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34 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lepis v. Lepisgreen2 sentences2025Importantly, "in the Family Part, a plenary hearing is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012); see R. 5:8-6. "[A] party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159 ; accord Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. 2025F. Finally, Junie contends the family court erred by not conducting a hearing to "hear [] relevant testimony and consider evidence and decide whether [the Division] should assist [Junie] or her aunt in becoming representative payee." The issue before the family court centered on a legal question and not a factual dispute. "[A] plenary hearing is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012); see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980) (holding the moving "party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine | 28 | 32 |
Hand v. Handgreen2 sentences2025Importantly, "in the Family Part, a plenary hearing is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012); see R. 5:8-6. "[A] party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159 ; accord Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. 2019See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980) (holding that "a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary."); see also Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. | 4 | 5 |
Shaw v. Shawgreen2 sentences2020Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157, 159 (1980). "[A] party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary." Id. at 159 (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J. 2020Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157, 159 . "[A] party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary." Id. at 159 (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J. | 3 | 4 |
Segal v. Lynchgreen2 sentences2025Importantly, "in the Family Part, a plenary hearing is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012); see R. 5:8-6. "[A] party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159 ; accord Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. 2025F. Finally, Junie contends the family court erred by not conducting a hearing to "hear [] relevant testimony and consider evidence and decide whether [the Division] should assist [Junie] or her aunt in becoming representative payee." The issue before the family court centered on a legal question and not a factual dispute. "[A] plenary hearing is only required if there is a genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230, 264-65 (2012); see also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980) (holding the moving "party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine | 2 | 3 |
Faucett v. Vasquezgreen2 sentences2020A-0548-19T2 6 that "a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary"); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. 2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial | 2 | 3 |
ANNA BERMEO VS. MARIO BERMEO (FM-13-1076-14, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)green1 sentence2022Super. 274, 290 (App. Div. 2010) ("Not every Lepis application requires a plenary hearing."). "[A] party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary." Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159 ; see also Bermeo v. Bermeo, 457 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Frankel v. Frankelgreen1 sentence2020Our conclusion in this regard is also informed by Rule 5:7-8's prohibition against "[b]ifurcation of trial of the marital dissolution . . . from trial of disputes A-5583-17T3 25 over support and equitable distribution" except "in extraordinary circumstances and for good cause shown." Because the term sheet incorporated into the DJOD did not contain all the provisions necessary to finalize the dissolution, this matter has some of the hallmarks of the disfavored bifurcated divorce. "[A]lthough bifurcation would allow entry of a partial judgment of divorce thereby enabling the spouses to remarry, | 1 | 1 |
Ozolins v. Ozolinsgreen1 sentence2019After reviewing the discovery propounded by plaintiff, the court noted the "very broad standard when it comes to discovery" and found the requested information was "reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence concerning the nature of the relationship." Thus, although the court restricted the discovery to a two-year period instead of the five years requested by plaintiff, the discovery of defendant it permitted included production of: • All bank account statements; 3 Lepis provides "a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing | 1 | 1 |
Tancredi v. Tancredigreen1 sentence1980See Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J.Super. at 440 ; Hallberg v. Hallberg, 113 N.J.Super. at 208; Tancredi v. Tancredi, 101 N.J.Super. 259, 262 (App.Div.1968). | 1 | 1 |
Hallberg v. Hallberggreen1 sentence1980See Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J.Super. at 440 ; Hallberg v. Hallberg, 113 N.J.Super. at 208; Tancredi v. Tancredi, 101 N.J.Super. 259, 262 (App.Div.1968). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Murphy v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2020A A-0600-19T2 14 plenary hearing should be ordered "only where the affidavits show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, and that the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing would be helpful." Murphy, 313 N.J. 2020A A-0600-19T2 14 plenary hearing should be ordered "only where the affidavits show that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact, and that the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing would be helpful." Murphy, 313 N.J. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Faucett v. Vasquez
neutral
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial 2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial | 2 | 2012–2020 |
Jacoby v. Jacoby
green
1 sentence2022The Family Part has substantial discretion in granting or denying applications to modify child support, and generally we will defer to the Family Part's decision of "whether a plenary hearing must be scheduled." Jacoby, 427 N.J. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Morris v. Morris
green
1 sentence2019Super. 575, 580 (App. Div. 1998); see also Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159 (holding "a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary," and explaining that "[w]ithout such a standard, courts would be obligated to hold hearings on every 3 In Morris, the parties' property settlement agreement included the following language, which we characterized as an "anti-Lepis provision: The parties hereby waive their rights for modification based upon changed circumstances as set forth in the case of Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980)." Morris, 263 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Faucett v. Vasquez
green
1 sentence2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Pfeiffer v. Ilson
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial 2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dunne v. Dunne
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial 2012See, e.g., Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 , 416 A.2d 45 (1980) (holding that “a party must clearly demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary”); Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J.Super. 108, 128 , 984 A.2d 460 (App.Div.2009) (explaining that party’s “conclusory certifications” are insufficient to warrant plenary hearing in child custody dispute), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 435 , 3 A.3d 1225 (2010); Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.Super. 102, 105 , 917 A.2d 269 (App.Div.2007) (explaining that hearing is required only when there “is a genuine and substantial | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.