cepa claim in New Jersey

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2026To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; A-2852-23 11 (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing" activity described in [N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c)]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the whistle- blowing activity and the adverse employment action. [Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 380 (2015) (quoting Dz

2026Thus, to establish a prima facie claim for a CEPA violation, a plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) "reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy;" that (2) "he or she performed a 'whistle- blowing' activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19–3[(c)];" that (3) "an adverse employment action was taken against him or her;" and (4) "a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment A-3834-23 9 action." Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462

2026Thus, to establish a prima facie claim for a CEPA violation, a plaintiff must show that he or she: (1) "reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy;" that (2) "he or she performed a 'whistle- blowing' activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19–3[(c)];" that (3) "an adverse employment action was taken against him or her;" and (4) "a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment A-3834-23 9 action." Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462

2026See Hitesman, 218 N.J. at 32 ("[A] pivotal component of a CEPA claim is the plaintiff's identification of authority in one or more of the categories enumerated in the statute that bears a substantial nexus to his or her claim.").

2026See Hitesman, 218 N.J. at 32 ("[A] pivotal component of a CEPA claim is the plaintiff's identification of authority in one or more of the categories enumerated in the statute that bears a substantial nexus to his or her claim.").

2026Although CEPA and Pierce "ha[ve] continued to exist side by side with" one another, Tartaglia, 197 N.J. at 103 , CEPA includes a waiver provision which precludes a plaintiff from bringing a common law action for wrongful discharge if the plaintiff institutes a CEPA claim challenging the discharge, see N.J.S.A. 34:19-8; Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 27-31 (1995).

2025Although CEPA and Pierce "ha[ve] continued to exist side by side with" one another, Tartaglia, 197 N.J. at 103 , CEPA includes a waiver provision which precludes a plaintiff from bringing a common law action for wrongful discharge if the plaintiff institutes a CEPA claim challenging the discharge, see N.J.S.A. 34:19-8; see also Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 27-31 (1995).

2025Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing a CEPA claim is not required to prove their employer actually violated any law, rule, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy to be successful; the plaintiff must merely "show that he or she 'reasonably believes this to be the case.'" Id. at 462 (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000) (internal quotation 3 Plaintiff's complaint does not clarify whether she is bringing her claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c).

2020Reconsideration Motion Decision Foreman contends the motion judge erred in determining that she did not satisfy CEPA's fourth element in order to avoid summary judgment dismissal of her CEPA claim.8 She cites to Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 612 (2000) (citing Romano v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 284 N.J.

2019Because we measure a plaintiff's objectively reasonable belief at the time she blew the whistle, see Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193 (1998), a CEPA claim based on plaintiff's report to Ballard is considerably weaker than the one based on the original incident.

2019Because we measure a plaintiff's objectively reasonable belief at the time she blew the whistle, see Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 153 N.J. 163, 193 (1998), a CEPA claim based on plaintiff's report to Ballard is considerably weaker than the one based on the original incident.

2026Although CEPA and Pierce "ha[ve] continued to exist side by side with" one another, Tartaglia, 197 N.J. at 103 , CEPA includes a waiver provision which precludes a plaintiff from bringing a common law action for wrongful discharge if the plaintiff institutes a CEPA claim challenging the discharge, see N.J.S.A. 34:19-8; Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 27-31 (1995).

2025Although CEPA and Pierce "ha[ve] continued to exist side by side with" one another, Tartaglia, 197 N.J. at 103 , CEPA includes a waiver provision which precludes a plaintiff from bringing a common law action for wrongful discharge if the plaintiff institutes a CEPA claim challenging the discharge, see N.J.S.A. 34:19-8; see also Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 27-31 (1995).

2025Although plaintiff cites this language in her brief as authority, it is inapplicable to her because she does not assert in her complaint that she is a "licensed or certified health care professional." A-1532-23 10 A plaintiff bringing a CEPA claim 3 must demonstrate: (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a "whistle-blowing activity" described in N.J.S.A. 34:19- 3[]; (3) an adverse employment action was taken against him or her;

2025Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing a CEPA claim is not required to prove their employer actually violated any law, rule, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy to be successful; the plaintiff must merely "show that he or she 'reasonably believes this to be the case.'" Id. at 462 (quoting Estate of Roach v. TRW, Inc., 164 N.J. 598, 613 (2000) (internal quotation 3 Plaintiff's complaint does not clarify whether she is bringing her claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c).

2019Plaintiff relied on the discipline policy and USM to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) and (c)(3). "[A] plaintiff who pursues a CEPA claim under [(c)(3)] may rely upon the same laws, rules and regulations that may be the subject of a claim under (c)(1)." Maimone, 188 N.J. at 231 .

2019Plaintiff relied on the discipline policy and USM to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) and (c)(3). "[A] plaintiff who pursues a CEPA claim under [(c)(3)] may rely upon the same laws, rules and regulations that may be the subject of a claim under (c)(1)." Maimone, 188 N.J. at 231 .

