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13 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wallgreen2 sentences2023See Wall, 212 Ariz. at 6, ¶ 28 (explaining there is no “bright-line rule that a lesser-included offense instruction is never proper if a defendant has asserted an all-or-nothing defense”). 2022“As a practical matter, when a defendant asserts an all- or-nothing defense[,] . . . there will ‘usually [be] little evidence on the record to support an instruction on the lesser included offenses.’” Wall, 212 Ariz. at 6, ¶ 29 (citation omitted). | 4 | 6 |
State v. Salazargreen2 sentences2006The court ruled that a lesser-included offense *6 instruction is not appropriate “when the ‘defendant’s theory of the case denies all involvement in the killing, and [when] no evidence provides a basis for a second degree murder conviction, ... [and] the record is such that defendant is either guilty of the crime charged or not guilty.’ ” Id. ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 408 , 844 P.2d 566, 575 (1992)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). ¶ 28 Van Adams thus did not establish a bright-line rule that a lesser-included offense instruction is never proper if a defendant ha 2006The court ruled that a lesser-included offense *6 instruction is not appropriate “when the ‘defendant’s theory of the case denies all involvement in the killing, and [when] no evidence provides a basis for a second degree murder conviction, ... [and] the record is such that defendant is either guilty of the crime charged or not guilty.’ ” Id. ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 408 , 844 P.2d 566, 575 (1992)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). ¶ 28 Van Adams thus did not establish a bright-line rule that a lesser-included offense instruction is never proper if a defendant ha | 2 | 2 |
State v. Calderagreen2 sentences2015See id. ¶ 80. ¶ 20 In Wall , decided the year before Speers’s trial, our supreme court clarified that “evidence in the record can be sufficient to require a lesser-included offense instruction even when the defendant employs an all- or-nothing defense,” although, “[a]s a practical matter, when a defendant asserts an all- or-nothing defense such as alibi or mistaken identity, there will ‘usually [be] little evidence on the record to support an instruction on the lesser included offenses.’” 212 Ariz. 1, ¶¶ 29-30 , 126 P.3d at 153 , quoting State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 637 , 688 P.2d 642, 645 2015See id. ¶ 80. ¶ 20 In Wall , decided the year before Speers’s trial, our supreme court clarified that “evidence in the record can be sufficient to require a lesser-included offense instruction even when the defendant employs an all- or-nothing defense,” although, “[a]s a practical matter, when a defendant asserts an all- or-nothing defense such as alibi or mistaken identity, there will ‘usually [be] little evidence on the record to support an instruction on the lesser included offenses.’” 212 Ariz. 1, ¶¶ 29-30 , 126 P.3d at 153 , quoting State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 637 , 688 P.2d 642, 645 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Geargreen2 sentences2005See State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 480 , 768 P.2d 638, 642 (1989) (defendant not denied “essential right to his defense” when defense was denial that offenses had occurred); People v. Gear, 19 Cal.App.4th 86 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 268 (1993) (finding no due process violation of defendant’s “right to present a defense” when, “not untypically, [defendant] presented an all-or-nothing defense based on credibility — either he is telling the truth and he did not commit any act of molestation or [the victim] is telling the truth and he is guilty”). 3 ¶ 8 Ramsey also contends the lengthy time period 2005See State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 480 , 768 P.2d 638, 642 (1989) (defendant not denied “essential right to his defense” when defense was denial that offenses had occurred); People v. Gear, 19 Cal.App.4th 86 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 268 (1993) (finding no due process violation of defendant’s “right to present a defense” when, “not untypically, [defendant] presented an all-or-nothing defense based on credibility — either he is telling the truth and he did not commit any act of molestation or [the victim] is telling the truth and he is guilty”). 3 ¶ 8 Ramsey also contends the lengthy time period | 2 | 2 |
