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31 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Boardgreen2 sentences2025It “prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.” Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315, 325 (2005) (explaining that a special legislation challenge is typically reviewed “under the - 19 - No. 1-23-0803 same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge”). 2023We disagree. ¶ 215 i. The Applicable Law ¶ 216 “The special legislation clause prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.” Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315, 325 , 837 N.E.2d 88, 95 (2005). | 7 | 11 |
Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.green2 sentences2020To determine whether a law constitutes special - 32 - legislation, a court must determine (1) “whether the statutory classification at issue discriminates in favor of a select group and against a similarly situated group” and (2) “if the classification does so discriminate, *** whether the classification is arbitrary.” Id. ¶ 86 First, “laws will not be regarded as improper special legislation merely because they affect only one class of entities and not another.” Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221, 236 , 840 N.E.2d 1174, 1183 (2005). 2020To determine whether a law constitutes special - 32 - legislation, a court must determine (1) “whether the statutory classification at issue discriminates in favor of a select group and against a similarly situated group” and (2) “if the classification does so discriminate, *** whether the classification is arbitrary.” Id. ¶ 86 First, “laws will not be regarded as improper special legislation merely because they affect only one class of entities and not another.” Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221, 236 , 840 N.E.2d 1174, 1183 (2005). | 4 | 6 |
Elementary School District 159 v. Schillergreen2 sentences2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut 2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut | 2 | 4 |
Best v. Taylor MacHine Worksgreen2 sentences2013Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 391 . 2013Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 391 . | 2 | 4 |
The Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. The Peoria Federation of Support Staffgreen2 sentences2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut 2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut | 2 | 2 |
Bridgewater v. Hotzgreen2 sentences2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut 2016The majority even recognizes this: “If an entity is uniquely situated, the special legislation clause will not bar the legislature from enacting a law tailored specifically to address the conditions of that particular entity.” (Emphasis in original.) Supra ¶ 22; Peoria School District, 2013 IL 114853, ¶ 55 (“Nothing in the constitution bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated.” (citing Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (2006))); Bridgewater, 51 Ill. 2d at 109 (holding that the constitut | 2 | 2 |
Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of Support Staffgreen2 sentences2013The court noted that the special legislation clause prohibits the legislature from “ ‘conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.’ ” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18 (quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325 ). 2013The court noted that the special legislation clause prohibits the legislature from “ ‘conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.’ ” 2012 IL App (4th) 110875, ¶ 18 (quoting Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325 ). | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc.green2 sentences2005Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc. , 208 Ill. 2d 12, 21 (2003), citing Best v. Taylor Machine Works , 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (1997). 2005Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 21 (2003), citing Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (1997). | 2 | 2 |
Moline School District v. Quinngreen2 sentences2020The clause prohibits the legislature “from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group of persons and excluding others that are similarly situated.” Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education v. Quinn, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 18 . 2019The clause prohibits the legislature “from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group of persons and excluding others that are similarly situated.” Moline School District No. 40 Board of Education v. Quinn, 2016 IL 119704, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 4 |
Caulkins v. Pritzkergreen1 sentence2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2003Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill.2d at 367 , 91 Ill.Dec. 610 , 483 N.E.2d 1245 . 2003Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill.2d at 367 , 91 Ill.Dec. 610 , 483 N.E.2d 1245 . | 4 | 1986–2003 |
Piccioli v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System
green
2 sentences2024This clause “prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Piccoli v. Board of Trustees of Teachers’ Retirement System, 2019 IL 122905, ¶ 18 . 2020The clause “prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Piccioli, 2019 IL 122905, ¶ 18 . | 3 | 2020–2024 |
Village of Vernon Hills v. Vernon Fire Protection District
green
2 sentences2006Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 235 ; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122 . 2006Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 235 ; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Miller v. Rosenberg
green
2 sentences2002Miller, 196 Ill.2d at 60 , 255 Ill.Dec. 464 , 749 N.E.2d at 953 . 2002Miller, 196 Ill.2d at 60 , 255 Ill.Dec. 464 , 749 N.E.2d at 953 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
In re M.A.
green
1 sentence2020And in an equal protection challenge, where the party challenging the legislation’s constitutionality “fails to show that he is similarly situated to the comparison group, his equal protection challenge fails.” In re M.A., 2015 IL 118049, ¶ 26 . ¶ 29 Austin has not met its burden, as it fails to show, let alone explain, how a two-year statute of limitations for claims and causes of action against insurance producers (and limited insurance representatives and registered firms) is a special benefit or privilege conferred upon this group at the expense of others that are similarly situated. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc. v. Edgar
green
1 sentence1986(Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 357, 367 ; Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc. v. Edgar (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 1, 4 .) “It arbitrarily, and without a sound, reasonable basis, discriminates in favor of a select group.” (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 130,137-38 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano
green
1 sentence1986(Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 357, 367 ; Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda, Inc. v. Edgar (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 1, 4 .) “It arbitrarily, and without a sound, reasonable basis, discriminates in favor of a select group.” (Emphasis in original.) Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 130,137-38 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.