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16 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1919–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc.green2 sentences2008As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Serv., Inc., the injured person’s failure to care for and treat his injuries as a reasonable prudent person would under the same or similar circumstances was ‘a branch of the doctrine of contributory negligence[’] ... only in the sense that damages resulting from such failure are ultimately not proximately caused by the wrongdoer’s acts or omissions, but by the injured person’s own subsequent negligence. 414 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex.1967) (emphasis added) (quoting Gulf C. & S.F. 2008As noted by the Texas Supreme Court in Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Serv., Inc., the injured person’s failure to care for and treat his injuries as a reasonable prudent person would under the same or similar circumstances was ‘a branch of the doctrine of contributory negligence[’] . . . only in the sense that damages resulting from such failure are ultimately not proximately caused by the wrongdoer’s acts or omissions, but by the injured person’s own subsequent negligence. 414 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1967) (emphasis added) (quoting Gulf, C. & S.F. | 3 | 3 |
Kroger Co. v. Kenggreen2 sentences2015Because nonsubscribers are not entitled to 249, 251 (1943)). a contributory negligence instruction, the court of appeals reformed the judgment and awarded Elwood one hundred In this case, there is no evidence that loading groceries on percent of the damages. 2004 WL 2567069 (citing Kroger the sloped portion of Kroger's parking lot is an unusually Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex.2000)). 2006Because non-subscribers are not entitled to a contributory negligence instruction, the court of appeals reformed the judgment and awarded Elwood one hundred percent of the damages. 2004 WL 2567069 (citing Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex.2000)). | 2 | 2 |
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. McMannewitzgreen2 sentences1967Co. v. Mannewitz, 70 Tex. 73 , 8 S.W. 66, 67 (1888), we said that failure of an injured person to care for and treat his injuries as a reasonable prudent person would under the same or similar circumstances was “a branch of the doctrine of contributory negligence.” It is a branch of that doctrine only in the sense that damages resulting from such failure are ultimately not proximately caused by the wrongdoer’s acts or omissions, but by the injured person’s own subsequent negligence, and are thus not recoverable from the wrongdoer. 1967Co. v. Mannewitz, 70 Tex. 73 , 8 S.W. 66, 67 (1888), we said that failure of an injured person to care for and treat his injuries as a reasonable prudent person would under the same or similar circumstances was “a branch of the doctrine of contributory negligence.” It is a branch of that doctrine only in the sense that damages resulting from such failure are ultimately not proximately caused by the wrongdoer’s acts or omissions, but by the injured person’s own subsequent negligence, and are thus not recoverable from the wrongdoer. | 1 | 2 |
McMahon Ex Rel. the Estate of McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc.green1 sentence2018Id. at 482 . 14 Similarly, a contributory-negligence defense may require reexamination of military decisions if it requires considering the fault of a military decision-maker.59 After a power outage, a Marine was electrocuted while trying to install a backup generator.60 Despite being told not to turn on the main generator because a group of Marines was working on it, the contractor turned it on, resulting in the Marine’s injuries.61 The contractor asserted a contributory-negligence defense, which would have required the court to decide whether the Marines were reasonable in trying to install | 1 | 1 |
Gilligan v. Morgangreen1 sentence2018Id. at 482 . 14 Similarly, a contributory-negligence defense may require reexamination of military decisions if it requires considering the fault of a military decision-maker.59 After a power outage, a Marine was electrocuted while trying to install a backup generator.60 Despite being told not to turn on the main generator because a group of Marines was working on it, the contractor turned it on, resulting in the Marine’s injuries.61 The contractor asserted a contributory-negligence defense, which would have required the court to decide whether the Marines were reasonable in trying to install | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. Halliburtongreen1 sentence2018Id. at 482 . 14 Similarly, a contributory-negligence defense may require reexamination of military decisions if it requires considering the fault of a military decision-maker.59 After a power outage, a Marine was electrocuted while trying to install a backup generator.60 Despite being told not to turn on the main generator because a group of Marines was working on it, the contractor turned it on, resulting in the Marine’s injuries.61 The contractor asserted a contributory-negligence defense, which would have required the court to decide whether the Marines were reasonable in trying to install | 1 | 1 |
