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12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1975–1996 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Paul Belton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996Therefore, “[i]f the trial court had been specifically apprised of the reconstruction of events now put forward to us by appellate counsel, it would have been well advised to give the manslaughter instruction,” id. (emphasis added), whether or not it was strictly required to. 1994The court went on to say that if trial counsel had advanced even the very tenuous theory in support of the instructions that was articulated for the first time on appeal, the trial court "would have been well advised to give the manslaughter instruction.” 127 U.S.App.D.C. at 207, 382 F.2d at 156 . .The majority’s reliance on Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 594-95 (D.C.1991) is also misguided. | 2 | 4 |
Pendergrast v. Unites Statesgreen2 sentences1977Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 315 , 16 S.Ct. 839 , 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896); Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975). 1977Harris v. United States, D.C.App., 373 A.2d 590 (1977); Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975). | 2 | 4 |
West v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 864 (D.C.1985). 2 . 1990See West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 864-65 (D.C.1985). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Atkinsgreen2 sentences1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-43 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct "in light of the jury's verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice"); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree murd 1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-13 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct “in light of the jiffy’s verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice”); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree mur | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bartowsheskigreen2 sentences1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-43 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct "in light of the jury's verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice"); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree murd 1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-13 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct “in light of the jiffy’s verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice”); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree mur | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1994The court went on to say that if trial counsel had advanced even the very tenuous theory in support of the instructions that was articulated for the first time on appeal, the trial court "would have been well advised to give the manslaughter instruction." 127 U.S.App.D.C. at 207, 382 F.2d at 156 . [4] The majority's reliance on Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 594-95 (D.C.1991) is also misguided. 1994The court went on to say that if trial counsel had advanced even the very tenuous theory in support of the instructions that was articulated for the first time on appeal, the trial court "would have been well advised to give the manslaughter instruction.” 127 U.S.App.D.C. at 207, 382 F.2d at 156 . .The majority’s reliance on Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 594-95 (D.C.1991) is also misguided. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dixongreen2 sentences1990See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441, 443 , 511 P.2d 623, 625 (1973) (where first-degree murder statute classifies as felony murder killings in the commission of one of five enumerated felonies, a homicide occurring in the course of a non-enumerated felony does not constitute second-degree “malice aforethought" murder). 1990See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441, 443 , 511 P.2d 623, 625 (1973) (where first-degree murder statute classifies as felony murder killings in the commission of one of five enumerated felonies, a homicide occurring in the course of a non-enumerated felony does not constitute second-degree “malice aforethought" murder). | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1977Morgan v. United States, D.C.App., 363 A.2d 999, 1003 (1976); Hurt v. United States, supra at 218-19; Belton v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 201 , 208, 382 F.2d 150, 157 (1967). *428 Accordingly, it was not error for the judge to refuse to give the requested instruction in this case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Charles Comer
green
2 sentences1977See Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975); United States v. Alexander, supra; United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888 (1971); United States v. Comer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 214 , 421 F.2d 1149 (1970). 1977See Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975); United States v. Alexander, supra; United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888 (1971); United States v. Comer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 214 , 421 F.2d 1149 (1970). | 2 | 1976–1977 |
United States v. Rodney Sinclair
green
2 sentences1977See Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975); United States v. Alexander, supra; United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888 (1971); United States v. Comer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 214 , 421 F.2d 1149 (1970). 1976See Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975); United States v. Alexander, supra; United States v. Sinclair, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 13 , 444 F.2d 888 (1971); United States v. Comer, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 214 , 421 F.2d 1149 (1970). | 2 | 1976–1977 |
Keeble v. United States
green
2 sentences1994If there was error it was harmless.”). 17 We emphasize that our analysis does not encompass the position clearly rejected by Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 , 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98 , 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), and Moore v. United States, 599 A.2d 1381, 1384-85 (D.C.1991), that any conviction of a greater offense necessarily renders the failure to instruct on a lesser-included of fense harmless error. 1994If there was error it was harmless.”). 17 We emphasize that our analysis does not encompass the position clearly rejected by Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 , 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98 , 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), and Moore v. United States, 599 A.2d 1381, 1384-85 (D.C.1991), that any conviction of a greater offense necessarily renders the failure to instruct on a lesser-included of fense harmless error. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Moore v. United States
green
2 sentences1994If there was error it was harmless."). [17] We emphasize that our analysis does not encompass the position clearly rejected by Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 , 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98 , 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), and Moore v. United States, 599 A.2d 1381, 1384-85 (D.C.1991), that any conviction of a greater offense necessarily renders the failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense *937 harmless error. 1994If there was error it was harmless.”). 17 We emphasize that our analysis does not encompass the position clearly rejected by Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 , 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98 , 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), and Moore v. United States, 599 A.2d 1381, 1384-85 (D.C.1991), that any conviction of a greater offense necessarily renders the failure to instruct on a lesser-included of fense harmless error. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Legal Services Corp. v. East Arkansas Legal Services
green
2 sentences1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-43 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct "in light of the jury's verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice"); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree murd 1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-13 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct “in light of the jiffy’s verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice”); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree mur | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Armour & Co. v. Holsey
green
2 sentences1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-43 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct "in light of the jury's verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice"); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree murd 1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-13 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct “in light of the jiffy’s verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice”); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree mur | 1 | 1994–1994 |
National Broadcasting Co. v. Herman
green
2 sentences1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-43 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct "in light of the jury's verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice"); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree murd 1994See also, e.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 242-13 (Colo.1983) (en banc) (jury instructed on first-degree and second-degree murder but not manslaughter; court found no evidence to support a manslaughter instruction but observed that the failure to instruct “in light of the jiffy’s verdict for the most serious possible offense, does not comport with an inference of prejudice”); State v. Atkins, 681 S.W.2d 571, 577 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 , 105 S.Ct. 1395 , 84 L.Ed.2d 784 (1985) (because jury found appellant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree mur | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Comber v. United States
green
1 sentence1992Id. at 42 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
2 sentences1978He then argues, on the basis of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), that by requiring appellant to produce at least some evidence of no malice (in order to earn the manslaughter instruction) or of mere assault (to qualify for the assault instructions), the burden of proof was shifted — unconstitutionally — to appellant. *964 Mullaney concerned a Maine statute providing for punishment of all felonious homicide as murder unless the defendant were to prove “by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocat 1978He then argues, on the basis of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), that by requiring appellant to produce at least some evidence of no malice (in order to earn the manslaughter instruction) or of mere assault (to qualify for the assault instructions), the burden of proof was shifted — unconstitutionally — to appellant. *964 Mullaney concerned a Maine statute providing for punishment of all felonious homicide as murder unless the defendant were to prove “by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocat | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Stevenson v. United States
green
2 sentences1977Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 315 , 16 S.Ct. 839 , 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896); Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975). 1977Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 315 , 16 S.Ct. 839 , 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896); Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Harris v. United States
green
1 sentence1977Harris v. United States, D.C.App., 373 A.2d 590 (1977); Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919 (1975). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.