Iowa rule in Iowa

2015There are “two tiers of work product recognized by Iowa rule 1.503(3).” Keefe, 774 N.W.2d at 674 ; see also Squealer Feeds, 530 N.W.2d at 689 (“[A] claimant must focus on the availability from other sources of the facts necessary to establish his claim . . . . [I]n no event are the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation discoverable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2015There are “two tiers of work product recognized by Iowa rule 1.503(3).” Keefe, 774 N.W.2d at 674 ; see also Squealer Feeds, 530 N.W.2d at 689 (“[A] claimant must focus on the availability from other sources of the facts necessary to establish his claim.... [I]n no event are the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation discoverable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

1996State v. Cullen, 357 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 1984) (deriving this test from prior cases); see also Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Iowa 1988) (clarifying the first prong through an interpretation of Iowa rule of evidence 606(b) by excluding any evidence of the internal deliberations of the jury but allowing statements containing extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence that was brought to bear on the jury).

1994See Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Iowa 1988) (interpreting Iowa rule of evidence 606(b)).

2020“Our supreme court adopted the rule ‘that a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible as nonhearsay to rebut a charge of recent improper motive under Iowa rule of evidence [5.]801(d)(1)(B) only if the statement was made before the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose.’” Juste, 939 N.W.2d at 674 (quoting State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Iowa 1995)).

2019Our supreme court adopted the rule “that a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible as nonhearsay to rebut a charge of recent improper motive under Iowa rule of evidence 801(d)(1)(B) only if the statement was made before the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose.” State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Iowa 1995) (adopting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as pronounced in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 (1995)).

2015The Iowa rule resembles Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), “and the history and cases under the federal rule provide guidance in interpreting the Iowa counterpart.” Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 1983) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)), abrogated on other grounds by Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 47-48 .

2015The Iowa rule resembles Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), “and the history and cases under the federal rule provide guidance in interpreting the Iowa counterpart.” Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 1983) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)), abrogated on other grounds by Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 47-48 .

2021“Federal case law, however, is not binding, and we are free to develop our own approach to legal questions under the Iowa rule.” Id.

2021“Federal case law, however, is not binding, and we are free to develop our own approach to legal questions under the Iowa rule.” Id.

2015The Iowa rule resembles Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), “and the history and cases under the federal rule provide guidance in interpreting the Iowa counterpart.” Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 1983) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)), abrogated on other grounds by Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 47-48 .

2015The Iowa rule resembles Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), “and the history and cases under the federal rule provide guidance in interpreting the Iowa counterpart.” Ashmead v. Harris, 336 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 1983) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)), abrogated on other grounds by Wells Dairy, 690 N.W.2d at 47-48 .

2022See State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 507 (Iowa 2017) (“The Iowa rule is broader than the federal counterpart in Federal Rule of Evidence 106, which applies only to all or part of writing or recorded statement.

2022See State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 507 (Iowa 2017) (“The Iowa rule is broader than the federal counterpart in Federal Rule of Evidence 106, which applies only to all or part of writing or recorded statement.

2018The Iowa standard is expressed differently but encompasses the same general notion: whether it appears "the misconduct was calculated to, and with a reasonable probability did, influence the verdict." Webster , 865 N.W.2d at 235 -36 (quoting State v. Cullen , 357 N.W.2d 24 , 27 (Iowa 1984) ).

2018The Iowa standard is expressed differently but encompasses the same general notion: whether it appears "the misconduct was calculated to, and with a reasonable probability did, influence the verdict." Webster , 865 N.W.2d at 235 -36 (quoting State v. Cullen , 357 N.W.2d 24 , 27 (Iowa 1984) ).

2016“A convincing preponderance of the evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Iowa 2012).

2016“A convincing preponderance of the evidence is more than a preponderance of the evidence, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCarthy, 814 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Iowa 2012).

2016The Iowa rule does not use the term “may.” The Minnesota court, however, has recently held that if a respondent fails to file a timely answer, “[u]pon the Director’s [of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility] motion, we deem[ ] the allegations in the petition admitted.” In re Disciplinary Action Against Ulanowski, 834 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Minn.2013) (per curiam).

2016The Iowa rule does not use the term “may.” The Minnesota court, however, has recently held that if a respondent fails to file a timely answer, “[u]pon the Director’s [of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility] motion, we deem[ ] the allegations in the petition admitted.” In re Disciplinary Action Against Ulanowski, 834 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Minn.2013) (per curiam).

2016See In re Peterson, 439 N.W.2d 165, 166 (Iowa 1989) (concluding an applicant for admission to the Iowa bar must demonstrate his or her moral fitness to practice law by a convincing preponderance of the evidence before we will reverse a decision of the board of law examiners denying him or her an opportunity to sit for the bar because by rule the applicant bears the burden of submitting “satisfactory proof’ of his or her fitness to practice law).

