should consider relevant factors in New York

2026In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, "the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Moore v Day , 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2d Dept 2008]; see Calaci v Allied Interstate , Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [4th Dept 2013]).

2026In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, "the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Moore v Day , 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2d Dept 2008]; see Calaci v Allied Interstate , Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [4th Dept 2013]).

2013In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, “the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits” (Moore v Day, 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2008]; see Puchner v Nastke, 91 AD3d 1261, 1262 [2012]; Kahn v Stamp, 52 AD2d 748, 749 [1976]).

2013In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, “the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits” (Moore v Day, 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2008]; see Puchner v Nastke, 91 AD3d 1261, 1262 [2012]; Kahn v Stamp, 52 AD2d 748, 749 [1976]).

2013In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, “the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits” (Moore v Day, 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2008]; see Puchner v Nastke, 91 AD3d 1261, 1262 [2012]; Kahn v Stamp, 52 AD2d 748, 749 [1976]).

2013In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, “the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits” (Moore v Day, 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2008]; see Puchner v Nastke, 91 AD3d 1261, 1262 [2012]; Kahn v Stamp, 52 AD2d 748, 749 [1976]).

2026In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, "the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Moore v Day , 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2d Dept 2008]; see Calaci v Allied Interstate , Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [4th Dept 2013]).

2026In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, "the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Moore v Day , 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2d Dept 2008]; see Calaci v Allied Interstate , Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [4th Dept 2013]).

2012Here, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that respondent had a reasonable excuse for his default and a meritorious defense to the proceeding (see Lauer, 53 AD3d at 217 ; see generally Solomon Abrahams, P. C. v Peddlers Pond Holding Corp., 125 AD2d 355, 357 [1986]).

2012Here, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that respondent had a reasonable excuse for his default and a meritorious defense to the proceeding (see Lauer, 53 AD3d at 217 ; see generally Solomon Abrahams, P. C. v Peddlers Pond Holding Corp., 125 AD2d 355, 357 [1986]).

2023"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Lyubomirsky v Lubov Arulin, PLLC , 125 AD3d at 614 ; see Hamilton v New York Hosp.

2022"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Hamilton v New York Hosp. [*2]Queens , 183 AD3d 621, 622 ; see Lyubomirsky v Lubov Arulin, PLLC , 125 AD3d 614 ). "[M]ere neglect is not a reasonable excuse" ( OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer , 153 AD3d 714, 716 ; see Konstantakopoulos v Karakash 185 AD3d at 564 ).

2019"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Citicorp Trust Bank, FSB v Makkas , 127 AD3d 907, 908 ; see Lyubomirsky v Lubov Arulin, PLLC , 125 AD3d 614 ; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc. , 110 AD3d 56, 60 ).

2015In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits (see Oller v Liberty Lines Tr., Inc., 111 AD3d at 904; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d 56 , 60 [2013]; Moore v Day, 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2008]; Harcztark v Drive Variety, Inc., 21 AD3d 876, 876-877 [2005]). *615 Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in excusing the plaintiffs default based u

2025The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse sufficient to open a default lies within the sound discretion of the motion court ( see Matter of Gambardella v Ortov Light. , 278 AD2d 494 [2000]; see also Harcztark v Drive Variety, Inc. , 21 AD3d 876 [2005]). " 'However, in making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits' " ( 2 Lisa Ct. Corp. v Licalzi , 22

2025The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse sufficient to open a default lies within the sound discretion of the motion court ( see Matter of Gambardella v Ortov Light. , 278 AD2d 494 [2000]; see also Harcztark v Drive Variety, Inc. , 21 AD3d 876 [2005]). " 'However, in making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits' " ( 2 Lisa Ct. Corp. v Licalzi , 22

2019"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( id .; see Kramarenko v New York Community Hosp. , 134 AD3d at 772 ; Oller v Liberty Lines Tr., Inc. , 111 AD3d 903 , 904; Smyth v Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. , 103 AD3d at 790).

2015In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits (see Oller v Liberty Lines Tr., Inc., 111 AD3d at 904; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d 56 , 60 [2013]; Moore v Day, 55 AD3d 803, 804 [2008]; Harcztark v Drive Variety, Inc., 21 AD3d 876, 876-877 [2005]). *615 Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in excusing the plaintiffs default based u

2025An order relieving a party from a default may be conditioned on payment of monetary sanctions to the opposing party ( see CPLR 5015 [a]; Hudson v Gouldbourne , 83 AD3d 1001, 1001 [2011]; Du Jour v DeJean , 247 AD2d 370, 371 [1998]).

