all-or-nothing doctrine in California

2021Under the invited error doctrine, “a defendant may not invoke a trial court’s failure to 18 instruct on a lesser included offense as a basis on which to reverse a conviction when, for tactical reasons, the defendant persuades a trial court not to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by the evidence.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198 ; see also People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 905 ; People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 114 .) Respondent argues that the invited error doctrine applies here, because appellant pursued an all-or-nothing defense and asked the court not

2021Under the invited error doctrine, “a defendant may not invoke a trial court’s failure to 18 instruct on a lesser included offense as a basis on which to reverse a conviction when, for tactical reasons, the defendant persuades a trial court not to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by the evidence.” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 198 ; see also People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 905 ; People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 114 .) Respondent argues that the invited error doctrine applies here, because appellant pursued an all-or-nothing defense and asked the court not

2020(Patent Scaffolding, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 514 .) Analogizing to that case, the trial court concluded a causal connection was similarly lacking here, because defendants’ failure to defend Pulte had not “caused the homeowners to file their lawsuit[s] against Pulte and thereby necessitate th[e] defense costs to be incurred.” “Therefore, as in Patent Scaffolding, there is no causal relationship.” The trial court also concluded subrogation was an all-or-nothing claim, meaning it required a shifting of the entire amount of defense costs (all $189,000) to defendants on a joint and several basi

2020(American Motorcycle).) [¶] ‘In cases involving multiple tortfeasors, [this] principle . . . has commonly been expressed in terms of “joint and several liability.” ’ ” (Henry, at p. 448, quoting American Motorcycle, at p. 586.) “In American Motorcycle the Court concluded its adoption of principles of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 . . . , which eliminated the all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence, ‘does not warrant the abolition or contraction of the established “joint and several liability” doctrine; each tortfeasor whose negligence is a proxi

2020(American Motorcycle).) [¶] ‘In cases involving multiple tortfeasors, [this] principle . . . has commonly been expressed in terms of “joint and several liability.” ’ ” (Henry, at p. 448, quoting American Motorcycle, at p. 586.) “In American Motorcycle the Court concluded its adoption of principles of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 . . . , which eliminated the all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence, ‘does not warrant the abolition or contraction of the established “joint and several liability” doctrine; each tortfeasor whose negligence is a proxi

2020Respondents argued there was no basis to impose joint and several liability because there was no shared obligation to support doing so (see Douglas v. Bergere (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 267 [“[i]f two persons bind themselves severally in respect to the same subject matter each obligor is liable only for his several promise and cannot be held for the other”]; Civ.

2015(Cavens v. Zaberdac (Ind. 2006) 849 N.E.2d 526 [in wrongful death action, trial court correctly refused emergency room physician’s request to assert the defense of contributory negligence based on evidence of the patients’ excessive use of asthma medication and her delay in seeking treatment at the emergency room]; Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital (1990) 236 Neb. 1 [ 459 N.W.2d 178 ] [patient’s failure to heed doctor’s advice to lose weight may have caused pulmonary embolism, but was irrelevant to claim that doctor later negligently treated the condition]; Eiss v. Lillis (1987) 233 V

2015(Cavens v. Zaberdac (Ind. 2006) 849 N.E.2d 526 [in wrongful death action, trial court correctly refused emergency room physician’s request to assert the defense of contributory negligence based on evidence of the patients’ excessive use of asthma medication and her delay in seeking treatment at the emergency room]; Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital (1990) 236 Neb. 1 [ 459 N.W.2d 178 ] [patient’s failure to heed doctor’s advice to lose weight may have caused pulmonary embolism, but was irrelevant to claim that doctor later negligently treated the condition]; Eiss v. Lillis (1987) 233 V

2015(Cavens v. Zaberdac (Ind. 2006) 849 N.E.2d 526 [in wrongful death action, trial court correctly refused emergency room physician’s request to assert the defense of contributory negligence based on evidence of the patients’ excessive use of asthma medication and her delay in seeking treatment at the emergency room]; Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital (1990) 236 Neb. 1 [ 459 N.W.2d 178 ] [patient’s failure to heed doctor’s advice to lose weight may have caused pulmonary embolism, but was irrelevant to claim that doctor later negligently treated the condition]; Eiss v. Lillis (1987) 233 V

2015(Cavens v. Zaberdac (Ind. 2006) 849 N.E.2d 526 [in wrongful death action, trial court correctly refused emergency room physician’s request to assert the defense of contributory negligence based on evidence of the patients’ excessive use of asthma medication and her delay in seeking treatment at the emergency room]; Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital (1990) 236 Neb. 1 [ 459 N.W.2d 178 ] [patient’s failure to heed doctor’s advice to lose weight may have caused pulmonary embolism, but was irrelevant to claim that doctor later negligently treated the condition]; Eiss v. Lillis (1987) 233 V

2015(Cavens v. Zaberdac (Ind. 2006) 849 N.E.2d 526 [in wrongful death action, trial court correctly refused emergency room physician’s request to assert the defense of contributory negligence based on evidence of the patients’ excessive use of asthma medication and her delay in seeking treatment at the emergency room]; Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital (1990) 236 Neb. 1 [ 459 N.W.2d 178 ] [patient’s failure to heed doctor’s advice to lose weight may have caused pulmonary embolism, but was irrelevant to claim that doctor later negligently treated the condition]; Eiss v. Lillis (1987) 233 V