2016Specifically, in In re Peterson, we considered whether an applicant to the Iowa bar with a prior criminal record had been wrongly denied the opportunity to sit for the Iowa bar examination. 439 N.W.2d at 166 .

2015See id. r. 32:1.11(d)(1) (“Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee . . . is subject to rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.9 . . . .”).

2015See id. r. 32:1.11(d)(1) (“Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee . . . is subject to rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.9 . . . .”).

2015There are “two tiers of work product recognized by Iowa rule 1.503(3).” Keefe, 774 N.W.2d at 674 ; see also Squealer Feeds, 530 N.W.2d at 689 (“[A] claimant must focus on the availability from other sources of the facts necessary to establish his claim.... [I]n no event are the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation discoverable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

2015I do not dispute that there are “two tiers of work product recognized by Iowa rule 1.503(3).” Keefe v. Bernard, 774 N.W.2d 663, 674 (Iowa 2009).

2015If not taken advantage of by demurrer or answer, it will be deemed waived.”); see generally Bond v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 518 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1994) (“We have defined an affirmative defense as ‘one resting on facts not necessary to support plaintiff’s case.’ Under Iowa rule of civil procedure 101 these matters must be specially pleaded, and a motion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict do not qualify as special pleadings.

2015If not taken advantage of by demurrer or answer, it will be deemed waived.”); see generally Bond v. Cedar Rapids Television Co., 518 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1994) (“We have defined an affirmative defense as ‘one resting on facts not necessary to support plaintiff’s case.’ Under Iowa rule of civil procedure 101 these matters must be specially pleaded, and a motion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict do not qualify as special pleadings.

2014Iowa Health Sys., 766 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Iowa 2009) (“The longstanding Iowa rule is that in a tort action the necessity of expert testimony or the quality of necessary expert testimony determines whether substantial evidence supports the submission of the causal relationship between the act of the wrongdoer and the injury.”).

2014Iowa Health Sys., 766 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Iowa 2009) (“The longstanding Iowa rule is that in a tort action the necessity of expert testimony or the quality of necessary expert testimony determines whether substantial evidence supports the submission of the causal relationship between the act of the wrongdoer and the injury.”).

2009See Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 886-88 (5th Cir.1983) (citing cases).

2009See Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 , 886–88 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing cases).

1997State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1981).

1990State v. Ogilvie, 310 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1981).

1996See Shaw v. Soo Line R.R., 463 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa 1990); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 904 (Iowa 1978); Konz v. Ehly, 451 N.W.2d 504, 505 (Iowa App.1989).

1990Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 904 (Iowa 1978).

2019Our supreme court adopted the rule “that a witness’s prior consistent statement is admissible as nonhearsay to rebut a charge of recent improper motive under Iowa rule of evidence 801(d)(1)(B) only if the statement was made before the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose.” State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Iowa 1995) (adopting the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as pronounced in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 (1995)).

1995Defendant relies on either of two reasons: (1) Our decision in State v. Gardner, 490 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1992) is not applicable to the present case because the facts are distinguishable and, under Iowa rule of evidence 801(d)(1)(B), the videotape did not amount to “rebuttal” evidence; or (2) if we hold Gardner is not distinguishable, we should overrule it and adopt instead the analysis set forth in Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 696 , 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995) and hold the offered statement must have preceded in time the origin of the alleged improper motive by the complainant, A.J.,

2017"Federal rule of civil procedure 23(e) concerning approval of class action settlements is somewhat analogous to Iowa rule of civil procedure [1.271].” City of Dubuque v. Iowa Trust, 587 N.W.2d 216, 221 (Iowa 1998).

2017“Federal rule of civil procedure 23(e) concerning approval of class action settlements is somewhat analogous to Iowa rule of civil procedure [1.271].” City of Dubuque v. Iowa Trust, 587 N.W.2d 216 , 16 This case is over.

2014Its probative value, if any exists, is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of issues and would be misleading to the jury under Iowa rule of evidence 403.” Id.

2005Its probative value, if any exists, is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion of issues and would be misleading to the jury under Iowa rule of evidence 403. 480 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Iowa 1992).

2014In 1983, the United States Supreme Court in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc. held that an Iowa defendant who pleaded guilty to an offense that was later expunged was nevertheless “convicted” for purposes of the Act. 460 U.S. 103, 115 , 103 S. Ct. 986, 993 , 74 L.

2014In 1983, the United States Supreme Court in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc. held that an Iowa defendant who pleaded guilty to an offense that was later expunged was nevertheless “convicted” for purposes of the Act. 460 U.S. 103, 115 , 103 S. Ct. 986, 993 , 74 L.

1987In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, in discussing the standards for summary judgment in defamation cases, applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which is virtually identical to the Iowa rule.

1987In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, in discussing the standards for summary judgment in defamation cases, applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which is virtually identical to the Iowa rule.