11 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Service Investment Co. v. Dorstgreen2 sentences2004Co. v. Dorst, 232 Wis. 574, 577 , 288 N.W. 169 (1939) ("Although as a general rule of construction a modifying clause is considered ordinarily to be confined to the last antecedent, that rule is not always applicable and may be easily rebutted where other circumstances so indicate."). ¶ 14. 2004Co. v. Dorst, 232 Wis. 574, 577 , 288 N.W. 169 (1939) ("Although as a general rule of construction a modifying clause is considered ordinarily to be confined to the last antecedent, that rule is not always applicable and may be easily rebutted where other circumstances so indicate."). ¶ 14. | 2 | 6 |
Facebook, Inc. v. Duguidgreen1 sentence2024See Facebook, 592 U.S. at 404 (“This Court has declined to apply the rule where, like here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated list.”). | 1 | 1 |
Georgiades v. Glickmangreen2 sentences2005See Georgiades v. Glickman, 272 Wis. 257, 263-64 , 75 N.W.2d 573 (1956) (where modifying clause is not preceded by a comma, the modifying clause modifies only the last antecedent clause). 2005See Georgiades v. Glickman, 272 Wis. 257, 263-64 , 75 N.W.2d 573 (1956) (where modifying clause is not preceded by a comma, the modifying clause modifies only the last antecedent clause). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Mor
green
2 sentences1939Co. 206 Mass. 247, 251 , 92 N. E. 447 , the court, in holding that the final clause in a sentence modified all preceding clauses as well as the last antecedent, said— “The general rule that a modifying clause is ordinarily to be confined to the last antecedent does not apply where a consideration of the subject matter requires a different construction. [Citing cases.] The punctuation of the paragraph . . . confirms this view, and punctuation, although often disregarded, may be resorted to- when it tends to throw light upon the meaning of the language.” “When several words are followed by a cla 1939Co. 206 Mass. 247, 251 , 92 N. E. 447 , the court, in holding that the final clause in a sentence modified all preceding clauses as well as the last antecedent, said— “The general rule that a modifying clause is ordinarily to be confined to the last antecedent does not apply where a consideration of the subject matter requires a different construction. [Citing cases.] The punctuation of the paragraph . . . confirms this view, and punctuation, although often disregarded, may be resorted to- when it tends to throw light upon the meaning of the language.” “When several words are followed by a cla | 2 | 1939–1981 |
Greenough v. Phoenix Insurance
green
2 sentences1956Co. (1910), 206 Mass. 247, 251 , 92 N. E. 447 , hold that, although the general rule is that a modifying clause is ordi *264 narily to be confined to the last antecedent, this does not always apply, and punctuation may be resorted to when it tends to throw light upon the meaning of the language. 3 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), pp. 1807, 1808, sec. 629, suggests that the test, of whether a written contract is so unambiguous as not to render admissible any testimony of surrounding circumstances, is dependent on whether the words used are so clear that the offered evidence “would not persuade 1956Co. (1910), 206 Mass. 247, 251 , 92 N. E. 447 , hold that, although the general rule is that a modifying clause is ordi *264 narily to be confined to the last antecedent, this does not always apply, and punctuation may be resorted to when it tends to throw light upon the meaning of the language. 3 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), pp. 1807, 1808, sec. 629, suggests that the test, of whether a written contract is so unambiguous as not to render admissible any testimony of surrounding circumstances, is dependent on whether the words used are so clear that the offered evidence “would not persuade | 2 | 1939–1956 |
Morrill v. State
green
1 sentence1977Third, while the punctuation of a statute is not entitled to a great deal of weight in determining legislative intent, Morrill v. The State , 38 Wis. 428 , 434 (1875), the Supreme Court has on occasion looked to the punctuation of a statute in determining to which of the *Page 218 preceding matter a modifying clause relates. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Drinkwater v. State
green
2 sentences1977See, e.g., Service Investment Co. v. Dorst , 232 Wis. 574 , 577 , 288 N.W. 169 (1939); Drinkwater v. State , 69 Wis.2d 60 , 72-74 , 230 N.W.2d 126 (1975). 1977See, e.g., Service Investment Co. v. Dorst , 232 Wis. 574 , 577 , 288 N.W. 169 (1939); Drinkwater v. State , 69 Wis.2d 60 , 72-74 , 230 N.W.2d 126 (1975). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co.
green
1 sentence1956C. 1917), 239 Fed. 976 , 985: “All the attendant facts constituting the setting of a contract are admissible, so long as they are helpful; the extent of their assistance depends upon the different meanings which the language itself will let in. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of Southern California, Inc. v. National Candy & Tobacco Co.
green
1 sentence1939Ed. 944 ; Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of Southern California v. National Candy & Tobacco Co. 11 Cal. (2d) 634, 82 Pac. (2d) 3 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
McLeod v. Bertschy
neutral
1 sentence1922In Boutin v. Andreas, 161 Wis. 152 , 152 N. W. 822 , although the statute here quoted is not referred to and although the defendant there had interposed a counterclaim — • a fact not stated in the opinion,- — it was again held (p. 153) that there was no absolute right in plaintiff to dismiss his action and again confirms the prior modifying of the rule of the earlier cases such as McLeod v. Bertschy, 33 Wis. 176 , supra. Whatever, therefore, might be the rule at common law, there is in this state under the established rule no absolute, unqualified right in the plaintiff to insist, on his own m | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Boutin v. Andreas
neutral
2 sentences1922In Boutin v. Andreas, 161 Wis. 152 , 152 N. W. 822 , although the statute here quoted is not referred to and although the defendant there had interposed a counterclaim — • a fact not stated in the opinion,- — it was again held (p. 153) that there was no absolute right in plaintiff to dismiss his action and again confirms the prior modifying of the rule of the earlier cases such as McLeod v. Bertschy, 33 Wis. 176 , supra. Whatever, therefore, might be the rule at common law, there is in this state under the established rule no absolute, unqualified right in the plaintiff to insist, on his own m 1922In Boutin v. Andreas, 161 Wis. 152 , 152 N. W. 822 , although the statute here quoted is not referred to and although the defendant there had interposed a counterclaim — • a fact not stated in the opinion,- — it was again held (p. 153) that there was no absolute right in plaintiff to dismiss his action and again confirms the prior modifying of the rule of the earlier cases such as McLeod v. Bertschy, 33 Wis. 176 , supra. Whatever, therefore, might be the rule at common law, there is in this state under the established rule no absolute, unqualified right in the plaintiff to insist, on his own m | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.