parole consideration hearing in Oregon

2025No amended reply brief was filed by petitioner and this case was scheduled for submission. 612 Downs v. Board of Parole the present version of ORS 144.228, because applying the present version of ORS 144.228 violates the ex post facto clauses of Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution.3 That argument is foreclosed by our decision in Morrison, 277 Or App at 865 , which rejected the petitioner’s “ex post facto challenge to the board’s application of the 2009 version of ORS 144.228 to set his next parole consideration hearing

2025No amended reply brief was filed by petitioner and this case was scheduled for submission. 612 Downs v. Board of Parole the present version of ORS 144.228, because applying the present version of ORS 144.228 violates the ex post facto clauses of Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, and Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution.3 That argument is foreclosed by our decision in Morrison, 277 Or App at 865 , which rejected the petitioner’s “ex post facto challenge to the board’s application of the 2009 version of ORS 144.228 to set his next parole consideration hearing

2023The majority’s discussion of State v. Huntley, 302 Or 418 , 730 P2d 1234 (1986), is not necessary given that this case is about the board’s parole consideration hearing.

2023The majority’s discussion of State v. Huntley, 302 Or 418 , 730 P2d 1234 (1986), is not necessary given that this case is about the board’s parole consideration hearing.

1990In Meriweather v. Board of Parole, 307 Or 509, 510 , 770 P2d 593 (1989), the court said: “The parole consideration hearing date is the date upon which the prisoner would otherwise be set for parole release were the prisoner not a dangerous offender.” Petitioner argues that the 15-year minimum is part of his sentence as a dangerous offender and, therefore, the minimum must be disregarded in determining what his parole release date would have been, had he not been sentenced as a dangerous offender.

1990In Meriweather v. Board of Parole, 307 Or 509, 510 , 770 P2d 593 (1989), the court said: “The parole consideration hearing date is the date upon which the prisoner would otherwise be set for parole release were the prisoner not a dangerous offender.” Petitioner argues that the 15-year minimum is part of his sentence as a dangerous offender and, therefore, the minimum must be disregarded in determining what his parole release date would have been, had he not been sentenced as a dangerous offender.

2026Id.

2026Id.

2023Washington, 294 Or App at 498 .

2023Washington, 294 Or App at 498 .

2023In considering whether and how long to defer a parole consideration hearing the board applies the factors listed in OAR 255-062-0016.5 5 OAR 255-062-0016 provides this nonexclusive list of factors, one or more of which would support deferral of the parole consideration hearing date: “(1) A determination by the Board, based on the psychological evaluation and all the information available at the hearing, that the inmate has a men- tal or emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition, or disorder predisposing him/her to the commission of any crime to a degree rendering the inmate a danger to the

2023Cite as 325 Or App 795 (2023) 803 The board decided not to assign a release date and to instead reset the matter for another parole consideration hearing three years later based on these findings: “[T]he Board finds the offender has a mental or emotional disturbance, deficiency, condition, or disorder predispos- ing offender to the commission of any crime to the degree rendering the offender a danger to the health or safety of others; therefore, the condition which made the AIC dan- gerous is not in remission and AIC does continue to remain a danger.” At petitioner’s request, the board reviewe

2023Bell v. Board of Parole, 283 Or App 711, 713 , 391 P3d 907 , rev den, 361 Or 645 (2017).

2023Bell v. Board of Parole, 283 Or App 711, 713 , 391 P3d 907 , rev den, 361 Or 645 (2017).

2018There, we concluded that the board erred when, in the context of a parole consideration hearing, the board relied on a psychological evaluation that was based, in part, on *851 inaccurate information included in a presentence investigation report. 258 Or.

2018App. at 42 -43 , 309 P.3d 161 .

2017In Alexander, we reserved the question of whether the board’s application of the then-current version of ORS 144.226 violated ex post facto protections. 205 Or App at 451 n 2.

2017Id.

2017The department shall provide protective social services of its own or of other available social agencies if necessary to prevent further abuses to the child or to safeguard the child’s welfare.” We recently held in Nulph v. Board of Parole, 279 Or App 652 , 381 P3d 948 (2016), rev allowed, 360 Or 851 (2017), that, as used in ORS 144.228(l)(c), relating to the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision’s obligation in considering a request for a parole consideration hearing to determine whether a condition that made an inmate dangerous is in remission, the term “reasonable cause” is a “del-ega

2017The department shall provide protective social services of its own or of other available social agencies if necessary to prevent further abuses to the child or to safeguard the child’s welfare.” We recently held in Nulph v. Board of Parole, 279 Or App 652 , 381 P3d 948 (2016), rev allowed, 360 Or 851 (2017), that, as used in ORS 144.228(l)(c), relating to the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision’s obligation in considering a request for a parole consideration hearing to determine whether a condition that made an inmate dangerous is in remission, the term “reasonable cause” is a “del-ega

2015Id.

