modifying clause in Massachusetts

2024While "[i]t is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent" (quotation omitted), Moulton v. Brookline Rent Control Bd., 385 Mass. 228, 230-231 (1982), this rule typically applies where "a list of multiple, distinct antecedents precedes the modifying clause," Bednark v. Catania Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 812 (2011).

1998Part 3 provides that damages in the form of uninsured benefits will be reduced by “(a]ny expenses that are payable or would have been payable except for a deductible under the PIP coverage of this policy or any other Massachusetts auto policy.” Scarcella’s contention that the words “except for a deductible” modify “expenses” is inconsistent with the general rule of grammatical construction that “a modifying clause!, proviso, or exception] is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation." Deerskin T

2025See Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016) ("When this Court has interpreted statutes that include a list of terms or phrases followed by a limiting clause, we have typically applied an interpretive strategy called the rule of the last antecedent," which "provides that a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows" [quotations and citations omitted]); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) ("It is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confine

2015Furthermore, as a general rule of statutory and grammatical construction, a modifying clause is said to modify only that which immediately precedes it • — ■ here, the word “received.” See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) (“The last antecedent rule is a ‘general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation’ ”).

2013The judge reasoned that the concluding phrase of part (b) — “and not included as part of the units” — modifies the entire sentence rather than just “party walls and common walls.” However, it is the “general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation.” Bednark v. Catania Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 812 (2011), quoting from Druzik v. Board of Health of Haverhill, 324 Mass. 129, 133 (1949).

2013The rule’s “common and most powerful use occurs where a list of multiple, distinct antecedents precedes the modifying clause.” Ibid.

2024This understanding of the statutory language is consistent with the so-called “last antecedent rule.” When reading a statute or other legal document, the general rule is that “a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation.” Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 398 Mass. 118, 123 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 391 Mass. 157 , 160 -10- (1984).

2018See Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc. , 398 Mass. 118 , 123, 495 N.E.2d 303 (1986) (general rule of grammatical construction is that "a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent" [citation omitted] ).

2024This understanding of the statutory language is consistent with the so-called “last antecedent rule.” When reading a statute or other legal document, the general rule is that “a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation.” Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. Spencer Press, Inc., 398 Mass. 118, 123 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 391 Mass. 157 , 160 -10- (1984).

2006Generally, “a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 391 Mass. 157, 160 (1982).

2015Furthermore, as a general rule of statutory and grammatical construction, a modifying clause is said to modify only that which immediately precedes it • — ■ here, the word “received.” See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) (“The last antecedent rule is a ‘general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation’ ”).

2015Furthermore, as a general rule of statutory and grammatical construction, a modifying clause is said to modify only that which immediately precedes it -- here, the word "received." See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007), quoting from Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) ("The last antecedent rule is a 'general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation'").

2024While "[i]t is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent" (quotation omitted), Moulton v. Brookline Rent Control Bd., 385 Mass. 228, 230-231 (1982), this rule typically applies where "a list of multiple, distinct antecedents precedes the modifying clause," Bednark v. Catania Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 812 (2011).

2013The judge reasoned that the concluding phrase of part (b) — “and not included as part of the units” — modifies the entire sentence rather than just “party walls and common walls.” However, it is the “general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation.” Bednark v. Catania Hospitality Group, Inc., 78 Mass. App. Ct. 806, 812 (2011), quoting from Druzik v. Board of Health of Haverhill, 324 Mass. 129, 133 (1949).

2025See Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016) ("When this Court has interpreted statutes that include a list of terms or phrases followed by a limiting clause, we have typically applied an interpretive strategy called the rule of the last antecedent," which "provides that a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows" [quotations and citations omitted]); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 547 (1934) ("It is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confine

2024In other words, “a limiting clause or phrase … should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 , 351 (2016), quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003).

2025Accs., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 631 , 638 n.17 (2016) ("a modifying clause is confined to the phrase that immediately precedes it and not to the phrases appearing earlier").[8] As applied to § 131F, the last antecedent rule validates the Commonwealth's position.

2025Accs., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 631 , 638 n.17 (2016) ("a modifying clause is confined to the phrase that immediately precedes it and not to the phrases appearing earlier").[8] As applied to § 131F, the last antecedent rule validates the Commonwealth's position.

2010See Sullivan, supra. Turning, then, to the words of the statute, as the judge observed: “[t]he ‘rule of the last antecedent’ holds that, unless there is something in the subject matter, dominant purpose, or language of the statute that requires a different interpretation, ‘qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to others more remote.’ Russell v. Boston Wyman, Inc., 410 Mass. 1005 , 1006-1007 (1991), quoting [from] United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751 [(1st Cir. 1985)]. ... ‘It is the general rule

1997However, the rule is not absolute, Ven-Fuel, 758 F.2d at 751 , and “is only a rule of construction to ascertain the legislative intent.” Dupee, 423 Mass. at 620 (citation omitted).

2024In other words, “a limiting clause or phrase … should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347 , 351 (2016), quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003).

2018L. c. 159A]." "Licensed and regulated" modifies "an employer." See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc , 475 Mass. 820 , 822, 62 N.E.3d 34 (2016) ("court uses standard rules of grammar when interpreting statutory language"); Globe Newspaper Co . v. Boston Retirement Bd ., 388 Mass. 427 , 432, 446 N.E.2d 1051 (1983) ("the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction [is] that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent" [citation omitted] ).

2018L. c. 159A]." "Licensed and regulated" modifies "an employer." See Commonwealth v. LeBlanc , 475 Mass. 820 , 822, 62 N.E.3d 34 (2016) ("court uses standard rules of grammar when interpreting statutory language"); Globe Newspaper Co . v. Boston Retirement Bd ., 388 Mass. 427 , 432, 446 N.E.2d 1051 (1983) ("the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction [is] that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent" [citation omitted] ).

2011The absence of a comma suggests that the Legislature intended the words “of that house or administrative fee” to modify both “designation” and “written description.” 16 See Taylor v. Burke, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 81 (2007) (punctuation, though not determinative of legislative intent, may be considered as indication of purpose of legislation). 17 A more pertinent grammatical rule is provided by Justice Brandéis, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920): “When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as muc

2010See Sullivan, supra. Turning, then, to the words of the statute, as the judge observed: “[t]he ‘rule of the last antecedent’ holds that, unless there is something in the subject matter, dominant purpose, or language of the statute that requires a different interpretation, ‘qualifying phrases are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to others more remote.’ Russell v. Boston Wyman, Inc., 410 Mass. 1005 , 1006-1007 (1991), quoting [from] United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751 [(1st Cir. 1985)]. ... ‘It is the general rule

2007See Selectmen of Topsfield. v. State Racing Commn., 324 Mass. 309, 312 (1949).

2006It does not alter the definition of regular compensation.” (Emphasis original.) Leary v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 421 Mass. 344, 347 (1995).

1997However, the rule is not absolute, Ven-Fuel, 758 F.2d at 751 , and “is only a rule of construction to ascertain the legislative intent.” Dupee, 423 Mass. at 620 (citation omitted).

1988See Burwick v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Worcester, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 739, 743, 745 (1974), and cases cited, (c) We do not see how the plaintiffs were harmed by the board’s and the court’s refusals to hold that the plaintiffs’ notice of a rent increase should be given effect as of the first day of the month following the expiration of the twelve-month period referred to in § 6 of the ordinance and § 16 of the regulations.

1982See West’s Case, 313 Mass. 146, 149 (1943).