Nationwide motion in Ohio

2013If the movant satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 293 , quoting Civ.R. 56(E). {¶6} The trial court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment for two reasons.

2012If the movant satisfies this burden, the non- moving party “‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 293 , quoting Civ.R. 56(E). {¶19} We begin by noting that Appellants spend a great deal of time asserting that the insurance policy and the subrogation provision included therein which accompanied Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment could not be properly considered.

2011Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 , 671 N.E.2d 241 .

2007Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102 , 105 . {¶ 14} Given the absence of any legal basis or rationale within the de minimis text of the disputed summary judgment ruling to serve as a starting point, we will compare the theories presented in Nationwide's motion with the record of evidence to determine whether Nationwide presented relevant and persuasive evidence in support of their Civ.R. 56 (C) motion. *Page 5 {¶ 15} Nationwide's summary judgment motion was argued on the basis of negligent entrustment and respondeat superior.

2008To permit coverage in circumstances like those presented here would improperly allow “a person who owns more than one motor vehicle [to] choose not to insure one vehicle and bear no financial risk for the decision because he will be deemed to have in effect purchased liability coverage for the vehicle he decided not to insure if he is struck by another uninsured motorist.” Martin , id. {¶ 32} We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the other-owned-auto exclusion clearly and unambiguously applied to this claim and that Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment sh

2003Topic: Whether Nationwide Coverage is Primary or Excess. 1 (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 431 . 2 88 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2000-Ohio-264 . 3 79 Ohio St.3d 401 , 1997-Ohio-375 . 4 85 Ohio St.3d 660 , 1999-Ohio-292 . 5 Pursuant to Loc.R. 9(A)(1), Nationwide's brief was required to contain a copy of the trial court's judgment entry.

2004Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660 and its progeny, which formed the basis for the trial court's August 6, 2002 Judgment Entry denying Nationwide's motion for summary judgment and granting appellant's motion for summary judgment. {¶ 12} On January 16, 2004, the trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Christine Troiano was an insured under the Nationwide UM/UIM endorsement.

2003Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660 , 1999-Ohio-292 . {¶ 14} The trial court, in ruling on Nationwide's motion for summary judgment stated: {¶ 15} "In this case, Plaintiff's claims for UM/UIM coverage under the four policies issued by Defendant Nationwide are barred by the claim preclusion component of res judicata.

2004Co. of Am. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 557 , 715 N.E.2d 1142 , and, therefore, that the policy at issue does not provide coverage, even though the parties had stipulated otherwise.

2004Co. of Am. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 557 , 715 N.E.2d 1142 , and, therefore, that the policy at issue does not provide coverage, even though the parties had stipulated otherwise.

2004Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216 , 2003-Ohio-5849 , which limited Scott-Pontzer .

2004Pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Galatis, “[a]bsent specific language to the contrary, a policy of insurance that *423 names a corporation as an insured for uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage covers a loss sustained by an employee of the corporation only if the loss occurs within the course and scope of employment.” Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216 , 2003-Ohio-5849 , 797 N.E.2d 1256 , at paragraph two of the syllabus.

2003Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660 , 1999-Ohio-292 . {¶ 14} The trial court, in ruling on Nationwide's motion for summary judgment stated: {¶ 15} "In this case, Plaintiff's claims for UM/UIM coverage under the four policies issued by Defendant Nationwide are barred by the claim preclusion component of res judicata.

2003Topic: Whether Nationwide Coverage is Primary or Excess. 1 (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 431 . 2 88 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2000-Ohio-264 . 3 79 Ohio St.3d 401 , 1997-Ohio-375 . 4 85 Ohio St.3d 660 , 1999-Ohio-292 . 5 Pursuant to Loc.R. 9(A)(1), Nationwide's brief was required to contain a copy of the trial court's judgment entry.

2018Cook v. Wilson , 165 Ohio App.3d 202 , 2006-Ohio-234 , 845 N.E.2d 563 (10th Dist.) ; Owensby v. Fresenius Dialysis Unit , 10th Dist.

