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30 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Bennettgreen2 sentences1987See, Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285 , 424 A.2d 864 (1980), rearg. denied, February 18, 1982, Mr. Justice Larsen joined by Mr. Justice Flaherty referred to the Davenport rule as the "quintessential illustration of mechanical jurisprudence" in expressing their dissatisfaction with the "rote application of the Davenport formula” at the "expense of justice.” Other members of the Court noted their displeasure with the “iron rule” in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (Mr. Justice Flaherty, concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Hutchinson; Mr. Justice McDermott, concu 1987See, Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285 , 424 A.2d 864 (1980), rearg. denied, February 18, 1982, Mr. Justice Larsen joined by Mr. Justice Flaherty referred to the Davenport rule as the "quintessential illustration of mechanical jurisprudence" in expressing their dissatisfaction with the "rote application of the Davenport formula” at the "expense of justice.” Other members of the Court noted their displeasure with the “iron rule” in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (Mr. Justice Flaherty, concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Hutchinson; Mr. Justice McDermott, concu | 4 | 6 |
Commonwealth v. Davenportred2 sentences2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s 2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s | 2 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2004See Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216, 217 (1983) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“The Davenport rule severely undermines the truth-determining process, and results in the exclusion of constitutionally permissible statements.”); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004, 1008 (1982) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“We must ... discard Davenport and return to a more flexible approach. 2004See Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216, 217 (1983) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“The Davenport rule severely undermines the truth-determining process, and results in the exclusion of constitutionally permissible statements.”); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004, 1008 (1982) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“We must ... discard Davenport and return to a more flexible approach. | 2 | 7 |
Commonwealth v. Bladygreen2 sentences1987See, Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285 , 424 A.2d 864 (1980), rearg. denied, February 18, 1982, Mr. Justice Larsen joined by Mr. Justice Flaherty referred to the Davenport rule as the "quintessential illustration of mechanical jurisprudence" in expressing their dissatisfaction with the "rote application of the Davenport formula” at the "expense of justice.” Other members of the Court noted their displeasure with the “iron rule” in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (Mr. Justice Flaherty, concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Hutchinson; Mr. Justice McDermott, concu 1987See, Commonwealth v. Blady, 492 Pa. 285 , 424 A.2d 864 (1980), rearg. denied, February 18, 1982, Mr. Justice Larsen joined by Mr. Justice Flaherty referred to the Davenport rule as the "quintessential illustration of mechanical jurisprudence" in expressing their dissatisfaction with the "rote application of the Davenport formula” at the "expense of justice.” Other members of the Court noted their displeasure with the “iron rule” in Commonwealth v. Bennett, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970 (1982) (Mr. Justice Flaherty, concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Hutchinson; Mr. Justice McDermott, concu | 2 | 5 |
In Re Nomination Petition of Shuligreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia 2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Hughesgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia 2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 2 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Travagliagreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia 2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 2 | 3 |
Humphrey v. Northern States Power Co.green2 sentences1986See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983) (travel time between counties must be accounted for if we are to require arraignment in county where jurisdiction for charged crime lies), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984). 4 . 1986See Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474 , 467 A.2d 288 (1983) (travel time between counties must be accounted for if we are to require arraignment in county where jurisdiction for charged crime lies), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256 , 104 S.Ct. 3547 , 82 L.Ed.2d 850 (1984). 4 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Triplettgreen2 sentences1980Moreover, in subsequent cases stating the Davenport rule, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has mentioned “exigent circumstances.” See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 476 Pa. 344 , 347 n.2, 382 A.2d 1202 , 1204 n.2 (1978); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 476 Pa. 83, 89 , 381 A.2d 877, 881 (1977); Commonwealth v. Morton, 475 Pa. 374 , 379 n.3, 380 A.2d 769 , 771 n.3 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 274 Pa.Super. 140 , 148 n.4, 418 A.2d 335 , 339 n.4, (1979) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa.Super. 159 , 166 n.7, 401 A.2d 1148 , 1152 n.7 (1979) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. 1980Moreover, in subsequent cases stating the Davenport rule, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has mentioned “exigent circumstances.” See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 476 Pa. 344 , 347 n.2, 382 A.2d 1202 , 1204 n.2 (1978); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 476 Pa. 83, 89 , 381 A.2d 877, 881 (1977); Commonwealth v. Morton, 475 Pa. 374 , 379 n.3, 380 A.2d 769 , 771 n.3 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 274 Pa.Super. 140 , 148 n.4, 418 A.2d 335 , 339 n.4, (1979) (per curiam); Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa.Super. 159 , 166 n.7, 401 A.2d 1148 , 1152 n.7 (1979) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Keasleygreen2 sentences2004See Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216, 217 (1983) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“The Davenport rule severely undermines the truth-determining process, and results in the exclusion of constitutionally permissible statements.”); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004, 1008 (1982) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“We must ... discard Davenport and return to a more flexible approach. 