contributory negligence doctrine in South Carolina

15 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1903–2011 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
Oliver Ex Rel. Oliver v. Blakeneygreen sc · 1964 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2003 2 sentences 2003Oliver v. Blakeney , 244 S.C. 565, 569 , 137 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1964). 2003Oliver v. Blakeney , 244 S.C. 565, 569 , 137 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1964).	2	2
Stephens v. Draffingreen sc · 1997 · cited in 2 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2003–2004 2 sentences 2004The fact that substantial damages did not occur until later is immaterial to determining when the action accrued or arose.” Stephens v. Draffin, 327 S.C. 1, 5 , 488 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1997) (tort claims of patient who had been treated for years by his physician, and claims of patient’s wife, accrued before the date contributory negligence was abrogated; thus their claims were controlled by doctrine of contributory negligence as that rule was in effect when their claims first accrued) (citations omitted). 2004The fact that substantial damages did not occur until later is immaterial to determining when the action accrued or arose.” Stephens v. Draffin, 327 S.C. 1, 5 , 488 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1997) (tort claims of patient who had been treated for years by his physician, and claims of patient’s wife, accrued before the date contributory negligence was abrogated; thus their claims were controlled by doctrine of contributory negligence as that rule was in effect when their claims first accrued) (citations omitted).	1	2
Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.green sc · 2003 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004“In South Carolina, the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued controls the parties’ legal relationships and rights.” Id.; see also Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 371 , 585 S.E.2d 292, 297 (2003) (plaintiffs’ claims accrued 398 prior to filing of class action lawsuit; therefore, version of consumer protection statute in effect when plaintiffs filed the lawsuit and court granted summary judgment was controlling); Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 356 S.C. 592 , 590 S.E.2d 479, 482-484 (2003) (cause of action ordinarily accrues when facts relating to negligence 2004“In South Carolina, the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued controls the parties’ legal relationships and rights.” Id.; see also Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 371 , 585 S.E.2d 292, 297 (2003) (plaintiffs’ claims accrued 398 prior to filing of class action lawsuit; therefore, version of consumer protection statute in effect when plaintiffs filed the lawsuit and court granted summary judgment was controlling); Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 356 S.C. 592 , 590 S.E.2d 479, 482-484 (2003) (cause of action ordinarily accrues when facts relating to negligence	1	1
Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp.green sc · 2003 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004 2 sentences 2004“In South Carolina, the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued controls the parties’ legal relationships and rights.” Id.; see also Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 371 , 585 S.E.2d 292, 297 (2003) (plaintiffs’ claims accrued 398 prior to filing of class action lawsuit; therefore, version of consumer protection statute in effect when plaintiffs filed the lawsuit and court granted summary judgment was controlling); Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 356 S.C. 592 , 590 S.E.2d 479, 482-484 (2003) (cause of action ordinarily accrues when facts relating to negligence 2004“In South Carolina, the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued controls the parties’ legal relationships and rights.” Id.; see also Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 371 , 585 S.E.2d 292, 297 (2003) (plaintiffs’ claims accrued 398 prior to filing of class action lawsuit; therefore, version of consumer protection statute in effect when plaintiffs filed the lawsuit and court granted summary judgment was controlling); Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 356 S.C. 592 , 590 S.E.2d 479, 482-484 (2003) (cause of action ordinarily accrues when facts relating to negligence	1	1
Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regimegreen sc · 1998 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86-87 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 573-74 (1998) (“[Ajbsolute defense of assumption of risk is inconsistent with South Carolina’s comparative negligence system ... ”; unless assumption of risk can be characterized as express or primary implied assumption, plaintiff is not barred from recovery if degree of fault arising from assumed risk is less than defendant’s negligence.). 2002Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation, 333 S.C. 71, 86-87 , 508 S.E.2d 565, 573-74 (1998) (“[Ajbsolute defense of assumption of risk is inconsistent with South Carolina’s comparative negligence system ... ”; unless assumption of risk can be characterized as express or primary implied assumption, plaintiff is not barred from recovery if degree of fault arising from assumed risk is less than defendant’s negligence.).	1	1
