language demands clause in California

1960Of course, this rule is subject to the exception that “When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable *400 as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be applicable to all” (Porto Rico Ry. etc. Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 [ 40 S.Ct. 516 , 64 L.Ed. 944 ], as quoted in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National etc. Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 659 [ 82 P.2d 3 , 118 A.L.R. 486 ]).

1960Of course, this rule is subject to the exception that “When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable *400 as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be applicable to all” (Porto Rico Ry. etc. Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 [ 40 S.Ct. 516 , 64 L.Ed. 944 ], as quoted in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National etc. Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 659 [ 82 P.2d 3 , 118 A.L.R. 486 ]).

2023The first exception “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ‘ “ ‘the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” ’ ” (Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 743 .) The phrase “when employees are engaged in the cleaning, repairing, servicing, setting-up or adjusting of prime movers, machinery and equipment” does not necessarily apply equally to the words “be developed” as such an interpretation would negate another subsection of the regulation, section 3314, subdivis

2022The first exception “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ‘ “ ‘the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” ’ ” (Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 743 .) The phrase “for distribution in wholesale or retail markets” does not necessarily apply equally to all the preceding terms because, as demonstrated with the 22 silage at issue here, the farm products could go through any of the specifically enumerated processes without being marketed.

2016Appeals Bd. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 705, 111 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] [the last antecedent rule is “not applicable when the natural construction of the language demands the clause be read as applicable to the first and other words, as well as to the last, or when the sense of the entire statute requires a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words”].) Here, restricting the phrase “conducted by” state and local authorities to its nearest antecedent, “audit,” makes little sense.

2016Appeals Bd. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 705, 111 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 903 ] [the last antecedent rule is “not applicable when the natural construction of the language demands the clause be read as applicable to the first and other words, as well as to the last, or when the sense of the entire statute requires a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words”].) Here, restricting the phrase “conducted by” state and local authorities to its nearest antecedent, “audit,” makes little sense.

2013Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 530 ; see In re Phelps (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 .) One exception “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, „the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.‟ [Citation] Another 29 provides that when the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words, its application will not be restricted to the last.” (Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 743 .) These “exceptions

2013Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 530 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 ]; see In re Phelps (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ].) One exception “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ‘ “ ‘the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” ’ [Citation] Another provides that when the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply to several preceding words, its application will not be restricted to the last.” (Renee su

2010Under the last antecedent rule, “ ‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ ” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 646 P.2d 191 ], quoting Board of Port Commrs. v. Williams (1937) 9 Cal.2d 381, 389 [ 70 P.2d 918 ].) There is an exception to that rule, however, which “provides that ‘ “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural con

2010Under the last antecedent rule, “ ‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ ” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 646 P.2d 191 ], quoting Board of Port Commrs. v. Williams (1937) 9 Cal.2d 381, 389 [ 70 P.2d 918 ].) There is an exception to that rule, however, which “provides that ‘ “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural con

2018Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 529 .) Mr. Shine relies on the rule of natural construction, which provides an exception to the last antecedent rule: “[W]hen several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ‘“‘the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’”’ [Citation.]” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 .) Williams-Sonoma argues that under the last antecedent rule, the phrase “pled in the Complaint” should be read to modify only the phrase that immedia

2016Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 530 [ 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 ] [“the last antecedent rule is ‘ “not immutable” ’ and should not be ‘rigidly applied’ ”].) “ ‘ “[W]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” ’ ” (White, at pp. 680-681; accord, Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 28 P.3d 876 ] [“[W]hen the sense of the entire act requires that a qualifying word or phrase apply

1978It is a general rule of statutory construction, however, that “ ‘modifying phrases are to be applied to the words immediately preceding them and are not to be construed as extending to more remote phrases.’ (City of Santa Barbara v. Maher, 25 Cal.App.2d 325, 327 [ 77 P.2d 306 ], and cases there cited.)” (Watkins v. Real Estate Commissioner (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 191 ].) An exception to this rule provides that “ ‘[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language de

1978It is a general rule of statutory construction, however, that “ ‘modifying phrases are to be applied to the words immediately preceding them and are not to be construed as extending to more remote phrases.’ (City of Santa Barbara v. Maher, 25 Cal.App.2d 325, 327 [ 77 P.2d 306 ], and cases there cited.)” (Watkins v. Real Estate Commissioner (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 191 ].) An exception to this rule provides that “ ‘[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language de

