pure de novo standard in Tennessee

2019We review questions of law “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

2016With respect to legal issues, our review is conducted “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

2005STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (Tenn. 2002); Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

2005STANDARD OF REVIEW The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 569-70 (2002); Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001).

2003A trial court's ruling on a matter of law, however, will be reviewed "`under a pure de novo standard . . . according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower court[].'" Bank/First Citizens, 82 S.W.3d at 262 (quoting Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2001)).

2003A trial court’s ruling on a matter of law, however, will be reviewed “ ‘under a pure de novo standard ... according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower court[ ].’ ” Bank/First Citizens, 82 S.W.3d at 262 (quoting Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2001)).

2007Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn.1991).

2007Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn.1991).

2018Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002) (citing The Bank/First Citizens Bank v. Citizens & Assocs., 82 S.W.3d 259, 262 (Tenn. 2002)). 2 The damage award was apportioned as follows:  Wrongful eviction: $1.00  Conversion of personal property: $23,130.00  Punitive and exemplary damages: $5,000.00  Discretionary costs: $2,395.60  Pre-judgment interest on the full amount of the judgment from December 11, 2012: $6,224.27 Defendants were held jointly and severally liable on the judgment. 3 III.

2018Rutherford Cnty. v. Wilson, 121 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tenn. 2003); Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W. 3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

2006Thompson v. Hensley, 136 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

2006Thompson v. Hensley, 136 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 10, 2004).

2006Id.; Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000) .

2005Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn.2000).

2005Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tenn. 2001).

2001See, e.g., Daron v. Department of Corr., 44 S.W.3d 478, 480 (Tenn.2001); Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tenn.2001).

2003It is well established that a contract can be express, implied, written, or oral, “but an enforceable contract must result from a meeting of the minds in mutual assent to terms, must be based upon sufficient consideration, must be free from fraud or undue influence, not against public policy and must be sufficiently definite to be enforced.” Klosterman Devel *930 opment Corp. v. Outlaw Aircraft Sales, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 621, 635 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002).

2003It is well established that a contract can be express, implied, written, or oral, “but an enforceable contract must result from a meeting of the minds in mutual assent to terms, must be based upon sufficient consideration, must be free from fraud or undue influence, not against public policy and must be sufficiently definite to be enforced.” Klosterman Development Corp. v. Outlaw Aircraft Sales, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 621, 635 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

2002With respect to the issues relating to the interpretation of the contact, “[t]he interpretation of a written agreement is a matter of law and not of fact, therefore, our review is de novo on the record with no presumption of the correctness of the trial court’s conclusions of law.” Inscoe v. Kemper, No. M1999-00741-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1657844 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2000) (citing Union Planter’s Nat’l Bank v. American Home Assurance Co., 865 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

1998With respect to issues relating to the interpretation of a contract, “[t]he interpretation of a written agreement is a matter of law and not of fact, therefore, our review is de novo on the record with no presumption of the correctness of the trial court’s conclusions of law.” Inscoe v. Kemper, No. M1999-00741-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1657844 , at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2000) (citing Union Planter’s Nat’l Bank v. American Home Assurance Co., 865 S.W.2d 907, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)).

2018Rutherford Cnty. v. Wilson, 121 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Tenn. 2003); Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W. 3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002).

2015Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn. 2013).

2014Reinhardt v. Neal, 241 S.W.3d 472, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).

2014Questions of law are reviewed “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Johnson v. Johnson, 165 S.W.3d 640, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)).

2014Our review of a legal issue is conducted “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” Moody v. Hutchison, 159 S.W.3d 15, 26 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2004) (quoting Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)).

2013“Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to impose contempt sanctions using the more relaxed ‘abuse of discretion’ standard of review.” Freeman v. Freeman, 147 S.W.3d 234, 242 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting McDowell v. McDowell, No. M2000-00164-COA-R3- CV, 2001 WL 459101 , at *5; 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 315 , at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2001)).

2008Serv., 181 S.W.3d 661, 663 (Tenn. 2005).

2005As to the trial court’s conclusions of law, our review is conducted “under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts.” S. Contractors, Inc. v. Loudon Co. Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). “[T]rial courts are in the most favorable position to resolve factual disputes hinging on credibility determinations.” Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999).

2005Appellate courts do not “re-evaluate a trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Id.

2005“Generally, what will constitute a partnership is a matter of law, but whether a partnership exists under conflicting evidence is one of fact.” Messer Griesheim Indus., Inc. v. Cruotech of Kingsport, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 588, 605 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001)(quoting Wyatt v. Brown, 39 TenmApp. 28, 281 S.W.2d 64, 68 (1955)).

2005ANALYSIS In Five Star Express, Inc. v. Davis, 866 S.W.2d 944, 950 (Tenn.1993), we held that “venue in worker’s [sic] compensation actions is to be determined solely by the workers’ compensation venue statute— § 50-6-225(c)(l) — and any other authority indicating otherwise is hereby expressly overruled.” Section 50-6-225(e)(l) of the Tennessee Code of 1993, which was the venue provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act at the time Five Star was announced, provided that “[t]he party filing the petition may ... file ... an original petition in either the circuit, criminal or chancery court of [1]

2005“Generally, what will constitute a partnership is a matter of law, but whether a partnership exists under conflicting evidence is one of fact.” Messer Griesheim Indus., Inc. v. Cruotech of Kingsport, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 588, 605 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001)(quoting Wyatt v. Brown, 39 TenmApp. 28, 281 S.W.2d 64, 68 (1955)).

2004As to factual issues, concurrent findings of fact by the Special Master and Trial Court are "conclusive on appeal, except where the finding is on an issue not appropriate for referral, where it is based on an error of law or a mixed question of fact and law, or where the factual finding is not based on material evidence." Pendola v. Butler, No. M2002-00131-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 535 , at **11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2003), no appl. perm. appeal filed (quoting Aussenberg v. Kramer, 944 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)).