2004See Commonwealth v. Keasley, 501 Pa. 461 , 462 A.2d 216, 217 (1983) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“The Davenport rule severely undermines the truth-determining process, and results in the exclusion of constitutionally permissible statements.”); Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 500 Pa. 144 , 454 A.2d 1004, 1008 (1982) (McDermott, J., concurring) (“We must ... discard Davenport and return to a more flexible approach. | 1 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Duncanred2 sentences2004The Duncan Court recognized that the Davenport rule had "been applied on a mechanical basis to violations which bear no relationship to the statement obtained and has shielded the guilty for no reason relevant to the individual circumstances of their case." Id. at 1182. 2004The Duncan Court recognized that the Davenport rule had "been applied on a mechanical basis to violations which bear no relationship to the statement obtained and has shielded the guilty for no reason relevant to the individual circumstances of their case." Id. at 1182. | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Bennettgreen2 sentences1986See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 287 Pa.Super. 485 , 430 A.2d 994 (1981), aff'd per curiam, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970 (1982). 1986See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 287 Pa.Super. 485 , 430 A.2d 994 (1981), aff'd per curiam, 498 Pa. 656 , 450 A.2d 970 (1982). | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Braceygreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia 2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cookgreen2 sentences2002Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50 , 735 A.2d 673, 674 (1999). ¶ 8 Insofar as the alleged violation of the Davenport rule in the Hart case is concerned, we note that Appellant carefully avoids providing any specific information defining the time frame within which the violation supposedly occurred, or any references to the record supporting his allegations. 2002Commonwealth v. Cook, 558 Pa. 50 , 735 A.2d 673, 674 (1999). ¶ 8 Insofar as the alleged violation of the Davenport rule in the Hart case is concerned, we note that Appellant carefully avoids providing any specific information defining the time frame within which the violation supposedly occurred, or any references to the record supporting his allegations. | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Devangreen | 1 | 1 |
John E. Adams v. United States of America, Ernest J. Stuckey v. United States of America, Melvin R. Roots v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s 2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Feigherygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Barrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Mortongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hoopa Valley Tribe of Indians v. Shortgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Hudegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Culmergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Haddengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Futch
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s 2000Id. at 392 , 290 A.2d at 418 (citing Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C.Cir.1968) (concurring opinion)). ¶ 8 However, the flexible standard of Futch proved difficult for law enforcement officers to apply, and in Commonwealth v. Davenport, 471 Pa. 278, 286-87 , 370 A.2d 301, 306 (1977), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a rule which provided that when an accused is not arraigned within six hours of arrest, any statements obtained after arrest but before arraignment are inadmissible at trial. ¶ 9 The Davenport rule was later modified by the Court in Commonwealth v. Duncan, s | 3 | 1980–2000 |
Commonwealth v. Robertson
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia 2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 2 | 1985–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Rhem
green
2 sentences1985In Commonwealth v. Rhem, 283 Pa.Superior Ct. 565, 424 A.2d 1345 (1980), we held that the Davenport rule does not apply to physical evidence. 1985In Commonwealth v. Rhem, 283 Pa.Superior Ct. 565, 424 A.2d 1345 (1980), we held that the Davenport rule does not apply to physical evidence. | 2 | 1982–1985 |
Commonwealth v. Perez
green
2 sentences2021In Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360 , 845 A.2d 779 (2004), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsidered the Davenport rule where a majority of the Court concluded that the “application of a stringent bright-line rule to the vastly different sets of circumstances that may be involved in arrest, investigation, and arraignment has yielded perplexing results....” Id. at 368 , 845 A.2d at 784 . 2021In Commonwealth v. Perez, 577 Pa. 360 , 845 A.2d 779 (2004), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reconsidered the Davenport rule where a majority of the Court concluded that the “application of a stringent bright-line rule to the vastly different sets of circumstances that may be involved in arrest, investigation, and arraignment has yielded perplexing results....” Id. at 368 , 845 A.2d at 784 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2018Three, the statements – the condition of the defendant at all times while he was in police custody was to make him as comfortable as possible under the ____________________________________________ 6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). - 13 - J-S36019-18 circumstances to provide him with food of his own choice from the same places that the police are commonly found to eat and, in fact, the police ate food from the same restaurants and further that his other needs were also see[n] to including cigarettes and use of facility. *** Finally, court finds that none of the statements were taken in 2018Three, the statements – the condition of the defendant at all times while he was in police custody was to make him as comfortable as possible under the ____________________________________________ 6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). - 13 - J-S36019-18 circumstances to provide him with food of his own choice from the same places that the police are commonly found to eat and, in fact, the police ate food from the same restaurants and further that his other needs were also see[n] to including cigarettes and use of facility. *** Finally, court finds that none of the statements were taken in | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Payne
green
1 sentence2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Cipriano
green
2 sentences2004People v. Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315 , 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988), involved Michigan’s statutory requirement that an accused be brought before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay.” Id., at 783 n. 1 (citing M.C.L. §§ 764.13, 764.26; M.S.A. §§ 28.871(1), 28.885). 2004People v. Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315 , 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988), involved Michigan’s statutory requirement that an accused be brought before a magistrate “without unnecessary delay.” Id., at 783 n. 1 (citing M.C.L. §§ 764.13, 764.26; M.S.A. §§ 28.871(1), 28.885). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Devine
