commits reversible error in Florida

2013And “where a motion presents a sufficient basis for withdrawal of a plea, a trial court commits reversible error if it fails to ‘conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the facts surrounding the entry of the plea.’ ” Crane v. State, 69 So.3d 357, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Caddo v. State, 806 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).

2012And “where a motion presents a sufficient basis for withdrawal of a plea, a trial court commits reversible error if it fails to ‘conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the facts surrounding the entry of the plea.’ ” Crane v. State, 69 So.3d 357, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Caddo v. State, 806 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).

2022McCray, 71 So. 3d at 864 ; Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988) (explaining that once a defendant exercises his right to self-representation, it is “incumbent upon the court to determine whether the accused is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel, and the court commits reversible error if it fails to do so”), superseded on other grounds by Hooks v. State, 286 So. 3d 163 , 169 (Fla. 2019); Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 379 (“Under our clear precedent, and that of the district courts of appeal, the trial court’s failure to hold a Faretta hearing in thi

2004It "is incumbent upon the court to determine whether the accused is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel, and the court commits reversible error if it fails to do so." Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.1988).

2025“Accordingly, a trial court commits reversible error when it does not make an independent determination that a defendant is competent to stand trial.” Id. at 1277 (citing Zern, 191 So. 3d at 965 (“Because an independent competency finding is a due-process right that cannot be waived once a reason for a competency hearing has surfaced, the trial court fundamentally err[s] in failing to make such a finding.”)).

2025“Accordingly, a trial court commits reversible error when it does not make an independent determination that a defendant is competent to stand trial.” Id. at 1277 (citing Zern, 191 So. 3d at 965 (“Because an independent competency finding is a due-process right that cannot be waived once a reason for a competency hearing has surfaced, the trial court fundamentally err[s] in failing to make such a finding.”)).

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it “permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children.” M.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 29 So.3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 958 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 948 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it "permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children." M.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 29 So. 3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 958 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 948 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it “permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children.” M.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 29 So.3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 958 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 948 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it "permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children." M.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 29 So. 3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 958 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 948 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it “permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children.” M.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 29 So.3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 958 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 948 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it "permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children." M.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 29 So. 3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 958 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 948 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it “permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children.” M.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 29 So.3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 958 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 948 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it "permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children." M.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 29 So. 3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 958 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 948 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it “permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children.” M.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 29 So.3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 958 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 948 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it "permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children." M.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 29 So. 3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 958 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 948 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it “permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children.” M.M. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 29 So.3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 958 So.2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 948 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th DCA

2017We have repeatedly held that a court commits reversible error when it "permanently award[s] custody to a non-offending parent when the offending parent has a case plan goal of reunification and has either substantially complied with the plan, or where the time for compliance has not yet expired—at least without a finding that reunification would be detrimental to the children." M.M. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 29 So. 3d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing K.E. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 958 So. 2d 968, 972 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); R.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 948 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 5th

2014See Hagood v. State, 824 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929, 932 (Fla.1986) (“The trial judge has no discretion in whether to instruct the jury on a necessarily lesser included offense.”)).

2014See Hagood v. State, 824 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929, 932 (Fla.1986) (“The trial judge has no discretion in whether to instruct the jury on a necessarily lesser included offense.”)).

2014See Hagood v. State, 824 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929, 932 (Fla.1986) (“The trial judge has no discretion in whether to instruct the jury on a necessarily lesser included offense.”)).

2014See Hagood v. State, 824 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (citing State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929, 932 (Fla.1986) (“The trial judge has no discretion in whether to instruct the jury on a necessarily lesser included offense.”)).

2013And “where a motion presents a sufficient basis for withdrawal of a plea, a trial court commits reversible error if it fails to ‘conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the facts surrounding the entry of the plea.’ ” Crane v. State, 69 So.3d 357, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Caddo v. State, 806 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).

2012And “where a motion presents a sufficient basis for withdrawal of a plea, a trial court commits reversible error if it fails to ‘conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to develop the facts surrounding the entry of the plea.’ ” Crane v. State, 69 So.3d 357, 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (quoting Caddo v. State, 806 So.2d 520, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)).

