Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
32 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2016–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scott v. Stategreen2 sentences2025When the plain meaning is not as clear, however, the court must “look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework, to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it.” Scott v. State, 299 Ga. 568, 571 (2) ( 788 SE2d 468 ) (2016). 2025When the plain meaning is not as clear, however, the court must “look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework, to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it.” Scott v. State, 299 Ga. 568, 571 (2) ( 788 SE2d 468 ) (2016). | 13 | 15 |
Patton v. Vanterpoolgreen2 sentences2019Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.4 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 254 ( 806 SE2d 493 ) (2017), quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 4 “The right to file a claim for wrongful death did not exist at common law; it is entirely a legisl 2019Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.4 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 254 ( 806 SE2d 493 ) (2017), quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 4 “The right to file a claim for wrongful death did not exist at common law; it is entirely a legisl | 6 | 7 |
Deal v. Colemangreen2 sentences2019Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.4 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 254 ( 806 SE2d 493 ) (2017), quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 4 “The right to file a claim for wrongful death did not exist at common law; it is entirely a legisl 2019Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.4 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis omitted.) Patton v. Vanterpool, 302 Ga. 253, 254 ( 806 SE2d 493 ) (2017), quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 4 “The right to file a claim for wrongful death did not exist at common law; it is entirely a legisl | 6 | 7 |
Merritt v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Those opinions suggest that the mischief rule has never been a part of our law: But “the legislature’s intent is discerned from the text of a duly enacted statute and the statute’s context within the larger legal framework.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 67 (2) ( 799 SE2d 770 ) (2017). “[W]hen judges start discussing not the meaning of the statutes the legislature actually enacted, as determined from the text of those laws, but rather the unexpressed ‘spirit’ or ‘reason’ of the legislation, and the need to make sure the law does not cause unreasonable consequences, we venture into dangerously un 2017Those opinions suggest that the mischief rule has never been a part of our law: But “the legislature’s intent is discerned from the text of a duly enacted statute and the statute’s context within the larger legal framework.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 67 (2) ( 799 SE2d 770 ) (2017). “[W]hen judges start discussing not the meaning of the statutes the legislature actually enacted, as determined from the text of those laws, but rather the unexpressed ‘spirit’ or ‘reason’ of the legislation, and the need to make sure the law does not cause unreasonable consequences, we venture into dangerously un | 6 | 6 |
State v. Riggsgreen2 sentences2017But “the legislature’s intent is discerned from the text of a duly enacted statute and the statute’s context within the larger legal framework.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 67 (2) ( 799 SE2d 770 ) (2017). [W]hen judges start discussing not the meaning of the statutes the legislature actually enacted, as determined from the text of those laws, but rather the unexpressed “spirit” or “reason” of the legislation, and the need to make sure the law does not cause unreasonable consequences, we venture into dangerously undemocratic, unfair, and impractical territory. 2017But “the legislature’s intent is discerned from the text of a duly enacted statute and the statute’s context within the larger legal framework.” State v. Riggs, 301 Ga. 63, 67 (2) ( 799 SE2d 770 ) (2017). [W]hen judges start discussing not the meaning of the statutes the legislature actually enacted, as determined from the text of those laws, but rather the unexpressed “spirit” or “reason” of the legislation, and the need to make sure the law does not cause unreasonable consequences, we venture into dangerously undemocratic, unfair, and impractical territory. | 4 | 4 |
Malphurs v. the Stategreen2 sentences2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[Ojur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n. 3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County. 2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[Ojur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n. 3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County. | 3 | 3 |
Georgia Lottery Corporation v. Tabletop Media LLC.green2 sentences2020Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.5 Here, Hernandez’s nuisance count relies on OCGA § 16-15-7, which provides: (a) Any real property which is erected, established, maintained, owned, leased, or used by any criminal street gang for the purpose of conducting 4 (Punctuation omitted.) RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma L 2020Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.5 Here, Hernandez’s nuisance count relies on OCGA § 16-15-7, which provides: (a) Any real property which is erected, established, maintained, owned, leased, or used by any criminal street gang for the purpose of conducting 4 (Punctuation omitted.) RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma L | 2 | 2 |
