validity of any subsequent waiver in Louisiana

2026“When a defendant exercises his privilege against self- incrimination the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon whether police have ‘scrupulously honored’ his right to remain silent.” Taylor, 2001-1638 p. 6, 838 So.2d at 739 , citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 326 .

2026“When a defendant exercises his privilege against self- incrimination the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon whether police have ‘scrupulously honored’ his right to remain silent.” Taylor, 2001-1638 p. 6, 838 So.2d at 739 , citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 326 .

2026“When a defendant exercises his privilege against self- incrimination the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon whether police have ‘scrupulously honored’ his right to remain silent.” Taylor, 2001-1638 p. 6, 838 So.2d at 739 , citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. at 326 .

2017Because I’m not about to let y’all sit up here and use that, talking about...” He relies on State v. Taylor, 01-1638, p. 6 (La. 1/14/03), 838 So.2d 729, 739 , wherein the Court recognized that “[wjhen a defendant exercises his privilege against self-incrimination the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon whether police have “scrupulously honored” his right to remain silent.” (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).

1982If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.' Although it has been recognized that an accused may later change his mind and waive the same rights which he earlier asserted, [ State v. Manning, 380 So.2d 46 (La.1980), and State v. Dominick, 354 So.2d 1316 (La.1978)] once a defendant has invoked his constitutional right to remain silent or his right to counsel, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the `scrupulous honoring' of that right by the police, Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1

1982If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.' Although it has been recognized that an accused may later change his mind and waive the same rights which he earlier asserted, [ State v. Manning, 380 So.2d 46 (La.1980), and State v. Dominick, 354 So.2d 1316 (La.1978)] once a defendant has invoked his constitutional right to remain silent or his right to counsel, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the `scrupulous honoring' of that right by the police, Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1

1982If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.' Although it has been recognized that an accused may later change his mind and waive the same rights which he earlier asserted, [ State v. Manning, 380 So.2d 46 (La.1980), and State v. Dominick, 354 So.2d 1316 (La.1978)] once a defendant has invoked his constitutional right to remain silent or his right to counsel, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the `scrupulous honoring' of that right by the police, Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1

1981Although it has been recognized that an accused may later change his mind and waive the same rights which he earlier asserted [ State v. Manning, 380 So.2d 46 (La., 1980), and State v. Dominick, 354 So.2d 1316 (La., 1978)], once a defendant has invoked his constitutional right to remain silent or his right to counsel, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of that right by the police.

1996Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

1991Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

1996Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

1991Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

1996Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

1991Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

1996Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

1991Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La.1987), cert. den., 484 U.S. 947 , 108 S.Ct. 337 , 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).

2022However, police are not obliged to ignore spontaneous and unsolicited statements by someone in custody, as long as those statements do not result from police -initiated custodial interrogation or 13 questioning " reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." See State v. Tilley, 99- 0569 ( La. 716100), 767 So. 2d 6, 11 , cert. denied, 532 U. S. 959 , 121 S. Ct. 1488 , 149 L.Ed. 2d 375 ( 2001).

2022However, police are not obliged to ignore spontaneous and unsolicited statements by someone in custody, as long as those statements do not result from police -initiated custodial interrogation or 13 questioning " reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." See State v. Tilley, 99- 0569 ( La. 716100), 767 So. 2d 6, 11 , cert. denied, 532 U. S. 959 , 121 S. Ct. 1488 , 149 L.Ed. 2d 375 ( 2001).

2022However, police are not obliged to ignore spontaneous and unsolicited statements by someone in custody, as long as those statements do not result from police -initiated custodial interrogation or 13 questioning " reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." See State v. Tilley, 99- 0569 ( La. 716100), 767 So. 2d 6, 11 , cert. denied, 532 U. S. 959 , 121 S. Ct. 1488 , 149 L.Ed. 2d 375 ( 2001).

2022However, police are not obliged to ignore spontaneous and unsolicited statements by someone in custody, as long as those statements do not result from police -initiated custodial interrogation or 13 questioning " reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." See State v. Tilley, 99- 0569 ( La. 716100), 767 So. 2d 6, 11 , cert. denied, 532 U. S. 959 , 121 S. Ct. 1488 , 149 L.Ed. 2d 375 ( 2001).

2004While the Louisiana Supreme Court has expressed its preference for personal colloquies between a trial court and a defendant entering a guilty plea on the basis that the failure to individually address the defendant may undermine the validity of any subsequent waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has consistently stated that the knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's rights "depends upon the circumstances of each case." State v. Richard, 00-0659 (La.9/29/00), 769 So.2d 1177 , 1178 State v. Filer, 00-0073 (La.6/30/00), 762 So.2d 1080, 1081 .

2001In State v. Tolbert, 30,821 (La.App.2d Cir.8/19/98), 716 So.2d 949 , writ denied, 98-2562 (La.1/15/99), 736 So.2d 207 , this court held: When a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of that right by the police.

2001In State v. Tolbert, 30,821 (La.App.2d Cir.8/19/98), 716 So.2d 949 , writ denied, 98-2562 (La.1/15/99), 736 So.2d 207 , this court held: When a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of that right by the police.

2000C.Cr.P. art. 556.1(A) incorporates this Court's preference for personal colloquies between a trial judge and a defendant entering a guilty plea, see State v. Williams, 384 So.2d 779, 781 (La.1980) ("The only realistic means of assuring that the trial judge leaves a record adequate for any later review is to require that the record contain on its face direct evidence that the accused was made aware by the trial judge of his right to a jury trial, his right to confront accusers, and his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.") (citations omitted), and while the failure of a trial judge

1996App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied 590 So.2d 1197 (La.1992), cert. den. 506 U.S. 818 , 113 S.Ct. 62 , 121 L.Ed.2d 30 (1992): Once a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of the right by the police.

1996App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied 590 So.2d 1197 (La.1992), cert. den. 506 U.S. 818 , 113 S.Ct. 62 , 121 L.Ed.2d 30 (1992): Once a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of the right by the police.

1996App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied 590 So.2d 1197 (La.1992), cert. den. 506 U.S. 818 , 113 S.Ct. 62 , 121 L.Ed.2d 30 (1992): Once a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of the right by the police.

1996App. 4th Cir.1991), writ denied 590 So.2d 1197 (La.1992), cert. den. 506 U.S. 818 , 113 S.Ct. 62 , 121 L.Ed.2d 30 (1992): Once a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the "scrupulous honoring" of the right by the police.

1991Therefore, the state was required only to show that defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights and waived the same before making his statements." Id., 499 So.2d at pps. 304 and 305. (emphasis added) Once a defendant invokes his constitutional right to silence, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon the *1329 "scrupulous honoring" of the right by the police.

1984State v. McCarty, 421 So.2d 213 (La.1982).

1982State v. Mouton, 366 So.2d 1336 (La.1978); State v. Peevy, 321 So.2d 324 (La.1975).

1982State v. Kevin Michael Shea, 421 So.2d 200 (La.1982) (on rehearing).

1982State v. Mouton, 366 So.2d 1336 (La.1978); State v. Peevy, 321 So.2d 324 (La.1975).

1981Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); State v. Thucos, 390 So.2d 1281 (La., 1980); State v. Manning, supra. The State's burden here is a *671 heavy one.