31 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1919–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McClellan v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2025Because these lesser- 11 To support a manslaughter instruction based upon extreme emotional disturbance, the evidence must have been such that it could induce a reasonable jury to believe that Appellant acted violently because of “a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome his judgment, and to cause him to act uncontrollably from an impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.3d 493, 503 (Ky. 2019) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 , 468–69 (Ky.1986)). 4 The 2015To support a manslaughter instruction based upon extreme' emotional disturbance, the evidence must have been such that it could induce a reasonable jury to believe that Appellant acted t violently because of “a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to over come [his] judgment, and to cause [him] to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986). | 2 | 3 |
Gall v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1993Under the instruction for murder, the trial court basically parroted the murder statute, KRS 507.020, by stating that appellant would be guilty of murder if he killed Fred Cash “not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable justification or excuse under the circumstances as he believed them to be.” The manslaughter instruction instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree if the jury did not find appellant guilty of murder and the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant “killed Charles Fred 1993Under the instruction for murder, the trial court basically parroted the murder statute, KRS 507.020, by stating that appellant would be guilty of murder if he killed Fred Cash "not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable justification or excuse under the circumstances as he believed them to be." The manslaughter instruction instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree if the jury did not find appellant guilty of murder and the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant "killed Charles Fred | 1 | 2 |
Johnston v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1953It is argued Muncy is guilty of murder or nothing and it was reversible error to give the manslaughter instruction, citing Johnston v. Com., 170 Ky. 766 , 186 S.W. 655 . 1953It is argued Muncy is guilty of murder or nothing and it was reversible error to give the manslaughter instruction, citing Johnston v. Com., 170 Ky. 766 , 186 S.W. 655 . | 1 | 2 |
Holland v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025Because these lesser- 11 To support a manslaughter instruction based upon extreme emotional disturbance, the evidence must have been such that it could induce a reasonable jury to believe that Appellant acted violently because of “a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome his judgment, and to cause him to act uncontrollably from an impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.3d 493, 503 (Ky. 2019) (quoting McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464 , 468–69 (Ky.1986)). 4 The | 1 | 1 |
Spears v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2015Extreme emotional disturbance is the successor to the common law concept of “sudden heat of passion.” Spears v. Commonwealth, 30 S.W.3d 152, 154 (Ky.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Baze v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004See Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817 (1997), which held that it is error to require the Commonwealth to prove the presence of extreme emotional disturbance as an element of the offense of first-degree manslaughter. *71 V. 2004See Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817 (1997), which held that it is error to require the Commonwealth to prove the presence of extreme emotional disturbance as an element of the offense of first-degree manslaughter. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1996The Commonwealth further argues that we should not affirm as the reversal “leads to an absurd result and ... is completely unjustified by the facts of the case.” Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 683, 688 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Bowling v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1996Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to inform the jury that its decision with respect to mitigation did not have to be unanimous was fully resolved in Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 175, 180 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Warnell v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1993See Warnell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 683 (1953).) At any rate, Warnell presumably raised objection to the manslaughter instruction. 1993See Warnell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 683 (1953).) At any rate, Warnell presumably raised objection to the manslaughter instruction. | 1 | 1 |
Wellman v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1990See Wellman, supra ; Gall, supra . 1990See Wellman, supra; Gall, supra. Appellant further objects (now) that the trial court in its instructions failed to define reasonable doubt, to state the Commonwealth’s burden of proof, and adequately to inform the jury of the presumption of innocence. | 1 | 1 |
| Cook v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davenport v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1971Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628 , 148 S.W.2d 1054 ; Canada v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 641 , 136 S.W.2d 1061 . 1971Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628 , 148 S.W.2d 1054 ; Canada v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 641 , 136 S.W.2d 1061 . | 3 | 1959–1971 |
Canada v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1971Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628 , 148 S.W.2d 1054 ; Canada v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 641 , 136 S.W.2d 1061 . 1971Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628 , 148 S.W.2d 1054 ; Canada v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 641 , 136 S.W.2d 1061 . | 3 | 1959–1971 |
