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33 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1993“Actually substantially dependent” requires that “the party seeking alimony would be actually unable to maintain the accustomed standard of living [established before separation] from his or her own means.” Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 181 , 261 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1980). 1993“Actually substantially dependent” requires that “the party seeking alimony would be actually unable to maintain the accustomed standard of living [established before separation] from his or her own means.” Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 181 , 261 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1980). | 5 | 12 |
Glass v. Glassgreen2 sentences2020App. 784, 789-90 , 509 S.E.2d 236, 239 (1998), that an established pattern of contributing to a retirement or savings plan may be considered by the trial court in determining the parties’ accustomed standard of living. 2020App. 784, 789-90 , 509 S.E.2d 236, 239 (1998), that an established pattern of contributing to a retirement or savings plan may be considered by the trial court in determining the parties’ accustomed standard of living. | 3 | 5 |
Vadala v. Vadalagreen2 sentences2021App. 237 , 262, 837 S.E.2d 443 , 460 (2020). “[A]lthough the parties’ pattern of savings may not be determinative of a claim for alimony, the trial court must at least consider this pattern in determining the parties’ accustomed standard of living.” Vadala v. Vadala, 145 N.C. 2021App. 237 , 262, 837 S.E.2d 443 , 460 (2020). “[A]lthough the parties’ pattern of savings may not be determinative of a claim for alimony, the trial court must at least consider this pattern in determining the parties’ accustomed standard of living.” Vadala v. Vadala, 145 N.C. | 2 | 4 |
Smith v. Smithgreen2 sentences2022JAIN 2022-NCCOA-408 Opinion of the Court afford to pay more to maintain the accustomed standard of living of the child.” Id. at 146 , 786 S.E.2d at 22 (citations omitted). ¶9 “[T]o determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child’s actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses.” Jackson v. Jackson, 280 N.C. 2022JAIN 2022-NCCOA-408 Opinion of the Court afford to pay more to maintain the accustomed standard of living of the child.” Id. at 146 , 786 S.E.2d at 22 (citations omitted). ¶9 “[T]o determine the reasonable needs of the child, the trial court must hear evidence and make findings of specific fact on the child’s actual past expenditures and present reasonable expenses.” Jackson v. Jackson, 280 N.C. | 2 | 3 |
Beaman v. Beamangreen2 sentences2015This Court also held, "[t]he statute does not require a specifically articulated finding on the subject [of accustomed standard of living]." iD. at 280, 374 s.E.2D at 453 (citing bEaman v. bEaman, 77 n.C.APp. 717, 721-22, 336 S.E.2d 129 , 131-32 (1985) (holding the trial court's failure to make a categorical finding about the parties' accustomed standard of living was not fatal to the validity of the judgment)). 1988We said that when the "evidence clearly allows the [reviewing] court to determine the parties' accustomed standard of living ... [a] specific finding of fact [is] not necessary." Id. | 2 | 2 |
Hunt v. Huntgreen2 sentences2019In making a dependency determination, the relevant Williams factors include: (1) the accustomed standard of living of the parties prior to the separation, (2) the income and expenses of each of the parties at the time of the trial, (3) the value of the estates, if any, of both spouses at the time of the hearing, and (4) “the length of [the] marriage and the contribution each party has made to the financial status of the family over the years.” Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C. 2015"Actually substantially dependent requires that the party seeking alimony would be actually unable to maintain the accustomed standard of living [established before separation] from his or her own means." Hunt v. Hunt, 112 N.C.App. 722 , 726, 436 S.E.2d 856 , 859 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Adams v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2015Adams, 92 N.C.App. at 279 -80 , 374 S.E.2d at 453 . 2000App. 274, 279-80 , 374 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1988) (“The judge’s findings as to Mr. Adams’ monthly gross income and his reasonable living expenses, coupled with the findings as to Ms. Adams’ monthly income and her expenses during the last year of the marriage, satisfied the requirement . . . for findings regarding the Adamses’ accustomed standard of living.”). | 1 | 2 |