1959In People v. Kahn, 19 Cal.App.2d Supp. 758, 762 [ 60 P.2d 596 ], upon which defendant relies, it is held that, quoting with approval from Porto Rico Ry. etc. Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 [ 40 S.Ct. 516 , 64 L.Ed 944], “When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” However, in City of Santa Barbara v. Maher, 25 Cal.App.2d 325, 327 [ 77 P.2d 306 ], cited by the People, this court stated: “It is a settled rule of statutory construction

1959In People v. Kahn, 19 Cal.App.2d Supp. 758, 762 [ 60 P.2d 596 ], upon which defendant relies, it is held that, quoting with approval from Porto Rico Ry. etc. Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 [ 40 S.Ct. 516 , 64 L.Ed 944], “When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” However, in City of Santa Barbara v. Maher, 25 Cal.App.2d 325, 327 [ 77 P.2d 306 ], cited by the People, this court stated: “It is a settled rule of statutory construction

2024“A longstanding rule of statutory construction—the ‘last antecedent rule’—provides that ‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ ” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 .) However, an exception to the last antecedent rule provides that “ ‘ “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as appli

2020These two prior felony convictions for violating section 647.6 authorized the court to impose a four-year sentence on Graves under subdivision (c)(2). 7 There is an exception to the last antecedent rule “which ‘provides that “ ‘[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be applicable to all.’ ” ’ ” (Lickter v. Lickter (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 712, 726 .) We are aware of no case that applies the exception to disregard the effect of clauses, like those in sec

1991It is a general rule of statutory interpretation, however, that "when several words [e.g., "directly" and "indirectly"] are followed by a clause [e.g., "by chemical extraction"] which is as applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all." (Porto Rico Ry. etc. Co. v. Mor (1920) 253 U.S. 345, 348 ; see also, Wholesale T.

1976NOTES [1] [I add to the Court of Appeal opinion the following quotation from Porto Rico Ry. etc. Co. v. Mor (1920) 253 U.S. 345, 348 [ 64 L.Ed. 944, 945-946 , 40 S.Ct. 516 ]: "When several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands the clause be read as applicable to all." (Cited with approval in Wholesale T.

2011As this court has previously noted “ ‘[ejvidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma.’ ” (Lingenfelter v. County of Fresno (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 198, 207 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 378 ].) Lacking a comma offsetting it from “full or partial support,” the local government qualifying phrase can only reasonably be deemed to modify “support.” Despite Kern’s contention to the contrary, comparison to section 3362 bolsters our conclusion that the Legislatu

2011As this court has previously noted “ ‘[ejvidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedents by a comma.’ ” (Lingenfelter v. County of Fresno (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 198, 207 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 378 ].) Lacking a comma offsetting it from “full or partial support,” the local government qualifying phrase can only reasonably be deemed to modify “support.” Despite Kern’s contention to the contrary, comparison to section 3362 bolsters our conclusion that the Legislatu

2010Under the last antecedent rule, “ ‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ ” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 646 P.2d 191 ], quoting Board of Port Commrs. v. Williams (1937) 9 Cal.2d 381, 389 [ 70 P.2d 918 ].) There is an exception to that rule, however, which “provides that ‘ “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural con

2010Under the last antecedent rule, “ ‘qualifying words, phrases and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding and are not to be construed as extending to or including others more remote.’ ” (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [ 183 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 646 P.2d 191 ], quoting Board of Port Commrs. v. Williams (1937) 9 Cal.2d 381, 389 [ 70 P.2d 918 ].) There is an exception to that rule, however, which “provides that ‘ “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural con

2003(In re Phelps (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ] (Phelps).) One court-identified exception to the last antecedent rule “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ‘ “ ‘the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” ’ ” (Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 743; White, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 680-681; Phelps, at p. 456; Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 920, 926 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 830 ] (Board of Trustees).) Further, “the rule of the las

2003(In re Phelps (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 451, 456 [ 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 217 ] (Phelps).) One court-identified exception to the last antecedent rule “provides that when several words are followed by a clause that applies as much to the first and other words as to the last, ‘ “ ‘the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.’ ” ’ ” (Renee J., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 743; White, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 680-681; Phelps, at p. 456; Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 920, 926 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 830 ] (Board of Trustees).) Further, “the rule of the las

1984Section 854.5 defines “confine” in the disjunctive—“admit, commit, place, detain or hold in custody.” In its ordinary sense, the word “or” indicates an alternative such as “either this or that.” (Handeland v. Department of Real Estate (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 810 ]; Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712 [ 285 P.2d 257 ].) The words in section 854.5 are therefore an alternative to each other.

