expressly declined to determine what “standard should govern the withdrawal of a plea after a trial court declines to i

2022(People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) H.

2021(Ibid.) The court explained: “Whatever defendant’s subjective intent, the substitution of counsel on the morning of trial would certainly have led to a continuance, and the trial court properly found that such a disruption would be unreasonable under the circumstances.” (Ibid.) In People v. Lau (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 473 at page 479, the defendant asked to substitute retained counsel for appointed counsel on the first day of trial, “literally the moment jury selection was to begin.” After noting the motion was untimely, the trial court asked him to explain why he was dissatisfied with appointed

2021“To justify denial of a request, a party must have a ‘reasonable ground’ to believe he would prevail on the issue. [Citations.] That means more than a hope or a roll of the dice.” (Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 532 .) Whatever defendants may have believed about their contention ALADS lacked standing to recover the funds in its own PAC account, nothing prevented them from admitting the 31 facts they were asked to admit related to their taking $100,000 from the PAC account and returning it 17 days later.

2021(See generally DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823-825 .) Whatever defendant chooses to label his contention, we conclude that it is meritless. 15 existence, and it is not clear that it would have been an appealable order.

2020A defendant’s state of mind must, in the absence of the defendant’s own statements, be established by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Baker (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1217, 13 . 1223.) Although undue weight should not be given to the severity of the victim’s wounds because severe injuries may be consistent with a desire to kill, heat of passion, or an explosion of violence (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1137 ), the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted nevertheless may be considered in assessing intent (People v. Pre (2004) 117

2020A defendant’s state of mind must, in the absence of the defendant’s own statements, be established by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Baker (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1217, 13 . 1223.) Although undue weight should not be given to the severity of the victim’s wounds because severe injuries may be consistent with a desire to kill, heat of passion, or an explosion of violence (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1137 ), the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted nevertheless may be considered in assessing intent (People v. Pre (2004) 117

2020A defendant’s state of mind must, in the absence of the defendant’s own statements, be established by the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Baker (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1217, 13 . 1223.) Although undue weight should not be given to the severity of the victim’s wounds because severe injuries may be consistent with a desire to kill, heat of passion, or an explosion of violence (People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1137 ), the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted nevertheless may be considered in assessing intent (People v. Pre (2004) 117

2016“Our task, then, is to determine ‘whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.’” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 , quoting Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 .) Whatever defendant knew before he went to lunch, the evidence supports that by the time he entered the door of the business he knew a murder, or a grave risk of death, was in the offing.

2016“Our task, then, is to determine ‘whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.’” (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 417 , quoting Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 .) Whatever defendant knew before he went to lunch, the evidence supports that by the time he entered the door of the business he knew a murder, or a grave risk of death, was in the offing.

2014Since it is defendants’ burden as appellants to identify and demonstrate prejudicial error in the judgment or order appealed (Yield Dynamics, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556-557; In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 ), and defendants have not done so with respect to the attorney fee order, we deem the 18 argument forfeited and disregard the last two paragraphs of this argument section.

2014Since it is defendants’ burden as appellants to identify and demonstrate prejudicial error in the judgment or order appealed (Yield Dynamics, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 556-557; In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 ), and defendants have not done so with respect to the attorney fee order, we deem the 18 argument forfeited and disregard the last two paragraphs of this argument section.

2001Indeed, the vagueness of his complaints supported the court’s apparent finding that the motion was motivated not by any genuine dissatisfaction with counsel but by a desire to delay the trial. [¶] Whatever defendant’s subjective intent, the substitution of counsel on the morning of trial would certainly have led to a continuance, and the trial court properly found that such a disruption would be unreasonable under the circumstances.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Bland, supra, 20 F.3d 1469 , also addressed the timeliness of the defendant’s motion to discharge retained counsel, who had already been hel

1988Finally, defendant may be understood to allege that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, in accordance with the charge we subsequently required in People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 544 , footnote 17.

1986However, in the final judgment, for which Larry himself petitioned, the trial court unequivocally awarded Darlene one-half of Larry’s “retirement benefits received from the United States Marine Corps . . . .” Clearly, the courts at that time regarded retirement benefits arising from employment as community property subject to equal division.* **** 6 (Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]; Phillipson v. Board of Administration (1970) 3 Cal.3d 32 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 61 , 473 P.2d 765 ]; French v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775 [ 112 P.2d 235 , 134 A.L.R. 366 ].) Whatever

1986However, in the final judgment, for which Larry himself petitioned, the trial court unequivocally awarded Darlene one-half of Larry’s “retirement benefits received from the United States Marine Corps . . . .” Clearly, the courts at that time regarded retirement benefits arising from employment as community property subject to equal division.* **** 6 (Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]; Phillipson v. Board of Administration (1970) 3 Cal.3d 32 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 61 , 473 P.2d 765 ]; French v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775 [ 112 P.2d 235 , 134 A.L.R. 366 ].) Whatever

1986However, in the final judgment, for which Larry himself petitioned, the trial court unequivocally awarded Darlene one-half of Larry’s “retirement benefits received from the United States Marine Corps . . . .” Clearly, the courts at that time regarded retirement benefits arising from employment as community property subject to equal division.* **** 6 (Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]; Phillipson v. Board of Administration (1970) 3 Cal.3d 32 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 61 , 473 P.2d 765 ]; French v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775 [ 112 P.2d 235 , 134 A.L.R. 366 ].) Whatever

1986However, in the final judgment, for which Larry himself petitioned, the trial court unequivocally awarded Darlene one-half of Larry’s “retirement benefits received from the United States Marine Corps . . . .” Clearly, the courts at that time regarded retirement benefits arising from employment as community property subject to equal division.* **** 6 (Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]; Phillipson v. Board of Administration (1970) 3 Cal.3d 32 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 61 , 473 P.2d 765 ]; French v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775 [ 112 P.2d 235 , 134 A.L.R. 366 ].) Whatever