2018Cook v. Wilson , 165 Ohio App.3d 202 , 2006-Ohio-234 , 845 N.E.2d 563 (10th Dist.) ; Owensby v. Fresenius Dialysis Unit , 10th Dist.

2012Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 , 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 ; Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

2012Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 , 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 ; Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

2012Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 , 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 ; Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

2012No. 24422, 2009-Ohio-2222, ¶ 12-14 . 7 Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in granting Nationwide’s motion to vacate.

2012Under de novo analysis, we are required to “accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Grey at ¶ 3, citing Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56 , 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991). {¶13} Here, the trial court granted Nationwide’s motion to dismiss based on the language in the life insurance contracts underlying appellants’ claims.

2012Under de novo analysis, we are required to “accept all factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Grey at ¶ 3, citing Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56 , 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991). {¶13} Here, the trial court granted Nationwide’s motion to dismiss based on the language in the life insurance contracts underlying appellants’ claims.

2012Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 , 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 ; Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

2012Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc. 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 , 1998-Ohio-389 , 696 N.E.2d 201 ; Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 , 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

2011Co. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 209 , 744 N.E.2d 154 , which stands for the proposition that courts may stay discovery and bifurcate the trial of bad faith claims until the claims determining the underlying issue of insurance coverage have been decided.

2011Co. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 209 , 744 N.E.2d 154 , which stands for the proposition that courts may stay discovery and bifurcate the trial of bad faith claims until the claims determining the underlying issue of insurance coverage have been decided.

2011Dominish appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policy language was ambiguous and that in any event, Nationwide, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. {¶ 6} We accepted Nationwide’s discretionary appeal. 127 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 2010-Ohio-5762 , 937 N.E.2d 1035 (Proposition of Law No. I accepted); 127 Ohio St.3d 1480 , 2010-Ohio-6370 , 938 N.E.2d 1040 (on reconsideration, Proposition of Law No. II also accepted).

2011Dominish appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policy language was ambiguous and that in any event, Nationwide, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. {¶ 6} We accepted Nationwide’s discretionary appeal. 127 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 2010-Ohio-5762 , 937 N.E.2d 1035 (Proposition of Law No. I accepted); 127 Ohio St.3d 1480 , 2010-Ohio-6370 , 938 N.E.2d 1040 (on reconsideration, Proposition of Law No. II also accepted).

2011Dominish appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policy language was ambiguous and that in any event, Nationwide, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. {¶ 6} We accepted Nationwide’s discretionary appeal. 127 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 2010-Ohio-5762 , 937 N.E.2d 1035 (Proposition of Law No. I accepted); 127 Ohio St.3d 1480 , 2010-Ohio-6370 , 938 N.E.2d 1040 (on reconsideration, Proposition of Law No. II also accepted).

2011Dominish appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policy language was ambiguous and that in any event, Nationwide, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. {¶ 6} We accepted Nationwide’s discretionary appeal. 127 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 2010-Ohio-5762 , 937 N.E.2d 1035 (Proposition of Law No. I accepted); 127 Ohio St.3d 1480 , 2010-Ohio-6370 , 938 N.E.2d 1040 (on reconsideration, Proposition of Law No. II also accepted).

2011Dominish appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policy language was ambiguous and that in any event, Nationwide, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. {¶ 6} We accepted Nationwide’s discretionary appeal. 127 Ohio St.3d 1444 , 2010-Ohio-5762 , 937 N.E.2d 1035 (Proposition of Law No. I accepted); 127 Ohio St.3d 1480 , 2010-Ohio-6370 , 938 N.E.2d 1040 (on reconsideration, Proposition of Law No. II also accepted).

2011Co., 177 Ohio App.3d 502 , 2008-Ohio-3662 , 895 N.E.2d 217 . {¶ 62} In the instant case, the court granted Nationwide’s motion to bifurcate on November 24, 2009.

2011Co., 177 Ohio App.3d 502 , 2008-Ohio-3662 , 895 N.E.2d 217 . {¶ 62} In the instant case, the court granted Nationwide’s motion to bifurcate on November 24, 2009.