Barrett v. Barrettgreen2 sentences2024Plaintiff thus argues that the trial court’s failure to consider the parties’ actual accustomed standard of living resulted in an insufficient alimony award. “[T]he parties’ needs and expenses for purposes of computing alimony should be measured in light of their accustomed standard of living during the marriage.” Barrett v. Barrett, 140 N.C. 2024App. 369, 372 , 536 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2000); see N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Whedon v. Whedongreen2 sentences2020“While the court must consider the needs of the spouse seeking alimony in the context of the family unit’s accustomed standard of living, it also must determine that the supporting spouse has the financial capacity to provide the support needed therefor.” Whedon v. Whedon, 58 N.C. 2020App. 524, 527 , 294 S.E.2d 29, 31 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48 , 57, 134 S.E.2d 227 , 234 (1964) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a [parent] has a legal duty to give his [or her] children those advantages which are reasonable considering his [or her] financial condition and his [or her] position in society."); Loosvelt v. Brown, 235 N.C.App. 88 , 105, 760 S.E.2d 351 , 362 (2014) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a father has a legal duty to give his children those advantages which are reasonable considering his financial condition and his position in society."). 2016See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48 , 57, 134 S.E.2d 227 , 234 (1964) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a [parent] has a legal duty to give his [or her] children those advantages which are reasonable considering his [or her] financial condition and his [or her] position in society."); Loosvelt v. Brown, 235 N.C.App. 88 , 105, 760 S.E.2d 351 , 362 (2014) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a father has a legal duty to give his children those advantages which are reasonable considering his financial condition and his position in society."). | 1 | 1 |
Loosvelt v. Browngreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48 , 57, 134 S.E.2d 227 , 234 (1964) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a [parent] has a legal duty to give his [or her] children those advantages which are reasonable considering his [or her] financial condition and his [or her] position in society."); Loosvelt v. Brown, 235 N.C.App. 88 , 105, 760 S.E.2d 351 , 362 (2014) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a father has a legal duty to give his children those advantages which are reasonable considering his financial condition and his position in society."). 2016See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48 , 57, 134 S.E.2d 227 , 234 (1964) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a [parent] has a legal duty to give his [or her] children those advantages which are reasonable considering his [or her] financial condition and his [or her] position in society."); Loosvelt v. Brown, 235 N.C.App. 88 , 105, 760 S.E.2d 351 , 362 (2014) ("In addition to the actual needs of the child, a father has a legal duty to give his children those advantages which are reasonable considering his financial condition and his position in society."). | 1 | 1 |
Rhew v. Feltongreen2 sentences2015"Alimony is ordinarily determined by a party's actual income, from all *859 sources, at the time of the order. " Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C.App. 781 , 787, 501 S.E.2d 671 , 675 (1998) (second emphasis supplied and citation omitted); see also Rhew v. Felton, 178 N.C.App. 475 , 484-85, 631 S.E.2d 859 , 866 (2006) ("A supporting spouse's ability to pay an alimony award is generally determined by the supporting spouse's income at *704 the time of the award.") The burden rests on the party seeking alimony to show the accustomed standard of living and the lack of the means to maintain that standa 2015"Alimony is ordinarily determined by a party's actual income, from all *859 sources, at the time of the order. " Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C.App. 781 , 787, 501 S.E.2d 671 , 675 (1998) (second emphasis supplied and citation omitted); see also Rhew v. Felton, 178 N.C.App. 475 , 484-85, 631 S.E.2d 859 , 866 (2006) ("A supporting spouse's ability to pay an alimony award is generally determined by the supporting spouse's income at *704 the time of the award.") The burden rests on the party seeking alimony to show the accustomed standard of living and the lack of the means to maintain that standa | 1 | 1 |