1984Section 854.5 defines “confine” in the disjunctive—“admit, commit, place, detain or hold in custody.” In its ordinary sense, the word “or” indicates an alternative such as “either this or that.” (Handeland v. Department of Real Estate (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 810 ]; Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712 [ 285 P.2d 257 ].) The words in section 854.5 are therefore an alternative to each other.

1984Section 854.5 defines “confine” in the disjunctive—“admit, commit, place, detain or hold in custody.” In its ordinary sense, the word “or” indicates an alternative such as “either this or that.” (Handeland v. Department of Real Estate (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 810 ]; Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712 [ 285 P.2d 257 ].) The words in section 854.5 are therefore an alternative to each other.

1984Section 854.5 defines “confine” in the disjunctive—“admit, commit, place, detain or hold in custody.” In its ordinary sense, the word “or” indicates an alternative such as “either this or that.” (Handeland v. Department of Real Estate (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 513, 517 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 810 ]; Houge v. Ford (1955) 44 Cal.2d 706, 712 [ 285 P.2d 257 ].) The words in section 854.5 are therefore an alternative to each other.

1978It is a general rule of statutory construction, however, that “ ‘modifying phrases are to be applied to the words immediately preceding them and are not to be construed as extending to more remote phrases.’ (City of Santa Barbara v. Maher, 25 Cal.App.2d 325, 327 [ 77 P.2d 306 ], and cases there cited.)” (Watkins v. Real Estate Commissioner (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 191 ].) An exception to this rule provides that “ ‘[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language de

1978It is a general rule of statutory construction, however, that “ ‘modifying phrases are to be applied to the words immediately preceding them and are not to be construed as extending to more remote phrases.’ (City of Santa Barbara v. Maher, 25 Cal.App.2d 325, 327 [ 77 P.2d 306 ], and cases there cited.)” (Watkins v. Real Estate Commissioner (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 397, 399 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 191 ].) An exception to this rule provides that “ ‘[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language de

1976Dealers v. National etc. Co. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 634, 659 [ 82 P.2d 3 , 118 A.L.R. 486 ], and People v. Kahn (1936) 19 Cal. App.2d Supp. 758, 762 [ 60 P.2d 596 ]; also see United States v. Standard Brewery (1920) 251 U.S. 210, 218 [ 64 L.Ed. 229, 234-235 , 40 S.Ct. 139 ].)]

1976Dealers v. National etc. Co. (1938) 11 Cal.2d 634, 659 [ 82 P.2d 3 , 118 A.L.R. 486 ], and People v. Kahn (1936) 19 Cal. App.2d Supp. 758, 762 [ 60 P.2d 596 ]; also see United States v. Standard Brewery (1920) 251 U.S. 210, 218 [ 64 L.Ed. 229, 234-235 , 40 S.Ct. 139 ].)]

1938An even stronger case, considering the same problem of statutory construction, and arriving at the same conclusion, is Hillsboro Coal Co. v. Knotts, (1920) 273 Fed. 221 . ‘ ‘ Our statement that, the phrase quoted is applicable to both sales and gifts becomes clear when we consider the next rule of construction which is expressed in 23 California Jurisprudence, page 764, and quoted in In re Sekuguchi, (1932) 123 Cal. App. 537, 538 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 655 ]. ‘Every statute and code section should be construed with reference to its purpose and the objects intended to be accomplished by it.

1938An even stronger case, considering the same problem of statutory construction, and arriving at the same conclusion, is Hillsboro Coal Co. v. Knotts, (1920) 273 Fed. 221 . ‘ ‘ Our statement that, the phrase quoted is applicable to both sales and gifts becomes clear when we consider the next rule of construction which is expressed in 23 California Jurisprudence, page 764, and quoted in In re Sekuguchi, (1932) 123 Cal. App. 537, 538 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 655 ]. ‘Every statute and code section should be construed with reference to its purpose and the objects intended to be accomplished by it.