Lord v. Fogcutter Bargreen1 sentence2013Contrast Lord v. Fogcutter Bar, 813 P.2d 660, 662 (Alaska 1991) (plaintiff, who was allegedly over-served by defendant before he left with a woman — and was later convicted of kidnapping and raping her — -was barred as a matter of public policy from recovering damages resulting from his imprisonment). . 63 N.Y.2d 19, 22-24, 28-29 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 , 468 N.E.2d 39, 40-44 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Kallashgreen2 sentences2013Contrast Lord v. Fogcutter Bar, 813 P.2d 660, 662 (Alaska 1991) (plaintiff, who was allegedly over-served by defendant before he left with a woman — and was later convicted of kidnapping and raping her — -was barred as a matter of public policy from recovering damages resulting from his imprisonment). . 63 N.Y.2d 19, 22-24, 28-29 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 , 468 N.E.2d 39, 40-44 (1984). 2013Contrast Lord v. Fogcutter Bar, 813 P.2d 660, 662 (Alaska 1991) (plaintiff, who was allegedly over-served by defendant before he left with a woman — and was later convicted of kidnapping and raping her — -was barred as a matter of public policy from recovering damages resulting from his imprisonment). . 63 N.Y.2d 19, 22-24, 28-29 , 479 N.Y.S.2d 201 , 468 N.E.2d 39, 40-44 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Axelradgreen2 sentences2008Cf. Jackson, 221 S.W.3d at 655-57 (observing that, for purposes of a contributory negligence inquiry in a medical malpractice case, a physician patient's specialized knowledge may be relevant to the ordinary care standard). 2008Cf. Jackson, 221 S.W.3d at 655-57 (observing that, for purposes of a contributory negligence inquiry in a medical malpractice case, a physician patient’s specialized knowledge may be relevant to the ordinary care standard). | 1 | 1 |
Barry Brister and Karen Brister, Cross-Appellees v. A.W.I., Inc., Cross-Appellantsgreen1 sentence2007The charge also properly informed the jury that the causation burden for the Jones Act claim was “legal cause” while the causation burden for the unseaworthiness claim was “proximate cause.” See Brister, 946 F.2d at 354-55 (contrasting liberal causation standard under Jones Act with more demanding proximate causation standard for unseaworthiness claim). | 1 | 1 |
Schiller v. Ricegreen1 sentence1985Sargent, 258 S.W.2d at 788 (guest statute); Schiller, 246 S.W.2d at 615-16 (guest statute); Fort Worth Elevators Co, 70 S.W.2d at 408 (suit for exemplary damages under the gross negligence provision of the Texas Constitution, TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Sargent v. Williamsgreen1 sentence1985Sargent, 258 S.W.2d at 788 (guest statute); Schiller, 246 S.W.2d at 615-16 (guest statute); Fort Worth Elevators Co, 70 S.W.2d at 408 (suit for exemplary damages under the gross negligence provision of the Texas Constitution, TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russellgreen1 sentence1985Sargent, 258 S.W.2d at 788 (guest statute); Schiller, 246 S.W.2d at 615-16 (guest statute); Fort Worth Elevators Co, 70 S.W.2d at 408 (suit for exemplary damages under the gross negligence provision of the Texas Constitution, TEX. | 1 | 1 |
General Motors Corp. v. Simmonsgreen1 sentence1979See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Sup.1977); Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of Texas, 544 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Sup.1976); Starr v. U. S., 393 F.Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (N.D.Tex.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Starr v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1979See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Sup.1977); Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of Texas, 544 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Sup.1976); Starr v. U. S., 393 F.Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (N.D.Tex.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Vassallo v. Sabatte Land Co.green2 sentences1967Compare, Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445 , 72 N.W.2d 861, 865 (1955), and Vassalo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal.App.2d 11 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 814 (1963). 1967Compare, Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445 , 72 N.W.2d 861, 865 (1955), and Vassalo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal.App.2d 11 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 814 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Andersongreen2 sentences1967Compare, Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445 , 72 N.W.2d 861, 865 (1955), and Vassalo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal.App.2d 11 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 814 (1963). 