Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
30 Maryland opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Beygreen2 sentences2018Petitioner contests the Court of Special Appeals' analysis of the interplay between CP §§ 7-101 and 7-109 : "The reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals, i.e. , 'that the custody requirement of CP § 7-101 takes precedence over the appeals provisions of CP § 7-109,' overlooks the presumption that the General Assembly 'intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law.' " State v. Bey , 452 Md. 255 , 266, 156 A.3d 873 (2017) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 2018Petitioner contests the Court of Special Appeals' analysis of the interplay between CP §§ 7-101 and 7-109 : "The reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals, i.e. , 'that the custody requirement of CP § 7-101 takes precedence over the appeals provisions of CP § 7-109,' overlooks the presumption that the General Assembly 'intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law.' " State v. Bey , 452 Md. 255 , 266, 156 A.3d 873 (2017) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Schisler v. Stategreen1 sentence2022II Discussion “Where an order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland constitutional, statutory or case law, our Court must determine whether the trial court’s conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review.” Schisler v. State, 394 Md. 519, 535 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Goshen Run HOA v. Cisnerosgreen1 sentence2021See Goshen Run Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Cisneros, 467 Md. 74, 88 (2020); Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 257 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Harvey v. Marshallgreen1 sentence2021See Goshen Run Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Cisneros, 467 Md. 74, 88 (2020); Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 257 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence2020The Pfeifer court distilled three guiding principles from Lane: (1) the uninsured motorist statute “embodies a public policy to assure financial compensation to the innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from financially irresponsible uninsured motorists”; (2) an insured’s claim against his or her own insurer to recover uninsured motorist coverage is a contract action; and (3) “[a]s long as the insured does not demand compensation under his own insurance policy, the uninsured motorist [insurer] is not called upon to pay under the contract, and, therefore there ca | 1 | 1 |
Breslin v. Powellgreen2 sentences2017On brief, Michael and Judith mischaracterize the Court of Special Appeals’s analysis by arguing, in a single sentence without elaboration or discussion, that it incorrectly applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which is “[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 287-88 , 26 A.3d 878, 891 (2011) (“[CJourts may consider with caution the can[ jon of [statutory] cons 2017On brief, Michael and Judith mischaracterize the Court of Special Appeals’s analysis by arguing, in a single sentence without elaboration or discussion, that it incorrectly applied the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which is “[a] canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Breslin v. Powell, 421 Md. 266, 287-88 , 26 A.3d 878, 891 (2011) (“[CJourts may consider with caution the can[ jon of [statutory] cons | 1 | 1 |
Wooldridge v. Pricegreen2 sentences2016Petitioners’ reliance on the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis in Wooldridge , is also attenuated, given that the Court addressed in relevant part, whether the contributory negligence of the decedent barred a wrongful death beneficiary’s subsequent wrongful death and survival action. 184 Md.App. 451, 454 , 966 A.2d 955, 957 (2009). 2016Petitioners’ reliance on the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis in Wooldridge , is also attenuated, given that the Court addressed in relevant part, whether the contributory negligence of the decedent barred a wrongful death beneficiary’s subsequent wrongful death and survival action. 184 Md.App. 451, 454 , 966 A.2d 955, 957 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n v. Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences2012Tenants rely on the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis and also point out that Landlords “blocked Sorrento from participating by refusing to consent to an assignment of the grounds leases” and therefore “can hardly raise a party-in-interest defense when they are the ones responsible for the missing party’s absence.” Maryland Rule 2-201 provides: “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest^]” 39 As Judge Harrell explained in Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Public Service Comm’n, “the trend has been to define a real party in interest as: ‘A person entitled unde 2012Tenants rely on the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis and also point out that Landlords “blocked Sorrento from participating by refusing to consent to an assignment of the grounds leases” and therefore “can hardly raise a party-in-interest defense when they are the ones responsible for the missing party’s absence.” Maryland Rule 2-201 provides: “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest^]” 39 As Judge Harrell explained in Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass’n v. Public Service Comm’n, “the trend has been to define a real party in interest as: ‘A person entitled unde | 1 | 1 |
