31 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goetzman v. Wicherngreen2 sentences1987Glidden involved a tort action filed and tried after we abrogated the doctrine of contributory negligence in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1983), but before July 1, 1984 when chapter 668 became operative. 1984On December 22, 1982, however, we abandoned the contributory negligence doctrine and adopted comparative negligence based on “proportionate responsibility for fault.” Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982). | 2 | 5 |
Irlbeck v. Pomeroygreen2 sentences1991Id. at 375 (citing Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d 831, 833-34 (Iowa 1973)). 1979See Irlbeck v. Pomeroy, 210 N.W.2d at 833-834 . | 2 | 3 |
Rozevink v. Farisgreen2 sentences1985As we thereafter said in Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1983), “that holding delineated a rule for a specific category of eases and displaced a single doctrine, the doctrine of contributory negligence.” 366 N.W.2d at 545 . 1985As we thereafter said in Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1983), "that holding delineated a rule for a specific category of cases and displaced a single doctrine, the doctrine of contributory negligence." 366 N.W.2d at 545. | 2 | 3 |
Rosenau Ex Rel. Rosenau v. City of Esthervillegreen1 sentence2022Coop., 267 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa 1978) (concluding submission of repetitive instructions on assumption of risk in a contributory negligence case defendant’s challenge to the negligence marshalling instruction for its failure to set out the elements of a “premises liability type of case.” 508 N.W.2d at 729–30. 13 was reversible error); Rosenau, 199 N.W.2d at 133 (finding no error in refusal to give assumption of risk instruction because it involved the same elements and facts as the contributory negligence instruction). | 1 | 1 |
Manley v. O'Brien County Rural Electric Cooperativegreen1 sentence2022Coop., 267 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa 1978) (concluding submission of repetitive instructions on assumption of risk in a contributory negligence case defendant’s challenge to the negligence marshalling instruction for its failure to set out the elements of a “premises liability type of case.” 508 N.W.2d at 729–30. 13 was reversible error); Rosenau, 199 N.W.2d at 133 (finding no error in refusal to give assumption of risk instruction because it involved the same elements and facts as the contributory negligence instruction). | 1 | 1 |
Reilly v. Andersongreen1 sentence2016See Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982) (“We hold that in all cases in which contributory negligence has previously been a complete defense, it is supplanted by the doctrine of comparative negligence.”), superseded by statute, Iowa Code ch. 668, as recognized in Reilly v. Anderson, 727 N.W.2d 102, 108 (Iowa 2006). 10 fifteen at the time of the accident, T.D. claims he had the “lowest standard of negligence contemplated by Iowa law.” T.D. also claims the only evidence of his negligence was his testimony on cross-examination when he was asked about information contained in the w | 1 | 1 |
Bokhoven v. Klinkergreen2 sentences1994In Bokhoven v. Klinker, 474 N.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Iowa 1991), we held “the doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery.” The doctrine’s chief *50 purpose was to ameliorate the harsh effects of the doctrine of contributory negligence. 1994Id. at 556 ; see also W. | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Van Roekelgreen1 sentence1992We held that it was not in Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Iowa 1984) (“[w]e do not believe that the change in the contributory negligence defense in Goetzman should affect the holding in Rosenau eliminating assumption of risk in its secondary meaning in negligence cases.”). | 1 | 1 |
Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.green2 sentences1982Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal.3d 804, 828 , 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 875 (1975). *753 We have experienced more than 100 years of judicial and legislative efforts to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine in Iowa. 1982Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 13 Cal.3d 804, 828 , 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 , 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 875 (1975). *753 We have experienced more than 100 years of judicial and legislative efforts to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine in Iowa. | 1 | 1 |
Dutcher v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1982He objected to the instruction on contributory negligence on the same grounds “as to the constitutional questions and as to the misstatement of the law.” In determining the sufficiency of an objection to preserve error, “the test is whether the exception taken alerted the trial court to the error which is urged on appeal.” Dutcher v. Lewis, 221 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Iowa 1974). 1982He objected to the instruction on contributory negligence on the same grounds "as to the constitutional questions and as to the misstatement of the law." In determining the sufficiency of an objection to preserve error, "the test is whether the exception taken alerted the trial court to the error which is urged on appeal." Dutcher v. Lewis, 221 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Iowa 1974). | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Iowa Power & Light Co.green1 sentence1981See Wilson v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 280 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Iowa 1979) (“We reserve the question whether plaintiff’s separate action for loss of consortium would have been subject to the contributory negligence defense.