State v. Whitneygreen2 sentences2005See State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 480 , 768 P.2d 638, 642 (1989) (defendant not denied “essential right to his defense” when defense was denial that offenses had occurred); People v. Gear, 19 Cal.App.4th 86 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 268 (1993) (finding no due process violation of defendant’s “right to present a defense” when, “not untypically, [defendant] presented an all-or-nothing defense based on credibility — either he is telling the truth and he did not commit any act of molestation or [the victim] is telling the truth and he is guilty”). 3 ¶ 8 Ramsey also contends the lengthy time period 2005See State v. Whitney, 159 Ariz. 476, 480 , 768 P.2d 638, 642 (1989) (defendant not denied “essential right to his defense” when defense was denial that offenses had occurred); People v. Gear, 19 Cal.App.4th 86 , 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 261, 268 (1993) (finding no due process violation of defendant’s “right to present a defense” when, “not untypically, [defendant] presented an all-or-nothing defense based on credibility — either he is telling the truth and he did not commit any act of molestation or [the victim] is telling the truth and he is guilty”). 3 ¶ 8 Ramsey also contends the lengthy time period | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bearupgreen1 sentence2020“We recognize that a trial court is not automatically precluded from instructing on a lesser-included offense because a defendant elects to present an all-or-nothing defense.” State v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163, 169, ¶ 26 (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Bauer v. Crottygreen2 sentences1997Both Bauer and Thude acknowledge this. [2] Bauer, 167 Ariz. at 168 , 805 P.2d at 401 ("Although A.R.S. § 12-2505(A) eliminated *262 the all-or-nothing principle as applied to ordinary contributory negligence, it remains intact when the jury finds that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was willful or wanton."); Thude, 180 Ariz. 531, 538 , 885 P.2d 1096, 1103 ("[I]t must be that the all or nothing principles of contributory negligence still apply to the willful and wanton plaintiff...."). 1997Both Bauer and Thude acknowledge this. [2] Bauer, 167 Ariz. at 168 , 805 P.2d at 401 ("Although A.R.S. § 12-2505(A) eliminated *262 the all-or-nothing principle as applied to ordinary contributory negligence, it remains intact when the jury finds that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was willful or wanton."); Thude, 180 Ariz. 531, 538 , 885 P.2d 1096, 1103 ("[I]t must be that the all or nothing principles of contributory negligence still apply to the willful and wanton plaintiff...."). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Thudegreen2 sentences1997Both Bauer and Thude acknowledge this. [2] Bauer, 167 Ariz. at 168 , 805 P.2d at 401 ("Although A.R.S. § 12-2505(A) eliminated *262 the all-or-nothing principle as applied to ordinary contributory negligence, it remains intact when the jury finds that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was willful or wanton."); Thude, 180 Ariz. 531, 538 , 885 P.2d 1096, 1103 ("[I]t must be that the all or nothing principles of contributory negligence still apply to the willful and wanton plaintiff...."). 1997Both Bauer and Thude acknowledge this. [2] Bauer, 167 Ariz. at 168 , 805 P.2d at 401 ("Although A.R.S. § 12-2505(A) eliminated *262 the all-or-nothing principle as applied to ordinary contributory negligence, it remains intact when the jury finds that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was willful or wanton."); Thude, 180 Ariz. 531, 538 , 885 P.2d 1096, 1103 ("[I]t must be that the all or nothing principles of contributory negligence still apply to the willful and wanton plaintiff...."). | 1 | 1 |
Daly v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences1995Laws 1 , 3. [5] For policy arguments on both sides of the issue of comparative fault in strict liability, see Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 , 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385-90 , 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-72 (1978). [6] Section 6 provides that "[t]he right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." [7] The same argument, of course, applies to assumption of risk, an all-or-nothing defense to a common-law strict liability action. 1995Laws 1 , 3. [5] For policy arguments on both sides of the issue of comparative fault in strict liability, see Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 , 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385-90 , 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-72 (1978). [6] Section 6 provides that "[t]he right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." [7] The same argument, of course, applies to assumption of risk, an all-or-nothing defense to a common-law strict liability action. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dugan
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Van Adams
green
