ninety-day notice requirement in Mississippi

2025For example, in University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Easterling, 928 So. 2d 815, 819-20 (¶¶21-23) (Miss. 2006), the supreme court emphasized that strict compliance with the ninety-day notice requirement is required, regardless of the plaintiff’s reasons for failing to provide notice.

2010See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 72 (Miss.2009) ("the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which ... is strictly applied"); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 518 (Miss. 2009) ("[s]trict compliance with statutory notice is required ..."); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 820 (quoting Ivy v. GMAC, 612 So.2d 1108, 1116 (Miss.1992)) ("the ninety-day notice requirement ... is a `hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces'"). [7] In Arceo , this Court added that, under the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, [8] "[t]he mandatory

2012In Arthur v. Tunica County, 31 So.3d 653, 655 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2010), this Court held: In Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 695 (¶ 7) (Miss.2008) (quoting Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Stringer, 748 So.2d 662, 665 (¶ 11) (Miss.1999)), our supreme court held that “[t]he notice-of-claim requirement ‘imposes a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action.’ ” The Bunton court further held “the ninety-day notice requirement under section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which [an appellate court] strictly enforces.” Id. at 696 (¶ 8) (quoting Univ. of Miss.

2010See also Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 695-696 (Miss.2008) (citation omitted) (holding “the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces.”); Long v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 969 So.2d 35, 41 (Miss.2007) (citation omitted) ("Mississippi law now requires strict compliance with the ninety-day notice requirement in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.”); South Cent.

2010Ctr. v. Guffy, 930 So.2d 1252, 1259 (Miss.2006) ("[I]n Easterling, 928 So.2d at 819, this Court has gone further and adopted strict compliance as to the ninety-day notice requirement under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1).”); Univ. of Miss.

2009Ctr. v. Guffy, 930 So. 2d 1252, 1259 (Miss. 2006) (“[I]n Easterling, 928 So. 2d at 819, 2006 WL 871302 *5 , this Court has gone further and adopted strict compliance as to the ninety-day notice requirement under Miss.

2010See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 72 (Miss.2009) ("the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which ... is strictly applied"); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 518 (Miss. 2009) ("[s]trict compliance with statutory notice is required ..."); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 820 (quoting Ivy v. GMAC, 612 So.2d 1108, 1116 (Miss.1992)) ("the ninety-day notice requirement ... is a `hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces'"). [7] In Arceo , this Court added that, under the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, [8] "[t]he mandatory

2010See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 72 (Miss.2009) (“the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which ... is strictly applied”); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 518 (Miss. 2009) (“[s]trict compliance with statutory notice is required ... ”); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 820 (quoting Ivy v. GMAC, 612 So.2d 1108, 1116 (Miss.1992)) (“the ninety-day notice requirement ... is a ‘hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces’ ”). 7 In Arceo , this Court added that, under the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, 8 “[t]he mandatory na

2009The majority then concluded that the plaintiff had failed to comply at all with the ninety-day-notice requirement, clearly stating that “ ‘substantial compliance is not the same as, nor a substitute for, non compliance.’ ” Davis, 869 So.2d at 402 (quoting Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.1999)).

2009The majority then concluded that the plaintiff had failed to comply at all with the ninety-day-notice requirement, clearly stating that "`substantial compliance is not the same as, nor a substitute for, non compliance.'" Davis, 869 So.2d at 402 (quoting Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.1999)).

2010See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 72 (Miss.2009) ("the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which ... is strictly applied"); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 518 (Miss. 2009) ("[s]trict compliance with statutory notice is required ..."); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 820 (quoting Ivy v. GMAC, 612 So.2d 1108, 1116 (Miss.1992)) ("the ninety-day notice requirement ... is a `hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces'"). [7] In Arceo , this Court added that, under the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, [8] "[t]he mandatory

2010See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 72 (Miss.2009) (“the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which ... is strictly applied”); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 518 (Miss. 2009) (“[s]trict compliance with statutory notice is required ... ”); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 820 (quoting Ivy v. GMAC, 612 So.2d 1108, 1116 (Miss.1992)) (“the ninety-day notice requirement ... is a ‘hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces’ ”). 7 In Arceo , this Court added that, under the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, 8 “[t]he mandatory na

2010See also Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 695-696 (Miss.2008) (citation omitted) (holding “the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces.”); Long v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 969 So.2d 35, 41 (Miss.2007) (citation omitted) ("Mississippi law now requires strict compliance with the ninety-day notice requirement in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.”); South Cent.