Ruth v. Lanegreen sc · 1970 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997E.g., Cooper v. Mayes, 234 S.C. 491, 495-96 , 109 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1959); Ruth v. Lane, 254 S.C. 431, 433-34 , 175 S.E.2d 820, 821 (1970). 1997E.g., Cooper v. Mayes, 234 S.C. 491, 495-96 , 109 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1959); Ruth v. Lane, 254 S.C. 431, 433-34 , 175 S.E.2d 820, 821 (1970).	1	1
Cooper v. Mayesgreen sc · 1959 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997E.g., Cooper v. Mayes, 234 S.C. 491, 495-96 , 109 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1959); Ruth v. Lane, 254 S.C. 431, 433-34 , 175 S.E.2d 820, 821 (1970). 1997E.g., Cooper v. Mayes, 234 S.C. 491, 495-96 , 109 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1959); Ruth v. Lane, 254 S.C. 431, 433-34 , 175 S.E.2d 820, 821 (1970).	1	1
Senn v. Sun Printing Co.green scctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997Compare Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., Inc., 205 S.C. 333, 348-49 , 32 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1944) (stating assumption of risk rests in contract) with Senn v. Sun Printing Co., 295 S.C. 169, 173 , 367 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ct.App.1988) (stating assumption of risk turns on assent, voluntariness, and choice). 513 Courts continued, however, in their effort to distinguish the defense of assumption of risk from the doctrine of contributory negligence, while at the same time conceding their kinship. 1997Compare Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., Inc., 205 S.C. 333, 348-49 , 32 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1944) (stating assumption of risk rests in contract) with Senn v. Sun Printing Co., 295 S.C. 169, 173 , 367 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ct.App.1988) (stating assumption of risk turns on assent, voluntariness, and choice). 513 Courts continued, however, in their effort to distinguish the defense of assumption of risk from the doctrine of contributory negligence, while at the same time conceding their kinship.	1	1
Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., Inc.green · 1943 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997Compare Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., Inc., 205 S.C. 333, 348-49 , 32 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1944) (stating assumption of risk rests in contract) with Senn v. Sun Printing Co., 295 S.C. 169, 173 , 367 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ct.App.1988) (stating assumption of risk turns on assent, voluntariness, and choice). 513 Courts continued, however, in their effort to distinguish the defense of assumption of risk from the doctrine of contributory negligence, while at the same time conceding their kinship. 1997Compare Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co., Inc., 205 S.C. 333, 348-49 , 32 S.E.2d 5, 9 (1944) (stating assumption of risk rests in contract) with Senn v. Sun Printing Co., 295 S.C. 169, 173 , 367 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ct.App.1988) (stating assumption of risk turns on assent, voluntariness, and choice). 513 Courts continued, however, in their effort to distinguish the defense of assumption of risk from the doctrine of contributory negligence, while at the same time conceding their kinship.	1	1
Thomas v. Brutongreen scd · 1967 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984See, e.g., Thomas v. Bruton, 270 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.S.C. 1967) (“[The doctrine of last clear chance] is an exception or a qualification or modification to the doctrine of contributory negligence....”); Eastern Brick and Tile Co. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.S.C. 1968), citing Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133, 138 (1944) “[The doctrine of last clear *170 chance] constitutes no exception to the general doctrine of contributory negligence, and does not permit one to recover in spite of contributory negligence.”); Britt v. Seaboard Coast Line R	1	1
Eastern Brick & Tile Co. v. United Statesgreen scd · 1968 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984See, e.g., Thomas v. Bruton, 270 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.S.C. 1967) (“[The doctrine of last clear chance] is an exception or a qualification or modification to the doctrine of contributory negligence....”); Eastern Brick and Tile Co. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.S.C. 1968), citing Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133, 138 (1944) “[The doctrine of last clear *170 chance] constitutes no exception to the general doctrine of contributory negligence, and does not permit one to recover in spite of contributory negligence.”); Britt v. Seaboard Coast Line R	1	1