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Blantongreen2 sentences2011It is especially so because Petitioners argue that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Tax Court is erroneous because that judgment is “entirely dependent on its [incorrect] determination that the county income tax and State income tax are one and the same.” To support this assertion, Petitioners cite Comptroller v. Blanton, contending that this Court held that the State and *139 local taxes are “two distinct taxes.” 390 Md. 528, 533, 543 , 890 A.2d 279, 282, 288 (2006). 2011It is especially so because Petitioners argue that the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Tax Court is erroneous because that judgment is “entirely dependent on its [incorrect] determination that the county income tax and State income tax are one and the same.” To support this assertion, Petitioners cite Comptroller v. Blanton, contending that this Court held that the State and *139 local taxes are “two distinct taxes.” 390 Md. 528, 533, 543 , 890 A.2d 279, 282, 288 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Warner v. Markoegreen2 sentences2011This logistical element of the incident, however, is a not relevant to an assumption of risk analysis, although it might be relevant to a contributory negligence analysis where a voluntary encounter with a known risk might be "itself unreasonable." See BG & E v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 706 , 705 A.2d 1144 (1998) (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260, 264 (1937) ("Contributory negligence defeats recovery because it is a proximate cause of the accident which happens, but assumption of risk defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an acc 2011This logistical element of the incident, however, is a not relevant to an assumption of risk analysis, although it might be relevant to a contributory negligence analysis where a voluntary encounter with a known risk might be "itself unreasonable." See BG & E v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 706 , 705 A.2d 1144 (1998) (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260, 264 (1937) ("Contributory negligence defeats recovery because it is a proximate cause of the accident which happens, but assumption of risk defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an acc | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Clinegreen2 sentences2009The Court of Special Appeals’ analysis of the words “tortious conduct” included a discussion of Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004), in which this Court was presented with the issue of whether State personnel have immunity from liability for tortious acts or omissions that violate State constitutional rights. 2009The Court of Special Appeals’ analysis of the words “tortious conduct” included a discussion of Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245 , 863 A.2d 297 (2004), in which this Court was presented with the issue of whether State personnel have immunity from liability for tortious acts or omissions that violate State constitutional rights. | 1 | 1 |
| Ritchie v. Donnellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| DiPino v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monarch Academy Baltimore Campus, Inc. v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 612 n.10, 153 A.3d at 870 n.10. 2017Id. at 612 n.10, 153 A.3d at 870 n.10. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Havre de Grace v. K. Hovnanian Homes
green
1 sentence2021Hovnanian Homes of Maryland, LLC, 246 Md. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Doe v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services
green
1 sentence2020Services, 430 Md. 535 (2013), or Apprendi.16 16 In one sentence of his Court of Special Appeals brief, Rogers cited Nick H., 224 Md. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re NICK H.
green
1 sentence2020Services, 430 Md. 535 (2013), or Apprendi.16 16 In one sentence of his Court of Special Appeals brief, Rogers cited Nick H., 224 Md. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ali v. CIT Technology Financing Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020We agreed with the Court of Special Appeals’ analysis that, like the default federal tolling provision in 11 U.S.C. § 108 , the state tolling provision contained in CJ § 5- 202 “was enacted ‘to address the public’s complaint that debtors manipulated the bankruptcy and insolvency processes to avoid paying creditors by entering bankruptcy, 17 waiting for the statute of limitations to expire, and subsequently dismissing the bankruptcy proceeding.’” Id. at 268 (quoting Ali, 188 Md. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Johnson v. State
green
1 sentence2020Johnson v. State, 240 Md. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Pfeifer v. Phoenix Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2020The Pfeifer court distilled three guiding principles from Lane: (1) the uninsured motorist statute “embodies a public policy to assure financial compensation to the innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from financially irresponsible uninsured motorists”; (2) an insured’s claim against his or her own insurer to recover uninsured motorist coverage is a contract action; and (3) “[a]s long as the insured does not demand compensation under his own insurance policy, the uninsured motorist [insurer] is not called upon to pay under the contract, and, therefore there ca | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Shilling v. Nationwide Insurance
neutral
1 sentence2020In reaching the result it did, that court opined that “our conclusion is consistent with Lane’s holding that contract limitations are not triggered until the insured/injured party makes a demand for payment under the [underinsured motorist] policy.” Shilling, 241 Md. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Little Store, Inc. v. State
green
2 sentences2018This rule is not absolute though. " '[A]nd' and 'or' may be used interchangeably when it is reasonable and logical to do so." Little Store, Inc. v. State , 295 Md. 158 , 163, 453 A.2d 1215 (1983). 6 Disagreeing with the Court of Special Appeals' analysis of the statutory language, Petitioners argue that we should limit the possession and control exception to those cases involving asbestos. 2018This rule is not absolute though. " '[A]nd' and 'or' may be used interchangeably when it is reasonable and logical to do so." Little Store, Inc. v. State , 295 Md. 158 , 163, 453 A.2d 1215 (1983). 6 Disagreeing with the Court of Special Appeals' analysis of the statutory language, Petitioners argue that we should limit the possession and control exception to those cases involving asbestos. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Yates v. State