2025An order relieving a party from a default may be conditioned on payment of monetary sanctions to the opposing party ( see CPLR 5015 [a]; Hudson v Gouldbourne , 83 AD3d 1001, 1001 [2011]; Du Jour v DeJean , 247 AD2d 370, 371 [1998]).

2025An order relieving a party from a default may be conditioned on payment of monetary sanctions to the opposing party ( see CPLR 5015 [a]; Hudson v Gouldbourne , 83 AD3d 1001, 1001 [2011]; Du Jour v DeJean , 247 AD2d 370, 371 [1998]).

2025An order relieving a party from a default may be conditioned on payment of monetary sanctions to the opposing party ( see CPLR 5015 [a]; Hudson v Gouldbourne , 83 AD3d 1001, 1001 [2011]; Du Jour v DeJean , 247 AD2d 370, 371 [1998]).

2024"In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, 'the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits' " ( Calaci v Allied Interstate , Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [4th Dept 2013]; see Matter of County of Livingston [Mort] , 101 AD3d 1755 , 1755 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 862 [2013]). "[T]he determination of whether . . . to vacate a default . . . is generally left to the soun

2024"In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, 'the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits' " ( Calaci v Allied Interstate , Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [4th Dept 2013]; see Matter of County of Livingston [Mort] , 101 AD3d 1755 , 1755 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 862 [2013]). "[T]he determination of whether . . . to vacate a default . . . is generally left to the soun

2024"In determining whether to vacate an order entered on default, 'the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits' " ( Calaci v Allied Interstate , Inc. [appeal No. 2], 108 AD3d 1127, 1128 [4th Dept 2013]; see Matter of County of Livingston [Mort] , 101 AD3d 1755 , 1755 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 862 [2013]). "[T]he determination of whether . . . to vacate a default . . . is generally left to the soun

2024"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Moore v Day , 55 AD3d 803, 804 ; see Yongjie Xu v JJW Enters., Inc. , 149 AD3d 1146, 1147 ).

2024Here, the record reflects that there was only a short delay in the defendant buyer answering the amended complaint, that there was no willfulness on the part of the defendant buyer, and that there would be no prejudice to the plaintiff ( see Yongjie Xu v JJW Enters., Inc. , 149 AD3d at 1147 ).

2022"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Hamilton v New York Hosp. [*2]Queens , 183 AD3d 621, 622 ; see Lyubomirsky v Lubov Arulin, PLLC , 125 AD3d 614 ). "[M]ere neglect is not a reasonable excuse" ( OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer , 153 AD3d 714, 716 ; see Konstantakopoulos v Karakash 185 AD3d at 564 ).

2022"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( Hamilton v New York Hosp. [*2]Queens , 183 AD3d 621, 622 ; see Lyubomirsky v Lubov Arulin, PLLC , 125 AD3d 614 ). "[M]ere neglect is not a reasonable excuse" ( OneWest Bank, FSB v Singer , 153 AD3d 714, 716 ; see Konstantakopoulos v Karakash 185 AD3d at 564 ).

2019"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( id .; see Kramarenko v New York Community Hosp. , 134 AD3d at 772 ; Oller v Liberty Lines Tr., Inc. , 111 AD3d 903 , 904; Smyth v Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. , 103 AD3d at 790).

2019Under the circumstances here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in excusing the pro se plaintiff's default, based upon his failure to understand the significance of the adjourned date for the motion to strike upon his attorney's withdrawal, his expeditious action in moving to vacate the order, the lack of prejudice to the defendant, and the lack of any intent to abandon the action ( see Lyubomirsky v Lubov Arulin, PLLC , 125 AD3d at 615 ; Oller v Liberty Lines Tr., Inc. , 111 AD3d at 904; Smyth v Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. , 103 AD3d at 791).

2019"In making that discretionary determination, the court should consider relevant factors, such as the extent of the delay, prejudice or lack of prejudice to the opposing party, whether there has been willfulness, and the strong public policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits" ( id .; see Kramarenko v New York Community Hosp. , 134 AD3d at 772 ; Oller v Liberty Lines Tr., Inc. , 111 AD3d 903 , 904; Smyth v Getty Petroleum Mktg., Inc. , 103 AD3d at 790).