32 California opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cassel v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025Code, § 1119, subd. (c).)2 The mediation privilege extends to attorney-client communications that are made “ ‘for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation,’ ” which are “neither discoverable nor admissible—even for purposes of proving a claim of legal malpractice.” (Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113, 138 (Cassel); see also § 1119, subds. (a)–(b).) “ ‘Communications between counsel and client that are materially related to the mediation, even if they are not made to another party or the mediator, are “for the purpose of” or “pursuant to” mediation.’ ” (Cassel, 2025He argues that the email was protected by the mediation privilege, citing Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113, 121, 129 , and argues that he cannot have waived the privilege without express agreement orally or in writing. | 3 | 6 |
Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n v. Bramalea California, Inc.green2 sentences2025Evidence Code section 1119, subdivision (a), renders inadmissible “evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.” The Supreme Court has held this mediation privilege “unqualifiedly bars disclosure of communications made during mediation absent an express statutory exception.” (Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn. v. Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, 15 .) While Evidence Code sections 1122 and 1123 provide limited exceptions when all participants expressly agree to 5 disclosure or when a written settlement agreement expressl 2016Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(5) [“Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing shall be deemed waived.”]; Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn. v. Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, 10, fn. 7 [“Failure to object to admission of evidence of events occurring during a prior mediation has been held to constitute a waiver.”].) In their petition for rehearing, plaintiffs contend Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570 (Simmons) does not allow implied waiver of the mediation privilege by litigation conduct. | 2 | 5 |
Simmons v. Ghaderigreen2 sentences2016Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(5) [“Evidentiary objections not made at the hearing shall be deemed waived.”]; Foxgate Homeowners’ Assn. v. Bramalea California, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1, 10, fn. 7 [“Failure to object to admission of evidence of events occurring during a prior mediation has been held to constitute a waiver.”].) In their petition for rehearing, plaintiffs contend Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570 (Simmons) does not allow implied waiver of the mediation privilege by litigation conduct. 2014The mediation confidentiality statutes cannot be impliedly waived by litigation conduct—they can only be waived "in cases of express waiver or where due process is implicated." (Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 582 [no waiver even where the party who later asserted the mediation privilege had previously submitted evidence of events that occurred during mediation].) Lisa does not assert either of these 37 bases here. | 2 | 3 |
Amis v. Greenberg Traurig, LLPgreen2 sentences2021(See Cassel, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 122, 132, 136 [mediation confidentiality statutes may negatively affect the client’s ability to prove a legal malpractice claim against the lawyers]; Amis v. Greenberg Traurig (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 331, 339-340 [protecting attorneys from malpractice claims is an “unintended consequence” of mediation confidentiality]; Wimsatt, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 162-163 [participation in mediation in effect 8 relinquishes client’s claims for new and independent torts arising from mediation, including legal malpractice].) Keshen argues that the mediation privileg 2016(Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113, 118-119, 128-138 ; see Amis v. Greenberg Traurig LLP (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 331, 339 ; Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 163 .) Spanos offers reasons why her case is exceptional, and Dreyer defends the judgment. | 2 | 2 |
McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2013Therefore, just as an attorney sued by a former client for malpractice must be allowed to use otherwise confidential information received from that client (cf. McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 378, 385 ), Kurtin‟s decision to hold firm to the mediation privilege means Elieff did not get a fair trial. 2013Therefore, just as an attorney sued by a former client for malpractice must be allowed to use otherwise confidential information received from that client (cf. McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 378, 385 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ]), Kurtin’s decision to hold firm to the mediation privilege means Elieff did not get a fair trial. | 2 | 2 |
Wimsatt v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2021(See Cassel, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 122, 132, 136 [mediation confidentiality statutes may negatively affect the client’s ability to prove a legal malpractice claim against the lawyers]; Amis v. Greenberg Traurig (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 331, 339-340 [protecting attorneys from malpractice claims is an “unintended consequence” of mediation confidentiality]; Wimsatt, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 162-163 [participation in mediation in effect 8 relinquishes client’s claims for new and independent torts arising from mediation, including legal malpractice].) Keshen argues that the mediation privileg 2016(Cassel v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 113, 118-119, 128-138 ; see Amis v. Greenberg Traurig LLP (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 331, 339 ; Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 163 .) Spanos offers reasons why her case is exceptional, and Dreyer defends the judgment. | 1 | 3 |
Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp.green1 sentence2025(See, e.g., Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1283-1284 [unilateral requirement that plaintiff “submit to discussions with his supervisors” as a condition precedent to arbitration was substantively unconscionable because it was “an employer-controlled dispute resolution mechanism (i.e. one without a neutral mediator)” and would allow defendants a “‘free peek’ at plaintiff’s case”].) In this case, the mediation provision provides for a neutral mediator, does not prohibit attorney representation at the mediation, and applies to both parties. | 1 | 1 |
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.green1 sentence2025(See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1075-1076 [“there is no indication that the state of the law was ‘sufficiently clear at the time the arbitration agreement was signed to lead to the conclusion that this [appellate arbitration provision] was drafted in bad faith’”].) The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration after finding three of the provisions in the arbitration agreement were substantively unconscionable, including the mediation requirement and fees provision. | 1 | 1 |
