Barker balancing test in Georgia

2021“A trial court exercises substantial discretion in applying the Barker balancing test, and its ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of that discretion.” State v. Porter, 288 Ga. at 533 (2) (e).

2020See State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (e) ( 705 SE2d 636 ) (2011) (“A trial court exercises substantial discretion in applying the Barker balancing test, and its ultimate judgment 13 is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of that discretion.”).

2016When a trial court considering a constitutional speedy trial claim clearly errs in a material factual finding, the court’s exercise of discretion in applying the Barker balancing test “can be affirmed only if the appellate court can conclude that, had the trial court used the correct facts and legal analysis, it would have no discretion to reach a different, judgment.” State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 679 (2) (d) ( 706 SE2d 561 ) (2011).

2016When a trial court considering a constitutional speedy trial claim clearly errs in a material factual finding, the court’s exercise of discretion in applying the Barker balancing test “can be affirmed only if the appellate court can conclude that, had the trial court used the correct facts and legal analysis, it would have no discretion to reach a different, judgment.” State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 679 (2) (d) ( 706 SE2d 561 ) (2011).

2010Within the Barker balancing test, the issue of prejudice weighs “most heavily in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Frazier, supra, 277 Ga. App. at 883 (d).

2008Within the Barker balancing test, the issue of prejudice weighs “most heavily in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Frazier, supra, 277 Ga. App. at 883 (d).

2011Although a trial court’s application of the Barker balancing test is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion, “where . . . the trial court has clearly erred in some of its findings of fact and/or has misapplied the law to some degree, the deference owed the trial court’s ultimate ruling is diminished.” Williams, 277 Ga. at 601 ; Pickett, 288 Ga. at 679 .

2011See Williams, 277 Ga. at 601 .

2014(Punctuation omitted.) State v. Gay, 321 Ga. App. 92, 99 (3) (e) ( 741 SE2d 217 ) (2013), citing State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 679 (2) (d) ( 706 SE2d 561 ) (2011).

2014(Punctuation omitted.) State v. Gay, 321 Ga. App. 92, 99 (3) (e) ( 741 SE2d 217 ) (2013), citing State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 679 (2) (d) ( 706 SE2d 561 ) (2011).

2013“A trial court exercises a substantial discretion in applying the Barker balancing test, and its ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of that discretion.” Porter, 288 Ga. at 533 (2) (e) (citation omitted); see also Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 874-875 ( 700 SE2d 579 ) (2010).

2013“A trial court exercises a substantial discretion in applying the Barker balancing test, and its ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of that discretion.” Porter, 288 Ga. at 533 (2) (e) (citation omitted); see also Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 874-875 ( 700 SE2d 579 ) (2010).

2013If the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the trial court must then consider “whether [the] delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett, 505 U. S. at 651 (II); see also Barker, 407 U. S. at 530-533 (IV); Pickett, 288 Ga. at 675 (2) (a). 3 The trial court is afforded “substantial discretion in applying the Barker balancing test, and its ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal o

1997Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647 (112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

2013If the delay is presumptively prejudicial, the trial court must then consider “whether [the] delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett, 505 U. S. at 651 (II); see also Barker, 407 U. S. at 530-533 (IV); Pickett, 288 Ga. at 675 (2) (a). 3 The trial court is afforded “substantial discretion in applying the Barker balancing test, and its ultimate judgment is reviewed on appeal o

1997Brown, supra at 804-805 , citing Barker, supra at 532 .

2011On appeal from a pretrial ruling on a defendant’s plea in bar, the *781 issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the four factors set forth in Barker : “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state; (3) the timeliness of the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 512 ( 555 SE2d 710 ) (2001).

2011On appeal from a pretrial ruling on a defendant’s plea in bar, the *781 issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in balancing the four factors set forth in Barker : “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state; (3) the timeliness of the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 512 ( 555 SE2d 710 ) (2001).

2011See also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U. S. 25, 26 (94 SC 188, 38 LE2d 183) (1973) (remanding case to state court that erred in applying the Barker balancing test by ruling that lack of prejudice to the defendant was determinative of his claim and failing to consider all four factors).

2009In evaluating this final factor, we “consider three interests which the speedy trial right is designed to protect: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and, most importantly, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Weldon v. State, 262 Ga. App. 782, 785 (2) (d) ( 586 SE2d 452 ) (2006).

2009In evaluating this final factor, we “consider three interests which the speedy trial right is designed to protect: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing anxiety and concern of the defendant, and, most importantly, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Weldon v. State, 262 Ga. App. 782, 785 (2) (d) ( 586 SE2d 452 ) (2006).

2009“Within the Barker balancing test, the issue of prejudice weighs most heavily in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Simmons, supra, 290 Ga. App. at 316 (4).

2009“Within the Barker balancing test, the issue of prejudice weighs most heavily in determining whether a defendant’s constitutional rights have been violated.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Simmons, supra, 290 Ga. App. at 316 (4).

2008United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U. S. 302, 303 (106 SC 648, 88 LE2d 640) (1986).

1998“Delay alone, however, does not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment, and the other factors in the Barker balancing test must be considered.” Snow v. State, 229 Ga. App. 532, 533 ( 494 SE2d 309 ) (1997).

1998“Delay alone, however, does not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment, and the other factors in the Barker balancing test must be considered.” Snow v. State, 229 Ga. App. 532, 533 ( 494 SE2d 309 ) (1997).