City of Marietta v. Summerourgreen2 sentences2025Accord City of Marietta v. Summerour, 302 Ga. 645, 656 (3) ( 807 SE2d 324 ) (2017). 2025Accord City of Marietta v. Summerour, 302 Ga. 645, 656 (3) ( 807 SE2d 324 ) (2017). | 1 | 1 |
Waters v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2025Transparency, 359 Ga. App. at 33 (2)(“This Court looks to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Waters v. Roberts, 116 Ga. App. 620, 622 ( 158 SE2d 428 ) (1967) (stating that the provision’s “particular placement” after certain preceding subsections was informative as to its meaning). 17 2. 2025Transparency, 359 Ga. App. at 33 (2)(“This Court looks to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Waters v. Roberts, 116 Ga. App. 620, 622 ( 158 SE2d 428 ) (1967) (stating that the provision’s “particular placement” after certain preceding subsections was informative as to its meaning). 17 2. | 1 | 1 |
City of Coll. Park v. Martingreen2 sentences2023“Where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning generally ends.” City of College Park v. Martin, 304 Ga. 488, 489 ( 818 SE2d 620 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2023“Where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning generally ends.” City of College Park v. Martin, 304 Ga. 488, 489 ( 818 SE2d 620 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLCgreen2 sentences2022Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC, 299 Ga. 891, 894 (1) ( 792 SE2d 680 ) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2022These tax provisions inform the construction of the redemption provisions, because in construing a statute this court “look[s] to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it.” Reliance Equities, 299 Ga. at 894 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
IN THE INTEREST OF K.S., a Childgreen1 sentence2021S., 303 Ga. 542, 543 ( 814 SE2d 324 ) (2018), citing Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839 (1) ( 770 SE2d 851 ) (2015), Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 5 unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.”6 Here, under OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A), when a defendant is found guilty of fleeing with a speed more than 20 miles per hour over the speed limit, the sentencing statute authorizes the trial court to impose a fine of $5,000 and/or impose a sentence of “imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than | 1 | 1 |
Chan v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2021S., 303 Ga. 542, 543 ( 814 SE2d 324 ) (2018), citing Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839 (1) ( 770 SE2d 851 ) (2015), Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 5 unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.”6 Here, under OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A), when a defendant is found guilty of fleeing with a speed more than 20 miles per hour over the speed limit, the sentencing statute authorizes the trial court to impose a fine of $5,000 and/or impose a sentence of “imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 2021S., 303 Ga. 542, 543 ( 814 SE2d 324 ) (2018), citing Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839 (1) ( 770 SE2d 851 ) (2015), Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 5 unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.”6 Here, under OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A), when a defendant is found guilty of fleeing with a speed more than 20 miles per hour over the speed limit, the sentencing statute authorizes the trial court to impose a fine of $5,000 and/or impose a sentence of “imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than | 1 | 1 |
RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLPgreen2 sentences2020Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.5 Here, Hernandez’s nuisance count relies on OCGA § 16-15-7, which provides: (a) Any real property which is erected, established, maintained, owned, leased, or used by any criminal street gang for the purpose of conducting 4 (Punctuation omitted.) RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma L 2020Though we may review the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it, where the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.5 Here, Hernandez’s nuisance count relies on OCGA § 16-15-7, which provides: (a) Any real property which is erected, established, maintained, owned, leased, or used by any criminal street gang for the purpose of conducting 4 (Punctuation omitted.) RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma L | 1 | 1 |