2015(Cavens v. Zaberdac (Ind. 2006) 849 N.E.2d 526 [in wrongful death action, trial court correctly refused emergency room physician’s request to assert the defense of contributory negligence based on evidence of the patients’ excessive use of asthma medication and her delay in seeking treatment at the emergency room]; Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital (1990) 236 Neb. 1 [ 459 N.W.2d 178 ] [patient’s failure to heed doctor’s advice to lose weight may have caused pulmonary embolism, but was irrelevant to claim that doctor later negligently treated the condition]; Eiss v. Lillis (1987) 233 V

2008(MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 427-428; Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 147 ; Great West Contractors, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 592 .) The Supreme Court has recognized that “parties do sometimes operate without, or beyond the boundaries of, a formal contractual arrangement, under an implicit understanding that the contractor is working on a quantum meruit basis.” (MW Erectors, supra, at p. 428 .) The court has held that reference to “act” or “contract” in section 7031, subdivisions (a) and (b) “ensures that one may not avoid the all-or-nothing bar against recovery for unlicens

2008(MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 427-428; Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 147 ; Great West Contractors, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 592 .) The Supreme Court has recognized that “parties do sometimes operate without, or beyond the boundaries of, a formal contractual arrangement, under an implicit understanding that the contractor is working on a quantum meruit basis.” (MW Erectors, supra, at p. 428 .) The court has held that reference to “act” or “contract” in section 7031, subdivisions (a) and (b) “ensures that one may not avoid the all-or-nothing bar against recovery for unlicens

2008(MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 427-428; Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 147 ; Great West Contractors, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 592 .) The Supreme Court has recognized that “parties do sometimes operate without, or beyond the boundaries of, a formal contractual arrangement, under an implicit understanding that the contractor is working on a quantum meruit basis.” (MW Erectors, supra, at p. 428 .) The court has held that reference to “act” or “contract” in section 7031, subdivisions (a) and (b) “ensures that one may not avoid the all-or-nothing bar against recovery for unlicens

2008(MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 427-428; Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 147 ; Great West Contractors, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 592 .) The Supreme Court has recognized that “parties do sometimes operate without, or beyond the boundaries of, a formal contractual arrangement, under an implicit understanding that the contractor is working on a quantum meruit basis.” (MW Erectors, supra, at p. 428 .) The court has held that reference to “act” or “contract” in section 7031, subdivisions (a) and (b) “ensures that one may not avoid the all-or-nothing bar against recovery for unlicens

2007A person is unjustly enriched at the expense of another person *69 when the latter discharges a liability that the former should be responsible to pay. ( Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 108-109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 ( Western Steamship ).) [14] Equitable indemnity apportions the loss and determines how much each tortfeasor should be responsible to pay based on comparative fault. ( Western Steamship, supra, at p. 109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 .) Indemnification from a tortfeasor that has paid less than its apportioned

2007A person is unjustly enriched at the expense of another person *69 when the latter discharges a liability that the former should be responsible to pay. ( Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 108-109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 ( Western Steamship ).) [14] Equitable indemnity apportions the loss and determines how much each tortfeasor should be responsible to pay based on comparative fault. ( Western Steamship, supra, at p. 109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 .) Indemnification from a tortfeasor that has paid less than its apportioned

2007A person is unjustly enriched at the expense of another person *69 when the latter discharges a liability that the former should be responsible to pay. ( Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 108-109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 ( Western Steamship ).) [14] Equitable indemnity apportions the loss and determines how much each tortfeasor should be responsible to pay based on comparative fault. ( Western Steamship, supra, at p. 109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 .) Indemnification from a tortfeasor that has paid less than its apportioned

2007A person is unjustly enriched at the expense of another person *69 when the latter discharges a liability that the former should be responsible to pay. ( Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 108-109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 ( Western Steamship ).) [14] Equitable indemnity apportions the loss and determines how much each tortfeasor should be responsible to pay based on comparative fault. ( Western Steamship, supra, at p. 109 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 , 876 P.2d 1062 .) Indemnification from a tortfeasor that has paid less than its apportioned

2006Rejecting the prior all-or-nothing rule, courts have applied apportionment principles to allocate contractual liquidated damages where delays in construction projects have been caused both by the owner and by the contractor. ( Jasper Construction, Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 767 ]; see also Nomellini Constr.

2006Rejecting the prior all-or-nothing rule, courts have applied apportionment principles to allocate contractual liquidated damages where delays in construction projects have been caused both by the owner and by the contractor. ( Jasper Construction, Inc. v. Foothill Junior College Dist. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 1 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 767 ]; see also Nomellini Constr.

1993As the Supreme Court noted in Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d 294, 319 , the defendant in a resident child molester case rarely can offer a successful alibi or wrongful identification defense.

1990White, supra, 21 Cal.3d 497 , implicitly recognized that the rationale of our holding in American Motorcycle—modifying equitable indemnity from an all-or-nothing rule to a doctrine permitting an equitable apportionment of loss based on the relative responsibility of the parties—is as applicable to a claim for implied contractual indemnity as it is to a claim for noncontractual equitable indemnity.

1990White, supra, 21 Cal.3d 497 , implicitly recognized that the rationale of our holding in American Motorcycle — modifying equitable indemnity from an all-or-nothing rule to a doctrine permitting an equitable apportionment of loss based on the relative responsibility of the parties — is as applicable to a claim for implied contractual indemnity as it is to a claim for noncontractual equitable indemnity.

1976The logical corollary of the fault principle would be a rule of comparative or proportional negligence, not the present rule.' (2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 22.3, p. 1207.)" [1] The dissent in Li disputed only the conclusion that the contributory negligence rule was not a statutory one. [2] The Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated comparative principles were inapplicable to strict liability cases because the statute providing for comparative fault was expressly limited to negligence cases. ( Kirkland v. General Motors Corporation (1974) 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 .) [3a] The court reasoned