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33 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Christy A. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2024“We will not interfere in matters within the [superior] court’s discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair trial.” Id. (quoting O’Rielly Motor Co. v. Rich, 3 Ariz. App. 21, 27 (1966)). ¶31 Father received proper hearing notice, and the court did not err when it held the termination adjudication hearing in his absence. 2017A.R.S. § 8-863(C); see also § 8-537(C) (same directive for termination proceeding initiated by petition and analyzed in Christy A. v. ADES, 217 Ariz. 299 , 173 P.3d 463 (App. 2007)). 4 The Supreme Court has promulgated Rule 66(D)(2) to give effect to the statutory directives: If the court finds the parent ... failed to appear at the termination adjudication hearing -without good cause shown, had notice of the hearing, was properly served pursuant to Rule 64 and had been previously admonished regarding the consequences of failure to appear, including a warning that the hearing could go forward | 4 | 4 |
Manuel M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2023Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 211 , ¶¶ 19–20 (App. 2008). ¶13 Under Rule 352(f)(1), the superior court “may proceed with the termination adjudication hearing if the parent fails to appear at the initial termination hearing without good cause.” The court must find that the parent had notice of the initial termination hearing, was properly served, and, under subsection (C): [H]ad been admonished regarding the consequences of failing to appear at the initial termination hearing, including a warning that the adjudication hearing could go forward in the parent’s absence, and that failing to appear may const 2019See Brenda D. v. DCS, 243 Ariz. 437 , 440, ¶ 2 (2018); see also Trisha A., 245 Ariz. at 34, ¶ 30 (noting a parent who fails to appear without good cause waives certain rights); Manuel M., 218 Ariz. at 211, ¶¶ 19-20 (recognizing that although a parent has procedural due process rights in a termination adjudication hearing, the parent can waive those rights through non-appearance after being “specifically informed he or she could lose by failing to appear”) (citing Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. | 3 | 4 |
Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Matthew L.green2 sentences2023Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010). ¶14 L.H. had been in an out-of-home placement for more than two and one-half years at the start of the termination adjudication hearing. 2021Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010). ¶14 The children had been in an out-of-home placement for more than three years at the start of the termination adjudication hearing. | 3 | 3 |
Adrian E. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2015We will reverse only if the court’s exercise of its discretion was “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Id. ¶9 Arizona Rule of Procedure for Juvenile Court 66(D)(2) states: If the court finds the parent . . . failed to appear at the termination adjudication hearing without good cause shown, had notice of the hearing, was properly served pursuant to Rule 64 and had been previously admonished regarding the consequences of failure to appear, including a 3 MARK S. v. DCS, et al. 2015Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 101, ¶ 15 (App. 2007) (finding that unless “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons,” the juvenile court’s decision will not be set aside) (internal quotation and citation omitted). ¶13 Under A.R.S. § 8-863(C) and Rule 66(D)(2) of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, a parent who fails to appear at the termination adjudication hearing without good cause may be held to have admitted the allegations in the motion or petition for termination and to have waived her legal rights. | 2 | 3 |
Brenda D. v. Department of Child Safetygreen2 sentences2018Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in holding that "a parent has not 'failed to appear' simply because he or she is tardy without good cause," Brenda D. , 242 Ariz. at 153 ¶ 1, 393 P.3d at 933 , and in implicitly concluding on that basis that the juvenile court's finding of waiver at the start of the hearing was error, id. at 156 ¶ 18, 393 P.3d at 936 (holding that "only if a parent has failed to appear by the time both parties have fully presented their case, may the court treat the parent's absence as a waiver of the parent's legal rights"). ¶ 34 The court of appeals also held that the 2018Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in holding that "a parent has not 'failed to appear' simply because he or she is tardy without good cause," Brenda D. , 242 Ariz. at 153 ¶ 1, 393 P.3d at 933 , and in implicitly concluding on that basis that the juvenile court's finding of waiver at the start of the hearing was error, id. at 156 ¶ 18, 393 P.3d at 936 (holding that "only if a parent has failed to appear by the time both parties have fully presented their case, may the court treat the parent's absence as a waiver of the parent's legal rights"). ¶ 34 The court of appeals also held that the | 2 | 3 |
