Colorado rule in Colorado

2019Because C.R.C.P. 56(c) is “similar to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, we may look to federal authority for guidance in construing the Colorado rule.”4 Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81 , 86 ——————————————————————— 4 C.R.C.P. 56(c) is identical to the prior version of Fed.

2019Because C.R.C.P. 56(c) is “similar to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, we may look to federal authority for guidance in construing the Colorado rule.”4 Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81 , 86 ——————————————————————— 4 C.R.C.P. 56(c) is identical to the prior version of Fed.

2018CRE 706 is essentially identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 706, and “when the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are essentially identical, case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado rule,” Forbes v. 39 Goldenhersh, 899 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo. App. 1994) (citing Harding Glass, 640 P.2d at 1125 n.3).

2018CRE 706 is essentially identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 706, and “when the Colorado and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are essentially identical, case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado rule,” Forbes v. 39 Goldenhersh, 899 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo. App. 1994) (citing Harding Glass, 640 P.2d at 1125 n.3).

2016In Gagnon , for example, the United States Supreme Court engaged in separate analyses of the constitutional right to be present and the right to be present provided by the federal rule, which is substantially the same as the Colorado rule. 470 U.S. at 527-28 ; see Crumb v. People , 230 P.3d 726 , 731 n.5 (Colo. 2010) (looking to federal law interpreting federal rule of criminal procedure that is similar to Colorado rule).

2016In Gagnon , for example, the United States Supreme Court engaged in separate analyses of the constitutional right to be present and the right to be present provided by the federal rule, which is substantially the same as the Colorado rule. 470 U.S. at 527-28 ; see Crumb v. People , 230 P.3d 726 , 731 n.5 (Colo. 2010) (looking to federal law interpreting federal rule of criminal procedure that is similar to Colorado rule).

2005See State v. Buckley Powder Co., 945 P.2d 841, 844 (Colo.1997) (interpretations of federal rules are persuasive authority as to identical Colorado rule counterparts).

2003See State v. Buckley Powder Co., 945 P.2d 841 (Colo.1997)(interpretations of federal rules are persuasive authority as to the Colorado rule counterparts).

2015Dist. , 271 P.3d 578, 583 (Colo. App. 2011) (citation omitted). ¶16 Although there is no Colorado case law addressing whether a previously omitted counterclaim relates back to the original answer, “[b]ecause the Colorado rule and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) are substantially similar as relevant here, case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in our analysis of C.R.C.P. 15(c).” Kelso v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co ., 262 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Colo. App. 2011).

2015Dist. , 271 P.3d 578, 583 (Colo. App. 2011) (citation omitted). ¶16 Although there is no Colorado case law addressing whether a previously omitted counterclaim relates back to the original answer, “[b]ecause the Colorado rule and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) are substantially similar as relevant here, case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in our analysis of C.R.C.P. 15(c).” Kelso v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co ., 262 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Colo. App. 2011).

2015Dist. , 271 P.3d 578, 583 (Colo. App. 2011) (citation omitted). ¶16 Although there is no Colorado case law addressing whether a previously omitted counterclaim relates back to the original answer, “[b]ecause the Colorado rule and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) are substantially similar as relevant here, case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in our analysis of C.R.C.P. 15(c).” Kelso v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co ., 262 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Colo. App. 2011).

2015Dist. , 271 P.3d 578, 583 (Colo. App. 2011) (citation omitted). ¶16 Although there is no Colorado case law addressing whether a previously omitted counterclaim relates back to the original answer, “[b]ecause the Colorado rule and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(B) are substantially similar as relevant here, case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in our analysis of C.R.C.P. 15(c).” Kelso v. Rickenbaugh Cadillac Co ., 262 P.3d 1001, 1003 (Colo. App. 2011).

2023Evid. 803(8), so we may look to federal case law interpreting the federal rule for guidance on how to assess trustworthiness, see Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 , 287 P.3d 112, 115 (noting that, although we are “not bound to interpret our rules . . . the same way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do look to the federal rules and federal decisions 89 interpreting those rules for guidance”); Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 , 1125 n.3 (Colo. 1982) (“[C]ase law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado r

2023Evid. 803(8), so we may look to federal case law interpreting the federal rule for guidance on how to assess trustworthiness, see Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 , 287 P.3d 112, 115 (noting that, although we are “not bound to interpret our rules . . . the same way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do look to the federal rules and federal decisions 89 interpreting those rules for guidance”); Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 , 1125 n.3 (Colo. 1982) (“[C]ase law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado r

2013See Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735, 741 (Colo. 2005) (when Colorado's rule is modeled after the corresponding federal rule, commentary and case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive).

2007R.Civ.P. 69 "was intended to establish an effective and efficient means of securing the execution of judgments." United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir.1967); see Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735, 741 (Colo.2005) (when Colorado's rule is modeled after the corresponding federal rule, commentary and case law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in interpreting the Colorado rule).

2005Cf. People v. Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599, 601, n. 2 (Colo.1990) (deciding an over-breadth claim on the merits rather than on standing because "the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.").

