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31 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Francogreen2 sentences2024See Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. State v. Lente, 2019-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 52-53, 63-64, 84 , 453 P.3d 416 (providing that, to sustain child sex abuse convictions, highly specific testimony of each 1Our Supreme Court has made clear that the unitary conduct inquiry is the same inquiry as in Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624—the principal case examining whether distinct acts support multiple counts in unit-of-prosecution double jeopardy challenges. 2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ | 9 | 9 |
State v. Francogreen2 sentences2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ | 4 | 4 |
State v. DeGraffgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 27 , 139 N.M. 14 211, 131 P.3d 61 (considering whether one crime had been completed before another 15 was committed); State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶¶ 60-61 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 16 P.2d 660 (considering the initial use of force against a victim as separable by “an 17 intervening event” from subsequent but different uses of force and weapons that 18 resulted in the victim’s death). 2024See, e.g., State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 27 , 139 N.M. 14 211, 131 P.3d 61 (considering whether one crime had been completed before another 15 was committed); State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶¶ 60-61 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 16 P.2d 660 (considering the initial use of force against a victim as separable by “an 17 intervening event” from subsequent but different uses of force and weapons that 18 resulted in the victim’s death). | 3 | 3 |
Swafford v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Second, if the conduct was unitary, we “determine 9 whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” See id. 10 A. The Conduct Underlying Defendant’s Convictions Was Unitary 11 {13} “The unitary conduct analysis turns on whether the acts underlying the two 12 offenses are separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness.” State v. Lorenzo, 2024- 13 NMSC-003, ¶ 6, 545 P.3d 1156 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2024See Herron, 1991-NMSC-012 , 4 ¶ 15 (“[N]one of these factors alone is a panacea, but collectively they will assist in 5 guiding future prosecutions under [the relevant charging statute].”); Swafford v. 6 State, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 28, 112 N.M. 3 , 810 P.2d 1223 (adopting the Herron 7 factors in the unitary conduct inquiry for double description cases and noting that 8 time and space may easily distinguish acts in some cases, but not in every case, and 9 that courts should consider every factor); State v. Handa, 1995-NMCA-042 , ¶ 26 10 n.2, 120 N.M. 38 , 897 P.2d 225 (“[T]he time between each act | 2 | 7 |
State v. Senagreen2 sentences2024To determine whether sufficient indicia of distinctness exist, courts first examine whether the acts were adequately “separated by either time or space,” and then, if needed, they refer to the “quality and nature of the acts or to the objects and results involved,” considering “the elements of the charged offenses, the facts presented at trial, and the instructions given to the jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Phillips, ___-NMSC-___, ¶¶ 12-38 (discussing factors used by courts for the unitary conduct analysis). 2023See State v. Sena, 2020-NMSC-011, ¶ 46 , 470 P.3d 227 (considering 8 “the elements of the charged offenses” in the unitary conduct inquiry); Begaye, 9 2023-NMSC-015 , ¶¶ 22, 24 (considering the statutory elements of the charged 10 offenses to evaluate legislative intent). 11 {7} In relevant part, the aggravated assault statute outlines three ways to commit 12 the crime, by (1) “unlawfully assaulting or striking at another with a deadly 13 weapon”; (2) “committing assault by threatening or menacing another while wearing 14 a mask, hood, robe or other covering upon the face, head or body, or whi | 2 | 6 |
State v. Fraziergreen2 sentences2026The State alleges numerous flaws with 6 the current approach: it is “complex, fact-intensive, and produces unjust results.” “It 7 places too much emphasis on a complex unitary conduct analysis, which is beset by 8 numerous factors and presumptions.” The current “standard for finding unitary 9 conduct is too low.” The second step, often referred to as the modified Blockburger 10 test, is redundant of the unitary conduct analysis and “fails to accurately gauge 11 legislative intent.” Finally, the entire test fails to consider “highly-relevant indicia of 12 legislative intent.” 6 13 {43} The Stat 2026The State alleges numerous flaws with 6 the current approach: it is “complex, fact-intensive, and produces unjust results.” “It 7 places too much emphasis on a complex unitary conduct analysis, which is beset by 8 numerous factors and presumptions.” The current “standard for finding unitary 9 conduct is too low.” The second step, often referred to as the modified Blockburger 10 test, is redundant of the unitary conduct analysis and “fails to accurately gauge 11 legislative intent.” Finally, the entire test fails to consider “highly-relevant indicia of 12 legislative intent.” 6 13 {43} The Stat | 2 | 4 |