2021However, "filing a CEPA claim 'does not insulate the complaining employee from discharge or other disciplinary action for reasons unrelated to the complaint.'" Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J.

2021However, "filing a CEPA claim 'does not insulate the complaining employee from discharge or other disciplinary action for reasons unrelated to the complaint.'" Hancock v. Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J.

2025See Chiofalo, 238 N.J. at 541 ("[E]ither 'the court or the plaintiff' must identify the statute, regulation, rule, or public policy that closely relates to the complained-of conduct" to establish a prima facie CEPA claim (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J at 464)).

2021"Vague and conclusory complaints, complaints about trivial or minor matters, or generalized workplace unhappiness are not the sort of things that the Legislature intended to be protected by CEPA." Id. at 559 . "[T]he parties and the court need to have a common understanding of the legal principle that the CEPA plaintiff reasonably believed was being violated," which then "enables a true joinder of issues on the CEPA claim." Chiofalo v. State, 238 N.J. 527, 544 (2019).

2020Because "[i]t is beyond dispute that the framework for proving a CEPA claim follows that of a LAD claim,"5 Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 350 N.J.

2020Because "[i]t is beyond dispute that the framework for proving a CEPA claim follows that of a LAD claim,"5 Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 350 N.J.

2026A. Adverse Employment Action A-3834-23 10 An employer's action must "have either impacted on the employee's 'compensation or rank' or be 'virtually equivalent to discharge' in order to give rise to the level of a retaliatory action required for a CEPA claim." Klein, 377 N.J.

2026A. Adverse Employment Action A-3834-23 10 An employer's action must "have either impacted on the employee's 'compensation or rank' or be 'virtually equivalent to discharge' in order to give rise to the level of a retaliatory action required for a CEPA claim." Klein, 377 N.J.

2024Our Supreme Court has recognized that in the context of a CEPA claim, "a 'clear mandate' of public policy suggests an analog to a constitutional provision, statute, and rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law such that . . . there should be a high degree of public certitude in respect of acceptable versus unacceptable conduct." Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc'ns, Inc., 179 N.J. 439, 444 (2004) (Emphasis in original). .

2024Our Supreme Court has recognized that in the context of a CEPA claim, "a 'clear mandate' of public policy suggests an analog to a constitutional provision, statute, and rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law such that . . . there should be a high degree of public certitude in respect of acceptable versus unacceptable conduct." Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc'ns, Inc., 179 N.J. 439, 444 (2004) (Emphasis in original). .

2019Plaintiff also relies on Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital, 158 N.J. 404, 419-23 (1999), for the proposition that a CEPA violation can occur when an employee reports the wrongdoing of a co-employee, even when that wrongdoing is not sanctioned by the employer.

2006In Higgins v. Pascack Valley Hospital, 158 N.J. 404, 420-21 , 730 A. 2d 327 (1999), the Court recognized that CEPA has been liberally construed so as to prohibit employer retaliation against an employee who objects to an employer practice that violates a foreign country's public policy, as expressed in an industry safety guideline, even if the employee is unaware of the precise source of the public policy, Mehlman, supra, 153 N.J. at 188-90 , 707 A. 2d 1000 ; protects an employee who reports an illegal act of a minority partner, even if the partnership did not exist at the time of the wrongdoi

2024Thus, a CEPA claim may properly "rest on allegations about the activities of . . . co-employee[s]." Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 557 (2013).

2024Thus, a CEPA claim may properly "rest on allegations about the activities of . . . co-employee[s]." Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 557 (2013).

2021On June 30, 2016, in resolving defendants' request to dismiss Falco's complaint for failure to state a claim, the motion court declined to apply the CEPA waiver provision at that time based on Falco's argument that he was permitted to "choose his remedies (i.e. whether to proceed under CEPA or under his other retaliation claims) after conducting discovery." Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, Inc., 359 N.J.

2008Although CEPA itself makes clear that common law rights are not extinguished, see N.J.S.A. 34:19-8 (waiver and election of remedies); Young, supra, 141 N.J. at 27 , 660 A.2d 1153 (concluding that parallel claims would be duplicative); Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 359 N.J.Super. 420, 440-41 , 820 A.2d 105 (App.Div.2003) (acknowledging that a plaintiff may elect either a common law or CEPA claim), rev’d on other grounds, 179 N.J. 439 , 846 A.2d 604 (2004), it includes significant *106 requirements that, as a practical matter, serve to limit its availability.

2026Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003).

2026Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434, 448 (2003).

2018"It would require a strong showing to 'transmute [a] defense to the disciplinary charges into an affirmative CEPA claim.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting McLelland v. Moore, 343 N.J.