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Cuthbertgreen2 sentences1980In support, he cites Ross v.'Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435-36 , 397 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1964), which indicates that permitting one’s spouse to enrich the family treasury by recovering consortium damages when the injured spouse is barred from recovery by his or her own negligence defeats the basis of the contributory negligence doctrine, i. e., keeping a person from profiting by his own negligence. 1980In support, he cites Ross v.'Cuthbert, 239 Or. 429, 435-36 , 397 P.2d 529, 531-32 (1964), which indicates that permitting one’s spouse to enrich the family treasury by recovering consortium damages when the injured spouse is barred from recovery by his or her own negligence defeats the basis of the contributory negligence doctrine, i. e., keeping a person from profiting by his own negligence. | 1 | 1 |
Wardlow v. City of Keokukgreen2 sentences1974See Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, supra, We are deciding whether it will be extinguished by a contributory negligence defense good against the child. 1974See Wardlow v. City of Keokuk, supra, We are deciding whether it will be extinguished by a contributory negligence defense good against the child. | 1 | 1 |
Bauman v. City of Waverlygreen1 sentence1969See Bauman v. City of Waverly, Iowa, 164 N.W.2d 840, 845 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Markle v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1960Co., 219 Iowa 301, 308 , 257 N.W. 771, 775 , the court said: “ ‘Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, it is not necessary for plaintiff to show that he exercised the highest degree of care, or that the care exercised by him was perfect. 1960Co., 219 Iowa 301, 308 , 257 N.W. 771, 775 , the court said: “ ‘Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, it is not necessary for plaintiff to show that he exercised the highest degree of care, or that the care exercised by him was perfect. | 3 | 1938–1960 |
Handeland v. Brown
green
2 sentences1982In Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974), the court held the contributory negligence defense is inapplicable to a parental claim for medical expense and loss of services, companionship and society under Iowa R.Civ.P. 8. 1982In Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574 (Iowa 1974), the court held the contributory negligence defense is inapplicable to a parental claim for medical expense and loss of services, companionship and society under Iowa R.Civ.P. 8. | 2 | 1980–1982 |
Morgan v. Perlowski
green
1 sentence2022Coop., 267 N.W.2d 39, 44 (Iowa 1978) (concluding submission of repetitive instructions on assumption of risk in a contributory negligence case defendant’s challenge to the negligence marshalling instruction for its failure to set out the elements of a “premises liability type of case.” 508 N.W.2d at 729–30. 13 was reversible error); Rosenau, 199 N.W.2d at 133 (finding no error in refusal to give assumption of risk instruction because it involved the same elements and facts as the contributory negligence instruction). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Schuller v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence1987The pertinent facts of this case are fully set forth in the first appeal, Schuller v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1982), wherein the Iowa Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in favor of Hy-Vee on the grounds that the trial court erred in refusing one of plaintiff’s requested jury instructions and refusing to modify a contributory negligence instruction. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Speck v. Unit Handling Div., Litton Systems
green
2 sentences1985As we thereafter said in Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1983), “that holding delineated a rule for a specific category of eases and displaced a single doctrine, the doctrine of contributory negligence.” 366 N.W.2d at 545 . 1985We went on to say that we would decline to apply new chapter 668 piecemeal to cases filed before July 1, 1984, because to do so would complicate the many eases arising in this interim period and create a truly anomalous situation in Iowa tort law if we ignored the statute’s explicit wording concerning its effective date on some issues but complied with that expressed legislative intent on other issues. 366 N.W.2d at 546 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Alvis v. Ribar
green
2 sentences1982It also rejected an argument that the contributory negligence rule had been codified by statutes making it applicable under various liability statutes: “We believe that in enacting such statutes the legislature did not focus on the merits of the contributory negligence rule, but, rather, conformed the statutes to the then-existing law as announced by the court.” Id. at 23 , 52 Ill.Dec. at 33, 421 N.E.2d at 896 . 1982It also rejected an argument that the contributory negligence rule had been codified by statutes making it applicable under various liability statutes: “We believe that in enacting such statutes the legislature did not focus on the merits of the contributory negligence rule, but, rather, conformed the statutes to the then-existing law as announced by the court.” Id. at 23 , 52 Ill.Dec. at 33, 421 N.E.2d at 896 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Hoffman v. Jones
green
2 sentences1982The first state to make the change by judicial decision was Florida in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973). 1982The first state to make the change by judicial decision was Florida in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Stewart v. Madison
green
