31 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2007Prior to the court's holding in Vincent , the Fourth District had held that trial courts may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 471 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), while the Second and Third Districts held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that a harmless 2007Prior to the court's holding in Vincent , the Fourth District had held that trial courts may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 471 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), while the Second and Third Districts held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that a harmless | 3 | 6 |
People v. Mescallgreen2 sentences2007Prior to the court's holding in Vincent , the Fourth District had held that trial courts may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 471 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), while the Second and Third Districts held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that a harmless 2006While the Fourth District has held that a trial court may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 472-72 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), the Third and Second Districts have held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that the harmless error analysis is not applicabl | 2 | 5 |
In Re Leona W.green2 sentences2024Respondent’s suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) [(namely, that a trial court commits reversible error by not providing a written order, as the statute requires)] unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor - 10 - for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 35 Three years later, the supreme court in In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 458-59 (2008), reaffirmed what it wrote in Madison H., writing that in Madison H., “we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and suffici 2024Respondent’s suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) [(namely, that a trial court commits reversible error by not providing a written order, as the statute requires)] unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 24 Three years later, the supreme court in In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 458-59 (2008), reaffirmed what it wrote in Madison H., writing that in Madison H., “we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and sufficient to | 2 | 2 |
People v. Andino-Acostagreen2 sentences2024Respondent’s suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) [(namely, that a trial court commits reversible error by not providing a written order, as the statute requires)] unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor - 10 - for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 35 Three years later, the supreme court in In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 458-59 (2008), reaffirmed what it wrote in Madison H., writing that in Madison H., “we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and suffici 2024See also People v. Andino-Acosta, 2024 IL App (2d) 230463, ¶ 19 , construing the Pretrial Fairness Act: “[W]e hold that an explicit and individualized oral ruling may satisfy section 110- 6.1(h)(1).” ¶ 26 I urge trial courts to fully explain their reasoning at the pretrial detention hearing when they order a defendant detained. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2019See People v. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, ¶ 41 , 997 N.E.2d 791 (trial court violated the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel by converting a Krankel hearing on the defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance into an adversarial proceeding); People v. Cabrales, 325 Ill. 2019See People v. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, ¶ 41 , 997 N.E.2d 791 (trial court violated the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel by converting a Krankel hearing on the defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance into an adversarial proceeding); People v. Cabrales, 325 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2021Defendant states that “the trial court commits reversible error when it skips the initial determination of whether the defendant has produced evidence of possible neglect warranting the appointment of new counsel and addressing the merits of the claim.” (Citing People v. Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133741, ¶ 77 ). 2020See Roddis, 2018 IL App (4th) 170605, ¶ 81 ; Ieliot Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133741, ¶ 77 (trial court impermissibly moved directly to the merits of the claim and rejected them as falling short of Strickland standards without first attempting to determine whether sufficient facts were alleged to show possible neglect and deciding whether to appoint Krankel counsel; this, alone, is reversible error and new Krankel hearing is required). ¶ 13 However, subsequent to the filing of his supplemental brief, our state supreme court issued its decision in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352 , reversing t | 1 | 2 |
People v. Roddisgreen2 sentences2020In his appellant brief, defendant cited to People v. Roddis, 2018 IL App (4th) 170605, ¶ 81 , which held “that a trial court commits reversible error when it conducts a Krankel hearing and concludes—on the merits—that there was no ineffective assistance, and we note that we are not the first court to so conclude.” However, our supreme court recently reversed that finding in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352 , and held “that a trial court may consider both the facts and the legal merits of a defendant’s pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at the preliminary inquiry 2020See Roddis, 2018 IL App (4th) 170605, ¶ 81 ; Ieliot Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133741, ¶ 77 (trial court impermissibly moved directly to the merits of the claim and rejected them as falling short of Strickland standards without first attempting to determine whether sufficient facts were alleged to show possible neglect and deciding whether to appoint Krankel counsel; this, alone, is reversible error and new Krankel hearing is required). ¶ 13 However, subsequent to the filing of his supplemental brief, our state supreme court issued its decision in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352 , reversing t | 1 | 2 |