1967Compare, Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445 , 72 N.W.2d 861, 865 (1955), and Vassalo v. Sabatte Land Co., 212 Cal.App.2d 11 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 814 (1963). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 482 . 14 Similarly, a contributory-negligence defense may require reexamination of military decisions if it requires considering the fault of a military decision-maker.59 After a power outage, a Marine was electrocuted while trying to install a backup generator.60 Despite being told not to turn on the main generator because a group of Marines was working on it, the contractor turned it on, resulting in the Marine’s injuries.61 The contractor asserted a contributory-negligence defense, which would have required the court to decide whether the Marines were reasonable in trying to install 2018Id. at 482 . 14 Similarly, a contributory-negligence defense may require reexamination of military decisions if it requires considering the fault of a military decision-maker.59 After a power outage, a Marine was electrocuted while trying to install a backup generator.60 Despite being told not to turn on the main generator because a group of Marines was working on it, the contractor turned it on, resulting in the Marine’s injuries.61 The contractor asserted a contributory-negligence defense, which would have required the court to decide whether the Marines were reasonable in trying to install | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Cheryl Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 482 . 14 Similarly, a contributory-negligence defense may require reexamination of military decisions if it requires considering the fault of a military decision-maker.59 After a power outage, a Marine was electrocuted while trying to install a backup generator.60 Despite being told not to turn on the main generator because a group of Marines was working on it, the contractor turned it on, resulting in the Marine’s injuries.61 The contractor asserted a contributory-negligence defense, which would have required the court to decide whether the Marines were reasonable in trying to install | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of Texas
green
1 sentence1979See General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Sup.1977); Abalos v. Oil Development Co. of Texas, 544 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Sup.1976); Starr v. U. S., 393 F.Supp. 1359, 1365-66 (N.D.Tex.1975). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Railway Co. v. Ware
neutral
2 sentences1938Co. v. Ware, 67 Tex. 635 , 4 S.W. 13 , cited in Town of Gilmer v. Pickett, supra, does not support the statement of law made in that case. 1938Co. v. Ware, 67 Tex. 635 , 4 S.W. 13 , cited in Town of Gilmer v. Pickett, supra, does not support the statement of law made in that case. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Town of Gilmer v. Pickett
neutral
1 sentence1938Co. v. Ware, 67 Tex. 635 , 4 S.W. 13 , cited in Town of Gilmer v. Pickett, supra, does not support the statement of law made in that case. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Hodges v. Bierlein
neutral
1 sentence1919We think, under these circumstances; the Court of Civil Appeals properly held that the defendant waived any right to have the plea taken as confessed. 31 Cyc. pp. 733-735; Long v. Valleau, 87 Iowa, 675 , 55 N. W. 31 , 56 N. W. 748 ; Railway v. Tomlinson, 169 S. W. 217 . [2] The only other assignment necessary to consider relates to the refusal of the court to grant defendant a new trial on account of the following language used by plaintiff’s attorney in his closing address to fhe jury: “The law of assumed risk is an infamous law and a' bastard offspring of the doctrine of contributory neglige | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Tomlinson
neutral
1 sentence1919We think, under these circumstances; the Court of Civil Appeals properly held that the defendant waived any right to have the plea taken as confessed. 31 Cyc. pp. 733-735; Long v. Valleau, 87 Iowa, 675 , 55 N. W. 31 , 56 N. W. 748 ; Railway v. Tomlinson, 169 S. W. 217 . [2] The only other assignment necessary to consider relates to the refusal of the court to grant defendant a new trial on account of the following language used by plaintiff’s attorney in his closing address to fhe jury: “The law of assumed risk is an infamous law and a' bastard offspring of the doctrine of contributory neglige | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Long v. Valleau
green
1 sentence1919We think, under these circumstances; the Court of Civil Appeals properly held that the defendant waived any right to have the plea taken as confessed. 31 Cyc. pp. 733-735; Long v. Valleau, 87 Iowa, 675 , 55 N. W. 31 , 56 N. W. 748 ; Railway v. Tomlinson, 169 S. W. 217 . [2] The only other assignment necessary to consider relates to the refusal of the court to grant defendant a new trial on account of the following language used by plaintiff’s attorney in his closing address to fhe jury: “The law of assumed risk is an infamous law and a' bastard offspring of the doctrine of contributory neglige | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.