2 sentences1980Plaintiffs did not fully brief this issue because shortly after they filed their motion to strike, this court handed down its decision in Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1979), which declined to abrogate the doctrine of contributory negligence. 1980Plaintiffs did not fully brief this issue because shortly after they filed their motion to strike, this court handed down its decision in Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1979), which declined to abrogate the doctrine of contributory negligence. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Rickabaugh v. Wabash Railroad
green
2 sentences1973We must take them as we find them and do our best to apply them as new fact situations arise.” ( 242 Iowa at 750 , 44 N.W.2d at 661 .) Of course, that “saner and more workable rule” has now been adopted by the new contributory negligence standard enacted by the legislature in 1965 and found in sec *687 tion 619.17, The Code. 1973We must take them as we find them and do our best to apply them as new fact situations arise.” ( 242 Iowa at 750 , 44 N.W.2d at 661 .) Of course, that “saner and more workable rule” has now been adopted by the new contributory negligence standard enacted by the legislature in 1965 and found in sec *687 tion 619.17, The Code. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Yeary v. Holbrook
green
2 sentences1944For a case much in point, see Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 288 , 198 S. E. 441, 451 , where, after the plaintiff’s verdict, *424 it was urged that the contributory-negligence instruction was erroneous. 1944For a case much in point, see Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 288 , 198 S. E. 441, 451 , where, after the plaintiff’s verdict, *424 it was urged that the contributory-negligence instruction was erroneous. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Yance Ex Rel. Yance v. Hoskins
green
2 sentences1943We have frequently commended, for use in instructions, the statement of the contributory-negligence rule that “ ‘if the injured party contributed in any way, or in any degree directly to the injury, there can be no recovery.’ ” Yance v. Hoskins, 225 Iowa 1108, 1118 , 281 N. W. 489, 494 , 118 A. L. 1943We have frequently commended, for use in instructions, the statement of the contributory-negligence rule that “ ‘if the injured party contributed in any way, or in any degree directly to the injury, there can be no recovery.’ ” Yance v. Hoskins, 225 Iowa 1108, 1118 , 281 N. W. 489, 494 , 118 A. L. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Huffman v. King
green
2 sentences1938The decisive fact questions relate to the credibility of two sharply defined and diametrically opposed versions of the circumstances and occurrences of the accident giving rise to the claimed damages. ’ ’ In the very recent case of Huffman v. King, 222 Iowa 150 , 268 N. W. 144 , we find the following at page 154, 268 N. W., at page 147 : "It is the well settled rule of law in this state that if there is any evidence tending to establish plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence, that question is one for the jury. 1938The decisive fact questions relate to the credibility of two sharply defined and diametrically opposed versions of the circumstances and occurrences of the accident giving rise to the claimed damages. ’ ’ In the very recent case of Huffman v. King, 222 Iowa 150 , 268 N. W. 144 , we find the following at page 154, 268 N. W., at page 147 : "It is the well settled rule of law in this state that if there is any evidence tending to establish plaintiff’s freedom from contributory negligence, that question is one for the jury. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Smith v. Spirek
neutral
1 sentence1938It is sufficient to say briefly that, the evidence being sufficient to go to the jury on the question of Larson’s negligence, and no conclusive contributory negligence being disclosed, the case was clearly for the jury.” This court, in the case of Smith v. Spirek, 196 Iowa 1328 , 195 N. W. 736 , 737, said : "The controlling question in the determination of the instant appeal involves the doctrine of contributory negligence. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Ryan v. Perry Rendering Works
neutral
2 sentences1937The phraseology contained in a contributory negligence instruction in the case of Ryan v. Rendering Works, 215 Iowa 363 , 245 N. W. 301 , is not at all similar to any language used in Instruction No. 8 in the case at bar. 1937The phraseology contained in a contributory negligence instruction in the case of Ryan v. Rendering Works, 215 Iowa 363 , 245 N. W. 301 , is not at all similar to any language used in Instruction No. 8 in the case at bar. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Engle v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1937Defendant says that the contributory negligence which would bar plaintiff from recovery need not contribute “directly.” This question has been determined adversely to defendant in Engle v. Nelson, 220 Iowa 771 , loc. cit. 778, 263 N. W. 505 . 1937Defendant says that the contributory negligence which would bar plaintiff from recovery need not contribute “directly.” This question has been determined adversely to defendant in Engle v. Nelson, 220 Iowa 771 , loc. cit. 778, 263 N. W. 505 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Banning v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1932I. & P. Railroad Co., 89 Iowa 74, 81 , stated the contributory negligence rule in simple, unambiguous language, which it is difficult to improve upon. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Morris v. C., B. & Q. R. Co. green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Newman v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Bowman v. Humphrey green | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Davis v. Forbes neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.