green
2 sentences2012We first dispose of Petitioner’s concern with the Court of Special Appeals’s reference to the phrase res gestae in the course of surveying the law in other states on the subject of felony murder, 202 Md.App. at 714-18 , 33 A.3d 1071 , and the Court’s statement of “agree[ment] with this line of cases.” Id. at 718 , 33 A.3d 1071 . 2012We first dispose of Petitioner’s concern with the Court of Special Appeals’s reference to the phrase res gestae in the course of surveying the law in other states on the subject of felony murder, 202 Md.App. at 714-18 , 33 A.3d 1071 , and the Court’s statement of “agree[ment] with this line of cases.” Id. at 718 , 33 A.3d 1071 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2011The State, relying on language from Strickland concerning the performance prong of the analysis, notes that "a reviewing court `must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct [,]'" and "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ) 2011The State, relying on language from Strickland concerning the performance prong of the analysis, notes that "a reviewing court `must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct [,]'" and "[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ) | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo
green
2 sentences2011This logistical element of the incident, however, is a not relevant to an assumption of risk analysis, although it might be relevant to a contributory negligence analysis where a voluntary encounter with a known risk might be "itself unreasonable." See BG & E v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 706 , 705 A.2d 1144 (1998) (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260, 264 (1937) ("Contributory negligence defeats recovery because it is a proximate cause of the accident which happens, but assumption of risk defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an acc 2011This logistical element of the incident, however, is a not relevant to an assumption of risk analysis, although it might be relevant to a contributory negligence analysis where a voluntary encounter with a known risk might be "itself unreasonable." See BG & E v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 706 , 705 A.2d 1144 (1998) (quoting Warner v. Markoe, 171 Md. 351, 359-60 , 189 A. 260, 264 (1937) ("Contributory negligence defeats recovery because it is a proximate cause of the accident which happens, but assumption of risk defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to complain if an acc | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Jacobs v. Adams
green
2 sentences2011We agree that “[i]t is only after the rights of parties have been established by the laws of the situs that the forum may determine how those rights shall be exercised.” Jacobs, 66 Md.App. at 791 , 505 A.2d at 936 . 2011We agree that “[i]t is only after the rights of parties have been established by the laws of the situs that the forum may determine how those rights shall be exercised.” Jacobs, 66 Md.App. at 791 , 505 A.2d at 936 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Moran v. Fabergé, Inc.
green
1 sentence2009Id. at 586-88 , 933 A.2d at 577-79 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Beverly Lesnick, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Stanley S. Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., and Lorillard, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009Hollingsworth concerned the same facts as in Lesnick, supra . 2009Hollingsworth concerned the same facts as in Lesnick, supra. In holding that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City could not justifiably exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, H & V, located in Massachusetts, the intermediate appellate court recognized that H & V did no more than place its products into the stream of commerce. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Connor
green
2 sentences2009In recognizing the "stream-of-commerce-plus" theory, we also acknowledge that the theory is consistent with the Court of Special Appeals' analysis in Hollingsworth v. Connor, 136 Md.App. 91 , 764 A.2d 318 (2000). 2009In recognizing the "stream-of-commerce-plus" theory, we also acknowledge that the theory is consistent with the Court of Special Appeals' analysis in Hollingsworth v. Connor, 136 Md.App. 91 , 764 A.2d 318 (2000). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Collins v. Li
green
1 sentence2009Id. at 586-88 , 933 A.2d at 577-79 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2008Acknowledging the canons of statutory interpretation, the court then held that adopting the Court of Special Appeals’s test would render the private road provisions of § 21-101.1 “surplusage and therefore unnecessary.” 441 F.Supp.2d at 753-54 . 2008The court noted, “[a] contrary conclusion would not only assume the legislature incorporated an entirely redundant provision into the statute, but would also lead to the absurd and unreasonable result of exempting roads on federal enclaves ... from the most basic traffic safety laws.” Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Centre Ins. v. JTW
green
2 sentences2007Ehrlich v. Grove, 394 Md. 307 , 905 A.2d 842 (2006). 2007Ehrlich v. Grove, 394 Md. 307 , 905 A.2d 842 (2006). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Chaires v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Dishman v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Billman v. State of Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corp. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Parker v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Smith v. Brantley neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Zitzer v. California green | 1 | 1977–1977 |