testimony presented hearing in Illinois

2021Id. ¶ 63 First, although Daniel contends there was no acceptance because Erica did not sign the initial agreement, we find that there was ample evidence in the testimony presented at the hearing indicating that she accepted the written agreements.

2021Id. ¶ 62 First, although Daniel contends there was no acceptance because Erica did not sign the initial agreement, we find that there was ample evidence in the testimony presented at the hearing indicating that she accepted the written agreements.

2018Like the hypothetical posed in Luedemann, which the supreme court described as an “inoffensive” approach that would be unlikely to constitute a seizure, the approach of respondent in this case involved “only one or two officers ***, [who] displayed no weapons, *** did not touch [respondent], and *** did not use any language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with their requests was compelled.” See Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 554 . ¶ 140 Instead, it was only after the officers approached respondent for the sole purpose of asking him to accompany them to the police station as a potential

2017Like the hypothetical posed in Luedemann , which the supreme court described as an "inoffensive" approach that would be unlikely to constitute a seizure, the approach of respondent in this case involved "only one or two officers ***, [who] displayed no weapons, *** did not touch [respondent], and *** did not use any language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with their requests was compelled." See Luedemann , 222 Ill. 2d at 554 , 306 Ill.Dec. 94 , 857 N.E.2d 187 . ¶ 140 Instead, it was only after the officers approached respondent for the sole purpose of asking him to accompany them

2010After considering the testimony presented at the hearing, and considering the trial court’s credibility determinations and the weight it assigned to the testimony, we cannot say that the court’s judgment was “arbitrary, fanciful, [or] unreasonable,” 40 1-09-0796 or that “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Lieberman, 379 Ill.

2010After considering the testimony presented at the hearing, and considering the trial court’s credibility determinations and the weight it assigned to the testimony, we cannot say that the court’s judgment was “arbitrary, fanciful, [or] unreasonable,” or that “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Lieberman, 379 Ill.

2009We see no support for DCFS's contention that the testimony presented in the hearing did not establish an independent basis of abuse and neglect. *1052 DCFS further argues, relying on In re A.A., 181 Ill.2d 32 , 228 Ill.Dec. 905 , 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998), that the trial court did not have the authority to place S.D. in the custody of DCFS, as it was against the intent of the legislature.

2009We see no support for DCFS's contention that the testimony presented in the hearing did not establish an independent basis of abuse and neglect. *1052 DCFS further argues, relying on In re A.A., 181 Ill.2d 32 , 228 Ill.Dec. 905 , 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998), that the trial court did not have the authority to place S.D. in the custody of DCFS, as it was against the intent of the legislature.

1999This court stated that requiring "a report specified as a social investigation report, when the essential information is presented to the court through testimony and other reports, would be to place form over substance." R.D., 84 Ill.App.3d at 205 , 39 Ill.

1999This court stated that requiring “a report specified as a social investigation report, when the essential information is presented to the court through testimony and other reports, would be to place form over substance.” R.D., 84 Ill.

1997Paudel, 244 Ill.

1997Paudel, 244 Ill.

1980App. 3d 934 , 377 N.E.2d 590 ), we find that the reports submitted in the instant case, when viewed in conjunction with the testimony presented at the hearing, provided an adequate basis upon which the court could make its decision.

1980App.3d 934 , 377 N.E.2d 590 ), we find that the reports submitted in the instant case, when viewed in conjunction with the testimony presented at the hearing, provided an adequate basis upon which the court could make its decision.

2021App. 3d 1066, 1075 , 609 N.E.2d 1010, 1017 (1993) (“For clarity, we will detail the testimony presented at the section 115-10(b)(1) hearing because the trial court must determine whether the time, content, and circumstances provided sufficient safeguards of reliability based solely on the testimony presented at that hearing.”); People v. Burgund, 2016 IL App (5th) 130119, ¶ 244 , 66 N.E.3d 553 (“We also note that in analyzing the circuit court’s ruling under section 115- 10 of the Code, we must focus on the testimony admitted at the pretrial hearing rather than the testimony presented at trial

2021App. 3d 1066, 1075 , 609 N.E.2d 1010, 1017 (1993) (“For clarity, we will detail the testimony presented at the section 115-10(b)(1) hearing because the trial court must determine whether the time, content, and circumstances provided sufficient safeguards of reliability based solely on the testimony presented at that hearing.”); People v. Burgund, 2016 IL App (5th) 130119, ¶ 244 , 66 N.E.3d 553 (“We also note that in analyzing the circuit court’s ruling under section 115- 10 of the Code, we must focus on the testimony admitted at the pretrial hearing rather than the testimony presented at trial

2020The testimony presented at that hearing is explained in detail in People v. Yanez, 2014 IL App (1st) 123364 , but we repeat the facts here as they are necessary to our analysis. ¶5 At the hearing on defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, defendant testified that on March 12, 2002, she was driving a Chevrolet Silverado on the south side of Chicago near Midway Airport with her 24-year-old daughter and 6-year-old grandson in the truck with her.

2019She does not argue that the testimony undermined the adequacy of the attestation clause or showed that the clause “does not speak the truth.” See Alfaro, 301 Ill.