green
1 sentence2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Odrick
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia 2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Mason
green
2 sentences2004Cf. Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396 , 490 A.2d 421 (1985) (violation of Pa.R.Crim.P.2004 (now Pa.R.Crim.P. 204), which requires search warrants be served by law enforcement officers, does not result in automatic exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to warrant). 2004Cf. Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396 , 490 A.2d 421 (1985) (violation of Pa.R.Crim.P.2004 (now Pa.R.Crim.P. 204), which requires search warrants be served by law enforcement officers, does not result in automatic exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to warrant). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Ryles
green
2 sentences2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia 2004See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bracey, 541 Pa. 322 , 662 A.2d 1062 (1995) (period of delay attributable to accused’s mental or physical condition is "necessary delay,” and must be excluded when determining whether statement was obtained as result of "unnecessary delay”); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264 (1989) (no Davenport violation where defendant gave oral statement within six hours of arrest and subsequent written statement, completed after six-hour period, was mere recitation of oral statement); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300 (1987) (applying Travaglia | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Persiano
green
2 sentences2000Cf. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264, 1284 (1989) (McDermott, J., concurring) (criticizing the "mechanical and discredited six-hour rule"); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300, 307 (1987) (observing "[w]hatever validity the Davenport rule retains, its `six-hour' clock does not begin to run ... until the defendant has been returned to the judicial district wherein the arrest warrant was issued.") [12] In Commonwealth v. Persiano, 555 Pa. 428 , 725 A.2d 151 (1999), we faced a situation similar to that presented in Washington, supra, where a defendant was arrest 2000Cf. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423 , 555 A.2d 1264, 1284 (1989) (McDermott, J., concurring) (criticizing the "mechanical and discredited six-hour rule"); Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 514 Pa. 471 , 526 A.2d 300, 307 (1987) (observing "[w]hatever validity the Davenport rule retains, its `six-hour' clock does not begin to run ... until the defendant has been returned to the judicial district wherein the arrest warrant was issued.") [12] In Commonwealth v. Persiano, 555 Pa. 428 , 725 A.2d 151 (1999), we faced a situation similar to that presented in Washington, supra, where a defendant was arrest | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Commonwealth v. Gallo green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2000Indeed, in his Concurring Opinion, in which Justice Cappy joined, Justice Saylor criticized the rule, stating, "[gjiven the present holding, I now favor abandonment of the Davenport/Duncan construct and reversion to the federal model entailing consideration of the totality of the circumstances in every case.” Bridges , - Pa. at -, 757 A.2d at 883 (citing to Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). 2000Indeed, in his Concurring Opinion, in which Justice Cappy joined, Justice Saylor criticized the rule, stating, "[gjiven the present holding, I now favor abandonment of the Davenport/Duncan construct and reversion to the federal model entailing consideration of the totality of the circumstances in every case.” Bridges , - Pa. at -, 757 A.2d at 883 (citing to Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. Bridges
green
2 sentences2000In her Opinion, speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Neman acknowledged that "[t]he rule has many critics who believe that it arbitrarily sets a time limit for arraignment and excludes statements that may, in fact, have been given knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.” Id. at - n. 11, 757 A.2d at 871 n. 11 (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 461 , 555 A.2d 1264, 1284 (1989) (McDermott concurring) (criticizing the “mechanical and discredited six-hour rule”); Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 514 Pa. 471, 487 , 526 A.2d 300, 307 (1987) (observing "[wjhatever validity the Davenport 2000In her Opinion, speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Neman acknowledged that "[t]he rule has many critics who believe that it arbitrarily sets a time limit for arraignment and excludes statements that may, in fact, have been given knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.” Id. at - n. 11, 757 A.2d at 871 n. 11 (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 461 , 555 A.2d 1264, 1284 (1989) (McDermott concurring) (criticizing the “mechanical and discredited six-hour rule”); Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 514 Pa. 471, 487 , 526 A.2d 300, 307 (1987) (observing "[wjhatever validity the Davenport | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. MacHi
green
2 sentences2000In doing so, this Court relied on several cases, including Commonwealth v. Gallo, 276 Pa.Super. 562 , 419 A.2d 601 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Machi, 294 Pa.Super. 338 , 439 A.2d 1230 (1982). 2000In doing so, this Court relied on several cases, including Commonwealth v. Gallo, 276 Pa.Super. 562 , 419 A.2d 601 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Machi, 294 Pa.Super. 338 , 439 A.2d 1230 (1982). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Commonwealth v. Lovette green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Commonwealth v. Williams green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. Janis green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Illinois v. Gates green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth v. Crowley green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth v. Daniels green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth v. Ellis green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth v. Perkins green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Com. v. Washington green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Morton green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Williams green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Jefferson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. Rose green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.