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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Edwards v. Stategreen1 sentence2026But our deference is not without limits: a trial court commits reversible error if it “reject[s] the defendant’s reasons at the second step and terminate[s] further inquiry.” Edwards, 301 Ga. at 826 (2) (citing Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899 (2) ( 463 SE2d 699 ) (1995), and Burkett v. State, 230 Ga. App. 676, 677 (1) ( 497 SE2d 807 ) (1998)). 5 During jury selection, the State challenged Wilson’s peremptory strikes of several of the non-white prospective jurors under McCollum. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2026But our deference is not without limits: a trial court commits reversible error if it “reject[s] the defendant’s reasons at the second step and terminate[s] further inquiry.” Edwards, 301 Ga. at 826 (2) (citing Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899 (2) ( 463 SE2d 699 ) (1995), and Burkett v. State, 230 Ga. App. 676, 677 (1) ( 497 SE2d 807 ) (1998)). 5 During jury selection, the State challenged Wilson’s peremptory strikes of several of the non-white prospective jurors under McCollum. 2026But our deference is not without limits: a trial court commits reversible error if it “reject[s] the defendant’s reasons at the second step and terminate[s] further inquiry.” Edwards, 301 Ga. at 826 (2) (citing Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899 (2) ( 463 SE2d 699 ) (1995), and Burkett v. State, 230 Ga. App. 676, 677 (1) ( 497 SE2d 807 ) (1998)). 5 During jury selection, the State challenged Wilson’s peremptory strikes of several of the non-white prospective jurors under McCollum. | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See also Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 22 SE2d 802 ) (1975); Glisson v. Glisson, 268 Ga. 164, 165 ( 486 SE2d 167 ) (1997). 2014See also Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 212 SE2d 802 ) (1975); Glisson v. Glisson, 268 Ga. 164, 165 ( 486 SE2d 167 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Dill v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“A trial court has a duty to recharge the jury on issues for which the jury requests a recharge, and the trial court commits reversible error if it fails to do so.” Dill v. State, 277 Ga. 150, 151 (2) ( 587 SE2d 56 ) (2003). 2014“A trial court has a duty to recharge the jury on issues for which the jury requests a recharge, and the trial court commits reversible error if it fails to do so.” Dill v. State, 277 Ga. 150, 151 (2) ( 587 SE2d 56 ) (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Glisson v. Glissongreen2 sentences2014See also Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 22 SE2d 802 ) (1975); Glisson v. Glisson, 268 Ga. 164, 165 ( 486 SE2d 167 ) (1997). 2014See also Edwards v. State, 233 Ga. 625, 626 ( 22 SE2d 802 ) (1975); Glisson v. Glisson, 268 Ga. 164, 165 ( 486 SE2d 167 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Felder v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Furthermore, a trial court commits reversible error in failing to give the charge, even absent a written request or timely objection to its omission, where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming and “the prosecution has raised the issue [of retreat] when questioning witnesses or in closing arguments.” (Citations omitted.) Felder v. State, 291 Ga. App. 740, 742-743 (1) ( 662 SE2d 826 ) (2008). 2011Furthermore, a trial court commits reversible error in failing to give the charge, even absent a written request or timely objection to its omission, where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming and “the prosecution has raised the issue [of retreat] when questioning witnesses or in closing arguments.” (Citations omitted.) Felder v. State, 291 Ga. App. 740, 742-743 (1) ( 662 SE2d 826 ) (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Jackson, 237 Ga. App. at 746-747 . | 1 | 1 |
O S Advertising Co. of Georgia, Inc. v. Rubingreen2 sentences2003Therefore, “[i]n reviewing discretionary applications for appeals, our rules require us to grant the application when the trial court commits reversible error. . . . [Cit.]” O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 724 (1) ( 482 SE2d 295 ) (1997). 2003Therefore, “[i]n reviewing discretionary applications for appeals, our rules require us to grant the application when the trial court commits reversible error. . . . [Cit.]” O S Advertising Co. of Ga. v. Rubin, 267 Ga. 723, 724 (1) ( 482 SE2d 295 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Harper v. Harpergreen2 sentences2003See also Harper v. Harper, 259 Ga. 246 ( 378 SE2d 673 ) (1989). 2003See also Harper v. Harper, 259 Ga. 246 ( 378 SE2d 673 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Sumner v. Department of Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences2002Supplies, 194 Ga.App. 840, 843 (1), 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990) ("The right for any reason principle does not rise to save the day because a judgment based on an erroneous legal conclusion or theory is reversible error."); Sumner v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Ga.App. 91, 93-94 (2), 483 S.E.2d 602 (1997) ("While it is a general rule that a grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason [cite.], it is an equally well-established exception that a right-for-any-reason rule cannot be applied where, as in this case, it is apparent that the trial court rested its judgment upon a 2002Supplies, 194 Ga.App. 840, 843 (1), 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990) ("The right for any reason principle does not rise to save the day because a judgment based on an erroneous legal conclusion or theory is reversible error."); Sumner v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Ga.App. 91, 93-94 (2), 483 S.E.2d 602 (1997) ("While it is a general rule that a grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason [cite.], it is an equally well-established exception that a right-for-any-reason rule cannot be applied where, as in this case, it is apparent that the trial court rested its judgment upon a | 1 | 1 |
Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, Inc.green2 sentences2002Supplies, 194 Ga.App. 840, 843 (1), 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990) ("The right for any reason principle does not rise to save the day because a judgment based on an erroneous legal conclusion or theory is reversible error."); Sumner v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Ga.App. 91, 93-94 (2), 483 S.E.2d 602 (1997) ("While it is a general rule that a grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason [cite.], it is an equally well-established exception that a right-for-any-reason rule cannot be applied where, as in this case, it is apparent that the trial court rested its judgment upon a 2002Supplies, 194 Ga.App. 840, 843 (1), 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990) ("The right for any reason principle does not rise to save the day because a judgment based on an erroneous legal conclusion or theory is reversible error."); Sumner v. Dept. of Human Resources, 225 Ga.App. 91, 93-94 (2), 483 S.E.2d 602 (1997) ("While it is a general rule that a grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason [cite.], it is an equally well-established exception that a right-for-any-reason rule cannot be applied where, as in this case, it is apparent that the trial court rested its judgment upon a | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 458 ( 501 SE2d 622 ) (1998); Gilbert v. State, 226 Ga. App. 230 ( 486 SE2d 48 ) (1997). 1998See, e.g., Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 458 ( 501 SE2d 622 ) (1998); Gilbert v. State, 226 Ga. App. 230 ( 486 SE2d 48 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Newsome v. Department of Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences1997While it is a general rule that a grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason (Newsome v. Dept. of Human Resources, 199 Ga. App. 419, 423 (3) ( 405 SE2d 61 )), it is an equally well-established exception that a right-for-any-reason rule cannot be applied where, as in this case, it is apparent that the trial *94 court rested its judgment upon an erroneous legal theory; in such instances the trial court commits reversible error. 1997While it is a general rule that a grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is right for any reason (Newsome v. Dept. of Human Resources, 199 Ga. App. 419, 423 (3) ( 405 SE2d 61 )), it is an equally well-established exception that a right-for-any-reason rule cannot be applied where, as in this case, it is apparent that the trial *94 court rested its judgment upon an erroneous legal theory; in such instances the trial court commits reversible error. | 1 | 1 |
Huff v. Valentinegreen2 sentences1997Huff v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) ( 457 SE2d 249 ), and cases cited therein; accord Gaster Lumber Co. v. Browning, 219 Ga. App. 435, 437 (1) ( 465 SE2d 524 ). 1997Huff v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) ( 457 SE2d 249 ), and cases cited therein; accord Gaster Lumber Co. v. Browning, 219 Ga. App. 435, 437 (1) ( 465 SE2d 524 ). | 1 | 1 |
Gaster Lumber Co. v. Browninggreen2 sentences1997Huff v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) ( 457 SE2d 249 ), and cases cited therein; accord Gaster Lumber Co. v. Browning, 219 Ga. App. 435, 437 (1) ( 465 SE2d 524 ). 1997Huff v. Valentine, 217 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) ( 457 SE2d 249 ), and cases cited therein; accord Gaster Lumber Co. v. Browning, 219 Ga. App. 435, 437 (1) ( 465 SE2d 524 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Burkett v. State
green
2 sentences2026But our deference is not without limits: a trial court commits reversible error if it “reject[s] the defendant’s reasons at the second step and terminate[s] further inquiry.” Edwards, 301 Ga. at 826 (2) (citing Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899 (2) ( 463 SE2d 699 ) (1995), and Burkett v. State, 230 Ga. App. 676, 677 (1) ( 497 SE2d 807 ) (1998)). 5 During jury selection, the State challenged Wilson’s peremptory strikes of several of the non-white prospective jurors under McCollum. 2026But our deference is not without limits: a trial court commits reversible error if it “reject[s] the defendant’s reasons at the second step and terminate[s] further inquiry.” Edwards, 301 Ga. at 826 (2) (citing Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899 (2) ( 463 SE2d 699 ) (1995), and Burkett v. State, 230 Ga. App. 676, 677 (1) ( 497 SE2d 807 ) (1998)). 5 During jury selection, the State challenged Wilson’s peremptory strikes of several of the non-white prospective jurors under McCollum. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Green v. State
green
1 sentence1999Citing Green, supra, the Supreme Court also discussed the theory underlying the rule that a court commits reversible error in failing to charge on circumstantial evidence, upon request, when the only direct evidence comes from a witness who has been impeached: [W]here both direct and circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt is admitted, and the jury is authorized to find that all the direct evidence, in the form of witness testimony, has been impeached, the jury is left to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant based solely on the circumstantial evidence, and therefore must | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gilbert v. State
green
2 sentences1998See, e.g., Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 458 ( 501 SE2d 622 ) (1998); Gilbert v. State, 226 Ga. App. 230 ( 486 SE2d 48 ) (1997). 1998See, e.g., Smith v. State, 232 Ga. App. 458 ( 501 SE2d 622 ) (1998); Gilbert v. State, 226 Ga. App. 230 ( 486 SE2d 48 ) (1997). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.