2009Thus, DRMC’s interpretation of the phrase at issue cannot mean what DRMC claims it does. 4 See also Bunton v. King, 995 So. 2d 694, 695-696 (Miss. 2008) (citation omitted) (holding “the ninety-day notice requirement under Section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces.”); Long v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 969 So. 2d 35, 41 (Miss. 2007) (citation omitted) (“Mississippi law now requires strict compliance with the ninety-day notice requirement in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act.”); South Cent.

2009See, e.g., Jones, 758 So.2d at 429 (stating that a stay was the defendant’s sole remedy for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the ninety-day waiting period); City of Wiggins, 760 So.2d at 696 (same); City of Booneville, 738 So.2d at 1246 (finding that the proper remedy for failure to comply with the ninety-day waiting period is a stay); Tomlinson, 741 So.2d at 228 (same). ¶ 85.

2006In Easterling , we stated: In order to make it perfectly clear to all that strict compliance is required, as stated in Davis [v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397 (Miss.2004)] and Wright [v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 362 (Miss.2004)], we hereby overrule [ City of Pascagoula v.] Tomlinson[, 741 So.2d 224 (Miss.1999)] and its progeny, including [ Jackson v.] Booneville[, 738 So.2d 1241 (Miss.1999)], [ Leflore County v.] Givens[, 754 So.2d 1223 (Miss.2000)], [ Jackson v.] City of Wiggins[, 760 So.2d 694 (Miss.2000)], [ Jones v.] Mississippi School for Blind[, 758 So.2d 428 (Miss.2000)], and [ Williams v.] Clay County

2009The majority then concluded that the plaintiff had failed to comply at all with the ninety-day-notice requirement, clearly stating that “ ‘substantial compliance is not the same as, nor a substitute for, non compliance.’ ” Davis, 869 So.2d at 402 (quoting Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.1999)).

2009The majority then concluded that the plaintiff had failed to comply at all with the ninety-day-notice requirement, clearly stating that "`substantial compliance is not the same as, nor a substitute for, non compliance.'" Davis, 869 So.2d at 402 (quoting Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261, 265 (Miss.1999)).

2006We adhere to our controlling cases of Davis v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397 (Miss. 2004), and Wright v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 362 (Miss.2004), and accordingly find that Easterling failed to follow the ninety-day notice rule which this Court strictly enforces.

2006In Easterling , we stated: In order to make it perfectly clear to all that strict compliance is required, as stated in Davis [v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397 (Miss.2004)] and Wright [v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 362 (Miss.2004)], we hereby overrule [ City of Pascagoula v.] Tomlinson[, 741 So.2d 224 (Miss.1999)] and its progeny, including [ Jackson v.] Booneville[, 738 So.2d 1241 (Miss.1999)], [ Leflore County v.] Givens[, 754 So.2d 1223 (Miss.2000)], [ Jackson v.] City of Wiggins[, 760 So.2d 694 (Miss.2000)], [ Jones v.] Mississippi School for Blind[, 758 So.2d 428 (Miss.2000)], and [ Williams v.] Clay County

2009See, e.g., Jones, 758 So.2d at 429 (stating that a stay was the defendant’s sole remedy for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the ninety-day waiting period); City of Wiggins, 760 So.2d at 696 (same); City of Booneville, 738 So.2d at 1246 (finding that the proper remedy for failure to comply with the ninety-day waiting period is a stay); Tomlinson, 741 So.2d at 228 (same). ¶ 85.

2006In Easterling , we stated: In order to make it perfectly clear to all that strict compliance is required, as stated in Davis [v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397 (Miss.2004)] and Wright [v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 362 (Miss.2004)], we hereby overrule [ City of Pascagoula v.] Tomlinson[, 741 So.2d 224 (Miss.1999)] and its progeny, including [ Jackson v.] Booneville[, 738 So.2d 1241 (Miss.1999)], [ Leflore County v.] Givens[, 754 So.2d 1223 (Miss.2000)], [ Jackson v.] City of Wiggins[, 760 So.2d 694 (Miss.2000)], [ Jones v.] Mississippi School for Blind[, 758 So.2d 428 (Miss.2000)], and [ Williams v.] Clay County

2007Sch. for the Blind, 758 So. 2d 428, 429 (Miss. 2000), 6 Although Section 11-46-11 was revised in 1999, the language regarding the ninety- day-notice requirement remains unaltered from the pre-1999 version of Section 11-46-11.