State v. Silvasgreen2 sentences2023See 16 State v. Silvas, 2015-NMSC-006, ¶ 10 , 343 P.3d 616 (referencing the state’s theory 17 of the case within the unitary conduct analysis). 2023See State v. Silvas, 2015-NMSC-006, ¶ 10 , 343 P.3d 616 (referencing the state’s theory of the case within the unitary conduct analysis). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bahneygreen2 sentences2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 2019But we need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” Ramirez, 2018- NMSC-003, ¶ 42; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {16} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 12 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d | 2 | 2 |
State v. Portergreen2 sentences2023With this statutory background, 7 we turn to the double jeopardy analysis and “first ask whether the conduct was 8 unitary, meaning whether the same criminal conduct is the basis for both charges.” 9 State v. Reed, 2022-NMCA-025, ¶ 8 , 510 P.3d 1261 (internal quotation marks and 10 citation omitted), cert. denied (S-1-SC-39187, May 3, 2022). 11 A. Defendant’s Conduct Was Unitary 12 {8} The unitary conduct inquiry “turns on sufficient indicia of distinctness 13 between the acts at issue,” id. ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 14 and “depends to a large degree on the elements 2023With this statutory background, 7 we turn to the double jeopardy analysis and “first ask whether the conduct was 8 unitary, meaning whether the same criminal conduct is the basis for both charges.” 9 State v. Reed, 2022-NMCA-025, ¶ 8 , 510 P.3d 1261 (internal quotation marks and 10 citation omitted), cert. denied (S-1-SC-39187, May 3, 2022). 11 A. Defendant’s Conduct Was Unitary 12 {8} The unitary conduct inquiry “turns on sufficient indicia of distinctness 13 between the acts at issue,” id. ¶ 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 14 and “depends to a large degree on the elements | 1 | 3 |
State v. Coopergreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 27 , 139 N.M. 14 211, 131 P.3d 61 (considering whether one crime had been completed before another 15 was committed); State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶¶ 60-61 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 16 P.2d 660 (considering the initial use of force against a victim as separable by “an 17 intervening event” from subsequent but different uses of force and weapons that 18 resulted in the victim’s death). 2024See, e.g., State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 27 , 139 N.M. 14 211, 131 P.3d 61 (considering whether one crime had been completed before another 15 was committed); State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶¶ 60-61 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 16 P.2d 660 (considering the initial use of force against a victim as separable by “an 17 intervening event” from subsequent but different uses of force and weapons that 18 resulted in the victim’s death). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Fordgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Andazola, 2003-NMCA- 146, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 710 , 82 P.3d 77 (“[C]onduct is not unitary if the defendant’s acts have sufficient indicia of distinctness.”); see also Phillips, 2024-NMSC-009 , ¶¶ 12, 38 (listing “the existence of intervening events” as a relevant factor in the unitary conduct analysis). {18} The facts here are thus distinguishable from those in Ford, on which Defendant relies. [BIC 27] In Ford, we held that the defendant’s actions were unitary where he struggled with officers who were trying to handcuff him and kicked an officer in the shin during the struggle. 2007-NM 2010However, “if the conduct 18 can reasonably be said to be unitary,” we proceed to determine “whether the 4 1 [L]egislature intended multiple punishments.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal 2 quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 The unitary conduct inquiry focuses on whether the defendant’s acts are 4 separated by sufficient “indicia of distinctness.” Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 13 , 5 810 P.2d 1223, 1233 (1991). “[W]e consider such factors as whether the acts were 6 close in time and space, their similarity, the sequence in which they occurred, whether 7 other events intervened, and | 1 | 2 |
State v. Begayegreen1 sentence2026To 14 determine distinctness, we consider “the elements of the charged offenses, the facts 15 presented at trial, and the instructions given to the jury.” Sena, 2020-NMSC-011 , 16 ¶ 46; accord State v. Begaye, 2023-NMSC-015 , ¶ 20, 533 P.3d 1057 (“The conduct 17 question depends to a large degree on the elements of the charged offenses and the 18 facts presented at trial.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “[I]f it 19 reasonably can be said that the conduct is unitary, then we must conclude that the 1 conduct was unitary.” State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 12 , 476 P.3d 1201 2 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andazolagreen2 sentences2025See State v. Andazola, 2003-NMCA- 146, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 710 , 82 P.3d 77 (“[C]onduct is not unitary if the defendant’s acts have sufficient indicia of distinctness.”); see also Phillips, 2024-NMSC-009 , ¶¶ 12, 38 (listing “the existence of intervening events” as a relevant factor in the unitary conduct analysis). {18} The facts here are thus distinguishable from those in Ford, on which Defendant relies. [BIC 27] In Ford, we held that the defendant’s actions were unitary where he struggled with officers who were trying to handcuff him and kicked an officer in the shin during the struggle. 