defendant has a meritorious defense in Tennessee

2025Those criteria “include (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 491 (quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn. 1985)).

2025Three factors must be considered when determining if a default judgment should be vacated on the basis of excusable neglect: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the non-defaulting party would be prejudiced if relief were granted.” Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 (citing Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 866 ).5 The trial court’s assessment of these factors is accorded great weight.

2025Three factors must be considered when determining if a default judgment should be vacated on the basis of excusable neglect: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the non-defaulting party would be prejudiced if relief were granted.” Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481 (citing Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 866 ).5 The trial court’s assessment of these factors is accorded great weight.

2025See Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481-82 (indicating that in determining whether to set aside a default courts should consider” (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the non-defaulting party would be prejudiced if relief were granted” and that the burden rests with the party seeking to aside the default).12 Moving to the second step of the McEwen framework, we now consider whether, under the preponderance standard, the facts were in accord with the ALJ and Designee’s decisions assessing the appropriateness of setting aside the default.

2025Those criteria “include (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Discover Bank, 363 S.W.3d at 491 (quoting Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn. 1985)).

2022Tennessee has adopted the following criteria to be considered: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted.” Id. at 491 (citing Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2 863, 866 (Tenn. 1985)).

2025See 173 S.W.3d at 820 .

2025See Barbee, 689 S.W.2d at 867 (“[T]he trial court is in the best position to assess the various factors that should be considered in determining whether a default judgment should be vacated.”). 5 In a similar context, the Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted the following framework for considering whether a party’s failure to meet a deadline constitutes excusable neglect: “(1) the risk of prejudice to parties opposing the late filing, (2) the delay and its potential impact on proceedings, (3) the reasons why the filings were late and whether the reasons were within the filer’s reasonable contro

2021Thus, in Patterson v. Rockwell International, the Tennessee Supreme Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the defendant’s conduct was willful or excusable when the Rule 60 motion simply asserted that the defendant had “a good and valid defense to [the] action.” 665 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tenn. 1984), superseded on other grounds by rule as recognized in Pirkle v. Parker, No. E2002-01751-COA-R3CV, 2003 WL 104622 , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2003).

2019P’ship, 338 S.W.3d 882, 886 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tenn. 2003) (other internal -8- citations omitted).

2017Kirk v. Kirk, 447 S.W.3d 861, 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2000)) Father asserts the final order should be set aside due to “excusable neglect.” That ground brings into play three factors: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the non-defaulting party would be prejudiced if relief were granted.” LeDoux v. Pierce, No. M2003-00671-COA-R3- CV, 2004 WL 1877357 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Aug. 20, 2004) (citing Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481).

2017Kirk v. Kirk, 447 S.W.3d 861, 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tenn. 2000)) Father asserts the final order should be set aside due to “excusable neglect.” That ground brings into play three factors: “(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the non-defaulting party would be prejudiced if relief were granted.” LeDoux v. Pierce, No. M2003-00671-COA-R3- CV, 2004 WL 1877357 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App., filed Aug. 20, 2004) (citing Henry, 104 S.W.3d at 481).

2012Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Barbee, 689 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tenn.1985) (quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2d Cir.1983)). 22 In Barbee , a paternity action, *492 the defaulting party did not seek relief until three months after the default judgment resolved the one and only claim between the parties.

2004Henry v. Gains, 104 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Tenn.2003); see also Reynolds v. Battles, 108 S.W.3d 249, 251 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).