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32 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Kinggreen2 sentences2025In the alternative, defense counsel argued that pursuant to the one act one crime rule (see People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977)), the court should set aside one of the armed violence counts. 2000People v. King , 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 , 363 N.E.2d 838, 845 (1977) (the one-act-one-crime test). | 4 | 16 |
People v. Segaragreen2 sentences1991(Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 ; King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 , 363 N.E.2d 838 .) In promulgating the one-act-one-crime rule, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that prejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act. 1991(Segara, 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 ; King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 , 363 N.E.2d 838 .) In promulgating the one-act-one-crime rule, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that prejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2025See People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 14 ; People v. Campos, 2019 IL App (1st) 152613, ¶ 35 . 2020However, in his reply brief, he withdrew this contention, acknowledging that our supreme court’s decision in People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901 , which was issued while his appeal was pending, compelled the opposite conclusion. -2- No. 1-17-0007 ¶5 Mayra Dominguez testified that, in the early morning hours on April 11, 2011, she was working on her computer in her second-floor apartment on South St. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2001Succinctly put, the one-act-one-crime doctrine stands for the proposition that "[m]ultiple convictions are improper if they are based on precisely the same physical act." People v. Rodriguez , 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 , 661 N.E.2d 305 (1996). 2001Succinctly put, the one-act-one-crime doctrine stands for the proposition that "[m]ultiple convictions are improper if they are based on precisely the same physical act." People v. Rodriguez , 169 Ill. 2d 183, 186 , 661 N.E.2d 305 (1996). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence2025People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Curtisgreen1 sentence2022People v. Curtis, 367 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Rileygreen1 sentence2020It is well settled that “[m]ultiple convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault based on one act of sexual penetration cannot stand because of the one-act-one-crime rule.” People v. Riley, 219 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. DiPacegreen1 sentence2019We disagree. - 19 - 2019 IL App (2d) 160766 ¶ 73 In People v. DiPace, 354 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bussangreen2 sentences1999See also Bussan, 306 Ill.App.3d at 839 , 240 Ill.Dec. 133 , 715 N.E.2d at 822 (holding McLaurin mandates that the "charging instrument" approach be applied when determining the existence of lesser offenses under the one-act-one-crime rule). 1999See also Bussan, 306 Ill.App.3d at 839 , 240 Ill.Dec. 133 , 715 N.E.2d at 822 (holding McLaurin mandates that the "charging instrument" approach be applied when determining the existence of lesser offenses under the one-act-one-crime rule). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Murphygreen1 sentence1999See People v. Murphy , 261 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coberngreen1 sentence1994(People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70, 77 , 533 N.E.2d 802, 805 ; People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 289 , 426 N.E.2d 535, 538 (two separate invasions of victim’s body, even though closely related, were not one physical act); see People v. Cobern (1992), 236 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People of Illinois v. Myersgreen2 sentences1994(People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70, 77 , 533 N.E.2d 802, 805 ; People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 289 , 426 N.E.2d 535, 538 (two separate invasions of victim’s body, even though closely related, were not one physical act); see People v. Cobern (1992), 236 Ill. 1994(People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70, 77 , 533 N.E.2d 802, 805 ; People v. Myers (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 281, 289 , 426 N.E.2d 535, 538 (two separate invasions of victim’s body, even though closely related, were not one physical act); see People v. Cobern (1992), 236 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Priest
green
2 sentences1999We recognize that a different conclusion was reached by the Fourth District Appellate Court in People v. Priest, 297 Ill. 1999We recognize that a different conclusion was reached by the fourth district appellate court in People v. Priest, 297 Ill. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Duncan v. Campos
green
2 sentences2025See People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 14 ; People v. Campos, 2019 IL App (1st) 152613, ¶ 35 . 2025Campos, 2019 IL App (1st) 152613 , ¶ 36. ¶ 20 “The one-act, one-crime rule prohibits multiple convictions carved from the same physical act.” Campos, 2019 IL App (1st) 152613 , ¶ 36. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Coats
green
1 sentence2024People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926 , ¶ 11. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2022ANALYSIS ¶ 27 As noted, defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)), and that his convictions on count II and III for predatory criminal sexual assault were predicated on the same physical act, thereby violating the one-act one-crime doctrine. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Aguilar
green
1 sentence2021The record does not contain any copy of any postconviction petition filed around that time. ¶7 On September 13, 2016, Butler filed a section 2-1401 petition for post-judgment relief and a habeas corpus petition (735 ILCS 5/10-101 (West 2014)) alleging the following: (1) his conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon was void under People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 ; (2) his indictment was obtained through deceptive means; and (3) his convictions violated -2- No. 1-18-2637 the one-act-one-crime doctrine. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Maas
green
1 sentence2019We disagree. - 19 - 2019 IL App (2d) 160766 ¶ 73 In People v. DiPace, 354 Ill. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. McLaurin
green
1 sentence1999Although the issue here is whether the one- act-one-crime rule permits multiple convictions, the supreme court has used the charging instrument approach to identify lesser included offenses in both jury instruction cases ( Hamilton , 179 Ill. 2d at 324) and one-act-one-crime cases ( McLaurin , 184 Ill. 2d at 104 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Payne
green
2 sentences1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i 1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
2 sentences1994(Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 , 76 L. 1994(Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 , 76 L. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Tayborn
green
1 sentence1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Mormon
green
2 sentences1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i 1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Simmons
green
2 sentences1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i 1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i 1994People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253 , 538 N.E.2d 1118 (two gunshots constitute two separate physical acts sufficient to support convictions for both armed violence and attempted murder); People v. Segara (1988), 126 Ill. 2d 70 , 533 N.E.2d 802 (affirmed two convictions for rape); People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45 , 456 N.E.2d 44 (vacated the conviction and sentence for burglary because it was the underlying felony for the armed violence conviction and both offenses were based on a single physical act); People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 94 , 442 N.E.2d 891 (cannot convict on both i | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sharp v. Texas
green
1 sentence1994Ed. 2d 159 , 109 S. Ct. 190 .) We therefore cannot accept defendant’s suggestion that we vacate his convictions and sentences for armed violence and aggravated battery because his appellate counsel failed to raise the one-act-one-crime doctrine on direct appeal. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Gray
green
1 sentence1992(People v. Gray (1988), 171 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Pugh
green
1 sentence1988(Pugh, 162 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
People v. Gray
green
1 sentence1986App.3d 867, 872 , 460 N.E.2d 354 .) Nevertheless, in light of the facts in this case, we believe that the consecutive sentences are not at variance with the purpose or spirit of the law or manifestly in excess of the proscription of the Illinois Constitution requiring all penalties to be in proportion to the nature of the offense. • 7 Finally, defendant claims that his conviction for unlawful restraint was based on the same act as the rape and deviate sexual assault offenses and therefore violates the one-act one-crime principle articulated in People v. King (1977), 66 Ill.2d 551 , 363 N.E.2d | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Butler
green
2 sentences1984Our supreme court’s opinion in People v. Butler (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 485 , 356 N.E.2d 330 , disposes of defendant’s contention. 1984Our supreme court’s opinion in People v. Butler (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 485 , 356 N.E.2d 330 , disposes of defendant’s contention. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.