2006Jones v. ] Mississippi School for Blind, [ 758 So.2d 428 (Miss.2000) ] and [ Williams v. ] Clay County, [ 861 So.2d 953 (Miss.2003) ] but only as to those cases' analysis of the ninety-day notice requirement.

2009See, e.g., Jones, 758 So.2d at 429 (stating that a stay was the defendant’s sole remedy for the plaintiffs failure to comply with the ninety-day waiting period); City of Wiggins, 760 So.2d at 696 (same); City of Booneville, 738 So.2d at 1246 (finding that the proper remedy for failure to comply with the ninety-day waiting period is a stay); Tomlinson, 741 So.2d at 228 (same). ¶ 85.

2006In Easterling , we stated: In order to make it perfectly clear to all that strict compliance is required, as stated in Davis [v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397 (Miss.2004)] and Wright [v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 362 (Miss.2004)], we hereby overrule [ City of Pascagoula v.] Tomlinson[, 741 So.2d 224 (Miss.1999)] and its progeny, including [ Jackson v.] Booneville[, 738 So.2d 1241 (Miss.1999)], [ Leflore County v.] Givens[, 754 So.2d 1223 (Miss.2000)], [ Jackson v.] City of Wiggins[, 760 So.2d 694 (Miss.2000)], [ Jones v.] Mississippi School for Blind[, 758 So.2d 428 (Miss.2000)], and [ Williams v.] Clay County

2009See Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 697-98 (Miss.2008) (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing Section 11-46-11(1)); Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So.2d 691, 698-704 (Miss. 2006) (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing Section 15-1-36(15)); Fairley v. George County, 871 So.2d 713, 718-28 (Miss.2004) (Easley, J., concurring) (addressing section 11-46-11(2)).

2008He argues that under Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So.2d 691 (Miss. 2006), and Nelson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-North Mississippi, Inc., 972 So.2d 667 (Miss.Ct.App.2007), both decided subsequent to Easterling , this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment and render a dismissal of his complaint without prejudice. ¶ 16.

2012In Arthur v. Tunica County, 31 So.3d 653, 655 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2010), this Court held: In Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 695 (¶ 7) (Miss.2008) (quoting Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Stringer, 748 So.2d 662, 665 (¶ 11) (Miss.1999)), our supreme court held that “[t]he notice-of-claim requirement ‘imposes a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action.’ ” The Bunton court further held “the ninety-day notice requirement under section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which [an appellate court] strictly enforces.” Id. at 696 (¶ 8) (quoting Univ. of Miss.

2012In Arthur v. Tunica County, 31 So.3d 653, 655 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2010), this Court held: In Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 695 (¶ 7) (Miss.2008) (quoting Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Stringer, 748 So.2d 662, 665 (¶ 11) (Miss.1999)), our supreme court held that “[t]he notice-of-claim requirement ‘imposes a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action.’ ” The Bunton court further held “the ninety-day notice requirement under section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which [an appellate court] strictly enforces.” Id. at 696 (¶ 8) (quoting Univ. of Miss.

2009See Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 697-98 (Miss.2008) (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing Section 11-46-11(1)); Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So.2d 691, 698-704 (Miss. 2006) (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing Section 15-1-36(15)); Fairley v. George County, 871 So.2d 713, 718-28 (Miss.2004) (Easley, J., concurring) (addressing section 11-46-11(2)).

2008See Bunton v. King, 995 So. 2d 694, 697-98 (Miss. 2008) (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing Section 11-46- 11(1)); Arceo v. Tolliver, 949 So. 2d 691, 698-704 (Miss. 2006) (Graves, J., dissenting) (addressing Section 15-1-36(15)); Fairley v. George County, 871 So. 2d 713, 718-28 (Miss. 2004) (Easley, J., concurring) (addressing section 11-46-11(2)).

2009Dep't of Human Servs., 835 So.2d 9, 12 (Miss.2002) (citation omitted) ("Jurisdiction, however, will only attach when there has been `substantial compliance' with the [MTCA notice] statutes."); Henderson v. Un-Named Emergency Room, 758 So.2d 422, 427 (Miss.2000) (finding that "the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Henderson failed to comply with the notice provisions of the MTCA"); Jones ex rel.

2009Dep’t of Human Servs., 835 So.2d 9, 12 (Miss.2002) (citation omitted) (“Jurisdiction, however, will only attach when there has been ‘substantial compliance’ with the [MTCA notice] statutes.”); Henderson v. Un-Named Emergency Room, 758 So.2d 422, 427 (Miss.2000) (finding that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Henderson failed to comply with the notice provisions of the MTCA”); Jones ex rel.