2017Further, in each case relied upon by the dissent, the trial court, upon reviewing a motion to suppress, considered all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, all of the testimony presented at the hearing, the appropriate standard of review, and case precedent to decide whether a seizure occurred. ¶ 33 Among the many cases cited by the dissent is the case of In re Rafeal E., 2014 IL App (1st) 133027, ¶ 20 , wherein this court found that there was a seizure based upon the officers pulling alongside the defendant and ordering him to stop walking and additionally telling him to take his h

2016Rather, whether the instruction must be given turns on “whether a reasonable jury, hearing the testimony presented by the defense witnesses, could find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant, due to his mental illness, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of the crime.” Id. at 881 .

2016The Dwight court further observed that a federal appellate court construing a “very similar” federal statute held that a trial judge must construe this evidence “ ‘most favorably to the defendant.’ ” Id. at 880 (quoting United States v. Owens, 854 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. 1988)).

2016The decisions then stated that the plaintiff had presented ‘no credible evidence’ that she was ‘not in violation of her family obligations.’ ” Id. at 23-24 .

2009DCFS cites to A.A. for the proposition that the General Assembly has broad discretion in amending the placement provisions to "`restrict the allocation of DCFS' scarce resources to its core population of abused, neglected, or dependent minors with no history of delinquency.'" See A.A., 181 Ill.2d at 39 , 228 Ill.Dec. 905 , 690 N.E.2d 980 , quoting In re C.T., 281 Ill.App.3d 189, 196-97 , 217 Ill.

2009DCFS cites to A.A. for the proposition that the General Assembly has broad discretion in amending the placement provisions to "`restrict the allocation of DCFS' scarce resources to its core population of abused, neglected, or dependent minors with no history of delinquency.'" See A.A., 181 Ill.2d at 39 , 228 Ill.Dec. 905 , 690 N.E.2d 980 , quoting In re C.T., 281 Ill.App.3d 189, 196-97 , 217 Ill.

2003The majority claims that "[i]t can be readily inferred from the testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress that defendant was the first car at the traffic light." Op. 280 Ill.Dec. at 604 , 802 N.E.2d at 855 .

2003The majority claims that "[i]t can be readily inferred from the testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress that defendant was the first car at the traffic light." Op. 280 Ill.Dec. at 604 , 802 N.E.2d at 855 .

1999This court stated that requiring "a report specified as a social investigation report, when the essential information is presented to the court through testimony and other reports, would be to place form over substance." R.D., 84 Ill.App.3d at 205 , 39 Ill.

1992(See Galler v. Galler (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 16 , 203 N.E.2d 577 ; Hagshenas v. Gaylord (1990), 199 Ill.

1992(See Galler v. Galler (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 16 , 203 N.E.2d 577 ; Hagshenas v. Gaylord (1990), 199 Ill.

1992(See Galler v. Galler (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 16 , 203 N.E.2d 577 ; Hagshenas v. Gaylord (1990), 199 Ill.

1986(Lupo v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1979), 82 Ill.

1983Ed. 2d 302 , 95 S. Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak’s identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1983It is well established that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill.2d 78 ; People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill.2d 525 ; People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026 , 42 L.Ed.2d 302 , 95 S.Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill.2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak's identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1983It is well established that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill.2d 78 ; People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill.2d 525 ; People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026 , 42 L.Ed.2d 302 , 95 S.Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill.2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak's identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1983It is well established that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill.2d 78 ; People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill.2d 525 ; People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026 , 42 L.Ed.2d 302 , 95 S.Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill.2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak's identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1983It is well established that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill.2d 78 ; People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill.2d 525 ; People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026 , 42 L.Ed.2d 302 , 95 S.Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill.2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak's identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1983Ed. 2d 302 , 95 S. Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak’s identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1983It is well established that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill.2d 78 ; People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill.2d 525 ; People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026 , 42 L.Ed.2d 302 , 95 S.Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill.2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak's identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1983It is well established that a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( People v. Holloway (1981), 86 Ill.2d 78 ; People v. Conner (1979), 78 Ill.2d 525 ; People v. Williams (1974), 57 Ill.2d 239 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1026 , 42 L.Ed.2d 302 , 95 S.Ct. 506 ; People v. Clay (1973), 55 Ill.2d 501 .) The testimony presented at the hearing concerning Walter Lesniak's identification contains no indication of any suggestive conduct on the part of the police.

1981As the court pointed out in Abney, each case involving a warrantless residential arrest must be decided on the individual facts presented. ( 81 Ill. 2d 159 , 173, 407 N.E.2d 543 , 549.) After reviewing the testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to quash, in light of the Abney exigency and reasonableness factors, we are convinced that the trial court acted properly in denying defendant Bares’ motion.

1981As the court pointed out in Abney, each case involving a warrantless residential arrest must be decided on the individual facts presented. ( 81 Ill. 2d 159 , 173, 407 N.E.2d 543 , 549.) After reviewing the testimony presented at the hearing on the motion to quash, in light of the Abney exigency and reasonableness factors, we are convinced that the trial court acted properly in denying defendant Bares’ motion.