Knott v. Knottgreen1 sentence2006See Knott v. Knott, 52 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Fisher v. Lukinoffgreen1 sentence2005See Fisher, 131 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Talent v. Talentgreen2 sentences2003See Talent, 76 N.C.App. at 548 , 334 S.E.2d at 259 ("the court must determine and consider ... the standard of living, socially and economically, to which the parties as a family unit became accustomed during the several years prior to their separation") (emphasis added); see Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 181 , 261 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1980) (term "contemplates the economic standard established by the marital partnership for the family unit during the years the marital contract was intact"). 2003See Talent, 76 N.C.App. at 548 , 334 S.E.2d at 259 ("the court must determine and consider ... the standard of living, socially and economically, to which the parties as a family unit became accustomed during the several years prior to their separation") (emphasis added); see Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 181 , 261 S.E.2d 849, 855 (1980) (term "contemplates the economic standard established by the marital partnership for the family unit during the years the marital contract was intact"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rhew v. Rhew
green
2 sentences2020Glass cautioned, however, that a party’s savings should not be used to “reduce his or her support obligation to the other by merely increasing his or her deductions for savings plans,” nor should a spouse be able to “increase an alimony award by deferring a portion of his or her income to a savings account,” emphasizing that “the purpose of alimony is not to allow a party to accumulate savings.” Then, in Rhew v. Rhew, 138 N.C. 2001App. 467 , 531 S.E.2d 471 (2000), (a case which we note, was decided by this Court after the trial court in the case sub judice had entered its order denying alimony), we clarified our holding in Glass , finding that although the parties’ pattern of savings may not be determinative of a claim for alimony, the trial court must at least consider this pattern in determining the parties’ accustomed standard of living. | 3 | 2001–2020 |
Nicks v. Nicks
green
2 sentences2020App. at 501 , 774 S.E.2d at 376 , but it does have to consider the parties’ accustomed standard of living during the marriage and not just Wife’s actual expenses at the time of trial. 2020App. at 501 , 774 S.E.2d at 376 , but it does have to consider the parties’ accustomed standard of living during the marriage and not just Wife’s actual expenses at the time of trial. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Row v. Row
green
2 sentences2020KLEOUDIS Opinion of the Court determining the cost of raising the parties’ children.” Row v. Row, 185 N.C. 2020KLEOUDIS Opinion of the Court determining the cost of raising the parties’ children.” Row v. Row, 185 N.C. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Zurosky v. Shaffer
green
2 sentences2020KLEOUDIS Opinion of the Court Father also argues “[t]he trial court failed to make any findings or conclusions regarding the accustomed standard of living of the minor child or the parties” and compares his case to Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. 2020KLEOUDIS Opinion of the Court Father also argues “[t]he trial court failed to make any findings or conclusions regarding the accustomed standard of living of the minor child or the parties” and compares his case to Zurosky v. Shaffer, 236 N.C. | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Cohen v. Cohen
green
2 sentences2016The determination of a child's needs is "largely measured by the 'accustomed standard of living of the child.' " Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C.App. 334 , 339, 396 S.E.2d 344 , 347 (1990). *22 Even though the expense of private school has never been specifically addressed in higher income cases, our appellate courts have long recognized that a child's reasonable needs are not limited to absolutely necessary items if the parents can afford to pay more to maintain the accustomed standard of living of the child. 2016The determination of a child's needs is "largely measured by the 'accustomed standard of living of the child.' " Cohen v. Cohen, 100 N.C.App. 334 , 339, 396 S.E.2d 344 , 347 (1990). *22 Even though the expense of private school has never been specifically addressed in higher income cases, our appellate courts have long recognized that a child's reasonable needs are not limited to absolutely necessary items if the parents can afford to pay more to maintain the accustomed standard of living of the child. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Kowalick v. Kowalick
green