Bast v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1937Alsoj in the case of Sergent v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 228 , 259 S. W. 349, 351 , in discussing the propriety of giving a manslaughter instruction in a ’.homicide case where there were no eyewitnesses and the evidence all circumstantial, the court said: “While there were no visible signs of a struggle having taken place at the spot where the body of Sergent was found with a large hole in the back of his head, the evidence shows that there were footprints in and around and leading down the hillside from it, and further that a fire had been kindled close to the body, the burnt embers being plainl 1937Alsoj in the case of Sergent v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 228 , 259 S. W. 349, 351 , in discussing the propriety of giving a manslaughter instruction in a ’.homicide case where there were no eyewitnesses and the evidence all circumstantial, the court said: “While there were no visible signs of a struggle having taken place at the spot where the body of Sergent was found with a large hole in the back of his head, the evidence shows that there were footprints in and around and leading down the hillside from it, and further that a fire had been kindled close to the body, the burnt embers being plainl | 3 | 1935–1937 |
Mullins v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 438 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Osborne v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2011Cf. Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky.2003) (holding that a first-degree, intent-to-injure manslaughter instruction was not required where the evidence showed only an intent to kill); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234 (Ky.2001) (same). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Caudill v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2011Cf. Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky.2003) (holding that a first-degree, intent-to-injure manslaughter instruction was not required where the evidence showed only an intent to kill); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.3d 234 (Ky.2001) (same). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cecil v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1996However, in light of our recent decisions in Cecil v. Commonwealth, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 669 (1994), and Morgan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 878 S.W.2d 18 (1994), the Commonwealth conceded that it was error to instruct on first degree manslaughter. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Morgan v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1996However, in light of our recent decisions in Cecil v. Commonwealth, Ky., 888 S.W.2d 669 (1994), and Morgan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 878 S.W.2d 18 (1994), the Commonwealth conceded that it was error to instruct on first degree manslaughter. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Payne v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1993Under the instruction for murder, the trial court basically parroted the murder statute, KRS 507.020, by stating that appellant would be guilty of murder if he killed Fred Cash “not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable justification or excuse under the circumstances as he believed them to be.” The manslaughter instruction instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree if the jury did not find appellant guilty of murder and the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant “killed Charles Fred 1993Under the instruction for murder, the trial court basically parroted the murder statute, KRS 507.020, by stating that appellant would be guilty of murder if he killed Fred Cash "not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable justification or excuse under the circumstances as he believed them to be." The manslaughter instruction instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of manslaughter in the first degree if the jury did not find appellant guilty of murder and the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant "killed Charles Fred | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Slone v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1974In Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S.W. 1062 (1925), we said: “In its ordinary acceptation, manslaughter is the unlawful, willful, and felonious killing of another in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, and not in the necessary or apparently necessary self-defense of the slayer. * * * Of course, where there is other and independent evidence tending to show that the killing was done in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, the mere fact that the accused was drunk will not deprive him of a manslaughter instructio 1974In Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S.W. 1062 (1925), we said: “In its ordinary acceptation, manslaughter is the unlawful, willful, and felonious killing of another in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, and not in the necessary or apparently necessary self-defense of the slayer. * * * Of course, where there is other and independent evidence tending to show that the killing was done in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, the mere fact that the accused was drunk will not deprive him of a manslaughter instructio | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Abbott v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1974In Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S.W. 1062 (1925), we said: “In its ordinary acceptation, manslaughter is the unlawful, willful, and felonious killing of another in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, and not in the necessary or apparently necessary self-defense of the slayer. * * * Of course, where there is other and independent evidence tending to show that the killing was done in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, the mere fact that the accused was drunk will not deprive him of a manslaughter instructio 1974In Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S.W. 1062 (1925), we said: “In its ordinary acceptation, manslaughter is the unlawful, willful, and felonious killing of another in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, and not in the necessary or