2005It would require a strong showing to "transmute [a] defense to the disciplinary charges into an affirmative CEPA claim." McLelland v. Moore, 343 N.J.Super. 589, 608 , 779 A. 2d 463 (App. Div.2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 43 , 791 A. 2d 221 (2002).

2021A claim is substantially independent from a retaliatory discharge claim when, like here, it "require[s] different proofs than those needed to substantiate [a] CEPA claim." A-3896-19 13 Id. at 31 (quoting Young, 275 N.J.

2013Safety, Div. of Gaming Enforcement, 327 N.J.Super. 428, 432 , 743 A.2d 872 (App.Div.2000) (finding no viable CEPA claim in ease that “involves nothing more than a policy dispute”); Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J.Super. 221, 237 , 645 A.2d 1238 (App.Div.1994) (CEPA “was not intended to provide a remedy for wrongful discharge for employees who simply disagree with an employer’s decision, where that decision is entirely lawful”), affd, 141 N.J. 16 , 660 A.2d 1153 (1995); Warthen v. Toms River Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 199 N.J.Super. 18, 28 , 488 A.2d 229 (App.Div.) (ruling that discharge of nurse for

2021As the Court has taken pains to explain, "because the sources and parameters of public policy are not susceptible to hard and fast rules, 'the judiciary must define the cause of action in case-by-case determinations.' That recognition applies not only to the common-law retaliatory discharge claim but to the more expansive CEPA claim as well." Id. at 187 (quoting Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72 ).

2013To sustain a CEPA claim, “the mandate of public policy [must] be clearly identified and firmly grounded” and must not be “vague, controversial, unsettled, [or] otherwise problematic[.]” See Mehlman, supra, 153 N.J. at 181 , 707 A.2d 1000 (quoting MacDougall v. Weichert, 144 N.J. 380, 391-92 , 677 A.2d 162 (1996)).

2024A court must still consider a tax assessor-plaintiff's employee status and the "reality of plaintiff's relationship with the party against whom the CEPA claim is advanced." Feldman, 187 N.J. at 241 .

2024A court must still consider a tax assessor-plaintiff's employee status and the "reality of plaintiff's relationship with the party against whom the CEPA claim is advanced." Feldman, 187 N.J. at 241 .

2003Instead, the plaintiff simply must show that he or she “ ‘reasonably believes’ that to be the case.” Roach, supra, 164 N.J. at 613 , 754 A.2d at 552 . *463 Nonetheless, a majority of our lower courts have imposed an additional procedural hurdle, requiring that when a plaintiff brings a CEPA claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3e, the trial court, as a threshold matter, must “first find and enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as alleged are true.” Fineman v. New Jersey Dep’t of Human Servs., 272 N.J

2003Instead, the plaintiff simply must show that he or she “ ‘reasonably believes’ that to be the case.” Roach, supra, 164 N.J. at 613 , 754 A.2d at 552 . *463 Nonetheless, a majority of our lower courts have imposed an additional procedural hurdle, requiring that when a plaintiff brings a CEPA claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:19-3e, the trial court, as a threshold matter, must “first find and enunciate the specific terms of a statute or regulation, or the clear expression of public policy, which would be violated if the facts as alleged are true.” Fineman v. New Jersey Dep’t of Human Servs., 272 N.J

2021The plaintiff's CEPA claim was based on the Division's alleged "failure to act on some of his recommendations for placement of persons on the casino exclusion list and the transfer of agents out of his unit." Id. at 430-31 .

2021The plaintiff's CEPA claim was based on the Division's alleged "failure to act on some of his recommendations for placement of persons on the casino exclusion list and the transfer of agents out of his unit." Id. at 430-31 .

2002The court in Ballinger I applied the logic of Crusco to conclude that Ballinger “erroneously pled an unavailable CEPA claim, and thus no bar attaches in respect of other available claims of wrongful discharge.” Ballinger I, supra, 311 N.J.Super. at 332 , 709 A.2d 1336 .

2002The court in Ballinger I applied the logic of Crusco to conclude that Ballinger “erroneously pled an unavailable CEPA claim, and thus no bar attaches in respect of other available claims of wrongful discharge.” Ballinger I, supra, 311 N.J.Super. at 332 , 709 A.2d 1336 .

2019Even assuming plaintiff's claim consists of a series of discriminatory non-discrete acts, which we do not, because he cannot show that "at least one of those acts occurred within the statutory limitations period," Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 7 , the continuing violation theory is not available to render any aspect of his CEPA claim timely.

2011The panel maintained that the issue of lost overtime was disputed, the jury verdict did not specify whether its economic-damages award included lost overtime, and Seddon did "not claim that the loss of overtime pay entitle[d] him to a new trial." Ibid. [12] After hearing oral argument, the Court requested additional briefing to address the following question: If proof of constructive discharge is an essential element of a CEPA claim for front and back pay, does the [ Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Center, 174 N.J. 1 , 803 A. 2d 611 (2002)] paradigm require modification to account for a ca