30 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1965–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
D. Sobat and E. Sobat v. The Borough of Midland ~ Appeal of: E. Sobatgreen2 sentences2024See R.R. at 138a-40a. 9 not circumvent a defendant’s immunity.” Sobat v. Borough of Midland, 141 A.3d 618, 627 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citing Holt v. Nw. 2024See Sobat, 141 A.3d at 627 . | 1 | 1 |
School District v. Framlau Corp.green1 sentence2020In the absence of a compliance with the applicable statutory provisions pertaining to the mode by which a board of school directors may make a contract, no enforceable contract will result. 328 A.2d at 870 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
D'Emilio v. Board of Supervisorsgreen1 sentence2020See D’Emilio v. Board of Supervisors, Township of Bensalem, 628 A.2d 1230, 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (“It is obvious that [the] [d]eveloper’s rather vague allegations of wrongdoing by the [s]upervisors are merely an attempt to impeach testimony already adduced in the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth State Emp. Ret. System v. Dau. Co.green1 sentence2020The power “to determine what property shall be subject to taxation and what shall be immune is traditionally within the province of the General Assembly.” Commonwealth v. Dauphin County, 6 A.2d 870, 871 (Pa. 1939). | 1 | 1 |
Duryea Borough Police Department v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Boardgreen1 sentence2012Duryea Borough Police Dep’t v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 862 A.2d 122, 127 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). | 1 | 1 |
Kirsch v. Public School Employees' Retirement Boardgreen2 sentences2011We specifically held that the “union-approved salary, which exceeded the School District standard salary, may appropriately be excluded.... [U]nder the statute, only the salary corresponding with the position held at the school district during the approved leave may be credited to retirement earnings.” Id. at 678 (footnote omitted). 2011We specifically held that the “union-approved salary, which exceeded the School District standard salary, may appropriately be excluded.... [U]nder the statute, only the salary corresponding with the position held at the school district during the approved leave may be credited to retirement earnings.” Id. at 678 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Mark v. Borough of Hatborogreen2 sentences2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). 2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Kneipp v. Teddergreen2 sentences2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). 2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). | 1 | 1 |
R.W. v. Manzekgreen2 sentences2005Thus, the Superior Court reasoned that Parents “did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether the harm suffered by L.W. was foreseeable to [the Fundraising Entities] in light of the respective conduct of each [the Fundraising Entities and the School District defendants].” R.W. v. Manzek, 838 A.2d 801, 804-05 (Pa.Super.2003). 2005Thus, the Superior Court reasoned that Parents "did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether the harm suffered by L.W. was foreseeable to [the Fundraising Entities] in light of the respective conduct of each [the Fundraising Entities and the School District defendants]." R.W. v. Manzek, 838 A.2d 801, 804-05 (Pa.Super.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co.green1 sentence2004See Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co., 763 A.2d 401 , 405 n. 1 (Pa.Super.2000) (“Under Pennsylvania law, a third party beneficiary’s rights and limitations in a contract are the same as those of the original contracting parties.”). | 1 | 1 |
Mulligan v. School Districtgreen2 sentences1999(School District’s brief at 10.) PSBA asserts that the General Assembly’s broad grant of authority to school districts in section 501 of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 5-501, gives the School District implied authority for its Plan. 9 (See PSBA’s brief at 15.) PSBA and the School District concede, as they must, that a school district is a creature of the legislature and therefore has no power “except by express statutory grant and necessary implication.” (School District’s brief at 11-12 (emphasis added), relying on Mulligan v. School District of Hanover Township, 241 Pa. 204, 207 , 88 A. 362, 362 1999(School District’s brief at 10.) PSBA asserts that the General Assembly’s broad grant of authority to school districts in section 501 of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 5-501, gives the School District implied authority for its Plan. 9 (See PSBA’s brief at 15.) PSBA and the School District concede, as they must, that a school district is a creature of the legislature and therefore has no power “except by express statutory grant and necessary implication.” (School District’s brief at 11-12 (emphasis added), relying on Mulligan v. School District of Hanover Township, 241 Pa. 204, 207 , 88 A. 362, 362 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Nomination Petition of Granatgreen2 sentences1999(School District’s brief at 10.) PSBA asserts that the General Assembly’s broad grant of authority to school districts in section 501 of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 5-501, gives the School District implied authority for its Plan. 9 (See PSBA’s brief at 15.) PSBA and the School District concede, as they must, that a school district is a creature of the legislature and therefore has no power “except by express statutory grant and necessary implication.” (School District’s brief at 11-12 (emphasis added), relying on Mulligan v. School District of Hanover Township, 241 Pa. 204, 207 , 88 A. 362, 362 1999(School District’s brief at 10.) PSBA asserts that the General Assembly’s broad grant of authority to school districts in section 501 of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 5-501, gives the School District implied authority for its Plan. 9 (See PSBA’s brief at 15.) PSBA and the School District concede, as they must, that a school district is a creature of the legislature and therefore has no power “except by express statutory grant and necessary implication.” (School District’s brief at 11-12 (emphasis added), relying on Mulligan v. School District of Hanover Township, 241 Pa. 204, 207 , 88 A. 362, 362 | 1 | 1 |
| Stidham v. Millvale Sportsmen's Clubgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Finn v. City of Philadelphiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Clearfield Area School Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Farley v. Township of Upper Darbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bersani v. School District of Philadelphiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pa. Pub. Util. Com'n v. Proc. Gas Consum.