2015Id.

2015That dismissal is the subject of our decision in Smith v. Mills, 268 Or App 454 , 342 P3d 1034 (2015).

2015That dismissal is the subject of our decision in Smith v. Mills, 268 Or App 454 , 342 P3d 1034 (2015).

2010In Guzman v. Board of Parole, 200 Or App 448, 455 , 115 P3d 983 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006), the petitioner contended that the board of parole had failed to hold a parole consideration hearing within the time required by the statute and administrative rule, and that, as a consequence, the board’s order was invalid.

2010In Guzman v. Board of Parole, 200 Or App 448, 455 , 115 P3d 983 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006), the petitioner contended that the board of parole had failed to hold a parole consideration hearing within the time required by the statute and administrative rule, and that, as a consequence, the board’s order was invalid.

2010In Guzman v. Board of Parole, 200 Or App 448, 455 , 115 P3d 983 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006), the petitioner contended that the board of parole had failed to hold a parole consideration hearing within the time required by the statute and administrative rule, and that, as a consequence, the board’s order was invalid.

2005Petition for judicial review dismissed. 1 State v. Engweiler, 118 Or App 132, 136 , 846 P2d 1163 , rev den, 317 Or 486 (1993) (so holding under ORS 161.620 (1989), amended by Or Laws 1989, ch 790, §3). 2 The statute was amended in. 2001 to broaden the range of board orders subject to review.

2005Petition for judicial review dismissed. 1 State v. Engweiler, 118 Or App 132, 136 , 846 P2d 1163 , rev den, 317 Or 486 (1993) (so holding under ORS 161.620 (1989), amended by Or Laws 1989, ch 790, §3). 2 The statute was amended in. 2001 to broaden the range of board orders subject to review.

2005See State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 145-46 , 752 P2d 1136 (1988), cert granted and vac’d on other grounds, 492 US 914 , 109 S Ct 3235 , 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989) (refusing to construe Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution as a due process clause); Gallant v. Board of Medical Examiners, 159 Or App 175 , 183 n 6, 974 P2d 814 (1999). 4 Before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472 , 115 S Ct 2293 , 132 L Ed 2d 418 (1995), which determined whether a state had created a liberty interest for incarcerated persons protected by the Due Process Clause, the analy

2005See State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 145-46 , 752 P2d 1136 (1988), cert granted and vac’d on other grounds, 492 US 914 , 109 S Ct 3235 , 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989) (refusing to construe Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution as a due process clause); Gallant v. Board of Medical Examiners, 159 Or App 175 , 183 n 6, 974 P2d 814 (1999). 4 Before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472 , 115 S Ct 2293 , 132 L Ed 2d 418 (1995), which determined whether a state had created a liberty interest for incarcerated persons protected by the Due Process Clause, the analy

2005See State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 145-46 , 752 P2d 1136 (1988), cert granted and vac’d on other grounds, 492 US 914 , 109 S Ct 3235 , 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989) (refusing to construe Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution as a due process clause); Gallant v. Board of Medical Examiners, 159 Or App 175 , 183 n 6, 974 P2d 814 (1999). 4 Before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472 , 115 S Ct 2293 , 132 L Ed 2d 418 (1995), which determined whether a state had created a liberty interest for incarcerated persons protected by the Due Process Clause, the analy

2005See State v. Wagner, 305 Or 115, 145-46 , 752 P2d 1136 (1988), cert granted and vac’d on other grounds, 492 US 914 , 109 S Ct 3235 , 106 L Ed 2d 583 (1989) (refusing to construe Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution as a due process clause); Gallant v. Board of Medical Examiners, 159 Or App 175 , 183 n 6, 974 P2d 814 (1999). 4 Before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Sandin v. Conner, 515 US 472 , 115 S Ct 2293 , 132 L Ed 2d 418 (1995), which determined whether a state had created a liberty interest for incarcerated persons protected by the Due Process Clause, the analy

1999In its order of dismissal, the court cited its own intervening decision in Luckey v. Board of Parole, 150 Or App 480 , 946 P2d 361 (1997).

1999In its order of dismissal, the court cited its own intervening decision in Luckey v. Board of Parole, 150 Or App 480 , 946 P2d 361 (1997).