People v. DeHoyosgreen1 sentence2025(See § 402; People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 133 [hearsay context].) Contrary to Beach’s argument, Cassel does not suggest that whether the mediation privilege applies is an issue for the fact finder at trial. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. County of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2022(See Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183 [explaining that the doctrine of judicial estoppel requires, inter alia, that “the two positions are totally inconsistent”].) Finally, Marchick and amicus CAR cite several opinions in which appellate courts have held a party’s failure to comply with the mediation provision in the Purchase Agreement barred that party from seeking attorney fees. | 1 | 1 |
Kurtin v. Elieffgreen1 sentence2015(See Simmons, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 588 [“The Legislature chose to promote mediation by ensuring confidentiality rather than adopt a scheme to ensure good behavior in the mediation and litigation process.”]; Kurtin v. Elieff (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 455, 470 [“The California Supreme Court has clearly signaled the policy behind the mediation privilege is so strong that California law is willing to countenance the ‘high price’ of the loss of relevant evidence to protect the privilege.”]; Wimsatt v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 137, 142 [“The Supreme Court has held that the mediation sta | 1 | 1 |
Greenbriar Homes Communities, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014(Greenbriar Homes Communities, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 337, 345-346 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 ], disapproved on another point in Tarrant Bell, supra, 51 Cal.4th atp. 547 ; Woodside Homes of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 723, 732-733 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 35 ].) There is no reason why a different result should apply to the mediation clause at issue here. 2014(Greenbriar Homes Communities, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 337, 345-346 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 ], disapproved on another point in Tarrant Bell, supra, 51 Cal.4th atp. 547 ; Woodside Homes of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 723, 732-733 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 35 ].) There is no reason why a different result should apply to the mediation clause at issue here. | 1 | 1 |
Woodside Homes of California, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014(Greenbriar Homes Communities, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 337, 345-346 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 ], disapproved on another point in Tarrant Bell, supra, 51 Cal.4th atp. 547 ; Woodside Homes of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 723, 732-733 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 35 ].) There is no reason why a different result should apply to the mediation clause at issue here. 2014(Greenbriar Homes Communities, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 337, 345-346 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 ], disapproved on another point in Tarrant Bell, supra, 51 Cal.4th atp. 547 ; Woodside Homes of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 723, 732-733 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 35 ].) There is no reason why a different result should apply to the mediation clause at issue here. | 1 | 1 |
| Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Doe 1 v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Frei v. Daveygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roberts v. City of Palmdalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murphy v. Padillagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Daly v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Sandrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blackburn v. Charnley
green
2 sentences2025In support of its argument that the lis pendens exception in paragraph 22C(2) applied, the trust relied on Blackburn v. Charnley (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 758 (Blackburn), which involved a residential purchase agreement containing a similar attorney fees provision, mediation requirement, and lis pendens exception. 2022“On appeal, we review the determination of the legal basis for an award of attorney fees de novo as a question of law. [Citation.]” (Blackburn v. Charnley (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 758, 767 .) The Purchase Agreement provides in paragraph 26, entitled “Attorney Fees,” that in any action arising out of the Purchase Agreement, “the prevailing Buyer or Seller shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing Buyer or Seller, except as provided in paragraph 31A.” Paragraph 31 of the Purchase Agreement is 56 entitled “Dispute Resolution.” Paragraph 31A, entitled “Mediation | 2 | 2022–2025 |
Solin v. O' Melveny & Myers, LLP.
green
2 sentences2013(See Solin v. O’Melveny & Myers (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 451 [client‟s invocation of attorney-client privilege vis-à-vis attorneys sued for malpractice required dismissal of malpractice action against them].) There are two flaws in the argument: One, Elieff already had a chance to clear up ambiguities in the settlement agreement before trial in arbitration. 2013(E.g., Solin, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 467 ; McDermott, Will & Emery v. Superior Court, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 385 [corporate outside counsel entitled to judgment in shareholder derivative action where counsel could not make use of attorney- client communications].) Elieff‟s theory concerning mediation simply cannot be squared with what our Supreme Court unanimously both did and said in Cassel v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.4th 113 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Marriage of Kieturakis
green
2 sentences2013“However, if there is a price to be paid in fairness to preserve mediation confidentiality, the cases have required that it be paid by parties challenging, not defending, what transpired in the mediation.” (Kieturakis, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 87 .) We are not persuaded by Elieff‟s argument connecting (a) the observation made by the Kieturakis court and (b) the idea Kurtin was put to a forced choice of giving up the mediation privilege or dropping his claims. 2013“However, if there is a price to be paid in fairness to preserve mediation confidentiality, the cases have required that it be paid by parties challenging, not defending, what transpired in the mediation.” (Kieturakis, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 87 .) We are not persuaded by Elieff’s argument connecting (a) the observation made by the Kieturakis court and (b) the idea Kurtin was put to a forced choice of giving up the mediation privilege or dropping his claims. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
In Re John W.