2007-NM 2025See State v. Andazola, 2003-NMCA- 146, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 710 , 82 P.3d 77 (“[C]onduct is not unitary if the defendant’s acts have sufficient indicia of distinctness.”); see also Phillips, 2024-NMSC-009 , ¶¶ 12, 38 (listing “the existence of intervening events” as a relevant factor in the unitary conduct analysis). {18} The facts here are thus distinguishable from those in Ford, on which Defendant relies. [BIC 27] In Ford, we held that the defendant’s actions were unitary where he struggled with officers who were trying to handcuff him and kicked an officer in the shin during the struggle. 2007-NM | 1 | 1 |
State v. Haskinsgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Haskins, 2008-NMCA-086, ¶ 19 , 144 N.M. 287 , 186 P.3d 916 (considering the act of the victim getting dressed and relocating to another room between touchings to be a sufficient intervening event to support separate charges for criminal sexual contact); see also Phillips, 2024-NMSC-009 , ¶¶ 12, 38 (listing “the existence of intervening events” as a relevant factor in the unitary conduct analysis). 2024See State v. Haskins, 2008-NMCA-086, ¶ 19 , 144 N.M. 287 , 186 P.3d 916 (considering the act of the victim getting dressed and relocating to another room between touchings to be a sufficient intervening event to support separate charges for criminal sexual contact); see also Phillips, 2024-NMSC-009 , ¶¶ 12, 38 (listing “the existence of intervening events” as a relevant factor in the unitary conduct analysis). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Phillipsgreen1 sentence2024See State v. Phillips, 2024- NMSC-009, ¶¶ 12, 38, 548 P.3d 51 (applying the Herron factors—“(1) temporal proximity of the acts, (2) location of the victim during each act, (3) the existence of intervening events, (4) the sequencing of the acts, (5) the defendant’s intent as evidenced by his conduct and utterances, and (6) the number of victims”—“in the double description analysis to determine whether a defendant’s acts are unitary or distinct”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lentegreen2 sentences2024See Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. State v. Lente, 2019-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 52-53, 63-64, 84 , 453 P.3d 416 (providing that, to sustain child sex abuse convictions, highly specific testimony of each 1Our Supreme Court has made clear that the unitary conduct inquiry is the same inquiry as in Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624—the principal case examining whether distinct acts support multiple counts in unit-of-prosecution double jeopardy challenges. 2024See Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. State v. Lente, 2019-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 52-53, 63-64, 84 , 453 P.3d 416 (providing that, to sustain child sex abuse convictions, highly specific testimony of each 1Our Supreme Court has made clear that the unitary conduct inquiry is the same inquiry as in Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624—the principal case examining whether distinct acts support multiple counts in unit-of-prosecution double jeopardy challenges. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Serratogreen1 sentence2022See id. ¶ 9 (examining “the elements stated in the instructions and the evidence produced at trial” to determine whether the conduct underlying multiple convictions was unitary); State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 39 , 126 N.M. 646 , 974 P.2d 140 (focusing the unitary conduct analysis on the jury instructions and the evidence at trial to determine what the jury found), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; see also Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 27 (providing that the unitary conduct question “depends to a large degree on the elements of | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pisiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hornbeckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lorenzo
green
2 sentences2026Second, if the conduct was unitary, we “determine 9 whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” See id. 10 A. The Conduct Underlying Defendant’s Convictions Was Unitary 11 {13} “The unitary conduct analysis turns on whether the acts underlying the two 12 offenses are separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness.” State v. Lorenzo, 2024- 13 NMSC-003, ¶ 6, 545 P.3d 1156 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2025However, in State v. Lorenzo, 2024-NMSC-003 , ¶ 11, 545 P.3d 1156 , our Supreme Court rejected the state’s unitary conduct argument that did not “match its presentation at trial.” In Lorenzo, had the state “opted for a different presentation at trial, it is possible that the jury could have decided that different uses of force satisfied the element of each crime” and the Court’s unitary conduct analysis “might be different.” Id. | 3 | 2025–2026 |
