all-or-nothing defense in Georgia

2025“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all-or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.” Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893 (834 SE2d 21) (2019) (cleaned up).

2025“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all-or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.” Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893 ( 834 SE2d 21 ) (2019).

2026“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all-or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.” Gardner v. 5 State, 310 Ga. 515, 519 (2) ( 852 SE2d 574 ) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2026“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all-or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.” Gardner v. 5 State, 310 Ga. 515, 519 (2) ( 852 SE2d 574 ) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024“The decision not to request a jury charge on a lesser included offense in order to pursue an all-or-nothing defense is a matter of trial strategy.” Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 825 (3) ( 809 SE2d 727 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2024“The decision not to request a jury charge on a lesser included offense in order to pursue an all-or-nothing defense is a matter of trial strategy.” Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 825 (3) ( 809 SE2d 727 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 474 (2) (b) ( 649 SE2d 583 ) (2007) (“an informed tactical decision to make an all-or-nothing defense,” and abandoning any charge on lesser included offenses, could not provide a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance) (citation omitted).

2014Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 474 (2) (b) ( 649 SE2d 583 ) (2007) (“an informed tactical decision to make an all-or-nothing defense,” and abandoning any charge on lesser included offenses, could not provide a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance) (citation omitted).

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2024See, e.g., Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893 (834 SE2d 21) (2019) (holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction, because the appellant maintained during consultations with counsel and at trial that he acted in self-defense, a theory that is generally inconsistent with a claim of voluntary manslaughter); Smith v. State, 301 Ga. 348, 353-354 (801 SE2d 18) (2017) (concluding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by deciding not to request jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct and by instead

2024See, e.g., Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893 (834 SE2d 21) (2019) (holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction, because the appellant maintained during consultations with counsel and at trial that he acted in self-defense, a theory that is generally inconsistent with a claim of voluntary manslaughter); Smith v. State, 301 Ga. 348, 353-354 (801 SE2d 18) (2017) (concluding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by deciding not to request jury instructions on involuntary manslaughter and reckless conduct and by instead

2022See Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 406 (858 SE2d 63) (2021) (“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges 17 to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all- or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 802 (837 SE2d 790) (2020) (“Floyd’s trial strategy was to assert that he had no involvement in Jackson’s death.

2022See Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 406 (858 SE2d 63) (2021) (“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges 17 to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all- or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 802 (837 SE2d 790) (2020) (“Floyd’s trial strategy was to assert that he had no involvement in Jackson’s death.

2018See also Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 807, 808-809 (2) (c) ( 439 SE2d 911 ) (1994).

2018See also Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 807, 808-809 (2) (c) ( 439 SE2d 911 ) (1994).

2013Hernandez cites the Georgia Supreme Court’s 70 Strickland, supra (citation omitted). 71 See Jones, 282 Ga. at 308 (6) (concluding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance at trial by not eliciting certain evidence and by not bringing out certain facts in closing argument, even though defendant argued that such evidence would have bolstered his defense; counsel established through cross-examination of state’s witness that there was no physical evidence to corroborate the state’s version of events and, during closing argument, emphasized the absence of such evidence); Ingram, s

2013See Jones, 282 Ga. at 308 (6) (concluding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance at trial by not eliciting certain evidence and by not bringing out certain facts in closing argument, even though defendant argued that such evidence would have bolstered his defense; counsel established through cross-examination of state’s witness that there was no physical evidence to corroborate the state’s version of events and, during closing argument, emphasized the absence of such evidence); Ingram, supra (concluding that ineffectiveness claim was properly rejected, where trial counsel m

2012See Nguyen v. State, 296 Ga. App. 853, 856-858 (2) (a) ( 676 SE2d 246 ) (2009); Leonard v. State, 279 Ga. App. 192, 195 (2) (b) ( 630 SE2d 804 ) (2006).

2012See Nguyen v. State, 296 Ga. App. 853, 856-858 (2) (a) ( 676 SE2d 246 ) (2009); Leonard v. State, 279 Ga. App. 192, 195 (2) (b) ( 630 SE2d 804 ) (2006).

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2026See Douglas v. State, 321 Ga. 739, 749 (2025) (“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to re- quest are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all- or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.”); OCGA § 16-5-1(e)(1); OCGA § 16-5-2(b) (“A person who commits the of- fense of voluntary manslaughter, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.”).

2025See Rosenbaum v. State, 320 Ga. 5, 12 ( 907 SE2d 593 ) (2024) (holding that trial “counsel’s choice to rely solely on the defense of accident, and not to request a jury charge on justification, was not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that 29 choice”).

2025See Rosenbaum v. State, 320 Ga. 5, 12 ( 907 SE2d 593 ) (2024) (holding that trial “counsel’s choice to rely solely on the defense of accident, and not to request a jury charge on justification, was not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that 29 choice”).

2025See Lopez, 318 Ga. at 671 (concluding that trial counsel’s decision to pursue an all-or-nothing defense instead of requesting jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter was not patently unreasonable).

2025See Lopez, 318 Ga. at 671 (concluding that trial counsel’s decision to pursue an all-or-nothing defense instead of requesting jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter was not patently unreasonable).

2022See Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 406 (858 SE2d 63) (2021) (“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges 17 to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all- or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 802 (837 SE2d 790) (2020) (“Floyd’s trial strategy was to assert that he had no involvement in Jackson’s death.

2022See Outlaw v. State, 311 Ga. 396, 406 (858 SE2d 63) (2021) (“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges 17 to request are classic matters of trial strategy, and pursuit of an all- or-nothing defense is generally a permissible strategy.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 802 (837 SE2d 790) (2020) (“Floyd’s trial strategy was to assert that he had no involvement in Jackson’s death.