2009Grimes v. Warrington, 982 So.2d 365, 369-70 (Miss.2008); East Miss.

2009See Grimes, 982 So.2d at 367-70 ; Adams, 947 So.2d at 890-91 ; Horton, 926 So.2d at 179-81 . ¶ 10.

2009Dep't of Human Servs., 835 So.2d 9, 12 (Miss.2002) (citation omitted) ("Jurisdiction, however, will only attach when there has been `substantial compliance' with the [MTCA notice] statutes."); Henderson v. Un-Named Emergency Room, 758 So.2d 422, 427 (Miss.2000) (finding that "the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Henderson failed to comply with the notice provisions of the MTCA"); Jones ex rel.

2009Dep’t of Human Servs., 835 So.2d 9, 12 (Miss.2002) (citation omitted) (“Jurisdiction, however, will only attach when there has been ‘substantial compliance’ with the [MTCA notice] statutes.”); Henderson v. Un-Named Emergency Room, 758 So.2d 422, 427 (Miss.2000) (finding that “the trial court lacked jurisdiction because Henderson failed to comply with the notice provisions of the MTCA”); Jones ex rel.

2008Easterling, 928 So.2d at 819 (citing Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, 813 So.2d 717, 721 (Miss.2002) (retroactive application of judicially articulated rulings applies to cases awaiting trial); Anderson v. Anderson, 692 So.2d 65, 70 (Miss.1997) (change in the law applied retroactively to the case pending review on appeal)).

2007Easterling, 928 So. 2d at 819 (citing Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, 813 So. 2d 717, 721 (Miss. 2002) (retroactive application of judicially articulated rulings applies to cases awaiting trial); Anderson v. Anderson, 692 So. 2d 65, 70 (Miss. 1997) (change in the law applied retroactively to the case pending review on appeal)).

2008Easterling, 928 So.2d at 819 (citing Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, 813 So.2d 717, 721 (Miss.2002) (retroactive application of judicially articulated rulings applies to cases awaiting trial); Anderson v. Anderson, 692 So.2d 65, 70 (Miss.1997) (change in the law applied retroactively to the case pending review on appeal)).

2007Easterling, 928 So. 2d at 819 (citing Thompson v. City of Vicksburg, 813 So. 2d 717, 721 (Miss. 2002) (retroactive application of judicially articulated rulings applies to cases awaiting trial); Anderson v. Anderson, 692 So. 2d 65, 70 (Miss. 1997) (change in the law applied retroactively to the case pending review on appeal)).

2010See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 72 (Miss.2009) ("the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which ... is strictly applied"); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 518 (Miss. 2009) ("[s]trict compliance with statutory notice is required ..."); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 820 (quoting Ivy v. GMAC, 612 So.2d 1108, 1116 (Miss.1992)) ("the ninety-day notice requirement ... is a `hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces'"). [7] In Arceo , this Court added that, under the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, [8] "[t]he mandatory

2010See also Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 72 (Miss.2009) ("the MTCA requires written notice of a claim in advance of the filing of a lawsuit, a requirement which ... is strictly applied"); Price v. Clark, 21 So.3d 509, 518 (Miss. 2009) ("[s]trict compliance with statutory notice is required ..."); Easterling, 928 So.2d at 820 (quoting Ivy v. GMAC, 612 So.2d 1108, 1116 (Miss.1992)) ("the ninety-day notice requirement ... is a `hard-edged, mandatory rule which the Court strictly enforces'"). [7] In Arceo , this Court added that, under the Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Act, [8] "[t]he mandatory

2012In Arthur v. Tunica County, 31 So.3d 653, 655 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2010), this Court held: In Bunton v. King, 995 So.2d 694, 695 (¶ 7) (Miss.2008) (quoting Mississippi Department of Public Safety v. Stringer, 748 So.2d 662, 665 (¶ 11) (Miss.1999)), our supreme court held that “[t]he notice-of-claim requirement ‘imposes a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action.’ ” The Bunton court further held “the ninety-day notice requirement under section 11-46-11(1) is a hard-edged, mandatory rule which [an appellate court] strictly enforces.” Id. at 696 (¶ 8) (quoting Univ. of Miss.

2009See, e.g., Wright v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 862, 366 (Miss.2004); Davis v. Hoss, 869 So.2d 397, 401-02 (Miss.2004); Jones ex rel.

2009Davis, 869 So.2d at 401-02 ; Wright, 876 So.2d at 366 .