State v. Bernal
green
2 sentences2024Therefore, we reaffirm our conclusion in Bernal that “we are doing a substantially similar analysis when we conduct a unitary conduct inquiry in double description cases as when we conduct a unit-of-prosecution inquiry.” Id. {14} If a defendant’s acts are sufficiently distinct, “then we will presume that the defendant has not received more punishments than were statutorily authorized.” Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 23 . 2024Therefore, we reaffirm our conclusion in Bernal that “we are doing a substantially 8 similar analysis when we conduct a unitary conduct inquiry in double description 9 cases as when we conduct a unit-of-prosecution inquiry.” Id. 10 {14} If a defendant’s acts are sufficiently distinct, “then we will presume that the 11 defendant has not received more punishments than were statutorily authorized.” 12 Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 23 . | 3 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Reed
green
2 sentences2024Essentially, we return to the original question presented in the unitary conduct analysis: whether “the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.”1 State v. Reed, 2022-NMCA-025, ¶ 9 , 510 P.3d 1261 (text only) (citation omitted). 2024Essentially, we return to the original question presented in the unitary conduct analysis: whether “the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.”1 State v. Reed, 2022-NMCA-025, ¶ 9 , 510 P.3d 1261 (text only) (citation omitted). | 3 | 2023–2024 |
State v. Handa
green
2 sentences2024See Herron, 1991-NMSC-012 , 4 ¶ 15 (“[N]one of these factors alone is a panacea, but collectively they will assist in 5 guiding future prosecutions under [the relevant charging statute].”); Swafford v. 6 State, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 28, 112 N.M. 3 , 810 P.2d 1223 (adopting the Herron 7 factors in the unitary conduct inquiry for double description cases and noting that 8 time and space may easily distinguish acts in some cases, but not in every case, and 9 that courts should consider every factor); State v. Handa, 1995-NMCA-042 , ¶ 26 10 n.2, 120 N.M. 38 , 897 P.2d 225 (“[T]he time between each act 2024See Herron, 1991-NMSC-012 , 4 ¶ 15 (“[N]one of these factors alone is a panacea, but collectively they will assist in 5 guiding future prosecutions under [the relevant charging statute].”); Swafford v. 6 State, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 28, 112 N.M. 3 , 810 P.2d 1223 (adopting the Herron 7 factors in the unitary conduct inquiry for double description cases and noting that 8 time and space may easily distinguish acts in some cases, but not in every case, and 9 that courts should consider every factor); State v. Handa, 1995-NMCA-042 , ¶ 26 10 n.2, 120 N.M. 38 , 897 P.2d 225 (“[T]he time between each act | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Benally
green
2 sentences2024Therefore, we reaffirm our conclusion in Bernal that “we are doing a substantially similar analysis when we conduct a unitary conduct inquiry in double description cases as when we conduct a unit-of-prosecution inquiry.” Id. {14} If a defendant’s acts are sufficiently distinct, “then we will presume that the defendant has not received more punishments than were statutorily authorized.” Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 23 . 2024Therefore, we reaffirm our conclusion in Bernal that “we are doing a substantially 8 similar analysis when we conduct a unitary conduct inquiry in double description 9 cases as when we conduct a unit-of-prosecution inquiry.” Id. 10 {14} If a defendant’s acts are sufficiently distinct, “then we will presume that the 11 defendant has not received more punishments than were statutorily authorized.” 12 Benally, 2021-NMSC-027, ¶ 23 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Ramirez
green
2 sentences2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 2019But we need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because 8 Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford 9 test.” Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA- 10 039, ¶ 21, 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct 11 because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either 12 prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). 13 {16} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. 14 Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 12 , 137 N | 2 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Ervin
green
2 sentences2024The existence of an intervening event makes this case distinguishable from State v. Ervin, 2008-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 45-47 , 143 N.M. 493 , 177 P.3d 1067 , on which Defendant relies, where the touching of different body parts was held to lack sufficient indicia of distinctness to support multiple convictions. 2024The existence of an intervening event makes this case distinguishable from State v. Ervin, 2008-NMCA-016, ¶¶ 45-47 , 143 N.M. 493 , 177 P.3d 1067 , on which Defendant relies, where the touching of different body parts was held to lack sufficient indicia of distinctness to support multiple convictions. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Herron v. State
green