Britt v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroadgreen scd · 1968 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984See, e.g., Thomas v. Bruton, 270 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.S.C. 1967) (“[The doctrine of last clear chance] is an exception or a qualification or modification to the doctrine of contributory negligence....”); Eastern Brick and Tile Co. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.S.C. 1968), citing Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133, 138 (1944) “[The doctrine of last clear *170 chance] constitutes no exception to the general doctrine of contributory negligence, and does not permit one to recover in spite of contributory negligence.”); Britt v. Seaboard Coast Line R	1	1
Brown v. Georgegreen sc · 1982 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984See, e.g., Thomas v. Bruton, 270 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.S.C. 1967) (“[The doctrine of last clear chance] is an exception or a qualification or modification to the doctrine of contributory negligence....”); Eastern Brick and Tile Co. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.S.C. 1968), citing Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133, 138 (1944) “[The doctrine of last clear *170 chance] constitutes no exception to the general doctrine of contributory negligence, and does not permit one to recover in spite of contributory negligence.”); Britt v. Seaboard Coast Line R	1	1
Seay v. Southern Ry. &8212 Carolina Divisiongreen · 1944 · cited in 1 South Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984 1 sentence 1984See, e.g., Thomas v. Bruton, 270 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.S.C. 1967) (“[The doctrine of last clear chance] is an exception or a qualification or modification to the doctrine of contributory negligence....”); Eastern Brick and Tile Co. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 216, 221 (D.S.C. 1968), citing Seay v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division, 205 S. C. 162, 31 S. E. (2d) 133, 138 (1944) “[The doctrine of last clear *170 chance] constitutes no exception to the general doctrine of contributory negligence, and does not permit one to recover in spite of contributory negligence.”); Britt v. Seaboard Coast Line R	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Ott v. Pittman green scctapp · 1995 2 sentences 2006This Court further discussed the doctrine in Ott v. Pittman, 320 S.C. 72 , 463 S.E.2d 101 (Ct.App.1995): If a plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, and that negligence proximately caused the injury complained of, under the doctrine of contributory negligence, the plaintiff was automatically barred from recovery. 2006This Court further discussed the doctrine in Ott v. Pittman, 320 S.C. 72 , 463 S.E.2d 101 (Ct.App.1995): If a plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, and that negligence proximately caused the injury complained of, under the doctrine of contributory negligence, the plaintiff was automatically barred from recovery.	2	1997–2006
Bodie v. Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co. green sc · 1901 2 sentences 1906Railway, 61 S. C., 468, 478, 39 S. E., 715 , the Court said: “The doctrine of assumption of risk by the employee is distinct from the doctrine of contributory negligence, although there may arise a certain condition of facts capable of supporting either inference. 1903Co., 61 S. C., 478, 39 S. E., 715 , Associate Justice Jones remarks: “The doctrine of as *211 sumption of risk by the employee is distinct from the doctrine of contributory negligence, although there may arise a certain condition of facts capable of supporting either inference.” This is followed by as clear a distinction between the two defenses as the nature of the subject will allow, concluding with this statement: “When, therefore, a case arises in which it is shown (upon proper pleadings) that the employee has assumed the risk from which the injury arose, or what is the same thing in effec	2	1903–1906
Martel v. Montana Power Co. green mont · 1988 1 sentence 2011Id. at 142-43 .	1	2011–2011
Eaton v. McLain green tenn · 1994 2 sentences 2006In so doing, the court stated, as dicta, that “[t]he policy considerations underlying ... the doctrine of contributory negligence ... have been implicitly subsumed by our decision in McIntyre and should also impact the jury’s apportionment of fault between the parties in an appropriate case.” Id. at 592 . 2006In so doing, the court stated, as dicta, that "[t]he policy considerations underlying. . . the doctrine of contributory negligence . . . have been implicitly subsumed by our decision in McIntyre and should also impact the jury's apportionment of fault between the parties in an appropriate case." Id. at 592 .	1	2006–2006