green
2 sentences2007III, § 14, the Department of Education's petition for review, seeking appointment of a receiver to operate and manage the District in place of the SBOC, was nonjusticiable and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter, much less to settle it by altering the statutory framework for local governance of a school district in violation of the separation-of-powers principles; (2) The Department's request for the appointment of a receiver, and the settlement approved by the court, constitute equity violating the law; (3) The Department failed to pursue the exclusive, mandatory, 2007III, § 14, the Department of Education's petition for review, seeking appointment of a receiver to operate and manage the District in place of the SBOC, was nonjusticiable and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter, much less to settle it by altering the statutory framework for local governance of a school district in violation of the separation-of-powers principles; (2) The Department's request for the appointment of a receiver, and the settlement approved by the court, constitute equity violating the law; (3) The Department failed to pursue the exclusive, mandatory, | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Mechanicsburg Area School District v. Kline
green
2 sentences1994The School District failed to present sufficient legal basis for its argument that the Commonwealth, Governor and Department of Education are indispensable parties to this litigation, Mechanicsburg Area School Dist. v. Kline, 494 Pa. 476 , 431 A.2d 953 (1981), or that this Court possesses the legal authority to compel the Commonwealth in these proceedings to appropriate additional resources to fund school desegregation measures which may be ordered by the Court. 1994The School District failed to present sufficient legal basis for its argument that the Commonwealth, Governor and Department of Education are indispensable parties to this litigation, Mechanicsburg Area School Dist. v. Kline, 494 Pa. 476 , 431 A.2d 953 (1981), or that this Court possesses the legal authority to compel the Commonwealth in these proceedings to appropriate additional resources to fund school desegregation measures which may be ordered by the Court. | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Vann v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences1986DISSENTING OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE CRUMLISH, JR.: The majority, in affirming the grant of the School District's motion for judgment on the pleadings, relies *185 principally on our holding in Vann v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia, 76 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 604 , 464 A.2d 684 (1983). 1986DISSENTING OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE CRUMLISH, JR.: The majority, in affirming the grant of the School District's motion for judgment on the pleadings, relies *185 principally on our holding in Vann v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia, 76 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 604 , 464 A.2d 684 (1983). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
In re Appeal of Maoying Yu
neutral
1 sentence2025The school district in Maoying Yu raised the same argument, and this Court declined to reach 14 that argument in light of our decision reversing the court of common pleas’ order and remanding the matter for a determination of the correct assessment. 121 A.3d at 584 n.10. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ray v. Brookville Area School District
green
1 sentence2023“Waste” is defined as “[a]n employer’s conduct or omissions which result in substantial abuse, misuse, destruction or loss of funds or resources belonging to or derived from Commonwealth or political subdivision sources.” 43 P.S. §1422. 3 “A Loudermill hearing is a pre-termination hearing given to a public employee that is required by due process, as established in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).” Ray v. Brookville Area School District, 19 A.3d 29 , 31 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). 3 The facts of record, as developed in discovery, follow. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill
green
1 sentence2023“Waste” is defined as “[a]n employer’s conduct or omissions which result in substantial abuse, misuse, destruction or loss of funds or resources belonging to or derived from Commonwealth or political subdivision sources.” 43 P.S. §1422. 3 “A Loudermill hearing is a pre-termination hearing given to a public employee that is required by due process, as established in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).” Ray v. Brookville Area School District, 19 A.3d 29 , 31 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). 3 The facts of record, as developed in discovery, follow. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
1198 Butler Street Associates v. Board of Assessment Appeals
green
1 sentence2020The trial court, as fact finder, has discretion over evidentiary weight and credibility determinations. 1198 Butler Street Associates v. Board of Assessment Appeals, County of Northampton, 946 A.2d 1131 , 1138 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). 5 The Board joins the School District’s brief on this matter. 6 Analysis We begin with the legal standards for determining whether government property can be subjected to local tax. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Appeal of Gateway School District
