constructive trust doctrine in Texas

2008Mitchell , 401 S.W.2d at 911 . 6 Thus, there are only two judicially-created limits to the literal language of article I, section 21: the Slayer's Rule and the constructive trust doctrine.

2008Mitchell, 401 S.W.2d at 911 .6 Thus, there are only two judicially-created limits to the literal language of article I, section 21: the Slayer's Rule and the constructive trust doctrine. 111.

2002Sepulveda, 839 S.W.2d at 134 .

2001In re Maple Mortgage, Inc., 81 F.3d at 596 ; In re Haber Oil, 12 F.3d at 435-36 .

2001In re Maple Mortgage, Inc., 81 F.3d at 596 ; In re Haber Oil, 12 F.3d at 435-36 .

1999In Sheldon, the case cited by NCS, the plaintiff sought a constructive trust placed on certain funds she had given to a petroleum company for the “promotion and financing of Texas ‘oil deals’.” 546 S.W.2d at 958-59 .

1999As the Sheldon court stated, it would be inequitable to place the burden of tracing all of the proceeds on the Tamez family where the proof necessary to separate funds is peculiarly within the knowledge and possession of NCS. 546 S.W.2d at 958 .

1985The Galveston court held that the constructive trust doctrine was applicable “to its fullest extent.” Zelesky, 262 S.W. at 192 .

1985The Galveston court held that the constructive trust doctrine was applicable "to its fullest extent." Zelesky, 262 S.W. at 192 .

1976Omohundro v. Matthews, supra; Dorbandt v. Bailey, 453 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref. n. r. e.); Burket v. Delaware Drilling Corporation, 435 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1968, writ dism’d).

1976Omohundro v. Matthews, supra; Dorbandt v. Bailey, 453 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref. n. r. e.); Burket v. Delaware Drilling Corporation, 435 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1968, writ dism'd).

1976The Texas Trust Act does not prohibit the enforcement of a constructive trust, Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, supra; Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367 , 341 S.W.2d 401 (1960), nor is the imposition of a constructive trust a violation of the Statute of Frauds.

1976The Texas Trust Act does not prohibit the enforcement of a constructive trust, Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, supra; Omohundro v. Matthews, 161 Tex. 367 , 341 S.W.2d 401 (1960), nor is the imposition of a constructive trust a violation of the Statute of Frauds.

1976Omohundro v. Matthews, supra; Dorbandt v. Bailey, 453 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref. n. r. e.); Burket v. Delaware Drilling Corporation, 435 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1968, writ dism’d).

1976Omohundro v. Matthews, supra; Dorbandt v. Bailey, 453 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref. n. r. e.); Burket v. Delaware Drilling Corporation, 435 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1968, writ dism'd).

1975Its purpose is to prevent a situation in which “the statutes of descent and distribution may . .~. be used as an instrument for perpetuating or protecting a fraud. ” 321 S. W. 2d at 655 .

1975Garrett, 211 S. W. 2d 559 (Tex.Sup. 1948). the court in Parks v. Dumas, sup, held that the constructive trust doctrine is a creature of equity.

1975AS the Supreme Court declared in Poue v. Garrett, supra. the doctrine of constructive trust is to be “imposed irrespective of and even contrary to the intention of the parties. ” 211 S. W. 2d at 561 .

1966Our Supreme Court in discussing Hill v. Noland, supra, impliedly approved the constructive trust principle.

1957The tendency of the courts is to construe the term “confidence” or “confidential relationship”' liberally in favor of the confider and against the confidant, for the purpose of raising a constructive trust on a violation or betrayal thereof.’ ” Our Supreme Court in Smith v. Bolin, 153 Tex. 486 , 271 S.W.2d 93, 97 , speaking this time through Judge Smith, quotes with approval the language used by Judge Griffin in speaking for the Supreme Court in: Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, supra, as follows: “While a confidential or fiduciary relationship does not in itself give rise to a constructive trust, an abus

1957The tendency of the courts is to construe the term “confidence” or “confidential relationship”' liberally in favor of the confider and against the confidant, for the purpose of raising a constructive trust on a violation or betrayal thereof.’ ” Our Supreme Court in Smith v. Bolin, 153 Tex. 486 , 271 S.W.2d 93, 97 , speaking this time through Judge Smith, quotes with approval the language used by Judge Griffin in speaking for the Supreme Court in: Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, supra, as follows: “While a confidential or fiduciary relationship does not in itself give rise to a constructive trust, an abus

1940It is the settled law in this state that the doctrine of constructive trust, relied upon by appellant, is only applicable in cases in which there is “some breach of duty or want of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the person acquiring the property, or of him from whom or under whom he has gotten it, of whom he has actual or constructive notice; of where the property has been acquired or possession of it taken on the assumption of a trust character, or under the belief by those with whom the transaction is had, or by reason of which it was acquired or possessed, that it was taken or a

1940It is the settled law in this state that the doctrine of constructive trust, relied upon by appellant, is only applicable in cases in which there is “some breach of duty or want of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the person acquiring the property, or of him from whom or under whom he has gotten it, of whom he has actual or constructive notice; of where the property has been acquired or possession of it taken on the assumption of a trust character, or under the belief by those with whom the transaction is had, or by reason of which it was acquired or possessed, that it was taken or a

1940It is the settled law in this state that the doctrine of constructive trust, relied upon by appellant, is only applicable in cases in which there is “some breach of duty or want of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the person acquiring the property, or of him from whom or under whom he has gotten it, of whom he has actual or constructive notice; of where the property has been acquired or possession of it taken on the assumption of a trust character, or under the belief by those with whom the transaction is had, or by reason of which it was acquired or possessed, that it was taken or a

1940It is the settled law in this state that the doctrine of constructive trust, relied upon by appellant, is only applicable in cases in which there is “some breach of duty or want of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the person acquiring the property, or of him from whom or under whom he has gotten it, of whom he has actual or constructive notice; of where the property has been acquired or possession of it taken on the assumption of a trust character, or under the belief by those with whom the transaction is had, or by reason of which it was acquired or possessed, that it was taken or a

1940It is the settled law in this state that the doctrine of constructive trust, relied upon by appellant, is only applicable in cases in which there is “some breach of duty or want of good faith and fair dealing on the part of the person acquiring the property, or of him from whom or under whom he has gotten it, of whom he has actual or constructive notice; of where the property has been acquired or possession of it taken on the assumption of a trust character, or under the belief by those with whom the transaction is had, or by reason of which it was acquired or possessed, that it was taken or a

1940In the recent case of Collins v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App., 125 S.W.2d 419, 420 , it is held that, “A ‘constructive trust’ is born of fraud and presupposes from its beginning adverse claim of right on part of trustee by implication.” Abilene State Bank v. Donnelly et al., Tex.Civ.App., 277 S.W. 447 .