2022See Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 802 (4) (b) (837 SE2d 790) (2020) (no deficient performance for failure to request jury instruction on self-defense that was contrary to the defense strategy); Smith v. 25 State, 301 Ga. 348, 353-354 (III) (b) (801 SE2d 18) (2017) (no deficient performance where, based on defendant’s account of events, counsel decided to forgo jury instructions based on alternative defense theory); see also Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893 (3) (b) (834 SE2d 21) (2019) (“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to request are classic matters of trial st

2022See Floyd v. State, 307 Ga. 789, 802 (4) (b) (837 SE2d 790) (2020) (no deficient performance for failure to request jury instruction on self-defense that was contrary to the defense strategy); Smith v. 25 State, 301 Ga. 348, 353-354 (III) (b) (801 SE2d 18) (2017) (no deficient performance where, based on defendant’s account of events, counsel decided to forgo jury instructions based on alternative defense theory); see also Velasco v. State, 306 Ga. 888, 893 (3) (b) (834 SE2d 21) (2019) (“Decisions about which defenses to present and which jury charges to request are classic matters of trial st

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2015Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that “[cjounsel’s decision to forgo a request to charge on criminal trespass, but rather go for an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy is not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made that decision.” See Ingram v. State, 317 Ga. App. 606, 607-08 (2) ( 732 SE2d 456 ) (2012) (counsel’s failure to request jury charge on misdemeanor obstruction of an officer in trial on a charge of felony obstruction and to instead pursue “all-or-nothing” defense was reasonable strategic decision); Leonard v. State, 279

2007Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 374 (5) (a) ( 620 SE2d 837 ) (2005). (c) Allen also contends his counsel elicited bad character evidence that was prejudicial.

2007Moyer v. State, 275 Ga. App. 366, 374 (5) (a) ( 620 SE2d 837 ) (2005). (c) Allen also contends his counsel elicited bad character evidence that was prejudicial.

2001“Failure to object to a court’s charge, however, is not ineffective assistance where the appellant does not show how this prejudiced his case. [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 18 (3) (c) ( 512 SE2d 640 ) (1999).

2001“Failure to object to a court’s charge, however, is not ineffective assistance where the appellant does not show how this prejudiced his case. [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Gomillion v. State, 236 Ga. App. 14, 18 (3) (c) ( 512 SE2d 640 ) (1999).

1999Milliken v. State, 230 Ga. App. 810, 812-813 (2) (b) ( 498 SE2d 127 ) (1998); Harshaw v. State, 222 Ga. App. 385, 387 (2) ( 474 SE2d 226 ) (1996).

1999Milliken v. State, 230 Ga. App. 810, 812-813 (2) (b) ( 498 SE2d 127 ) (1998); Harshaw v. State, 222 Ga. App. 385, 387 (2) ( 474 SE2d 226 ) (1996).

1999Milliken v. State, 230 Ga. App. 810, 812-813 (2) (b) ( 498 SE2d 127 ) (1998); Harshaw v. State, 222 Ga. App. 385, 387 (2) ( 474 SE2d 226 ) (1996).

1999Milliken v. State, 230 Ga. App. 810, 812-813 (2) (b) ( 498 SE2d 127 ) (1998); Harshaw v. State, 222 Ga. App. 385, 387 (2) ( 474 SE2d 226 ) (1996).

1996“Overwhelming evidence of [defendant’s] guilt, including the testimony of the victim as well as the contradictory and inconsistent statements of [the eyewitness inmates, coupled with the custodial statement of] defendant [admitting sexual contact] renders [counsel’s omission] harmless.” Vincent v. State, 264 Ga. 234, 235 ( 442 SE2d 748 ). (c) Defendant conceded that counsel’s trial strategy was an all- or-nothing defense, that is, complete denial of the charge. “ ‘In the absence of testimony to the contrary, counsel’s actions áre presumed strategic. [Cits.]’ Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 496

1996“Overwhelming evidence of [defendant’s] guilt, including the testimony of the victim as well as the contradictory and inconsistent statements of [the eyewitness inmates, coupled with the custodial statement of] defendant [admitting sexual contact] renders [counsel’s omission] harmless.” Vincent v. State, 264 Ga. 234, 235 ( 442 SE2d 748 ). (c) Defendant conceded that counsel’s trial strategy was an all- or-nothing defense, that is, complete denial of the charge. “ ‘In the absence of testimony to the contrary, counsel’s actions áre presumed strategic. [Cits.]’ Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 496

1996“Overwhelming evidence of [defendant’s] guilt, including the testimony of the victim as well as the contradictory and inconsistent statements of [the eyewitness inmates, coupled with the custodial statement of] defendant [admitting sexual contact] renders [counsel’s omission] harmless.” Vincent v. State, 264 Ga. 234, 235 ( 442 SE2d 748 ). (c) Defendant conceded that counsel’s trial strategy was an all- or-nothing defense, that is, complete denial of the charge. “ ‘In the absence of testimony to the contrary, counsel’s actions áre presumed strategic. [Cits.]’ Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 496

1996“Overwhelming evidence of [defendant’s] guilt, including the testimony of the victim as well as the contradictory and inconsistent statements of [the eyewitness inmates, coupled with the custodial statement of] defendant [admitting sexual contact] renders [counsel’s omission] harmless.” Vincent v. State, 264 Ga. 234, 235 ( 442 SE2d 748 ). (c) Defendant conceded that counsel’s trial strategy was an all- or-nothing defense, that is, complete denial of the charge. “ ‘In the absence of testimony to the contrary, counsel’s actions áre presumed strategic. [Cits.]’ Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494, 496