People v. Winfreygreen2 sentences2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill.App.3d 987 , 283 Ill.Dec. 623 , 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist.2004); See also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 193-99 , 280 Ill.Dec. 461 , 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill.2d 549 , 284 Ill.Dec. 344 , 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295-97 , 269 Ill.Dec. 350 , 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist.2002)(holding that a trial *909 court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); See also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-79 , 280 Ill.Dec. 456 , 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist.2003), app 2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hoodgreen1 sentence2025To the extent Turner is suggesting that a trial court commits reversible error for failing to appoint standby counsel, we see this as one more reason to disagree with that decision. ¶ 155 In People v. Hood, 2022 IL App (4th) 200260, ¶¶ 88-94, 110-13 , this court discussed at length the problem with appointing standby counsel, and we reaffirm now what we wrote in Hood: “In [People v.] Williams, 277 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Haynesgreen1 sentence2025App. 3d 742, 749 (1992)), but “substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and the admonishment the defendant received did not prejudice his rights” (People v. Haynes, 174 Ill. 2d 204, 236 (1996)). ¶ 19 In his original briefs, defendant put forth the general proposition that a trial court commits reversible error when it accepts a waiver of counsel that is not knowing and intelligent. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tategreen1 sentence2022People v. Tate, 2016 IL App (1st) 140598, ¶ 19 (collecting cases). ¶ 12 Aside from the statutory limiting factors which are not at play in this case, the parties do not dispute that defendant filed a timely motion to substitute judge under section 114-5(a). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pearsongreen2 sentences2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill.App.3d 987 , 283 Ill.Dec. 623 , 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist.2004); See also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 193-99 , 280 Ill.Dec. 461 , 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill.2d 549 , 284 Ill.Dec. 344 , 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295-97 , 269 Ill.Dec. 350 , 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist.2002)(holding that a trial *909 court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); See also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-79 , 280 Ill.Dec. 456 , 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist.2003), app 2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill.App.3d 987 , 283 Ill.Dec. 623 , 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist.2004); See also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 193-99 , 280 Ill.Dec. 461 , 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill.2d 549 , 284 Ill.Dec. 344 , 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295-97 , 269 Ill.Dec. 350 , 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist.2002)(holding that a trial *909 court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); See also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-79 , 280 Ill.Dec. 456 , 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist.2003), app | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shellstromgreen2 sentences2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill.App.3d 987 , 283 Ill.Dec. 623 , 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist.2004); See also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 193-99 , 280 Ill.Dec. 461 , 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill.2d 549 , 284 Ill.Dec. 344 , 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295-97 , 269 Ill.Dec. 350 , 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist.2002)(holding that a trial *909 court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); See also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-79 , 280 Ill.Dec. 456 , 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist.2003), app 2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill.App.3d 987 , 283 Ill.Dec. 623 , 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist.2004); See also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 193-99 , 280 Ill.Dec. 461 , 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill.2d 549 , 284 Ill.Dec. 344 , 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295-97 , 269 Ill.Dec. 350 , 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist.2002)(holding that a trial *909 court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); See also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-79 , 280 Ill.Dec. 456 , 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist.2003), app | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill.App.3d 987 , 283 Ill.Dec. 623 , 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist.2004); See also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 193-99 , 280 Ill.Dec. 461 , 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill.2d 549 , 284 Ill.Dec. 344 , 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295-97 , 269 Ill.Dec. 350 , 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist.2002)(holding that a trial *909 court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); See also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-79 , 280 Ill.Dec. 456 , 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist.2003), app 2004People v. Winfrey, 347 Ill.App.3d 987 , 283 Ill.Dec. 623 , 808 N.E.2d 589, 590-93 (2d Dist.2004); See also People v. Pearson, 345 Ill.App.3d 191, 193-99 , 280 Ill.Dec. 461 , 802 N.E.2d 386, 388-93 (2d Dist.2003), appeal allowed, 208 Ill.2d 549 , 284 Ill.Dec. 344 , 809 N.E.2d 1290 (2004); People v. Gaines, 335 Ill.App.3d 292, 295-97 , 269 Ill.Dec. 350 , 780 N.E.2d 822, 824-25 (2d Dist.2002)(holding that a trial *909 court cannot summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition); See also People v. Shellstrom, 345 Ill.App.3d 175, 176-79 , 280 Ill.Dec. 456 , 802 N.E.2d 381, 383-86 (2nd Dist.2003), app | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Ryburn