Monica C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen2 sentences2008Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, ¶ 20 , 118 P.3d 37, 41 (App. 2005) (general notice that parent’s failure to appear might lead to waiver of legal rights insufficient to The “trial” to which a parent is entitled is the termination adjudication hearing, “an 10 adjudicatory hearing in which the court determines whether the moving party . . . has met the burden of proving grounds upon which to terminate parental rights and whether termination is in the best interests of the child.” Ariz. R. 2008Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, ¶ 20 , 118 P.3d 37, 41 (App. 2005) (general notice that parent’s failure to appear might lead to waiver of legal rights insufficient to The “trial” to which a parent is entitled is the termination adjudication hearing, “an 10 adjudicatory hearing in which the court determines whether the moving party . . . has met the burden of proving grounds upon which to terminate parental rights and whether termination is in the best interests of the child.” Ariz. R. | 2 | 2 |
Jeff D. v. Department of Child Safetygreen2 sentences2019Jeff D. v. DCS, 239 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 6 (App. 2016) (citing Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ariz. 430, 432, ¶ 5 (App. 1999)). ¶27 After a motion to terminate parental rights is filed, the juvenile court must set a termination adjudication hearing within ninety days of the permanency hearing. 2018Jeff D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 6 (App. 2016) (citation omitted). “[A] parent has due process rights to be present, to participate, and to testify in the termination adjudication hearing.” Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437 , __, ¶ 23 (internal quotations and citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Shawanee S. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen1 sentence2026See Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 178-79, ¶¶ 13-16 . | 1 | 1 |
E.R. v. Department of Child Safetygreen1 sentence2026His progress reports from Terros were “favorable.” He was about a month and a half into the eight-month treatment program when the termination adjudication hearing occurred. ¶47 Although our standard of review is highly deferential to the superior court’s findings of fact, we can reject those findings when they are “clearly erroneous.” E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58, ¶ 9 (App. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen1 sentence2025Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 18 (2000). ¶12 The juvenile court heard from both parents at the termination adjudication hearing. | 1 | 1 |
O'Rielly Motor Company v. Richgreen1 sentence2024“We will not interfere in matters within the [superior] court’s discretion unless we are persuaded that the exercise of such discretion resulted in a miscarriage of justice or deprived one of the litigants of a fair trial.” Id. (quoting O’Rielly Motor Co. v. Rich, 3 Ariz. App. 21, 27 (1966)). ¶31 Father received proper hearing notice, and the court did not err when it held the termination adjudication hearing in his absence. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Y. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen1 sentence2024Id. at 259, ¶ 6 . | 1 | 1 |
Marina P. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen1 sentence2021Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007); see also Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (court must consider “both the origin [of the dependency] and any cause arising during the dependency”). ¶18 At the time of the termination adjudication hearing, Mother and Father had participated in many of the services DCS requested they participate in, including supervised visitation, drug testing, individual counseling, substance abuse treatment (Father) and psychological evaluations. | 1 | 1 |
Donald W. v. Dcs, M.D.green1 sentence2021Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007); see also Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (court must consider “both the origin [of the dependency] and any cause arising during the dependency”). ¶18 At the time of the termination adjudication hearing, Mother and Father had participated in many of the services DCS requested they participate in, including supervised visitation, drug testing, individual counseling, substance abuse treatment (Father) and psychological evaluations. | 1 | 1 |
