School District motion in New York

2015Finally, while the compulsory nature of the gym class activities precludes an assumption of risk defense, it is not an impediment to summary judgment, as it does not deprive the School District of its defense that the incident was sudden and unexpected ( see Knightner v William Floyd Union Free School Dist., 51 AD3d 876 ; Mayer v Mahopac Cent. [*3]School Dist., 29 AD3d 653, 655 ; Sangineto v Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist., 282 AD2d 596 ).

2015School Dist., 29 AD3d 653, 655 [2006]; Sangineto v Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist., 282 AD2d 596 [2001]).

2015Finally, while the compulsory nature of the gym class activities precludes an assumption of risk defense, it is not an impediment to summary judgment, as it does not deprive the School District of its defense that the incident was sudden and unexpected ( see Knightner v William Floyd Union Free School Dist., 51 AD3d 876 ; Mayer v Mahopac Cent. [*3]School Dist., 29 AD3d 653, 655 ; Sangineto v Mamaroneck Union Free School Dist., 282 AD2d 596 ).

2015Finally, while the compulsory nature of the gym class activities precludes an assumption of risk defense, it is not an impediment to summary judgment, as it does not deprive the School District of its defense that the incident was sudden and unexpected (see Knightner v William Floyd Union Free School Dist., 51 AD3d 876 [2008]; Mayer v Mahopac Cent.

2007School Dist., 3 AD3d 492, 493 [2004]; Matter of Bordan v Mamaroneck School Dist., 230 AD2d 792 [1996]; Matter of Sica v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 226 AD2d 542, 542-543 [1996]).

2005The key factors to be considered in determining whether to grant an application to serve a late notice of claim are whether the school district acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within the statutory 90-day period, whether the petitioners had a reasonable excuse for the delay, and whether the delay would substantially prejudice the school district in its defense on the merits (cf. Matter of Bordan v Mamaroneck School Dist, 230 AD2d 792 [1996]).

2007Ctr., 6 NY3d 531 [2006]; Matter of Padovano v Massapequa Union Free School Dist., supra; Bovich v East Meadow Pub.

2006Ctr., 6 NY3d 531 [2006]; Matter of Conroy v Smithtown Cent.

2025The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the action falls within an exception to the statute of limitations' or whether the statute of limitations has been tolled" ( Cammarato v 16 Admiral Perry Plaza, LLC , 216 AD3d 903, 904 , quoting Osborn v DeChiara , 165 AD3d 1270 , 1271; see Schulman v Schulman Family Enters. , 222 AD3d 898 , 899).

2025The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the action falls within an exception to the statute of limitations' or whether the statute of limitations has been tolled" ( Cammarato v 16 Admiral Perry Plaza, LLC , 216 AD3d 903, 904 , quoting Osborn v DeChiara , 165 AD3d 1270 , 1271; see Schulman v Schulman Family Enters. , 222 AD3d 898 , 899).

2024Since the Notice of Claim was in the possession of the County Attorney in the first instance, the County Respondents cannot claim (and do not claim) any prejudice from Petitioners? request for defense/indemnification on February "l, 2024, and, thus,·the County Respondents are equitably estopped from asserting Local Law No. 3 's limitations defense against the Petitioners under the circumst~ces of this cas_e. See Polak v. City o/Schenectady, 181 A.D.2d 233,235 (3d Dept. 1992); Lapidot v. State, 88 Misc. 2d 1090 (Ct. CL 1976); see, e.g., Sharpe v. Sturm, 2& A.D.3d 777,_778, (2d Dept. 2006) (dism

2024Since the Notice of Claim was in the possession of the County Attorney in the first instance, the County Respondents cannot claim (and do not claim) any prejudice from Petitioners? request for defense/indemnification on February "l, 2024, and, thus,·the County Respondents are equitably estopped from asserting Local Law No. 3 's limitations defense against the Petitioners under the circumst~ces of this cas_e. See Polak v. City o/Schenectady, 181 A.D.2d 233,235 (3d Dept. 1992); Lapidot v. State, 88 Misc. 2d 1090 (Ct. CL 1976); see, e.g., Sharpe v. Sturm, 2& A.D.3d 777,_778, (2d Dept. 2006) (dism

2022Safety Equip. , 79 NY2d 967, 970 ; Andriienko v Compass Group USA, Inc. , 174 AD3d 558 , 559-560; Philippou v Baldwin Union Free Sch.

2022Safety Equip. , 79 NY2d 967, 970 ; Andriienko v Compass Group USA, Inc. , 174 AD3d 558 , 559-560; Philippou v Baldwin Union Free Sch.

2021However, the Supreme Court erred in granting those branches of the School District's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action asserted against it on the ground that those causes of action were duplicative of the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, as the plaintiffs may assert alternative Labor Law causes of action ( see generally Bauer v Female Academy of Sacred Heart , 97 NY2d 445, 451 ).

2021Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the School District's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposing papers ( see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp. , 68 NY2d 320, 324 ).

2020Dist. , 139 AD3d 1006, 1007 ; Matter of Quinn v Wallkill Cent.

2020"When one driver chooses to gratuitously signal to another person, indicating that it is safe to proceed or that the signaling driver will yield the right-of-way, the signaling driver assumes a duty to do so reasonably under the circumstances" ( Dolce v Cucolo , 106 AD3d 1431, 1431 ; see Kievman v Philip , 84 AD3d 1031, 1031 ).

2020Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the School District defendants also demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them by demonstrating that they did not create the allegedly defective condition or have actual or constructive notice of its existence ( see Yarosh v Oceana Holding Corp ., 172 AD3d 1142 , 1143).

2020Pushing a swing is not the type of activity to which the doctrine of assumption of the risk is applicable ( see id. at 88 ).

2020"The overarching principle governing determinations of proximate cause is that a defendant's negligence qualifies as a proximate cause where it is a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury'" ( Hain v Jamison , 28 NY3d 524, 528-529 , quoting Mazella v Beals , 27 NY3d 694, 706 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2020In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider whether: (1) the school district or its agent acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant was an infant at the time the claim arose and, if so, whether there was a nexus between the infancy and the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim and for the subsequent delay in seeking leave to se

2018Since the plaintiff presented only unsubstantiated hearsay in opposition to the School District's motion, he failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Nucci v Proper , 95 NY2d 597, 602 ; Weinstein v Nicolosi , 117 AD3d 1036, 1037 ; Roche v Bryant , 81 AD3d 707, 708 ; Allstate Ins.