2010On December 21, 2004, the trial court denied the Pruszynskis’ motion for prejudgment interest, without conducting a hearing or identifying the basis for its decision in its judgment entry.” Pruszynski, 2006-Ohio-5190 , 2006 WL 2798257 , at ¶ 8. {¶ 9} The Pruszynskis appealed, assigning two errors: {¶ 10} “ ‘[T]he trial court erred by denying appellants’ motion for prejudgment interest * * * without conducting a hearing or providing any reasons for its ruling.” {¶ 11} “[T]he trial court erred by denying the motion for prejudgment interest * * * when the record reveals that appellants satisfied

2010On December 21, 2004, the trial court denied the Pruszynskis’ motion for prejudgment interest, without conducting a hearing or identifying the basis for its decision in its judgment entry.” Pruszynski, 2006-Ohio-5190 , 2006 WL 2798257 , at ¶ 8. {¶ 9} The Pruszynskis appealed, assigning two errors: {¶ 10} “ ‘[T]he trial court erred by denying appellants’ motion for prejudgment interest * * * without conducting a hearing or providing any reasons for its ruling.” {¶ 11} “[T]he trial court erred by denying the motion for prejudgment interest * * * when the record reveals that appellants satisfied

2010Specifically, Nationwide argues that Guide One preserved its subrogation claim against Nationwide when Guide One submitted the claim to inter-company arbitration within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. {¶11} In rendering its decision to overrule Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment and to grant Delacruz’ motion for summary judgment, the trial -6- Case No. 5-10-17 court relied, in large part, on Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Buckley, 9th Dist No. 06CA0013-M, 2006-Ohio-5362 .

2010On December 21, 2004, the trial court denied the Pruszynskis’ motion for prejudgment interest, without conducting a hearing or identifying the basis for its decision in its judgment entry.” Pruszynski, 2006-Ohio-5190 , 2006 WL 2798257 , at ¶ 8. {¶ 9} The Pruszynskis appealed, assigning two errors: {¶ 10} “ ‘[T]he trial court erred by denying appellants’ motion for prejudgment interest * * * without conducting a hearing or providing any reasons for its ruling.” {¶ 11} “[T]he trial court erred by denying the motion for prejudgment interest * * * when the record reveals that appellants satisfied

2009Like the insureds in Jayne , supra, Appellees extinguished their breach of contract claim once they were fully compensated by the tortfeasor. {¶ 31} Even assuming arguendo that Appellees could have established Nationwide's breach of contract at trial, the $1,000.00 judgment would be subject to the trust provisions of the insurance contract.

2008O’Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 219 , 58 O.O.2d 424 , 280 N.E.2d 896 .

2008O’Day v. Webb (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 219 , 58 O.O.2d 424 , 280 N.E.2d 896 .

2008Thomas appealed and presented four assignments of error for review — the exact assignments of error that she raises in the instant appeal: {¶ 11} “[1] The trial court committed reversible error in denying appellant’s motion for summary judgment where there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. {¶ 12} “[2] The trial court committed reversible error in granting appellee’s motion for a directed verdict where, after construing the evidence most strongly in appellant’s favor, reasonable minds could conclude that: appellant did not ma

2007In the absence of such an objection, and in accordance with the spirit of Civ.R. 15(B), Nationwide implicitly consented to the trial court's consideration of their failure to pay med-pay benefits in its analysis of Nationwide's entitlement to summary judgment. {¶ 17} There is a genuine issue of material fact that Nationwide's conduct constituted bad faith. {¶ 18} The tort of breach of a duty of good faith was recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court in Hoskins , supra: "[B]ased on the relationship between an insured and its insured, an insurer has the duty to act in good faith in the handling and

2007Co. v. Frencho (1996), 111 Ohio App.3d 213 , 221 . {¶ 16} Under the facts presented below, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Nationwide's claim did not become due and payable until the date of judgment.