Kent K. v. Bobby M.green1 sentence2019Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150- 51, ¶ 13 (citing Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶¶ 11-12 ); see also Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15 (“[I]n considering best interests, the court must balance the unfit parent’s ‘diluted’ interest ‘against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.’” (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35 )). | 1 | 1 |
Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safetygreen1 sentence2019See Brenda D. , 243 Ariz. at 444 ¶ 23, 410 P.3d at 426 ("[T]o avoid due process concerns, a juvenile court's discretionary finding of waiver based on a parent's failure to appear for a termination adjudication hearing should be made at the start of the hearing, before the proceeding commences."). | 1 | 1 |
Herman v. City of Tucsongreen1 sentence2019Jeff D. v. DCS, 239 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 6 (App. 2016) (citing Herman v. City of Tucson, 197 Ariz. 430, 432, ¶ 5 (App. 1999)). ¶27 After a motion to terminate parental rights is filed, the juvenile court must set a termination adjudication hearing within ninety days of the permanency hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Rawlsgreen1 sentence2019The R.B. factors — whether the juvenile and criminal proceedings are parallel, whether the parent’s constitutional rights will be threatened, and the balance of those constitutional rights against the child’s interest in permanency, see id. at 1201 (quoting Ex parte Rawls, 953 So. 2d 374, 378 (Ala. 2006)) — are encompassed within Rule 66(B), which already directs the juvenile court to consider, when exercising its discretion to continue a termination adjudication hearing, the existence of extraordinary circumstances, as well as whether “the continuance is necessary for the full, fair and prope | 1 | 1 |
Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F./d.L.green1 sentence2019Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150- 51, ¶ 13 (citing Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶¶ 11-12 ); see also Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15 (“[I]n considering best interests, the court must balance the unfit parent’s ‘diluted’ interest ‘against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.’” (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35 )). | 1 | 1 |
Dominique M. v. Department of Child Safetygreen1 sentence2019Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150- 51, ¶ 13 (citing Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶¶ 11-12 ); see also Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15 (“[I]n considering best interests, the court must balance the unfit parent’s ‘diluted’ interest ‘against the independent and often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.’” (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35 )). | 1 | 1 |
Bob H. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic SEC.green1 sentence2019Sec., 225 Ariz. 279, 283, ¶¶ 14-16 (App. 2010))). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Diazgreen | 1 | 1 |
Cecilia M Lewis Et Vir v. Ray C Debord Et Uxgreen2 sentences2018Polk v. Campbell , 239 Ariz. 405 , 408 ¶ 12, 372 P.3d 929 , 932 (2016) ("We decline to effectively, if not actually, rewrite [a statute], as that is the legislature's prerogative, not ours."); Lewis v. Debord , 238 Ariz. 28 , 31 ¶ 11, 356 P.3d 314 , 317 (2015) ("It is not the function of the courts to rewrite statutes...."). ¶ 51 The Majority's interpretation of § 8-863(C) and Rule 66(D)(2) is colored by its view that the juvenile court must make a discretionary finding of waiver under these provisions at the start of the termination adjudication hearing to permit the hearing to proceed. 2018Polk v. Campbell , 239 Ariz. 405 , 408 ¶ 12, 372 P.3d 929 , 932 (2016) ("We decline to effectively, if not actually, rewrite [a statute], as that is the legislature's prerogative, not ours."); Lewis v. Debord , 238 Ariz. 28 , 31 ¶ 11, 356 P.3d 314 , 317 (2015) ("It is not the function of the courts to rewrite statutes...."). ¶ 51 The Majority's interpretation of § 8-863(C) and Rule 66(D)(2) is colored by its view that the juvenile court must make a discretionary finding of waiver under these provisions at the start of the termination adjudication hearing to permit the hearing to proceed. | 1 | 1 |
| State of Arizona Ex Rel. Polk v. Hon. campbell/francis Frederick Krapsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Arizona v. Martin David Salazar-Mercadogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quigley v. City Court of the City of Tucsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Van Loan v. Van Loangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jennifer G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Securitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ugalde v. Burkegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lashonda M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