2003R.K. v. State, 834 So.2d 358, 358-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2003R.K. v. State, 834 So.2d 358, 358-59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

2022“Where a motion to 8 dismiss a complaint rests on facts outside the scope of the allegations contained in the complaint, the trial court commits reversible error in dismissing the complaint based on those extraneous matters.” Reed v. Sampson, 349 So. 2d 684, 685 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).

2000In this vein, "[w]here a motion to dismiss a complaint rests on facts outside the scope of the allegations contained in the complaint, the trial court commits reversible error in dismissing the complaint based on those extraneous matters." Id.

2026And so "[w]here a motion to dismiss . . . rests on facts outside the scope of the allegations contained in the complaint, the trial court commits reversible error in dismissing the complaint based on those extraneous matters." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Hewett-Kier Constr. v. Lemuel Ramos & Assocs., Inc., 775 So. 2d 373, 375 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).

2024See Maldonado v. Buchsbaum, 259 So. 3d 302, 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (holding that an ex parte temporary injunction was deficient because, among other things, “the trial court failed to endorse the date and hour of entry,” as required by rule 1.610(a)(2)).

2024Rivera Chiropractic, Inc. v. Rosello, 336 So. 3d 409 , 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (citing Lago v. Kame By Design, LLC, 120 So. 3d 73, 74-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)).

2022McCray, 71 So. 3d at 864 ; Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988) (explaining that once a defendant exercises his right to self-representation, it is “incumbent upon the court to determine whether the accused is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel, and the court commits reversible error if it fails to do so”), superseded on other grounds by Hooks v. State, 286 So. 3d 163 , 169 (Fla. 2019); Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 379 (“Under our clear precedent, and that of the district courts of appeal, the trial court’s failure to hold a Faretta hearing in thi

2022McCray, 71 So. 3d at 864 ; Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988) (explaining that once a defendant exercises his right to self-representation, it is “incumbent upon the court to determine whether the accused is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel, and the court commits reversible error if it fails to do so”), superseded on other grounds by Hooks v. State, 286 So. 3d 163 , 169 (Fla. 2019); Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 379 (“Under our clear precedent, and that of the district courts of appeal, the trial court’s failure to hold a Faretta hearing in thi

2022McCray, 71 So. 3d at 864 ; Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1988) (explaining that once a defendant exercises his right to self-representation, it is “incumbent upon the court to determine whether the accused is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel, and the court commits reversible error if it fails to do so”), superseded on other grounds by Hooks v. State, 286 So. 3d 163 , 169 (Fla. 2019); Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 379 (“Under our clear precedent, and that of the district courts of appeal, the trial court’s failure to hold a Faretta hearing in thi

2022See Smiley v. Court, 243 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); J.

2018Mirutil v. State, 30 So. 3d 588, 590 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (standing for the unremarkable proposition that, in sentencing a defendant whose juvenile sanctions have been revoked already, the sentencing court may not consider new crimes a defendant might have committed notwithstanding that those new crimes might have constituted the basis for the revocation).

2016See Lustig v. Garcia, 789 So.2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that “an involuntary dismissal may not be entered before the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence”).

2015Id. at 44-45; see also Thomas, 748 So.2d at 979 (citing Tomlinson with approval).

2015In Tomlinson v. State, 584 So.2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), this court adopted a per se rule that a trial court commits reversible error by giving an Allen charge more than once.

2015Id. at 44-45; see also Thomas, 748 So.2d at 979 (citing Tomlinson with approval).

2015See Banton v. Parker-Banton, 756 So.2d 155, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

2013However, a court commits reversible error “when an instruction is not only an erroneous or incomplete statement of law, but is also confusing or misleading.” McKenzie v. State, 830 So.2d 234, 236-37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). “[T]he inquiry is whether the jury might reasonably have been misled.” Id. at 237 .

2013However, a court commits reversible error “when an instruction is not only an erroneous or incomplete statement of law, but is also confusing or misleading.” McKenzie v. State, 830 So.2d 234, 236-37 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). “[T]he inquiry is whether the jury might reasonably have been misled.” Id. at 237 .