Swindler v. Swindler green scctapp · 2003 2 sentences 2004“In South Carolina, the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued controls the parties’ legal relationships and rights.” Id.; see also Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 371 , 585 S.E.2d 292, 297 (2003) (plaintiffs’ claims accrued 398 prior to filing of class action lawsuit; therefore, version of consumer protection statute in effect when plaintiffs filed the lawsuit and court granted summary judgment was controlling); Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 356 S.C. 592 , 590 S.E.2d 479, 482-484 (2003) (cause of action ordinarily accrues when facts relating to negligence 2004“In South Carolina, the law in effect at the time the cause of action accrued controls the parties’ legal relationships and rights.” Id.; see also Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 355 S.C. 361, 371 , 585 S.E.2d 292, 297 (2003) (plaintiffs’ claims accrued 398 prior to filing of class action lawsuit; therefore, version of consumer protection statute in effect when plaintiffs filed the lawsuit and court granted summary judgment was controlling); Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 356 S.C. 592 , 590 S.E.2d 479, 482-484 (2003) (cause of action ordinarily accrues when facts relating to negligence	1	2004–2004
Weaver Ex Rel. Estate of Weaver v. Lentz green scctapp · 2002 1 sentence 2003Weaver v. Lentz , 348 S.C. 672, 684 , 561 S.E.2d 362 , 366 (Ct. App. 2002).	1	2003–2003
Standard v. Shine green sc · 1982 2 sentences 1999Subsequently, in Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337 , 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), the Supreme Court abandoned the age-based presumptions that supported the rule in Herring . 1999Subsequently, in Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337 , 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), the Supreme Court abandoned the age-based presumptions that supported the rule in Herring .	1	1999–1999
Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company green sc · 1991 2 sentences 1997Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243 , 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991)(emphasis added). 1997Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243 , 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991)(emphasis added).	1	1997–1997
White v. Benedict College, Inc. green sc · 1986 1 sentence 1988In support of this position, she cites White v. Benedict College, Inc., 288 S. C. 572, 344 S. E. (2d) 147 (1986).	1	1988–1988
Langley v. Boyter green scctapp · 1984 1 sentence 1986For the reasons stated in Langley v. Boyter, 284 S. C. 162, 325 S. E. (2d) 550 (Ct. App. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 286 S. C. 85, 332 S. E. (2d) 100 (1985), this Court does not favor the doctrine of contributory negligence.	1	1986–1986
Langley v. Boyter green sc · 1985 1 sentence 1986For the reasons stated in Langley v. Boyter, 284 S. C. 162, 325 S. E. (2d) 550 (Ct. App. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 286 S. C. 85, 332 S. E. (2d) 100 (1985), this Court does not favor the doctrine of contributory negligence.	1	1986–1986
Lawrence v. Wirth green va · 1983 2 sentences 1984Lawrence v. Wirth, 226 Va. 408 , 309 S. E. (2d) 315 (1983); see also, Le Bel, Contributory Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Comparative Negligence Through the Back Door, Vol. X, No. 4, Va. B. 1984Lawrence v. Wirth, 226 Va. 408 , 309 S. E. (2d) 315 (1983); see also, Le Bel, Contributory Negligence and Mitigation of Damages: Comparative Negligence Through the Back Door, Vol. X, No. 4, Va. B.	1	1984–1984
Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education green md · 1983 1 sentence 1984Ct. 1980); Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 295 Md. 442 , 456 A. (2d) 894 (1983); Gross v. Nashville Gas Company, 608 S. W. (2d) 860 (Tenn. App. 1980) (Tennessee Court of Appeals deferred to its Supreme Court and legislature). 13 A recent decision of the Virginia Supreme Court appears to erode substantially the application of the doctrine of contributory negligence in that state and accomplish many of the aims of the doctrine of comparative negligence through the use of the concept of mitigation of damages.	1	1984–1984
Gross v. Nashville Gas Co. green tennctapp · 1980 1 sentence 1984Ct. 1980); Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 295 Md. 442 , 456 A. (2d) 894 (1983); Gross v. Nashville Gas Company, 608 S. W. (2d) 860 (Tenn. App. 1980) (Tennessee Court of Appeals deferred to its Supreme Court and legislature). 13 A recent decision of the Virginia Supreme Court appears to erode substantially the application of the doctrine of contributory negligence in that state and accomplish many of the aims of the doctrine of comparative negligence through the use of the concept of mitigation of damages.	1	1984–1984

Where else courts name it

MO 97 (1903–2024) CA 79 (1907–2026) IL 74 (1883–2024) LA 43 (1925–2024) IN 36 (1883–2023) MI 35 (1922–2026) KY 35 (1925–2022) NJ 34 (1976–2020) NY 33 (1887–2025) FL 32 (1930–2019) MD 31 (1910–2026) IA 31 (1903–2022) TN 30 (1964–2015) NC 29 (1900–2025) WA 29 (1931–2025) AZ 27 (1946–2025) AL 23 (1907–2024) DC 21 (1976–2021) NM 20 (1963–2021) PA 20 (1923–2025) TX 16 (1919–2018) OR 16 (1957–2022) SC 15 (1903–2011) MS 15 (1956–2018) CO 14 (1912–2016) WV 12 (1893–2017) OH 12 (1871–2024) VA 11 (1895–2024) GA 11 (1883–2009) MN 10 (1912–2006) CT 10 (1976–2014) WY 8 (1939–1994) UT 8 (1918–2018) NE 8 (1984–2003) WI 8 (1925–2015) SD 8 (1932–2009) KS 7 (1919–2017) AK 7 (1971–1991) MT 6 (1934–2008) OK 6 (1972–2026) HI 6 (1968–2008) MA 5 (1898–2007) ID 5 (1938–2021) VT 5 (1944–2025) AR 4 (1898–2001) NH 3 (1931–1984) DE 3 (1980–1995) ND 2 (1957–1970) ME 2 (1974–1984) RI 2 (1979–2004)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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