2 sentences2024Sec., 210 Ariz. 77 , 83, ¶ 19 (App. 2005) (citation omitted). ¶10 Absent good cause, failure to appear at a termination adjudication hearing “may result in a finding that the party has waived legal rights.” Ariz. R.P. 2016Sec., 210 Ariz. 77 , 83, ¶ 19 (App. 2005) (quoting Quigley v. Tucson City Court, 132 Ariz. 35, 37 (1982)). ¶10 Kelly argues that she had good cause for failing to appear at the pretrial conference because (1) she attended all previous hearings, (2) she telephoned her counsel at the close of the hearing to retrieve the telephone number to call for the hearing, (3) she was not endorsed on the minute entry from the initial hearing, and (4) the minute entry does not reflect that Kelly was given a Form 3 by the juvenile court.5 ¶11 If a court finds that a parent or guardian failed to appear at a te | 2 | 2016–2024 |
Raymond F. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
1 sentence2024Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377 , ¶ 15 n.2 (App. 2010). ¶11 DCS argues Mother waived her challenge to the adequacy of its reunification efforts by not raising the issue before the termination adjudication hearing. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ikeda v. Curtis
green
1 sentence2019Id. (citing Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42 , 48 (1960), and Ikeda v. Curtis, 261 P.2d 684, 690 (Wash. 1953)). ¶31 But neither does the decision to assert the privilege against self-incrimination deprive a parent of a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the termination adjudication hearing. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2019Id. (citing Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42 , 48 (1960), and Ikeda v. Curtis, 261 P.2d 684, 690 (Wash. 1953)). ¶31 But neither does the decision to assert the privilege against self-incrimination deprive a parent of a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the termination adjudication hearing. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Buzard v. Griffin
green
1 sentence2019Id. (citing Buzard v. Griffin, 89 Ariz. 42 , 48 (1960), and Ikeda v. Curtis, 261 P.2d 684, 690 (Wash. 1953)). ¶31 But neither does the decision to assert the privilege against self-incrimination deprive a parent of a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the termination adjudication hearing. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
R.M. v. Elmore Cty. Dept. of Resources, 2091106 (ala.civ.app. 7-15-2011)
green
1 sentence2019The R.B. factors — whether the juvenile and criminal proceedings are parallel, whether the parent’s constitutional rights will be threatened, and the balance of those constitutional rights against the child’s interest in permanency, see id. at 1201 (quoting Ex parte Rawls, 953 So. 2d 374, 378 (Ala. 2006)) — are encompassed within Rule 66(B), which already directs the juvenile court to consider, when exercising its discretion to continue a termination adjudication hearing, the existence of extraordinary circumstances, as well as whether “the continuance is necessary for the full, fair and prope | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Rocky J.
green
1 sentence2019Termination Pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) ¶11 Relying on Arizona Department of Economic Security v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437 (App. 2014), Father argues the evidence presented at the termination adjudication hearing required the juvenile court to find against the termination of his parental rights. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In re the Appeal in Yavapai County Juvenile Action No. J-9365 green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Garcia-Contreras
green
2 sentences2018Cf. State v. Garcia-Contreras , 191 Ariz. 144 , 146-49 ¶¶ 8-22, 953 P.2d 536 , 538-41 (1998) (recognizing that a criminal defendant has a due process right to be present at the defendant's trial and finding a violation of that right when a defendant who had not waived that right was absent during the entire jury selection proceeding). 2018Cf. State v. Garcia-Contreras , 191 Ariz. 144 , 146-49 ¶¶ 8-22, 953 P.2d 536 , 538-41 (1998) (recognizing that a criminal defendant has a due process right to be present at the defendant's trial and finding a violation of that right when a defendant who had not waived that right was absent during the entire jury selection proceeding). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Willie G. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Kenneth T. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Marianne N. v. Department of Child Safety green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Trust v. County of Yuma green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.