defendant has a meritorious defense in Wyoming

1997Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” Carlson, 836 P.2d at 301 -02 (quoting Amernational Industries, Inc. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 976 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233 , 111 S.Ct. 2857 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1991)).

1997Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.’ ” Carlson [v. Carlson], 836 P.2d [297], 301-02 [ (Wyo.1992) ] (quoting Amernational Indus., Inc. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 976 (6th Cir.1991)). 847 P.2d at 998 .

2026See M & A Const. Corp., 936 P.2d at 454–55 (citing First Southwestern Financial Services, 882 P.2d at 1215 ; Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 998 ). [¶25] As noted above, Mr. Moran offered nothing related to these three factors.

2014The three factors that this Court has held are relevant to this determination are: (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (8) whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default M & A Const. Corp. v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 936 P.2d 451, 454-55 (Wyo.1997). [¶14] Likewise, W.R.C.P. 60(b) provides the procedure for setting aside a default judgment, in pertinent part: (b) Other reasons.-On motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order,

2026See M & A Const. Corp., 936 P.2d at 454–55 (citing First Southwestern Financial Services, 882 P.2d at 1215 ; Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 998 ). [¶25] As noted above, Mr. Moran offered nothing related to these three factors.

1997Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.’ ” Carlson [v. Carlson], 836 P.2d [297], 301-02 [ (Wyo.1992) ] (quoting Amernational Indus., Inc. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 976 (6th Cir.1991)). 847 P.2d at 998 .

1997Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” Carlson, 836 P.2d at 301 -02 (quoting Amernational Industries, Inc. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 976 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233 , 111 S.Ct. 2857 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1991)).

1994Vanasse , at 998; see also Carlson v. Carlson, 836 P.2d 297, 301-02 (Wyo.1992); Amer national Indus., Inc. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 976 (6th Cir.1991).

2022W.R.C.P. 55(c) states: “The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause, and it may set aside a final default judgment under Rule 60(b).” When determining whether to set aside an entry of default, the district court considers three factors: “(1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether the culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” In re EMM at ¶ 11, 414 P.3d at 1160 (quoting In re HLL, ¶ 36, 372 P.3d at 192 ).

2021Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, ¶ 21 , 315 P.3d 648, 654 (Wyo. 2013). [¶19] “In exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider three factors when resolving a motion to set aside the entry of default: (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” EMM, ¶ 11, 414 P.3d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing HLL, ¶ 36, 372 P.3d at 192 ). “[N]o single factor is dispositive of the issue, and the ultimate determination . . . is made by weighing or balancing the c

2026See M & A Const. Corp., 936 P.2d at 454–55 (citing First Southwestern Financial Services, 882 P.2d at 1215 ; Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 998 ). [¶25] As noted above, Mr. Moran offered nothing related to these three factors.

2021Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, ¶ 21 , 315 P.3d 648, 654 (Wyo. 2013). [¶19] “In exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider three factors when resolving a motion to set aside the entry of default: (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” EMM, ¶ 11, 414 P.3d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing HLL, ¶ 36, 372 P.3d at 192 ). “[N]o single factor is dispositive of the issue, and the ultimate determination . . . is made by weighing or balancing the c

2021Brush v. Davis, 2013 WY 161, ¶ 21 , 315 P.3d 648, 654 (Wyo. 2013). [¶19] “In exercising its discretion, a trial court must consider three factors when resolving a motion to set aside the entry of default: (1) whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; (2) whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and (3) whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default.” EMM, ¶ 11, 414 P.3d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing HLL, ¶ 36, 372 P.3d at 192 ). “[N]o single factor is dispositive of the issue, and the ultimate determination . . . is made by weighing or balancing the c

2014"Exeusable neglect is measured on a strict standard to take care of genuine emergency conditions, such as death, sickness, undue delay in the mails, ... and other situations where such behavior might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the cireumstances." Crossan v. Irrigation Development Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo.1979) (quoted in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Department of Revenue, 2007 WY 62, ¶9 , 155 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo.2007)). [T15] Whether it be due to excusable neglect, good cause, or otherwise, this Court has consistently applied strict standards in both affirming and revers

2014"Exeusable neglect is measured on a strict standard to take care of genuine emergency conditions, such as death, sickness, undue delay in the mails, ... and other situations where such behavior might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the cireumstances." Crossan v. Irrigation Development Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo.1979) (quoted in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Department of Revenue, 2007 WY 62, ¶9 , 155 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo.2007)). [T15] Whether it be due to excusable neglect, good cause, or otherwise, this Court has consistently applied strict standards in both affirming and revers

2014"Exeusable neglect is measured on a strict standard to take care of genuine emergency conditions, such as death, sickness, undue delay in the mails, ... and other situations where such behavior might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the cireumstances." Crossan v. Irrigation Development Corp., 598 P.2d 812, 813 (Wyo.1979) (quoted in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Department of Revenue, 2007 WY 62, ¶9 , 155 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Wyo.2007)). [T15] Whether it be due to excusable neglect, good cause, or otherwise, this Court has consistently applied strict standards in both affirming and revers