West v. Stategreen2 sentences2017West v. State, 300 Ga. 39, 42 ( 793 SE2d 57 ) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2017West v. State, 300 Ga. 39, 42 ( 793 SE2d 57 ) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Rutter v. Ruttergreen2 sentences2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[O]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill.”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n.3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Edc., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150-151 ( 775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5 ( 730 SE2d 626 ) (2012); Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14 , 26 n.17 ( 714 SE2d 693 ) (2011) (Black 2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[O]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill.”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n.3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Edc., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150-151 ( 775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5 ( 730 SE2d 626 ) (2012); Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14 , 26 n.17 ( 714 SE2d 693 ) (2011) (Black | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Whitfield Countygreen2 sentences2017We look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it. 4 See, e.g., Williams v. Whitfield Cty., 289 Ga. App. 301, 303 ( 656 SE2d 584 ) (2008); Chamlee, 239 Ga. App. at 188 ; see also Blumsack v. Bartow Cty., 223 Ga. App. 392, 393-396 (1) ( 477 SE2d 642 ) (1996). 2017We look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it. 4 See, e.g., Williams v. Whitfield Cty., 289 Ga. App. 301, 303 ( 656 SE2d 584 ) (2008); Chamlee, 239 Ga. App. at 188 ; see also Blumsack v. Bartow Cty., 223 Ga. App. 392, 393-396 (1) ( 477 SE2d 642 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Blumsack v. Bartow Countygreen2 sentences2017We look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it. 4 See, e.g., Williams v. Whitfield Cty., 289 Ga. App. 301, 303 ( 656 SE2d 584 ) (2008); Chamlee, 239 Ga. App. at 188 ; see also Blumsack v. Bartow Cty., 223 Ga. App. 392, 393-396 (1) ( 477 SE2d 642 ) (1996). 2017We look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it. 4 See, e.g., Williams v. Whitfield Cty., 289 Ga. App. 301, 303 ( 656 SE2d 584 ) (2008); Chamlee, 239 Ga. App. at 188 ; see also Blumsack v. Bartow Cty., 223 Ga. App. 392, 393-396 (1) ( 477 SE2d 642 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
DAY v. FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; And Vice Versagreen2 sentences2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[O]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill.”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n.3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Edc., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150-151 ( 775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5 ( 730 SE2d 626 ) (2012); Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14 , 26 n.17 ( 714 SE2d 693 ) (2011) (Black 2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[O]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill.”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n.3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Edc., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150-151 ( 775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5 ( 730 SE2d 626 ) (2012); Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14 , 26 n.17 ( 714 SE2d 693 ) (2011) (Black | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walters v. the State
green
2 sentences2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[Ojur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n. 3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County. 2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[Ojur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n. 3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County. | 3 | 2017–2017 |
In re Interest of K.S.
green
1 sentence2021S., 303 Ga. 542, 543 ( 814 SE2d 324 ) (2018), citing Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839 (1) ( 770 SE2d 851 ) (2015), Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013). 5 unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning ends.”6 Here, under OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A), when a defendant is found guilty of fleeing with a speed more than 20 miles per hour over the speed limit, the sentencing statute authorizes the trial court to impose a fine of $5,000 and/or impose a sentence of “imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Chamlee v. Henry County Board of Education
green
1 sentence2017We look to the text of the provision in question and its context within the larger legal framework to discern the intent of the legislature in enacting it. 4 See, e.g., Williams v. Whitfield Cty., 289 Ga. App. 301, 303 ( 656 SE2d 584 ) (2008); Chamlee, 239 Ga. App. at 188 ; see also Blumsack v. Bartow Cty., 223 Ga. App. 392, 393-396 (1) ( 477 SE2d 642 ) (1996). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Keaton v. State
green
2 sentences2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[O]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill.”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n.3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Edc., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150-151 ( 775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5 ( 730 SE2d 626 ) (2012); Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14 , 26 n.17 ( 714 SE2d 693 ) (2011) (Black 2017See also Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 871-872 ( 785 SE2d 414 ) (2016) (“[O]ur concern is with the actual text of statutes, not the subjective statements of individual legislators expressing their personal intent in voting for or against a bill.”); Walters v. State, 335 Ga. App. 12 , 15 n.3 ( 780 SE2d 720 ) (2015); Day v. Floyd County Bd. of Edc., 333 Ga. App. 144, 150-151 ( 775 SE2d 622 ) (2015) (Dillard, J., concurring fully and specially); Rutter v. Rutter, 316 Ga. App. 894, 896 (1) n.5 ( 730 SE2d 626 ) (2012); Keaton v. State, 311 Ga. App. 14 , 26 n.17 ( 714 SE2d 693 ) (2011) (Black | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.