2 sentences2006Such a conclusion, however, is contrary to the analysis in the Van Adams case itself and inconsistent with case law in Arizona. ¶26 In Van Adams , the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted sexual assault. 194 Ariz. at 411 , ¶ 1 & n. 1, 984 P.2d at 19 & n. 1. 2006The court ruled that a lesser-included offense *6 instruction is not appropriate “when the ‘defendant’s theory of the case denies all involvement in the killing, and [when] no evidence provides a basis for a second degree murder conviction, ... [and] the record is such that defendant is either guilty of the crime charged or not guilty.’ ” Id. ¶ 14 (quoting State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 408 , 844 P.2d 566, 575 (1992)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). ¶ 28 Van Adams thus did not establish a bright-line rule that a lesser-included offense instruction is never proper if a defendant ha | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Chapple
red
2 sentences2002It is true that the state “cannot be compelled to try its case in a sterile setting.” State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50 , 56 ¶ 25, 22 P.3d 43 , 49 ¶ 25 (2001) (quoting Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 289-90 , 660 P.2d at 1216-17 ). 2002It is true that the state “cannot be compelled to try its case in a sterile setting.” State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50 , 56 ¶ 25, 22 P.3d 43 , 49 ¶ 25 (2001) (quoting Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 289-90 , 660 P.2d at 1216-17 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Bocharski
green
2 sentences2002It is true that the state “cannot be compelled to try its case in a sterile setting.” State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50 , 56 ¶ 25, 22 P.3d 43 , 49 ¶ 25 (2001) (quoting Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 289-90 , 660 P.2d at 1216-17 ). 2002It is true that the state “cannot be compelled to try its case in a sterile setting.” State v. Bocharski, 200 Ariz. 50 , 56 ¶ 25, 22 P.3d 43 , 49 ¶ 25 (2001) (quoting Chapple, 135 Ariz. at 289-90 , 660 P.2d at 1216-17 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Crawford v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR PIMA CTY.
green
2 sentences1991Although the supreme court stated it did not need to resolve those conflicting interpretations, it said that Crawford v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 498 , 698 P.2d 743 (App.1984), which held that the plaintiffs recovery was barred if the jury decided to apply the defense of contributory negligence, “appears ... to be on solid ground.” 149 Ariz. at 136 , 717 P.2d at 440 . 4 . 1991Although the supreme court stated it did not need to resolve those conflicting interpretations, it said that Crawford v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 498 , 698 P.2d 743 (App.1984), which held that the plaintiffs recovery was barred if the jury decided to apply the defense of contributory negligence, “appears ... to be on solid ground.” 149 Ariz. at 136 , 717 P.2d at 440 . 4 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Manhattan-Dickman Construction Co. v. Shawler
green
2 sentences1991On the other hand, the formulation “you may find for the plaintiff or for the defendant as you see fit,” while well adapted to the old all-or-nothing defense of contributory negligence, see Manhattan-Dickman, 113 Ariz. at 555 , 558 P.2d at 900 , unfortunately generates ambiguity when combined with instructions on the new comparative negligence and wanton contributory negligence principles of A.R.S. § 12-2505(A). 1991On the other hand, the formulation “you may find for the plaintiff or for the defendant as you see fit,” while well adapted to the old all-or-nothing defense of contributory negligence, see Manhattan-Dickman, 113 Ariz. at 555 , 558 P.2d at 900 , unfortunately generates ambiguity when combined with instructions on the new comparative negligence and wanton contributory negligence principles of A.R.S. § 12-2505(A). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Hall v. A.N.R. Freight System, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991Although the supreme court stated it did not need to resolve those conflicting interpretations, it said that Crawford v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 498 , 698 P.2d 743 (App.1984), which held that the plaintiffs recovery was barred if the jury decided to apply the defense of contributory negligence, “appears ... to be on solid ground.” 149 Ariz. at 136 , 717 P.2d at 440 . 4 . 1991Although the supreme court stated it did not need to resolve those conflicting interpretations, it said that Crawford v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 498 , 698 P.2d 743 (App.1984), which held that the plaintiffs recovery was barred if the jury decided to apply the defense of contributory negligence, “appears ... to be on solid ground.” 149 Ariz. at 136 , 717 P.2d at 440 . 4 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.