2005Cf. People v. Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599, 601, n. 2 (Colo.1990) (deciding an over-breadth claim on the merits rather than on standing because "the Colorado doctrine of standing to challenge overbreadth has become more complex than the overbreadth doctrine.").

2023Evid. 803(8), so we may look to federal case law interpreting the federal rule for guidance on how to assess trustworthiness, see Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 , 287 P.3d 112, 115 (noting that, although we are “not bound to interpret our rules . . . the same way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do look to the federal rules and federal decisions 89 interpreting those rules for guidance”); Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 , 1125 n.3 (Colo. 1982) (“[C]ase law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado r

2023Evid. 803(8), so we may look to federal case law interpreting the federal rule for guidance on how to assess trustworthiness, see Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 10 , 287 P.3d 112, 115 (noting that, although we are “not bound to interpret our rules . . . the same way the United States Supreme Court has interpreted its rules, we do look to the federal rules and federal decisions 89 interpreting those rules for guidance”); Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 , 1125 n.3 (Colo. 1982) (“[C]ase law interpreting the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado r

2022First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact, and second, this harm must have been to a legally protected interest.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 25 “We have interpreted the first prong of Colorado’s test for standing to require ‘a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.’” Id. at 856 (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)).

2004We have interpreted the first prong of Colorado’s test for standing to require “a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.” City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo.2000) (internal quotation omitted).

2016See Olson, 687 P.2d at 434-35 ; see also Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (“Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... is silent on the question of standing, state law governs the resolution of this issue.”). ¶ 23 Our supreme court articulated Colorado’s test for standing in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977).

2016See Olson, 687 P.2d at 434-35 ; see also Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (“Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... is silent on the question of standing, state law governs the resolution of this issue.”). ¶ 23 Our supreme court articulated Colorado’s test for standing in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168 , 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977).

2007See, e.g., In re Estate of Krotiuk, 12 P.3d 302, 305 (Colo.App.2000) (absent controlling Colorado authority, we may look to federal precedent for guidance in construing the language of the comparable Colorado rule).

2006See In re Estate of Krotiuk, supra, 12 P.3d at 305 .

2004See AWDI, supra, 874 P.2d at 378 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is virtually identical to Colorado’s rule, so federal precedent will be helpful); Powers v. Prof'l Rodeo Cowboys Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Colo.App.1992) (same).

2004See AWDI, supra, 874 P.2d at 378 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is virtually identical to Colorado's rule, so federal precedent will be helpful); Powers v. Prof'l Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n, 832 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Colo.App.1992) (same).

2004See AWDI, supra, 874 P.2d at 378 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is virtually identical to Colorado’s rule, so federal precedent will be helpful); Powers v. Prof'l Rodeo Cowboys Ass’n, 832 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Colo.App.1992) (same).

2004See AWDI, supra, 874 P.2d at 378 (Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is virtually identical to Colorado's rule, so federal precedent will be helpful); Powers v. Prof'l Rodeo Cowboys Ass'n, 832 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Colo.App.1992) (same).

2002Air Communication & Satellite Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 38 P.3d 1246, 1251 (Colo.2002).

2002Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316, 321 (Colo.2002); Air Communication and Satellite Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 38 P.3d 1246, 1251 (Colo.2002).

2002R.Civ.P. 83(a) provide helpful and highly persuasive guidance in interpreting our virtually identical C.R.C.P. 33(a) 9 See, e.g., King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 601 (Colo.1990) ("Although we are not bound by federal precedent interpreting the Colorado counterpart of Fed.R.Evid. 808(4), the fact that CRE 808(4) is a mirror image of the federal rule prompts us to construe the Colorado rule in light of the text and purpose of the federal rule."); Faris v. Rothenberg, 648 P.2d 1089 , 1091 n. 1 (Colo.1982) ("[Flederal cases and authorities interpreting the [identical] federal rule are highly persuas

2002R.Civ.P. 83(a) provide helpful and highly persuasive guidance in interpreting our virtually identical C.R.C.P. 33(a) 9 See, e.g., King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 601 (Colo.1990) ("Although we are not bound by federal precedent interpreting the Colorado counterpart of Fed.R.Evid. 808(4), the fact that CRE 808(4) is a mirror image of the federal rule prompts us to construe the Colorado rule in light of the text and purpose of the federal rule."); Faris v. Rothenberg, 648 P.2d 1089 , 1091 n. 1 (Colo.1982) ("[Flederal cases and authorities interpreting the [identical] federal rule are highly persuas

2026Co. v. McBride, 107 P.3d 973, 976 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶ 10 “Colorado’s test for standing ‘has traditionally been relatively easy to satisfy.’” Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 17 (quoting Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 856 (Colo. 2004)).

2022First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact, and second, this harm must have been to a legally protected interest.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 25 “We have interpreted the first prong of Colorado’s test for standing to require ‘a concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues that parties argue to the courts.’” Id. at 856 (quoting City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)).

