manslaughter instruction in Alabama

1994We do observe, however, that `[i]t is much the safer rule to charge upon all the degrees of homicide included in the indictment, when a party is on trial for murder, unless it is perfectly clear to the judicial mind that there is no evidence tending to bring the offense within some particular degree.' Phelps v. State, 435 So.2d 158, 163 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), quoted in Jones v. State, 514 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 514 So.2d 1068 (Ala.1987) .

1993We do observe, however, that "[i]t is much the safer rule to charge upon all the degrees of homicide included in the indictment, when a party is on trial for murder, unless it is perfectly clear to the judicial mind that there is no evidence tending to bring the offense within some particular degree." Phelps v. State , 435 So.2d 158 , 163 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), quoted in Jones v. State , 514 So.2d 1060 , 1064 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 514 So.2d 1068 (Ala. 1987).

1994We do observe, however, that `[i]t is much the safer rule to charge upon all the degrees of homicide included in the indictment, when a party is on trial for murder, unless it is perfectly clear to the judicial mind that there is no evidence tending to bring the offense within some particular degree.' Phelps v. State, 435 So.2d 158, 163 (Ala.Cr.App.1983), quoted in Jones v. State, 514 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 514 So.2d 1068 (Ala.1987) .

1993We do observe, however, that "[i]t is much the safer rule to charge upon all the degrees of homicide included in the indictment, when a party is on trial for murder, unless it is perfectly clear to the judicial mind that there is no evidence tending to bring the offense within some particular degree." Phelps v. State , 435 So.2d 158 , 163 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), quoted in Jones v. State , 514 So.2d 1060 , 1064 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 514 So.2d 1068 (Ala. 1987).

2026See, e.g., Lee v. State, 44 So. 3d 1145, 1156 (Ala. Crim.

2026App. 2013) (quoting Ex parte Woodall, 730 So. 2d 652, 657 (Ala. 1998)). 42 CR-2023-0654 whether voluntary or involuntary, may be considered by the jury whenever it's relevant to negate an element of the offense charged such as intent." (TR. 2618.) And, Creque's contention that trial counsel should have also requested a manslaughter instruction based on his "intoxication" is "not supported by the evidence," as properly recognized by the circuit court in summarily dismissing this claim.

2026Likewise, a manslaughter instruction was unwarranted by the evidence because there was "no indication that [Creque] was so intoxicated that he could not form the necessary intent, despite his statement that he had ingested drugs and alcohol before the murder." Hutcherson v. State, 677 So. 2d 1174, 1175 (Ala. Crim.

2015See Welch v. State, 630 So.2d 145, 146 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (“ When the evidence clearly shows that the appellant is either guilty of the offense charged, or innocent, the charge on a lesser-included offense is not necessary or proper.’” (quoting Hollins v. State, 415 So.2d 1249, 1253 (Ala.Crim.App.1982))).

2015See Welch v. State, 630 So.2d 145, 146 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (“ When the evidence clearly shows that the appellant is either guilty of the offense charged, or innocent, the charge on a lesser-included offense is not necessary or proper.’” (quoting Hollins v. State, 415 So.2d 1249, 1253 (Ala.Crim.App.1982))).

2013Cf. Shultz, 480 So.2d at 76 (“[Section] 13A-6-3(a)(2)[, Ala. Code 1975,] is designed to cover those situations where the jury does not believe a defendant is guilty of murder but also does not believe the killing was totally justified by self-defense.”); Wyllie v. State, 445 So.2d 958 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (holding that the circuit court erred in failing to give a provocation-manslaughter instruction in a case where the defendant shot her husband after he threatened to cut her throat with a knife and then came at her with his hands in his pocket); Hill v. State, 485 So.2d 808 (Ala.Crim.App.1986)

2010The Colorado Supreme Court cited United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision to request a manslaughter instruction; defendant wanted only self-defense argued to the jury); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense instruction or lesser-included-offense instruction; this was "a permissible exercise of trial strategy” because the primary line of defense was that defendant was not

2010The Colorado Supreme Court cited United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision to request a manslaughter instruction; defendant wanted only self-defense argued to the jury); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense instruction or lesser-included-offense instruction; this was "a permissible exercise of trial strategy” because the primary line of defense was that defendant was not

2010The Colorado Supreme Court cited United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision to request a manslaughter instruction; defendant wanted only self-defense argued to the jury); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense instruction or lesser-included-offense instruction; this was "a permissible exercise of trial strategy” because the primary line of defense was that defendant was not

2010The Colorado Supreme Court cited United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision to request a manslaughter instruction; defendant wanted only self-defense argued to the jury); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense instruction or lesser-included-offense instruction; this was "a permissible exercise of trial strategy” because the primary line of defense was that defendant was not

2010The Colorado Supreme Court cited United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision to request a manslaughter instruction; defendant wanted only self-defense argued to the jury); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense instruction or lesser-included-offense instruction; this was "a permissible exercise of trial strategy” because the primary line of defense was that defendant was not

2010The Colorado Supreme Court cited United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision to request a manslaughter instruction; defendant wanted only self-defense argued to the jury); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense instruction or lesser-included-offense instruction; this was "a permissible exercise of trial strategy” because the primary line of defense was that defendant was not

2010The Colorado Supreme Court cited United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision to request a manslaughter instruction; defendant wanted only self-defense argued to the jury); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 808 (6th Cir.2005) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel’s decision not to request a self-defense instruction or lesser-included-offense instruction; this was "a permissible exercise of trial strategy” because the primary line of defense was that defendant was not

2009By refusing to accede to the Commonwealth’s request for a manslaughter instruction, the judge imper-missibly prevented the jury from considering a lesser degree of culpability for Woodward.” 427 Mass, at 662-665, 694 N.E.2d at 1282-84 (footnotes omitted).

2009On the facts of this case, the judge was entitled to raise with counsel whether to give a manslaughter instruction, in view of her determination that the evidence warranted such an instruction, but she was not required to do so.” 431 Mass, at 337-38, 727 N.E.2d at 526-27 (footnotes omitted).

2000Ashley's ex-girlfriend testified that she had seen him at a bar approximately two hours before the stabbing and that he "looked like he was out of it" and "looked like he was on drugs." 641 So.2d at 1098.