red
2 sentences2003Indeed, the mediation requirement not only protects Nicholas from future harm, it also promotes “the strong public interest in preventing the juvenile dependency system from being used to subsidize private child custody disputes.” (In re John W., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 969 .) “The juvenile courts must not become a battleground by which family law war is waged by other means. 2003Indeed, the mediation requirement not only protects Nicholas from future harm, it also promotes "the strong public interest in preventing the juvenile dependency system from being used to subsidize private child custody disputes." ( In re John W., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 969 , 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 899 .) "The juvenile courts must not become a battleground by which family law war is waged by other means. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2025(See Dunk, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1801 .) In its ruling granting final approval of the Settlement Agreement, the court explained why it continued to find the agreement was fair and reasonable, noting the following factors: (1) the agreement was reached following a mediation hearing before a retired judge; (2) class counsel had experience litigating similar class actions; (3) only a small number of class members objected to, or opted out of, the settlement; (4) class counsel described in sufficient detail the documents and data that she reviewed before agreeing to settle the case and provi | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Viner v. Sweet
green
1 sentence2025Similarly, Beach states that the trial court did not base its decision on any failure on his part to provide sufficient evidence to establish causation under Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1235 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase
green
1 sentence2024Exclusion of Live Testimony Morales contends the arbitrator improperly resolved credibility issues on summary disposition based on excerpts from 9 Neither party contends this standard is incorrect, and, in any event, “an arbitrator’s decision is not generally reviewable for errors of fact or law[.]” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 6 .) 10 Morales also argues California Evidence Code section 1119 (describing the mediation privilege) does not prevent Morales or his experts from testifying about his own physical and mental state at the time of the mediation. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Rosario E. Sobremonte v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County
green
1 sentence2023(Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1996) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 992 .) Its failure to participate in mediation, a condition precedent to initiating arbitration in accordance with the agreement in the present case, constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate the dispute. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021(Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 810 .) Here, the new causes of action proposed by Keshen would not have resolved the underlying problem of the mediation privilege issue. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2021(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 , 3 455.) Keshen also argues that mediation privilege is not absolute, and does not apply in all cases. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Cellphone Termination Fee Cases
green
1 sentence2020The negotiation of settlements, however, is typically not transparent, and “[t]his lack of transparency is reflected in the limited ability of objectors to obtain discovery regarding settlement negotiations. ‘“It is well established . . . that objectors are not entitled to discovery concerning settlement negotiations between the parties without evidence indicating that there was collusion between plaintiffs and defendants in the negotiating process.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Ultimately, the key consideration for the trial court is the substantive fairness of the settlement terms, as well as t | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Oasis West Realty v. Goldman
green
1 sentence2015Anti-SLAPP Statute: Two-step Procedure The anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a two-step procedure for striking a cause of action at the earlier stages of litigation when it is established that the cause of action was filed to “chill” the defendant’s constitutional rights of free speech and/or to petition the government. (§ 425.16, subds. (a) & (b).) In the first step, the court determines whether the moving defendant has shown that a cause of action arises from “protected activity,” i.e., from an act in furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional right to petition or free speech as defined in th | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC
green
1 sentence2015Anti-SLAPP Statute: Two-step Procedure The anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a two-step procedure for striking a cause of action at the earlier stages of litigation when it is established that the cause of action was filed to “chill” the defendant’s constitutional rights of free speech and/or to petition the government. (§ 425.16, subds. (a) & (b).) In the first step, the court determines whether the moving defendant has shown that a cause of action arises from “protected activity,” i.e., from an act in furtherance of the defendant’s constitutional right to petition or free speech as defined in th | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014(Greenbriar Homes Communities, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 337, 345-346 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 371 ], disapproved on another point in Tarrant Bell, supra, 51 Cal.4th atp. 547 ; Woodside Homes of California, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 723, 732-733 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 35 ].) There is no reason why a different result should apply to the mediation clause at issue here. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gouvis Engineering v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2014(See Gouvis Engineering v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 642, 650 .) The court found that the mediation and settlement agreement “have been used as shields by Kensington to preclude an investigation by the Court into the realities of the various deal points between the parties.” In rejecting the application of the mediation privilege, the court stated, “The mediation privilege was argued to block inquiry into what the stakes really were. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Parsons v. Bristol Development Co.
green
1 sentence2014(Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865 .)” (Id. at pp. 1165–1166.) II At the 402 hearing, Wallace, in-house counsel for the bank, stated that her client would not waive either the mediation privilege or the confidentiality provision of the agreement in this proceeding. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
green
1 sentence2007(Garstang, supra, at pp. 532-535 .) In considering the strength of the privacy interest covering the coworkers’ communications with the workplace ombudsman, the Garstang court applied the following four factors: (1) whether “the communication was one made in the belief that it would not be disclosed,” (2) whether “confidentiality was essential to the maintenance of the relationship between the parties,” (3) whether “the relationship was one that society considers worthy of being fostered,” and (4) whether “the injury to the relationship incurred by disclosure would be greater than the benefit | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Rinaker v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Eisendrath v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Rojas v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Brewer green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.