2024Agencies, 3 Colo. Code Regs. 718-1, Rule 0.1 (adopting and incorporating by reference the safety requirements in ANSI B77.1-2017) (current version incorporates up to B77.1-2022). 14 ¶31 The SSA and PTSA, when read together with our case law, “provide a comprehensive Colorado framework which preserves ski lift common law negligence actions, while at the same time limiting skier suits for inherent dangers on the slopes and defining per se negligence for violation of statutory and regulatory requirements.” Bayer, 960 P.2d at 75 . ¶32 In accordance with this long-settled understanding of our statu

2021Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 74-84 (Colo. 1998) (The SSA, PTSA and regulations “provide a comprehensive Colorado framework which preserves ski lift common law negligence actions, while at the same time limiting skier suits for inherent dangers on the slopes, and defining per se negligence for violation of statutory and regulatory requirements.” (emphasis added).2 ¶ 58 Here, in addition to a common law negligence claim, plaintiff’s amended complaint contained a detailed statutory claim, seeking damages for injuries caused by defendant’s violations of explicit provi

2021We then consider, but ultimately reject, petitioners ' contention that, under Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186 , 217 , 82 S.Ct. 691 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 ( 1962 ) , and its Colorado progeny, the question of whether the unintelligible computer sounds complied with the reading requirement is a nonjusticiable political question outside our purview. ¶18 After determining that this dispute is justiciable and properly before us , we draw guidance from established principles of constitutional interpretation and hold that the unintelligible sounds that emanated from the computers did not comply with the reading

2021We then consider, but ultimately reject, petitioners’ contention that, under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), and its Colorado progeny, the question of whether the unintelligible computer sounds complied with the reading requirement is a nonjusticiable political question outside our purview. ¶18 After determining that this dispute is justiciable and properly before us, we draw guidance from established principles of constitutional interpretation and hold that the unintelligible sounds that emanated from the computers did not comply with the reading requirement.

2016This difference suggests to me a preference in the Colorado rules for a more lenient pleading standard than the “plausibility” standard adopted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570 , and expanded in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . ¶45 Second, the Twombly and Iqbal “plausibility” standard is neither set forth in nor required by Fed.

2016This difference suggests to me a preference in the Colorado rules for a more lenient pleading standard than the “plausibility” standard adopted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570 , and expanded in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 . ¶45 Second, the Twombly and Iqbal “plausibility” standard is neither set forth in nor required by Fed.

2015Instead, the federal rule adopted the terminology of "judgment as a matter of law" from the federal summary judgment rule, Rule 56, and in doing so "callled] attention to the relationship between the two rules" and "the common identity of two motions made at different times in the proceeding." Id.

2015Instead, the federal rule adopted the terminology of "judgment as a matter of law" from the federal summary judgment rule, Rule 56, and in doing so "callled] attention to the relationship between the two rules" and "the common identity of two motions made at different times in the proceeding." Id.

2004In McCroskey, Feldman, Cochrane & Brock, P.C. v. Waters, supra, 494 N.W.2d at 828 , the court concluded that such agreements actually benefit clients, as well as attorneys and courts, because they seek to "obviate time-consuming squabbles that formerly arose when [the firm's] entitlement to its fair share of any fee generated by a departing client's file was determined on a quantum mer[u]it basis." It stated that "such arrangements, as long as they are reasonable, should be encouraged." We are persuaded by the reasoning by which courts have upheld attorney separation agreements under rules sim

2004In McCroskey, Feldman, Cochrane & Brock, P.C. v. Waters, supra, 494 N.W.2d at 828 , the court concluded that such agreements actually benefit clients, as well as attorneys and courts, because they seek to "obviate time-consuming squabbles that formerly arose when [the firm's] entitlement to its fair share of any fee generated by a departing client's file was determined on a quantum mer[u]it basis." It stated that "such arrangements, as long as they are reasonable, should be encouraged." We are persuaded by the reasoning by which courts have upheld attorney separation agreements under rules sim

2002R.Civ.P. 83(a) provide helpful and highly persuasive guidance in interpreting our virtually identical C.R.C.P. 33(a) 9 See, e.g., King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 601 (Colo.1990) ("Although we are not bound by federal precedent interpreting the Colorado counterpart of Fed.R.Evid. 808(4), the fact that CRE 808(4) is a mirror image of the federal rule prompts us to construe the Colorado rule in light of the text and purpose of the federal rule."); Faris v. Rothenberg, 648 P.2d 1089 , 1091 n. 1 (Colo.1982) ("[Flederal cases and authorities interpreting the [identical] federal rule are highly persuas

2002R.Civ.P. 83(a) provide helpful and highly persuasive guidance in interpreting our virtually identical C.R.C.P. 33(a) 9 See, e.g., King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 601 (Colo.1990) ("Although we are not bound by federal precedent interpreting the Colorado counterpart of Fed.R.Evid. 808(4), the fact that CRE 808(4) is a mirror image of the federal rule prompts us to construe the Colorado rule in light of the text and purpose of the federal rule."); Faris v. Rothenberg, 648 P.2d 1089 , 1091 n. 1 (Colo.1982) ("[Flederal cases and authorities interpreting the [identical] federal rule are highly persuas