2 sentences2024See Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. State v. Lente, 2019-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 52-53, 63-64, 84 , 453 P.3d 416 (providing that, to sustain child sex abuse convictions, highly specific testimony of each 1Our Supreme Court has made clear that the unitary conduct inquiry is the same inquiry as in Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624—the principal case examining whether distinct acts support multiple counts in unit-of-prosecution double jeopardy challenges. 2024See Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. State v. Lente, 2019-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 52-53, 63-64, 84 , 453 P.3d 416 (providing that, to sustain child sex abuse convictions, highly specific testimony of each 1Our Supreme Court has made clear that the unitary conduct inquiry is the same inquiry as in Herron v. State, 1991-NMSC-012 , 111 N.M. 357 , 805 P.2d 624—the principal case examining whether distinct acts support multiple counts in unit-of-prosecution double jeopardy challenges. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kersey v. Hatch
green
2 sentences2022See id. ¶ 9 (examining “the elements stated in the instructions and the evidence produced at trial” to determine whether the conduct underlying multiple convictions was unitary); State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 39 , 126 N.M. 646 , 974 P.2d 140 (focusing the unitary conduct analysis on the jury instructions and the evidence at trial to determine what the jury found), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; see also Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 27 (providing that the unitary conduct question “depends to a large degree on the elements of 2022See id. ¶ 9 (examining “the elements stated in the instructions and the evidence produced at trial” to determine whether the conduct underlying multiple convictions was unitary); State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 39 , 126 N.M. 646 , 974 P.2d 140 (focusing the unitary conduct analysis on the jury instructions and the evidence at trial to determine what the jury found), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; see also Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 27 (providing that the unitary conduct question “depends to a large degree on the elements of | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences2022See id. ¶ 9 (examining “the elements stated in the instructions and the evidence produced at trial” to determine whether the conduct underlying multiple convictions was unitary); State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 39 , 126 N.M. 646 , 974 P.2d 140 (focusing the unitary conduct analysis on the jury instructions and the evidence at trial to determine what the jury found), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; see also Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 27 (providing that the unitary conduct question “depends to a large degree on the elements of 2022See id. ¶ 9 (examining “the elements stated in the instructions and the evidence produced at trial” to determine whether the conduct underlying multiple convictions was unitary); State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 39 , 126 N.M. 646 , 974 P.2d 140 (focusing the unitary conduct analysis on the jury instructions and the evidence at trial to determine what the jury found), abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, ¶ 17 , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 ; see also Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 27 (providing that the unitary conduct question “depends to a large degree on the elements of | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
1 sentence2020“When, as here, the statutes themselves do not expressly provide for multiple punishments, we begin by applying the rule of statutory construction from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 . . . (1932), to determine whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” State v. Branch, 2018-NMCA-031 , ¶ 24, 417 P.3d 1141 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Branch
green
1 sentence2020“When, as here, the statutes themselves do not expressly provide for multiple punishments, we begin by applying the rule of statutory construction from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 . . . (1932), to determine whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” State v. Branch, 2018-NMCA-031 , ¶ 24, 417 P.3d 1141 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Montoya
green
2 sentences2020With this in mind, we conclude that the unitary conduct analysis in State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-074 , 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 , is instructive here. {24} In relevant part, the defendant in Montoya argued that his conviction for second degree CSP (commission of a felony) and kidnapping violated double jeopardy. 2020With this in mind, we conclude that the unitary conduct analysis in State v. Montoya, 2011-NMCA-074 , 150 N.M. 415 , 259 P.3d 820 , is instructive here. {24} In relevant part, the defendant in Montoya argued that his conviction for second degree CSP (commission of a felony) and kidnapping violated double jeopardy. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Cummings green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.