green
2 sentences2007Prior to the court's holding in Vincent , the Fourth District had held that trial courts may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 471 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), while the Second and Third Districts held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that a harmless 2007Prior to the court's holding in Vincent , the Fourth District had held that trial courts may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 471 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), while the Second and Third Districts held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that a harmless | 3 | 2006–2007 |
People v. Hodge
green
2 sentences2024Respondent’s suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) [(namely, that a trial court commits reversible error by not providing a written order, as the statute requires)] unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 24 Three years later, the supreme court in In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 458-59 (2008), reaffirmed what it wrote in Madison H., writing that in Madison H., “we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and sufficient to 2024Respondent’s suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) [(namely, that a trial court commits reversible error by not providing a written order, as the statute requires)] unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 24 Three years later, the supreme court in In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 458-59 (2008), reaffirmed what it wrote in Madison H., writing that in Madison H., “we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and sufficient to | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Mandi H.
green
2 sentences2024Respondent’s suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) [(namely, that a trial court commits reversible error by not providing a written order, as the statute requires)] unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor - 10 - for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 35 Three years later, the supreme court in In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 458-59 (2008), reaffirmed what it wrote in Madison H., writing that in Madison H., “we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and suffici 2024Respondent’s suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) [(namely, that a trial court commits reversible error by not providing a written order, as the statute requires)] unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties.” In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 24 Three years later, the supreme court in In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 458-59 (2008), reaffirmed what it wrote in Madison H., writing that in Madison H., “we concluded that where an oral pronouncement is explicit and sufficient to | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Roddis
green
2 sentences2020In his appellant brief, defendant cited to People v. Roddis, 2018 IL App (4th) 170605, ¶ 81 , which held “that a trial court commits reversible error when it conducts a Krankel hearing and concludes—on the merits—that there was no ineffective assistance, and we note that we are not the first court to so conclude.” However, our supreme court recently reversed that finding in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352 , and held “that a trial court may consider both the facts and the legal merits of a defendant’s pro se posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at the preliminary inquiry 2020See Roddis, 2018 IL App (4th) 170605, ¶ 81 ; Ieliot Jackson, 2016 IL App (1st) 133741, ¶ 77 (trial court impermissibly moved directly to the merits of the claim and rejected them as falling short of Strickland standards without first attempting to determine whether sufficient facts were alleged to show possible neglect and deciding whether to appoint Krankel counsel; this, alone, is reversible error and new Krankel hearing is required). ¶ 13 However, subsequent to the filing of his supplemental brief, our state supreme court issued its decision in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352 , reversing t | 2 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Cabrales
green
2 sentences2019See People v. Fields, 2013 IL App (2d) 120945, ¶ 41 , 997 N.E.2d 791 (trial court violated the defendant’s right to be represented by counsel by converting a Krankel hearing on the defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance into an adversarial proceeding); People v. Cabrales, 325 Ill. 2018See People v. Fields , 2013 IL App (2d) 120945 , ¶ 41, 375 Ill.Dec. 480 , 997 N.E.2d 791 (trial court violated the defendant's right to be represented by counsel by converting a Krankel hearing on the defendant's pro se claim of ineffective assistance into an adversarial proceeding); People v. Cabrales , 325 Ill. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
People v. Lowry
green
2 sentences2015Lowry, 354 Ill. 2015Lowry, 354 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Bramlett
green
2 sentences2007Prior to the court's holding in Vincent , the Fourth District had held that trial courts may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 471 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), while the Second and Third Districts held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that a harmless 2007Prior to the court's holding in Vincent , the Fourth District had held that trial courts may summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition if it is frivolous and without merit (see, e.g., People v. Ryburn, 362 Ill.App.3d 870, 877 , 299 Ill.Dec. 281 , 841 N.E.2d 1013 (2005); People v. Bramlett, 347 Ill.App.3d 468, 471 , 282 Ill.Dec. 663 , 806 N.E.2d 1251 (2004)), while the Second and Third Districts held that a trial court commits reversible error in summarily dismissing a section 2-1401 petition without giving the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond and, furthermore, that a harmless | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Canteen Corp. v. Former Foods, Inc.