green
2 sentences2015Based upon this Court’s precedent in In re Appeal of Gateway School District, 124 Pa.Cmwlth. 463 , 556 A.2d 924 (1989), Starwood contends that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229, Pa. R.C.P. 2015Based upon this Court’s precedent in In re Appeal of Gateway School District, 124 Pa.Cmwlth. 463 , 556 A.2d 924 (1989), Starwood contends that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 229, Pa. R.C.P. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Mifflin County School District v. Stewart
green
1 sentence2013In Stewart, we explained that there is no expulsion where “one is made an alumnus.” Stewart, 503 A.2d at 1014 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District
green
1 sentence2012Dist., 466 F.Supp. 457 (S.D.Tex. 1978), aff'd, 608 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.1979). 8 The trial court had discretion to fashion a reasonable remedy to make Merrell whole for the School District’s violation of the Act. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
cluster 371141
green
1 sentence2012Dist., 466 F.Supp. 457 (S.D.Tex. 1978), aff'd, 608 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.1979). 8 The trial court had discretion to fashion a reasonable remedy to make Merrell whole for the School District’s violation of the Act. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Keystone Bank v. Flooring Specialists, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008In support thereof, Mid-State cites Keystone Bank v. Flooring Specialists, Inc., 513 Pa. 103 , 518 A.2d 1179 (1986). 2008In support thereof, Mid-State cites Keystone Bank v. Flooring Specialists, Inc., 513 Pa. 103 , 518 A.2d 1179 (1986). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Phillips v. Cricket Lighters
green
2 sentences2005Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644 , 841 A.2d 1000 (2003); Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580 , 812 A.2d 1218 (2002); Morena v. S. Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634 , 462 A.2d 680 , 684 n. 5 (1983). 2005Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644 , 841 A.2d 1000 (2003); Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580 , 812 A.2d 1218 (2002); Morena v. S. Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634 , 462 A.2d 680 , 684 n. 5 (1983). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Morena v. South Hills Health System
green
2 sentences2005Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644 , 841 A.2d 1000 (2003); Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580 , 812 A.2d 1218 (2002); Morena v. S. Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634 , 462 A.2d 680 , 684 n. 5 (1983). 2005Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644 , 841 A.2d 1000 (2003); Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580 , 812 A.2d 1218 (2002); Morena v. S. Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634 , 462 A.2d 680 , 684 n. 5 (1983). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
McKibben v. Scott
green
2 sentences2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). 2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644 , 841 A.2d 1000 (2003); Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580 , 812 A.2d 1218 (2002); Morena v. S. Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634 , 462 A.2d 680 , 684 n. 5 (1983). 2005Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 576 Pa. 644 , 841 A.2d 1000 (2003); Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580 , 812 A.2d 1218 (2002); Morena v. S. Hills Health System, 501 Pa. 634 , 462 A.2d 680 , 684 n. 5 (1983). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Woods v. Thrower
green
2 sentences2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). 2005Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 858 , 116 S.Ct. 165 , 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1208 (3d Cir.1996). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Powell v. McCormack
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 502-03 , 89 S.Ct. 1944 The School District’s challenge to Act 105 as violative of Article III, Section 4, does not seek to hold particular legisla *453 tors legally responsible; nor does it seek privileged information regarding the legislative process. 2002Id. at 502-03 , 89 S.Ct. 1944 The School District’s challenge to Act 105 as violative of Article III, Section 4, does not seek to hold particular legisla *453 tors legally responsible; nor does it seek privileged information regarding the legislative process. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| SEARCH EDP v. American Home Assur. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Germantown Insurance v. Martin green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| DiMino v. Borough of Pottstown neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Commonwealth v. Brown green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Mullen v. DuBois Area School District green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Hatfield Township School District Auditors' Petition neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Supler v. North Franklin Township School District green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.