2 sentences2015"Alimony is ordinarily determined by a party's actual income, from all *859 sources, at the time of the order. " Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C.App. 781 , 787, 501 S.E.2d 671 , 675 (1998) (second emphasis supplied and citation omitted); see also Rhew v. Felton, 178 N.C.App. 475 , 484-85, 631 S.E.2d 859 , 866 (2006) ("A supporting spouse's ability to pay an alimony award is generally determined by the supporting spouse's income at *704 the time of the award.") The burden rests on the party seeking alimony to show the accustomed standard of living and the lack of the means to maintain that standa 2015"Alimony is ordinarily determined by a party's actual income, from all *859 sources, at the time of the order. " Kowalick v. Kowalick, 129 N.C.App. 781 , 787, 501 S.E.2d 671 , 675 (1998) (second emphasis supplied and citation omitted); see also Rhew v. Felton, 178 N.C.App. 475 , 484-85, 631 S.E.2d 859 , 866 (2006) ("A supporting spouse's ability to pay an alimony award is generally determined by the supporting spouse's income at *704 the time of the award.") The burden rests on the party seeking alimony to show the accustomed standard of living and the lack of the means to maintain that standa | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Helms v. Helms
green
2 sentences2008Id. 2008Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Rice v. Rice
green
1 sentence2006Rice v. Rice, 159 N.C. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Rowe v. Rowe
green
2 sentences1997See G.S. § 50-16.5(a); Rowe, 305 N.C. at 187 , 287 S.E.2d at 846 . 1997See G.S. § 50-16.5(a); Rowe, 305 N.C. at 187 , 287 S.E.2d at 846 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Quick v. Quick
green
2 sentences1993Quick, 305 N.C. at 455-56 , 290 S.E.2d at 659-60 ; Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. 1993Quick, 305 N.C. at 455-56 , 290 S.E.2d at 659-60 ; Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Skamarak v. Skamarak
green
1 sentence1993Quick, 305 N.C. at 455-56 , 290 S.E.2d at 659-60 ; Skamarak v. Skamarak, 81 N.C. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Perkins v. Perkins
green
2 sentences1991Plaintiff also contends that the "trial court committed reversible error by repeatedly sustaining objections to testimony regarding the parties' accustomed standard of living prior to separation, contrary to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 50-16.5(a) and the decisions of this court." Plaintiff assigns as error the sustaining of an objection by defendant's attorney regarding plaintiff's preparation of a summary sheet of what he considered "reasonable monthly expenses for the maintenance of one person at the Woodberry Drive address." The summary sheet has not been included in the record. "[T]he parties' standar 1991Plaintiff also contends that the "trial court committed reversible error by repeatedly sustaining objections to testimony regarding the parties' accustomed standard of living prior to separation, contrary to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 50-16.5(a) and the decisions of this court." Plaintiff assigns as error the sustaining of an objection by defendant's attorney regarding plaintiff's preparation of a summary sheet of what he considered "reasonable monthly expenses for the maintenance of one person at the Woodberry Drive address." The summary sheet has not been included in the record. "[T]he parties' standar | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Perkins v. Perkins
neutral
1 sentence1991Plaintiff also contends that the "trial court committed reversible error by repeatedly sustaining objections to testimony regarding the parties' accustomed standard of living prior to separation, contrary to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 50-16.5(a) and the decisions of this court." Plaintiff assigns as error the sustaining of an objection by defendant's attorney regarding plaintiff's preparation of a summary sheet of what he considered "reasonable monthly expenses for the maintenance of one person at the Woodberry Drive address." The summary sheet has not been included in the record. "[T]he parties' standar | 1 | 1991–1991 |
OLIVETTI CORPORATION v. Ames Business Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence1991Plaintiff also contends that the "trial court committed reversible error by repeatedly sustaining objections to testimony regarding the parties' accustomed standard of living prior to separation, contrary to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 50-16.5(a) and the decisions of this court." Plaintiff assigns as error the sustaining of an objection by defendant's attorney regarding plaintiff's preparation of a summary sheet of what he considered "reasonable monthly expenses for the maintenance of one person at the Woodberry Drive address." The summary sheet has not been included in the record. "[T]he parties' standar | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Condie v. Condie
green
1 sentence1985App. 522 , 277 S.E. 2d 122 (1981), this Court upheld a determination that the defendant wife was a dependent spouse and an award of alimony where the lower court had failed to make specific findings of fact regarding the accustomed standard of living of the parties. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Gardner v. Gardner green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Self v. Self green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Self v. Self neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.