green
2 sentences1998Canteen Corp. v. Former Foods, Inc. , 238 Ill. 1998Canteen Corp. v. Former Foods, Inc., 238 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Snow
green
1 sentence2019However, as expressed “when evaluating the validity of the stop, [courts] consider the totality of the circumstances,” i.e., “the whole picture.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 . ¶ 73 Additionally, we note defendant’s contention that the State’s arguments relative to “bootstrapping” are forfeited based on its failure to cite legal authority “for the proposition that the trial court commits reversible error by using the term ‘bootstrapping’ in its analysis of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” See People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 11 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Timmsen
green
1 sentence2019However, as expressed “when evaluating the validity of the stop, [courts] consider the totality of the circumstances,” i.e., “the whole picture.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 . ¶ 73 Additionally, we note defendant’s contention that the State’s arguments relative to “bootstrapping” are forfeited based on its failure to cite legal authority “for the proposition that the trial court commits reversible error by using the term ‘bootstrapping’ in its analysis of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” See People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 11 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Snow
green
1 sentence2019However, as expressed “when evaluating the validity of the stop, [courts] consider the totality of the circumstances,” i.e., “the whole picture.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 . ¶ 73 Additionally, we note defendant’s contention that the State’s arguments relative to “bootstrapping” are forfeited based on its failure to cite legal authority “for the proposition that the trial court commits reversible error by using the term ‘bootstrapping’ in its analysis of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” See People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, ¶ 11 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Allen
green
1 sentence2006Dec. 813 , 808 N.E.2d 1101 (2004)), and this district has held that, while the trial court is not authorized to summarily dismiss a section 2-1401 petition, the harmless error analysis should be applied to such dismissals (see, e.g., People v. Allen, 366 Ill. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Sumner
green
2 sentences1994App. 3d 832 , 354 N.E.2d 18 , held that the trial court commits reversible error when it holds private conversations with members of the public in order to assist the court in determining the sentence it will impose. 1994After observing that “[pjrivate communications by a judge concerning a case are generally improper” (Sumner, 40 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Conley v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co.
green
1 sentence1993App. 3d 1094, 1100 , 403 N.E.2d 625 , in support of the contention that where a judge holds the erroneous belief that she lacks discretionary authority and she makes a summary ruling on that basis, the court commits reversible error. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Saldivar
green
2 sentences1993(People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256 , 497 N.E.2d 1138 .) The rationale of this rule is that the legislature has already devised a certain range of punishment for the crime which is based on the crime itself as well as the elements which comprise it. 1993(People v. Saldivar (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 256 , 497 N.E.2d 1138 .) The rationale of this rule is that the legislature has already devised a certain range of punishment for the crime which is based on the crime itself as well as the elements which comprise it. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Dodsworth
green
2 sentences1992The court in Dodsworth, relying on Taylor, held as follows: “In any event, where as here, the State unnecessarily and presumably intentionally destroys the. alleged contraband without the defendant having opportunity for his own testing or the protection of court imposed safeguards to protect his rights, we agree with Taylor that the trial court commits reversible error in admitting evidence of the results of the State’s test.” Dodsworth, 60 Ill. 1992App. 3d at 211 , 376 N.E.2d at 452 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Pernell green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| People v. Kline green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Powers v. Powers green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| The PEOPLE v. Eggers green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.