apparently necessary self-defense of the slayer. * * * Of course, where there is other and independent evidence tending to show that the killing was done in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, the mere fact that the accused was drunk will not deprive him of a manslaughter instructio | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Sewell v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1974There was even less evidence of a struggle in Sewell v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 183 , 144 S.W.2d 223 (1940), and in Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 (1964), yet a manslaughter instruction or instructions were required in both. 1974There was even less evidence of a struggle in Sewell v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 183 , 144 S.W.2d 223 (1940), and in Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 (1964), yet a manslaughter instruction or instructions were required in both. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Perciful v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1974In Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S.W. 1062 (1925), we said: “In its ordinary acceptation, manslaughter is the unlawful, willful, and felonious killing of another in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, and not in the necessary or apparently necessary self-defense of the slayer. * * * Of course, where there is other and independent evidence tending to show that the killing was done in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, the mere fact that the accused was drunk will not deprive him of a manslaughter instructio 1974In Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S.W. 1062 (1925), we said: “In its ordinary acceptation, manslaughter is the unlawful, willful, and felonious killing of another in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, and not in the necessary or apparently necessary self-defense of the slayer. * * * Of course, where there is other and independent evidence tending to show that the killing was done in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, the mere fact that the accused was drunk will not deprive him of a manslaughter instructio | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Stanley v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1974There was even less evidence of a struggle in Sewell v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 183 , 144 S.W.2d 223 (1940), and in Stanley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 380 S.W.2d 71 (1964), yet a manslaughter instruction or instructions were required in both. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Blackburn v. Commonwealth
neutral
1 sentence1974In Perciful v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S.W. 1062 (1925), we said: “In its ordinary acceptation, manslaughter is the unlawful, willful, and felonious killing of another in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, and not in the necessary or apparently necessary self-defense of the slayer. * * * Of course, where there is other and independent evidence tending to show that the killing was done in sudden heat of passion or in sudden affray, and without previous malice, the mere fact that the accused was drunk will not deprive him of a manslaughter instructio | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Lee v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1965Canada v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 641 , 136 S.W.2d 1061 ; Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628 , 148 S.W.2d 1054 ; and Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 . 1965Canada v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 641 , 136 S.W.2d 1061 ; Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628 , 148 S.W.2d 1054 ; and Lee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 57 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Young v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1953Hurd v. Com., 257 Ky. 315 , 78 S.W.2d 9 ; Young v. Com., 276 Ky. 26 , 122 S.W.2d 1034 . 1953Hurd v. Com., 257 Ky. 315 , 78 S.W.2d 9 ; Young v. Com., 276 Ky. 26 , 122 S.W.2d 1034 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Hurd v. Commonwealth
neutral
2 sentences1953Hurd v. Com., 257 Ky. 315 , 78 S.W.2d 9 ; Young v. Com., 276 Ky. 26 , 122 S.W.2d 1034 . 1953Hurd v. Com., 257 Ky. 315 , 78 S.W.2d 9 ; Young v. Com., 276 Ky. 26 , 122 S.W.2d 1034 . | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Barnes v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1948Barnes v. Commonwealth, 179 Ky. 725 , 201 S. W. 318 , and cases therein cited. 1948Barnes v. Commonwealth, 179 Ky. 725 , 201 S. W. 318 , and cases therein cited. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Richmond v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Marion v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1943The relationship of the two charged with the commission of the crime is not unlike that which exists in a conspiracy to kill a man, viz., if the parties agreed or conspired to kill him, there is no place for a manslaughter instruction, Marion v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 729 , 108 *401 S. W. (2d) 721, and even the right of self-defense is denied. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Spangler v. Hickey neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| House v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Frasure v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| King v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Sergent v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Payne v. Elkin neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Payne v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Centers v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Anderson v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Rutherford v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Feldman v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Jones v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Elliott v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| White v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Taylor v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Harris v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Bishop v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.